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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation carries out a systematic study of the religious thought of the 
20th century American philosopher John Dewey. Its motivation is that Dewey’s 
religious views have been seriously misunderstood and under appreciated by 
philosophers and Dewey scholars to date. Breaking with the standard 
interpretation of Dewey as a thoroughly scientific and secular thinker, the 
dissertation shows that Dewey’s writings reveal a robust and highly original 
religious naturalism. It further demonstrates that Dewey’s novel understanding 
of the religious dimensions of nature and the experiencing self can capably meet 
the challenges posed to philosophy of religion by the ecological turn presently 
transforming the philosophical landscape. The driving insight of the ecological 
turn in contemporary philosophy is the need to reconstruct our basic 
philosophical concepts and principles in light of the results of the ecological 
sciences, many of which challenge core tenets of modern Western thought.    
 To make the case for Dewey as a serious religious thinker, the dissertation 
places him into critical-constructive dialogue with other theorists representing a 
 vii 
wide range of philosophical and scientific perspectives, including those of 
pragmatism, naturalism, ecological and Gestalt psychology, deep ecology, and 
recent cognitive science. Dewey’s religious views are also analyzed in relation to 
the self-cultivation doctrines of Daoism and Zen Buddhism, highlighting rich 
connections between Dewey and Eastern thought; all of these thinkers and 
schools of thought share Dewey’s overriding concern to restore continuity 
between facts and values, between knowledge and action, between nature and the 
full range of human experience. The dissertation shows that by recovering 
Dewey’s religious naturalism, full of ecological insight and relevance, a new 
paradigm for philosophy of religion can be discerned, one that promises to bring 
philosophy of religion’s core problems and methods in line with the most up-to-
date scientific developments. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to establish and explore John Dewey’s (1859-1952) 
contributions to the field of philosophy of religion, especially where Dewey’s 
ideas about religion, nature, and the experiencing self speak to the “ecological 
turn”1 already embraced by most areas of philosophy—philosophy of religion 
being a very notable exception. Aside from his brief 1934 work, A Common Faith, 
however, much of what Dewey had to say on religion remains implicit and only 
vaguely articulated throughout his vast corpus. Needless to say, it has proved 
difficult for philosophers to arrive at a clear understanding of Dewey's religious 
views. Yet this should not stop serious philosophers from trying, for, as the 
dissertation argues, it is precisely an infusion of Deweyan ideas, of “ecological 
thinking,”2 that philosophy of religion requires if it is to remain relevant to 21st 
century realities and needs.  
 Breaking with the standard interpretation of Dewey's religious thought as 
essentially a form of scientific or secular humanism, the dissertation shows that a 
                                                        
1 The phrase “ecological turn” has turned up recently in the context of several disciplines, as a 
simple literature search demonstrates. In most formulations, it reflects an increased awareness of 
the ecological impact of human ideas and practices, coupled with a concern for rethinking those 
ideas and practices, as well as the very notion of the “human.” It thus has both a descriptive and a 
normative component to it.  
2 I adopt this term from feminist philosopher Lorraine Code, whose work is engaged in greater 
detail in Chapter 1. See Lorraine Code, Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms “ecological 
turn” and “ecological thinking” interchangeably. It should be noted that by ecological thinking, I 
do not mean to focus narrowly on human mentality; rather, the phrase is intended to signal the 
importance of conceptually reworking various academic disciplines in light of the results of the 
ecological sciences, many of which conflict with basic tenets of modern Western thought.      
 ix 
careful reading of Dewey’s work reveals a robust religious naturalism,3 one well 
poised to meet the multiple challenges posed to philosophy of religion by the turn 
to ecological thinking. In my view, Dewey's radically ecological understanding of 
the religious dimensions of nature and the experiencing self is of pressing 
relevance to anyone who has searched honestly for an empirically responsible 
appreciation of religion in the wake of Darwin. 
 Given the difficulty of Dewey’s prose—one commentator colorfully 
described the act of reading Dewey as akin to moving through “cold molasses”4—
my discussion will not be limited to an explication of Dewey’s ideas as he 
presented them. Instead, in what follows, I put forward a constructive 
interpretation, or what contemporary philosopher Robert Corrington calls an 
“emancipatory reenactment,” of Dewey’s religious thought that moves beyond its 
formal and historical limitations.5 To do this, I place Dewey into dialogue with 
various other theorists and schools of thought, including fellow pragmatists 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, George Herbert Mead, and C. I. Lewis, as 
well as pragmatism-inspired naturalist philosophers Justus Buchler and Risieri 
Frondizi, in addition to Gestalt psychology, James Gibson’s ecological 
                                                        
3 As a variety of naturalism, religious naturalism’s beliefs and attitudes are focused exclusively on 
this world, that is, on nature. As Jerome Stone notes, it outright rejects any “ontologically distinct 
or superior realm (such as God, soul, or heaven), to ground, explain, or give meaning to this 
world.” See his Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2008), 1. Religious naturalists are an eclectic group that 
counts the Stoics, Spinoza, Mordecai Kaplan, and Dewey among its forebears. Basic concepts and 
themes of religious naturalism are introduced throughout the dissertation, and discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 5.    
4 John Dos Passos, Century’s Ebb: The Thirteenth Chronicle (Boston: Gambit, 1975), 120. 
5 Robert S. Corrington, The Community of Interpreters: On the Hermeneutics of Nature and the 
Bible in the American Philosophical Tradition (Macon, GA: Mercer, 1987), xvii.    
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psychology, and Arne Næss’s deep ecology.6 Dewey’s religious naturalism is also 
analyzed in relation to Eastern thought, specifically the self-cultivation doctrines 
of Daoism and Zen Buddhism as articulated in the ancient Chinese eponymous 
text the Zhuangzi and the thought of 13th century Japanese monk Dōgen. 
Despite being historically and culturally removed from Dewey to varying degrees, 
all of these thinkers and schools of thought share Dewey’s principal intellectual 
concern to restore continuity between facts and values, between knowledge and 
action, between nature and the full range of human experience. 
 The overcoming of dualisms is also a core tenet of the sciences of ecology, 
which point to the fundamental relations and reciprocity between the earth’s 
various elements and functions, including those that make up human life.7 In the 
aftermath of several environmental and sociopolitical catastrophes of the 20th 
and now 21st centuries, various strains of ecological thinking have arisen to 
challenge the destructive beliefs and practices of Western modernism, with its 
tendency, going back to at least Descartes if not Plato, to privilege the mind over 
the body while cloistering both from the larger world of nature. The fracture 
                                                        
6 Originating with the work of Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, David Barnhill and Roger 
Gottlieb define deep ecology as “the ethical and religious attitude of valuing nature for its own 
sake and seeing it as divine or spiritually vital.” See their “Introduction” in Deep Ecology and 
World Religions: New Essays on Sacred Ground, eds. David Landis Barnhill and Roger S. 
Gottlieb (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 1. Deep ecologists are only 
beginning to engage Dewey in specific detail, though they have long claimed him as an intellectual 
and spiritual forefather. 
7 A tension may be noticed here between the notions of “dualism” and “reciprocity”—namely, that 
reciprocity implies a dualism of sorts, and dualism implies a relationship, even if a fragmented 
one, between distinct elements. The elimination of dualisms by Dewey and ecology recognizes 
that reality as perceived is dialectically structured; dualisms have a rightful place in reflective 
thought and abstract theorizing. What each denies is the total ontological separation of nature’s 
complex elements, which exist in constant transaction and communication with one another.     
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between a meaningless material world and a meaningful mental realm has been 
utterly disastrous in its outward effects; it also happens to be plain wrong from 
the perspective of present-day science. Any intellectually respectable area of 
human inquiry must take this simple but important fact into account.  
 Philosophy is no exception, despite transcendentalist arguments to the 
contrary. Already well-established in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, 
ritual studies, and even economics, ecological thinking is currently penetrating 
philosophy through the dramatic rise of enactivism8 and DEEDS (dynamical, 
embodied, extended, distributed, and situated) cognitive science.9 Together these 
frameworks force a radical reappraisal of the binary (mind-body, reason-
emotion, subject-object, self-other, divine-human, etc.) approaches that have 
governed conceptual and applied work in epistemology, ontology, ethics, and 
value theory for roughly the past 400 years.  
 A direct successor of the naturalist psychologies of William James and 
John Dewey, DEEDS views perception and cognition in terms of action in the 
environment. It posits that human cognition should be understood in terms of 
agent-environment relations rather than in terms of mental representation and 
symbolic computation. Like DEEDS, enactivism is an umbrella-term covering a 
                                                        
8 The definitive, now classic statement of the enactivist program is Francisco J. Varela, Evan 
Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). For a more recent overview, see Daniel D. Hutto and Erik 
Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2012).   
9 This is Leslie Marsh’s apt acronym for the cluster of anti-Cartesian, non-representational 
positions currently enjoying wide endorsement in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. See 
Leslie Marsh, “Dewey: the First Ghost-Buster?,” review of Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist 
Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, by W. Teed Rockwell, Trends in Cognitive 
Science 10, no. 6 (2006): 242-243.        
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wide range of positions, yet each of which agrees that everything humans do and 
experience emerges from meaningful, dynamically unfolding transactions with 
the environment. As vital organisms, we bring forth, or “enact,” the world we live 
in; our embodied action in the world constitutes our perception and forms the 
basis of our cognition. The ecological framework shared by enactivism and 
DEEDS, much of it prefigured in Dewey’s writings (a detail lost on the majority of 
both camps’ proponents), shows great empirical promise for resolving 
(dissolving) problems that have plagued philosophy for much of its history, 
including epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, reductionism, 
consciousness, free will, and the perpetual bane of Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy: the mind-body problem. Gone are the days when philosophers 
simply can turn to the authority of a past thinker or text in defense of ideas that 
contradict what the best available science and shared experience tells us!  
 In all seriousness, at the time this dissertation is being written, a growing 
number of philosophers are acknowledging the crucial significance of embodied, 
environment-involving engagements for understanding all facets of human 
mentality and action. On the whole, however, philosophers of religion have yet to 
rethink their basic concepts and doctrines in light of the results of the ecological 
sciences. In fact, widely influential, ecologically informed concepts and principles 
developed over the last twenty years in philosophy of mind and the cognitive 
sciences (e.g., affordance, embodied cognition, field, gestalt, sensorimotor 
knowledge, etc.) are conspicuously absent from the philosophy of religion 
 xiii 
literature, aside from a noticeable increase in concern for the welfare of animals 
and the environment.10  
 What exactly would a philosophy of religion that views religion as a 
natural, emergent artifact of the instrumental attempt to diagnose and resolve 
the problematic situations in which humans, as complex living organisms, 
inextricably find themselves look like? It is my belief that by recovering John 
Dewey’s religious thought and seeing it through fresh eyes, we can uncover 
answers to this important question while ushering in a new ecological paradigm 
for philosophy of religion. So far, for reasons to be addressed, philosophers of 
religion have largely resisted the pull of ecological thinking. Yet new theoretical 
questions are posed to their discipline with each scientific advance and, as is the 
case for any field of inquiry that aims for sustained cultural relevance, such 
advances are ignored only at great peril.       
 In addition to its potential for serving as an ecological framework for 
philosophy of religion, now is an especially ripe time to revisit John Dewey’s 
religious thought. Several recent works have argued persuasively for richer 
interpretations of Dewey’s early idealist psychology and logical theory, which 
most philosophers and Dewey scholars consider as being eclipsed by his later 
evolutionary naturalism.11 These works provide a powerful defense of a 
                                                        
10 On this issue, see, most recently, John Grim and Mary Evelyn Tucker, Ecology and Religion 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2014).      
11 See, for example, Donald J. Morse, Faith in Life: John Dewey’s Early Philosophy (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2011); James Scott Johnston, John Dewey’s Earlier Logical Theory 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014); and Hugh P. McDonald, John Dewey 
and Environmental Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
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“coherentist” reading of Dewey’s philosophy that views the early and later Dewey 
as mutually connected and reinforcing. Without a doubt, one of the principle 
reasons Dewey’s religious views remain little understood is due to the lack of a 
full appreciation of his early psychology and logic, which echo deeply throughout 
his mature naturalism and form the conceptual backdrop for his views on 
religion, as well as other modes of experience involving engagement with ideals, 
such as art and morality.  
 For Dewey, the universal presence and persistence of religion throughout 
history and across cultures speaks to something about the way the world and 
human selves really are, deep down. It is philosophy’s job, working alongside 
cutting-edge science, to help us understand and cultivate our natural religious 
instincts, not to debunk them or explain them away. It can only be hoped that 
Dewey would judge the present work a positive contribution in what is a vital and 
perpetually ongoing process of religious reconstruction.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
John Dewey as a Serious Religious Thinker 
 
 
Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding 
the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive 
it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared 
than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall 
not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the 
common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant. 
                                    -John Dewey1  
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
  
It is a cruel feature of history that its most creative and contributing minds 
achieve celebrity typically only posthumously. Yet this was not the case for John 
Dewey who during his lifetime was widely hailed as “America’s philosopher,” an 
appraisal echoed by The New York Times in a glowing obituary upon Dewey’s 
death in 1952 at an advanced age.2 Dewey's exception might lie in the tragic fact 
that many great personalities do not live long enough to gain a real-time audience 
or following. In Dewey’s case, however, it is more likely due to the wide reach and 
even-temperedness of his views, which are strikingly absent of the myopia and 
vitriol that often colored those of his peers, such as British philosopher Bertrand 
Russell despite all his brilliance. 
  In an era of increasing academic specialization, including within 
philosophy, Dewey’s intellectual sights remained set on an impressive range of 
                                                        
1 CF (1934), LW 9: 57-58.  
2 “Dr. John Dewey Dead at 92; Philosopher a Noted Liberal,” New York Times, June 2, 1952.  
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issues. This is not surprising given Dewey's identification with the philosophical 
movement known as “classical pragmatism.”3 Pragmatism is an intrinsically 
holistic perspective that aims to heal philosophy's fragmentation by pointing to 
the intimate connections, revealed to us in the course of experience, between 
knowledge (epistemology) and action (ethics), between reality (ontology) and 
perception (phenomenology), between facts (science) and values (axiology), 
between humanity (anthropology) and the divine (religion). Taking the continuity 
of nature and experience as demonstrated through the outcome of goal-directed 
action as its point of departure, pragmatism stresses a tight-fitting relationship 
between theory and human practice. To the pragmatist, we are not passive 
spectators, ghosts occupying flesh-and-bone machines; we are information-
seeking organisms vested with powers to create our own opportunities.  
 The term pragmatism derives from the Greek pragmata (singular: 
pragma), meaning, “acts,” “deeds,” or “affairs”—basically everything with which 
one is occupied or toward which one shows concern. Pragmatism rejects the idea, 
held by philosophers since the time of the ancient Greeks, that the primary 
function of thinking is to represent or mirror reality, a view reflected in all 
correspondence theories of truth. Pragmatists argue instead that thinking is 
better understood as an embodied function of the self’s situated activity in the 
                                                        
3 “Classical pragmatism” refers to the original formulations of pragmatist philosophy by its 
founders, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. George Herbert Mead and C. 
I. Lewis also share the label, which is now mainly used to distinguish the five theorists from the 
“Neopragmatists” who come later in the 20th century and take pragmatism in novel, mainly 
linguistic directions, such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.   
 
 3 
world, as is lived experiencing in all of its noncognitive richness and variety. 
Lived experiencing—meaning experience viewed as an active process and not a 
reified, finished product—admits no impassable dualisms, guaranteed 
foundations, a priori principles, or transcendent standpoints. Of all the 
pragmatists, it was Dewey who worked hardest to break down the divisions and 
dualisms that blocked progressive philosophical inquiry in his day. Sadly, many 
of the same divisions and dualisms continue to plague philosophy in its dominant 
contemporary expressions.     
 John Dewey was born on October 20, 1859, the same year that Darwin’s 
Origin of Species was published. While a student at the University of Vermont 
and later at Johns Hopkins, from where he took his doctorate, Dewey was 
exposed to Darwin’s theories of biological evolution and natural selection, in 
addition to cutting-edge work in experimental physiology and psychology. As Jay 
Martin points out in his penetrating biography, The Education of John Dewey, 
we also know that during his first year at college Dewey read with interest the 
work of Herbert Spencer, a colleague of Darwin’s who applied evolutionary 
principles to the study of the mind and human social relations.4  
 Evolutionary naturalism and scientific method thus would become the 
bedrock of Dewey’s philosophy, and early on encouraged his total rejection of the 
intellectual and experiential dualisms inherent to his strict religious upbringing. 
Dewey’s mother, Lucina Rich Dewey, was a devout Calvinist known for asking her 
                                                        
4 Jay Martin, The Education of John Dewey: A Biography (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003), 40. 
 4 
children each day whether they were “right with Jesus.” Her stern piety left a 
deep impression on Dewey’s religiosity, at the same time causing him great inner 
conflict and ambivalence, as many of his early writings illustrate. A poet in 
addition to a philosopher, Dewey gave personal and literary expression to this 
inner conflict in a poem fittingly titled “Unfaith.”   
 With you who do not now believe 
 The things you learned in childhood days, 
 And yet repining grieve 
 That truth should follow changing ways: 
 Who mourn the loss of spirit’s lore 
 That formed the past’s deep cherished store— 
 Grieving not for yourselves who endowed 
 With the mind’s ideal have left the crowd, 
 But for those who lack from such control 
 Still need guidance by faith’s inspirèd scroll, 
 Anciently writ by those who walked with God 
 (When as yet the unusèd paths he trod) 
 With you I shall not argue—‘tis not meet. 
 
 Yet not from laughter’s iron scorn 
 But that you, unknowing, still live forlorn. 
 For if the things you claim to greet 
 Were known by you from light of inner soul 
 —Light flaming from your own life’s self-mined coal— 
 You would also know that others too with feet 
 Unbound, springing like flowers from unfrozen sod, 
 Would make their own way to their soul’s own God.5 
 
 One also can see in this poem hints of the process of religious 
reconstruction that religious conflict invariably necessitates. Despite remaining 
an active member of the Congregational Church well into his thirties, Dewey 
broke all ties with organized religion when he moved from the University of 
Michigan, his first academic post, to head up the newly created Department of 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Education at the University of Chicago in 1904. It 
                                                        
5 John Dewey, The Poems of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1977), 66. 
 5 
was at Chicago that Dewey founded the famous Laboratory School, which would 
go on to become a bastion of experimental pedagogy in a country where 
provincial education remained the norm. 
 In place of the static, unchanging absolutes of traditional religion,6 which 
Dewey found reproduced in the great systems of Western philosophy, Dewey 
chose to focus on the interaction between organism and environment as 
fundamental to determining all questions of being, meaning, and value. Like the 
proto-mentality of lower organisms, Dewey saw the human mind as an evolved 
system that facilitates reaction and adjustment to our organic and cultural 
environment. The invariant structures of our organic-cultural environment affect 
our psychological constitution in turn. In Dewey’s judgment, this basic ecological 
insight meant that we are ultimately responsible to others, including our future 
selves, for our actions in the world. It also meant that with every action lies an 
opportunity to change the world for the better, to make it more perfect, more 
ideal. With Dewey, one finds a more optimistic view of human nature than is 
typically associated with Darwinian thinkers.    
 Dewey viewed the scientific method of inquiry as eminently desirable for 
two reasons. First, experimentation better reflects how intelligence operates in 
biological-social organisms situated in constantly evolving environments partly of 
their own making. Second, it deftly sidesteps the difficulties generated by the 
commitment to a foundationalist logic rooted in what is essentially a prescientific 
                                                        
6 By “traditional religion” I mean the Western, Judeo-Christian religious traditions influential in 
the academy during Dewey’s day (and still today in many ways) to which his religious naturalism 
was a direct response.    
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view of the world.7 In Dewey’s estimation, an abstract “logic of belief” that fails to 
take into account the contours of the existential situations that beliefs arise and 
function in is an unreliable one on which to stake our security and future. 
Dewey’s faith in an experimental “logic of inquiry” accounts for his lifelong 
promotion of democracy and progressive educational reform; it also helps us to 
understand his rethinking of religion in dynamic terms of the organism-
environment relationship. Under Dewey’s revised view, the meaningfully 
pregnant ideals that feeling and the imagination in their religious capacity point 
to are not to be taken as transcendentally given truths (objects, beings, etc.). They 
are more accurately viewed as action opportunities (events) resident in nature 
and enacted by adequately skilled selves in problematic situations where they 
fulfill a deep existential need or lack.  
 Dewey’s religious views have been met with stiff criticism from the time of 
their introduction up until the present. More often than not, they are altogether 
ignored in analyses of Dewey’s thought. As Finnish philosopher Sami Pihlström 
correctly observes, “In most commentaries, Dewey’s pragmatism, including his 
moral, social, and educational thought, is barely, if at all, connected with his 
views on religion.”8 The standard interpretation of Dewey’s religious thought 
among philosophers and Dewey scholars is that it is essentially a scientific, 
secular humanist critique of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition with little to 
                                                        
7 For more on this point, see the “Editor’s Introduction” to Dewey’s Logical Theory: New Studies 
and Interpretations, eds. F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester, and Robert B. Talisse (Nashville, 
TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), xi.  
8 Sami Pihlstrōm, “Dewey and Pragmatic Religious Naturalism,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Dewey, ed. Molly Cochran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 211.  
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no substance of its own. This was the heart of the various attacks on Dewey soon 
after A Common Faith, his sole work devoted to religion, was published in 1934.9 
More recently, Scott Aikin and Michael Hodges express this view when they state 
that “the approach Dewey takes leaves religious experience without determinate 
content” and hence provides “too thin a reed on which to hang religious lives.”10 
Aikin and Hodges would do well to remember, however, that no philosopher has 
a monopoly on the meanings of terms, including religion, otherwise philosophy 
scarcely would have progressed beyond the deductive methods of the ancient 
Greeks. It also is not clear whether all forms of experience necessarily have 
“determinate content” as Aikin and Hodges presume; this question is currently 
the subject of intense debate among philosophers of mind and perceptual 
psychologists, and the verdict is very much still out.11     
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 
 These comments bring us to the purpose of this dissertation, which is 
twofold. First, against the standard interpretation of Dewey’s religious thought as 
a form of a scientific or secular humanism, I argue that Dewey’s philosophy 
contains a robust religious naturalism. Second, I claim that Dewey’s novel 
                                                        
9 Steven C. Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 514-527.   
10 Scott F. Aikin and Michael P. Hodges, “Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the Possibility of Religion,” 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2006): 2.  
11 For a comprehensive overview of this debate, see the various articles contained in The Contents 
of Experience, ed. Tim Crane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). More will be said 
on the purported contents of religious experience, and experience more generally, in Chapter 4.  
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understanding of the religious dimensions of nature and the experiencing self can 
meet the challenges posed to philosophy of religion by the ecological turn already 
embraced by most other areas of philosophy. As the argument below will make 
clear, an infusion of Deweyan ideas, of ecological thinking,12 is precisely what 
philosophy of religion needs to remain relevant in an age beset by scientific 
breakthroughs and global religious challenges. To the religiously sensitive, 
scientifically informed student of the discipline, it becomes quickly apparent that 
traditional approaches in philosophy of religion are ill-equipped to shoulder the 
full weight of these issues. Backing up this assertion will require us to examine 
several distinct matters, including: (1) the meanings of philosophy and religion 
for Dewey, (2) the challenge and promise of ecological thinking, (3) the current 
crisis in philosophy of religion, and (4) the resources available for fleshing out 
Dewey’s religious naturalism in a clearer fashion than he was either willing or 
able to.  
 Of the four tasks just outlined, the first and second make up the content of 
the present chapter, while the third and fourth form the focus of Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 presents Dewey’s ecological reconstruction of nature, experience, and 
the self, with a focus on the organic-cultural origins of meaning and value, 
including their ideal religious forms. Chapter 4 draws on recent work in 
perceptual psychology and DEEDS cognitive science to sketch a Deweyan 
approach to religious experience and explains how it steers clear of theoretical 
                                                        
12 See the Preface for definitions of the “ecological turn” and “ecological thinking” informing this 
study. 
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difficulties inherent to the establishment model of perception, which is only 
poorly applied to qualitative modes of perceiving like the aesthetic, the moral, 
and the religious.13 Finally, in Chapter 5, Dewey’s religious naturalism is further 
analyzed in connection to the self-cultivation doctrines of deep ecology, Daoism, 
and Zen Buddhism. The full reach and promise of ecological thinking for 
philosophy of religion is already strongly hinted at by Dewey’s pithy remark made 
in the opening section of A Common Faith: “The essentially unreligious attitude 
is that which attributes human achievement and purpose to man in isolation 
from the world of physical nature and his fellows.”14 
 Regrettably, Dewey never provided a definitive statement of what he 
believed the “essentially religious attitude” to be. Yet a close reading of his 
philosophy shows that he saw it as a form of skillful action whereby an agent 
tends to improve its situation by selectively responding to and transforming 
aspects of its environment—and itself along with it. Extrapolating this outlook 
from vague remarks like, “whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious,” 
and “any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal…is religious in quality,”15 will 
require a comprehensive examination of the ecological framework undergirding 
                                                        
13 The real “problem” of religious experience, and experience conceived of more generally, regards 
the content and character of perceptual experiences. To clarify: what is at issue is not so much 
that religious experiences happen or occur—ample neuroscientific and psychological evidence 
shows they do—but how religious perceptual experiences relate to the external, objective world 
and if they provide one with any reliable knowledge. The relationship between perception, 
experience, and knowledge is a complicated one for not all theorists and disciplines mean the 
same thing with their use of these terms and they are often used interchangeably.  
14 CF (1934), LW 9: 18. 
15 Ibid., 17.  
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Dewey’s philosophy.16 Before we begin this examination, however, it will help us 
to review Dewey’s stance on the proper scope and role of philosophy itself. We 
then move on in the next section to an analysis of Dewey’s main work on religion, 
A Common Faith. This is followed by a discussion of the standard interpretation 
of this work, as it provides the critical axis around which the richer interpretation 
of Dewey’s religious thought unpacked over the next four chapters revolves.  
 
 
1.2 The Meaning of Philosophy for Dewey 
 
 
Disagreement over philosophy’s aim, scope, and methods has existed since its 
very beginnings. It also has not been clear at all times throughout history what 
distinguishes philosophy from science or religion, a fact that is especially true of 
Eastern cultures (a theme we will return to in Chapter 5).17 This uncertainty has 
reached a fevered pitch in the present post/late-modern context, where one finds 
as many works published annually in metaphilosophy, or the “philosophy of 
philosophy” as it is sometimes called, as one does in philosophy’s three main 
branches of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. 
                                                        
16 I am not the first to describe Dewey’s philosophy in ecological terms. Thomas Alexander has 
argued for the relevance of Dewey to the creation of what he calls an “eco-ontology” that can serve 
as a powerful corrective to the Western tradition of privileging being over nature. See Thomas 
Alexander, “The Being of Nature: Dewey, Buchler, and the Prospect for an Eco-Ontology,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46, no. 4 (2010): 544-569. More recently, in an 
article exploring the connections between Dewey’s naturalism and his educational theory, Deron 
Boyles argues for the importance of ecology for understanding basic tenets of both. See Deron 
Boyles, “Dewey, Ecology, and Education: Historical and Contemporary Debates Over Dewey’s 
Naturalism And (Transactional) Realism,” Educational Theory 62, no. 2 (2012), 143-161.  
17 On this point in its Japanese context, see Gerard Clinton Godart, “’Philosophy’ or ‘Religion’? 
The Confrontation with Foreign Categories in Late Nineteenth Century Japan,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 69, no. 1 (2008): 71-91. Though restricted to Japan, Godart’s analysis provides 
important cross-cultural insight on how human activities come to be classified.   
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 The various intellectual, professional, and social challenges impacting a 
culture at any moment accordingly have led to a wide range of conceptions of 
philosophy being offered across countries and over time. Moreover, philosophical 
definitions are never innocent; as is true of all scholarly interpretations, 
philosophical definitions mirror as well as help to shape the reigning social, 
political, and economic order. Not every conception of philosophy can be 
considered in a study of limited focus. When such is the case, as it is here, it is in 
the author’s best interests, in addition to those of the reader, to draw on the 
efforts of a respected past account. Pierre Hadot’s work on the history of 
philosophy supplies a twofold typology sufficient for our purposes.  
 After close comparative study of the differences between ancient and 
contemporary philosophers, Hadot suggested a sharp line of distinction be made 
between philosophy as “a way of life” and philosophy as “a form of written 
discourse.”18 Basically, Hadot found that for the ancient Greeks philosophy was 
primarily considered a style or method of living; only secondarily was philosophy 
regarded as a formal discussion of abstract concepts and theories. That this 
accurately depicts how followers of the Cynic and Peripatetic schools viewed 
philosophy is beyond question. Yet Hadot persuasively argued that even the 
grandly metaphysical speculations of ancient philosophy, including the Platonic 
realm of Pure Forms, Epicurean atoms, and the fiery Stoic pneuma, were but 
                                                        
18 These two conceptions of philosophy are explored most fully in Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a 
Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1995), and Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).  
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ancillary extensions of skillful spiritual exercises meant to increase human 
happiness and well-being here, in this world. In stark contrast to the ancients, 
Hadot viewed philosophers today as spiritually sick and alienated from their 
craft. And, to a certain degree, Hadot is correct. Philosophy largely has become a 
specialized form of written discourse—mainly that of linguistic-logical analysis—
made known to only a small cadre of initiates. 
 The specific details behind philosophy’s about-face need not concern us 
here, but as Hadot cogently presents them are closely tied to the flourishing of 
early European Christianity and philosophy’s demotion from its lofty position as 
“the queen of the sciences” to the subordinate status of theology’s “handmaiden” 
during the Middle Ages.19 The challenge issued by Hadot to contemporary 
philosophers is to recover the picture of philosophy as it was before its takeover 
by the medieval Scholastics, a picture that has faded and become almost lost to 
view as the analytic and Continental styles that dominate academic philosophy 
continue to hand over to other disciplines the responsibility of tackling the “Big 
Questions” that once defined philosophy’s point and significance, such as: What 
is the meaning of life?, How can we be happy?, Is beauty relative or absolute?, 
What is the self?, What is most real?, and so on.  
 
 
Philosophy as Problem-solving 
 
 This was John Dewey’s challenge, posed over a half-century before Hadot, 
                                                        
19 For more details, see Hadot, Ancient Philosophy, 237-281.  
 13 
when he defined philosophy as “cultural criticism” as part of a career-long 
attempt to direct philosophy away from the perennially esoteric “problems of 
philosophers” and toward the more immediate, more pressing “problems of 
men.”20 Criticism involves informed and reasoned judgment about experienced 
goods and values, while culture, from a broadly philosophical perspective, 
consists of common, collective ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Philosophy 
as cultural criticism, then, is an active, vitally significant enterprise aimed at “the 
ideal,” at life as it can and should be, with the understanding that our images of 
what the good is are bound to shift as our knowledge grows and develops—as it 
unfailingly does when coming into contact with a foreign culture or religion for 
the first time. In Dewey’s estimation, it is precisely this “inextricable mixture of 
stability and uncertainty” in the world that gave rise to philosophy.21 
  Dewey’s use of the term criticism to describe philosophy is open to 
frequent misinterpretation. For one thing, it has led to an incorrect association of 
his position with the relativistic social constructionism of postmodern critical 
theory.22 Though Dewey was careful to point out the importance of perspective 
and context to all considerations of meaning, truth, and value, he was no 
relativist. What Dewey meant by linking philosophy with criticism is that 
                                                        
20 As Dewey says in Essays in Experimental Logic: “Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to 
be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by 
philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.” EEL (1916), MW 10: 46.   
21 EN (1925), LW 1: 46. 
22 In engaging this precise issue, Larry Hickman convincingly argues that Deweyan pragmatism 
should actually be viewed as a form of what he calls “post-postmodernism.” See Larry A. 
Hickman, Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey (Bronx, NY: 
Fordham University Press, 2007).  
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philosophy is best viewed as a form of practical problem-solving rather than as a 
form of disconnected theoretical reasoning, which is how it is commonly 
depicted.23 Philosophical inquiry is in this way similar to scientific practice, 
which actually had its beginnings as “natural philosophy” before breaking off 
from philosophy during the Scientific Revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries.24  
 Science and philosophy both make use of problem-solving, but there are 
stark differences between them. Philosophy’s problem-solving is a second-order 
valuational activity, the purpose of which is not simply to better understand and 
explain our first-order beliefs and practices, like science, but to make them 
richer, sharper, and more enjoyable. Philosophy’s value as cultural criticism lies 
precisely in the opening up of possibilities for novel and deeper experiences of 
meaning and value. Dewey makes this position clear in what is considered by 
many his philosophical masterpiece, Experience and Nature, published in 1925. 
In the section “Existence, Value and Criticism” Dewey says: 
 [P]hilosophy...can be nothing but this critical operation and function become aware of 
 itself and its implications, pursued deliberately and systematically. It starts from actual 
 situations of belief, conduct and appreciative perception which are characterized by 
 immediate qualities of good and bad, and from the modes of critical judgment current at 
 any given time in all the regions of value; these are its data, its subject-matter. These 
 values, criticisms, and critical methods, it subjects to further criticism as comprehensive 
 and consistent as possible. The function is to regulate further the further appreciation of 
 goods and bads; to give greater freedom and security in those acts of direct selection, 
 appropriation, identification and of rejection, elimination, destruction which enstate and 
 which exclude objects of belief, conduct and contemplation.25 
  
                                                        
23 This view comes through in many of Dewey’s later works, but most clearly in Experience and 
Nature: “All criticism worthy of the title is but another name for that revealing discovery of 
conditions and consequences which enables liking, bias, interest to express themselves in 
responsible and informed ways instead of ignorantly and fatalistically.” EN (1925), LW 1: 321. 
24 John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science (Basingstoke, United 
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 5-7. 
25 EN (1925), LW 1: 302. 
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 Dewey reaffirms his position on the instrumental function of philosophy 
twenty years later in a lost manuscript (recently recovered in the Dewey archives 
at Southern Illinois University) for a comprehensive sociocultural history of 
Western philosophy. In that work, titled Unmodern Philosophy and Modern 
Philosophy, Dewey asserts that while scientists and philosophers each are geared 
toward methodical efficiency, philosophers should further concern themselves 
with how chosen methods “impinge upon collective mental disposition” and what 
“they import in the way of reconstruction of habits of belief in religious, moral 
and political affairs.”26 Only through disciplined philosophical criticism can we 
expect our beliefs and behaviors to improve.      
 Viewing philosophy as a way of life or as a form of problem-solving heralds 
a wider view of philosophy that understands it as more than a European cultural 
product and connects it to a global human practice. It is a practice continuous 
with scientific inquiry, but not reducible to it. Where philosophical inquiry 
specifically diverges from its scientific counterpart is that it makes no pretense to 
“value-free” neutrality or Archimedean, “God’s-eye view” objectivity. Of course, 
this is not to imply that science deals only with the “cold hard facts,” even if it is 
often portrayed that way in the public arena where the authoritative image of the 
white (a color connoting purity and perfection across most cultures) lab coat-clad 
scientist looms large. Scientific practice is regularly set and regulated by a fixed 
set of values, including those of reliability, accuracy, testability, precision, 
                                                        
26 John Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, ed. Philip Deen (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), 16. Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy has 
yet to be incorporated in The Collected Works.  
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generality, and conceptual parsimony.27 Furthermore, scientists, on the whole, 
strongly tend to disvalue error, fraud, bias, and “pseudoscientific” theorizing.  
 What both forms of inquiry, the scientific and the philosophical, share in 
common is a commitment to scientific method, which has never been the domain 
of science alone. Scientific method refers to the controlled use of human reason 
and sense experience, along with hypothetical experimentation—sometimes but 
not always aided by advanced technological instruments—to arrive at a 
“generalized” (i.e., valid for all or most cases) and “naturalistic” (i.e., ontologically 
and observationally viable) account of phenomena. There simply is no room for 
culturally particularist postures or supernaturalistic principles in genuine science 
or genuine philosophy. Rather, the methodological principles that ideally guide 
science and philosophy are those that are profitably termed empirical 
responsibility, meaning consistency with objective scientific discoveries about 
nature and the mind, and phenomenological fidelity, meaning faithfulness to the 
qualitative structures of lived experiencing. Dewey’s philosophy can be viewed as 
an ambitious attempt to satisfy both of these criteria, a fact that partly accounts 
for the mixture of competing interpretations his work opens itself up to.  
Let us sum up before moving on. For Dewey, both science and philosophy 
make use of scientific method to tell us what a particular phenomenon is, where 
it comes from, and how it functions in experience. Besides providing us with the 
analytical tools needed for obtaining accurate knowledge (scientia), however, 
                                                        
27 For an excellent overview of the role of values in science, see Larry Laudan, Science and 
Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1984).  
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philosophy, in its literal meaning as “the love of wisdom” (philo-sophia), 
additionally seeks to uncover meaningful ideals by which we can reliably ground 
and rank judgments of value. Dewey makes this point in the 1919 essay 
“Philosophy and Democracy” in the following manner: 
[T]his explains what is meant by saying that love of wisdom is not after all the same 
 thing as eagerness for scientific knowledge. By wisdom we mean not systematic or 
 proved knowledge of fact and truth, but a conviction about moral values, a sense for the 
 better kind of life to be led. Wisdom is a moral term, and like every moral term refers not 
 to the constitution of things already in existence, not even if that constitution be 
 magnified into eternity and absoluteness. As a moral term it refers to a choice about 
 something to be done, a preference for living this sort of life rather than that. It refers not 
 to accomplished reality but to a desired future which our desires, when translated into 
 articulate conviction, may help bring into existence.28 
 
 In other words, genuine philosophy, in its problem-solving capacity, aims 
not only to be empirically responsible and phenomenologically faithful in terms 
of its descriptions and explanations, but further aims to be existentially 
transformative in its practical outcomes and effects.29 This is how Karl Popper 
framed the goal of human problem-solving, viewing it as an extension of the 
more basic organismic drive for survival: “All life is problem solving. All 
organisms are inventors and technicians, good or not so good, successful or not 
so successful, in solving technical problems….Human technology solves human 
problems such as sewage disposal, or the storage and supply of good and water, 
as, for example, bees already have to do.”30 In this way, philosophy can also be 
viewed as therapeutic in nature, which further explains how the majority of the 
                                                        
28 “Philosophy and Democracy” (1919), MW 11: 44.   
29 This is the main thrust of Dewey’s theory of inquiry, his preferred name for his naturalistic 
approach to logic, where the transformation of problematic existential situations through 
controlled direction of their constitutive elements results in their satisfactory resolution. Dewey’s 
logical theory is addressed in further detail in Chapter 3.   
30 Karl Popper, All Life is Problem Solving, trans. Patrick Camiller (New York: Routledge, 1999), 
100. 
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ancient Greeks viewed it. Epicurus endorsed a conception of philosophy as 
therapy when he stated, “Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers 
therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if 
it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if 
it does not expel the suffering of the soul.”31  
 Dewey’s problem-solving view of philosophy remained remarkably 
consistent throughout the years; in a reply to his critics at the end of his career he 
made the following assertion with the confidence that comes from years of 
empirically supported observation: “The problem of restoring integration and 
cooperation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his 
beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest 
problem of modern life. It is the problem of any philosophy that is not isolated 
from life.”32 Dewey’s statements about the proper role and functions of 
philosophic activity carry important consequences with which contemporary 
philosophy, and especially philosophy of religion, must contend if it is to become 
a more socially relevant, intellectually progressive enterprise. It further helps us 
to get a conceptual grip on Dewey’s religious views, which have proven so 
slippery for his interpreters in the past and to which we now turn our attention.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
31 Quoted in Jonardon Ganeri and Clare Carlisle, eds. Philosophy as Therapeia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.  
32 Paul A. Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1939), 523. 
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1.3 Exploring Dewey’s “Common Faith” 
 
 
John Dewey’s conception of philosophy as problem-solving justifies his 
association with pragmatism, though he infrequently used this term and its 
cognates to describe his philosophy, preferring instead the labels 
instrumentalism and experimentalism. As Steve Odin explains the choice of 
these terms, “Dewey’s pragmatism is called experimentalism in that it represents 
an extension of the scientific experimental method to all fields of knowledge, 
whereupon concepts are regarded as ‘working hypotheses’ to be tested for their 
ability to solve problems….Dewey’s pragmatism is also referred [to] as 
instrumentalism in that all hypotheses are instruments used by an organism 
trying to adjust or adapt to its environment in a problematic situation.”33 More 
will be said on these various aspects of Dewey’s philosophy at later points in this 
study. For now, our primary concern is with how Dewey’s interest in human 
problems and problem-solving set the stage for his distinctive approach to 
religion, and so other aspects of his philosophy will be examined mainly insofar 
as they help to clarify his religious thought.34  
 To many commentators, the practical, contingent, and historical 
orientation of Dewey’s philosophy (by whatever name one chooses to call it) is 
                                                        
33 Steve Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), 171.  
34 Several excellent works have been written on Dewey and his general philosophical approach. 
Richard Bernstein offers both a sympathetic and critical treatment that is widely respected in the 
field. See Richard Bernstein, John Dewey (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966). J. E. Tiles 
gives an updated and expanded overview of Dewey’s philosophy that carefully relates it to the 
views of his fellow pragmatists, Peirce and James. See J. E. Tiles, Dewey (New York: Routledge, 
1988).   
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assumed to preclude serious inquiry into religion, which traditionally has been 
associated with the transcendent, the absolute, the ideal. As Dewey continually 
strove to make clear, however, the instrumental conditions that make successful 
inquiry possible, the conditions that permit our transformation from a state of 
doubt or uncertainty to a state of warranted knowledge, are the same for all 
subject matters, be they scientific, aesthetic, moral, or religious in nature. The 
main problem Dewey saw with traditional forms of religion is that they have 
turned away from this world and toward a supernatural realm to locate answers 
to what are essentially human created and human sustained problems. According 
to Dewey’s pragmatist understanding, religion, like philosophy, should renounce 
“inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific 
values and the specific conditions that generate them.”35 When performed openly 
and without prejudice, such active exploration enables one to discern the 
objectively ideal possibilities of natural existence.        
 
Religion, Religions, and the Religious 
 
 Dewey’s religious thought is impossible to present in a short summary, for 
it evolved over a long period of reflection. Those looking for a concise statement 
without fail turn to his late work, A Common Faith, and so we too will begin our 
investigation there. It is important to note that several of Dewey’s major texts not 
explicitly concerned with religion are peppered with references to the religious 
                                                        
35 “Influence of Darwin on Philosophy” (1909), MW 4: 10. 
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qualities of experience, the sacred, the divine, the holy, evil, and God, and some 
of his lesser-known articles bear such religiously provocative titles as “The 
Revival of the Soul,”36 “Christianity and Democracy,”37 “Education as a 
Religion,”38 and “Religion and Morality in a Free Society.”39 Consequently, to 
begin and stop an investigation into Dewey’s religious views with a slim volume 
totaling 87 pages leaves one with a partial appreciation of those views at best. On 
the face of it, this is no different from an art critic or historian trying to 
understand the full skill and creativity of Michelangelo as a sculptor by studying 
his Bacchus in isolation from his David or Pietà.  
 Delivered as the prestigious Terry Lectures at Yale in 1934 and published 
later that year, Dewey wrote A Common Faith when he was already 75 years old. 
Dewey’s turning to religion at this late point in his career caught many off guard, 
as he had long since abandoned participation in organized religion, and only four 
years earlier professed that he had “not been able to attach much importance to 
religion as a philosophic problem.”40 What Dewey meant by saying this is not 
entirely clear, but it likely is related to the fact that philosophers during his day, 
much like philosophers today, worked within the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks of established traditions when addressing religion, and so their 
“problems” and “solutions” remained, for the most part, circular and self-
                                                        
36 “The Revival of the Soul” (1893), LW 17: 10-14. 
37 “Christianity and Democracy” (1893), EW 4: 3-10. 
38 “Education as a Religion” (1922), MW 13: 317-322.  
39 “Religion and Morality in a Free Society” (1949), LW 15: 170-183. 
40 “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930), LW 5: 153. 
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contained. Yet traditional religious problems and solutions inevitably come under 
fire when read against the steady march of science, which in Dewey’s time 
resulted in the publication of Darwin’s Origin, the development of Einstein’s 
theory of relativity, and the dawning of the nuclear age with the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Traditional, or what Dewey mainly calls 
“supernaturalistic,” forms of religion still have difficulty making sense of these 
realities, which contradict the attributes classically assigned to the Abrahamic 
God as creator, preserver, and judge.     
 With these details in mind, A Common Faith can be viewed as Dewey’s 
attempt to reconcile the notion of religious faith with an increasingly scientific 
picture of the world. Dewey understood that with each scientific advance 
(whether moral or immoral in its effects), the connection between immanent 
nature and a supernatural realm or Supreme Being becomes increasingly difficult 
to defend. Dewey argued that the growth of natural science could now explain the 
extraordinary and emotionally stirring events that the term supernatural was 
originally used to give expression to.41 He also believed, in concert with today’s 
New Atheists,42 that supernaturalism was a fundamentally unjust and immoral 
doctrine, for it encourages passivity and a sense of resignation: 
“supernaturalism…stands in the way of effective realization of the sweep and 
depth of the implications of natural human relations. It stands in the way of using 
                                                        
41 CF (1934), LW 9: 46-47. 
42 This group includes, most famously, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and the 
late Christopher Hitchens. 
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the means that are in our power to make radical changes in these relations.”43 At 
the same time, Dewey was sensitively aware that many individuals, himself 
among them, remained committed to aspects of the religious life even after 
abandoning supernaturalism. Dewey later would state that he wrote A Common 
Faith because he wanted “to show such persons that they still have within their 
experience all the elements which give the religious attitude its value.”44  
 Where the New Atheists fiercely advocate throwing out all forms of 
religion with the bathwater of supernaturalism, Dewey advised religion simply 
needed its bathwater changed. For Dewey, this conceptual housekeeping brought 
with it restructured notions of faith, piety, the religious, and God. Dewey chose to 
retain these categories because he believed they spoke to something genuine in 
our ongoing transactions with each other and with the larger world of nature. 
Each was a means of apprehending and dealing with the changes we face in our 
environments and ourselves on a daily basis. For Dewey, the “religious attitude” 
was best viewed as a natural attempt to overcome the sense of insecurity that 
accompanies recognition of our perilous existence. Religion is a form of coping, 
of transforming and renewing the self amidst the spectrum of human ills.    
 The organization of A Common Faith makes its reconstructive purpose 
clear. It is divided into three sections: “Religion Versus the Religious,” “Faith and 
Its Object,” and “The Human Abode of the Religious Function.” Each reflects 
Dewey’s desire to bring religion back down to earth, to a natural, communal faith 
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that could be participated in by all humanity, regardless of differences in race, 
sex, status, or culture. Dewey was not naively optimistic with this suggestion; he 
knew creating such a common faith meant difficult business. In the work’s 
opening pages, Dewey immediately draws attention to the impossibility of 
defining religion for a mixed audience in a meaningful way: 
 For we are forced to acknowledge that concretely there is no such thing as religion in the 
 singular. There is only a multitude of religions. “Religion” is a strictly collective term and 
 the collection it stands for is not even of the kind illustrated in textbooks of logic. It has 
 not the unity of a regiment or assembly but that of any miscellaneous aggregate.45  
 
Students and scholars of religious studies will hear clear echoes of this realization 
in two frequently cited passages from the work of historian of religion Jonathan 
Z. Smith:   
 There is no data for religion. Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study. It is 
 created for the scholar’s analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and 
 generalization. Religion has no independent existence apart from the academy.46 
 
 “Religion” is not a native category. It is not a first person term of self-characterization. It 
 is a category imposed from the outside on some aspect of native culture. It is the other, in 
 these instances colonialists, who are solely responsible for the content of the term.47  
 
 The deconstructionist strategy shared by Dewey and Smith is more than 
mere rhetoric. It reflects a sincere attempt to avoid the pitfalls inherent to 
substantive, essentializing definitions of religion. Edward Tylor, for instance, 
infamously equated religion with animism, while James Frazer saw its origins in 
magic. Sigmund Freud viewed religion narrowly in terms of the frustrated 
personality, Émile Durkheim in terms of social norms, and Karl Marx in terms of 
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economic alienation. And these represent only a few of the classic definitions of 
religion offered since Max Müller sought to establish a non-partisan “science of 
religion” in the middle of the 19th century.   
 Yet, as Smith and likely also Dewey recognized, there is no indigenous 
word for religion in many world languages. Similarly, but perhaps more 
surprisingly, there is not even a word for religion in the Hebrew Bible or Greek 
New Testament.48 In truth, it was European scholars in the wake of 
Enlightenment rationalism and colonial expansion who manufactured the 
category “religion” in order to help make sense of the huge influx of data about 
foreign societies and cultures.49 Consequently, this data has come down to 
succeeding generations of academics and laypeople as filtered through Western, 
largely Christian categories; it thus should be accepted and employed only with a 
deep critical awareness of its innate bias.  
 This account is slightly more detailed than that provided by Dewey, but its 
reasoning stands behind the distinction he goes on to make between “religion” on 
the one hand, and “the religious” on the other. The noun religion, Dewey 
explains, always signifies “a special body of beliefs and practices having some 
kind of institutional organization, loose or tight.”50 By contrast, the adjective 
religious designates a generic or universal quality that can accrue to different 
                                                        
48 Kevin Schilbrack, “Religions: Are There Any?,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
78, no. 4 (2010): 3.  
49 On this point, see the detailed analysis contained in Russell McCutcheon, Manufacturing 
Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). McCutcheon’s analysis is complemented by that of Timothy Fitzgerald, 
The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).   
50 CF (1934), LW 9: 8. 
 26 
kinds of experience apart from specific religious beliefs, doctrines, and practices: 
 The adjective “religious” denotes nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either 
 institutional or as a system of beliefs. It does not denote anything to which one can 
 specifically point as one can point to this and that historic religion or existing church. For 
 it does not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be organized into a 
 particular form of existence. It denotes attitudes that may be taken toward every object 
 and every proposed end or ideal….It is the polar opposite of some type of experience that 
 can exist by itself.51 
 
 Dewey’s description of the religious as a natural quality of experience lines 
up with how the word is used in common parlance, when, for example, we 
describe a person’s liking something or engaging in a particular activity with 
excessive zest or zeal. But Dewey’s analysis went deeper and was more polemical 
in its thrust than this, for he believed that institutionalized forms of religion now 
actually prevented the religious quality of experience from being recognized by 
the vast majority of persons: “religions now prevent, because of their weight of 
historic encumbrances, the religious quality of experience from coming to 
consciousness and finding expression that is appropriate to present conditions, 
intellectual and moral.”52 As Dewey describes the situation, circumstances have 
changed drastically since the historical religions were founded. By failing to 
change with the times, as the saying goes, the concepts, beliefs, and practices of 
those religions now tended to fall on deaf ears. Phrases of self-identification 
popular today, such as “culturally Jewish,” “lapsed Catholic,” and “spiritual but 
not religious,” serve to illustrate Dewey’s general point. The fittest religions are 
those that speak to salient features of a collective’s inhabited perspective on life 
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and the world.    
 Dewey was prepared that not everyone would understand or approve of 
the distinction he attempted to make between religion and the religious. He thus 
further described the religious as an attitude, function, or orientation, one that 
effects a deep-seated adjustment between an individual and the sum total of her 
environing conditions—what Dewey together refers to as “our being in its 
entirety.”53 Religious adjustment is a process of self-actualization that involves a 
thorough harmonizing of the whole self “with the Universe (as a name for the 
totality of conditions with which the self is connected).”54 It is by one’s skillful 
perceptual attunement to the religious ideals inhering in natural experience that 
this unifying effect on the self—which Dewey understood as a relational 
organism-environment system in constant evolutive tension—comes about. 
Dewey’s plain but obscure language did not always serve his purposes well. The 
following quote from Horace Friess crisply sums up everything Dewey 
encompassed and entailed by the religion-religious conceptual distinction: 
 To set “religion and religions” as institutional entities over against “the religious” as a 
 quality of life thus meant for Dewey far more than the making of a formal or semantic 
 distinction. As he developed the contrast between “religion” and “the religious,” he 
 gathered into it: his reasons for a naturalistic outlook rejecting “supernaturalism”; his 
 case for “co-operative inquiry” and “idealizing imagination” as reliable methods; his 
 envisioning of a greater freedom as dependent not just on particular “resolve,” but on 
 knowledge, imagination, and “the organic plenitude of our being”; his lifelong effort for a 
 more thorough common culture expanding the values of natural human relations in 
 democratic society. Dewey thus associated this opposition of “religion versus the 
 religious” with the most pervasive and crucial issues in world-view, in method, in 
 psychological attitude, in society and culture.55   
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 When read against Dewey’s ecological conception of the self (to be 
discussed in Chapter 3), Darwin’s influence on his thinking about religion 
becomes clear. From an evolutionary perspective, the fundamental character of 
religious activity (when defined naturalistically, of course) is an adaptive function 
of the self’s embodiment and embeddedness in a constantly changing, frequently 
hazardous world. It is the achievement of a fuller, more whole—ideal in Deweyan 
parlance—state of self that is the basic condition of religious experience for 
Dewey, even though he preferred to speak in terms of the religious qualities of 
experience.  
 The religious attitude is not native to most of us, nor are we able to inhabit 
it most of the time; it requires faith and cultivation. Dewey’s use of the term faith 
takes on a unique meaning in this context. It is not the propositional faith of 
traditional religion where one might claim “I have faith that x,” or “I believe in y.” 
Faith is not a passive affair for Dewey and its content is not primarily intellectual. 
It is, rather, an active faith that involves the exercise of embodied skill: “I should 
describe this faith as the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive 
ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will 
responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices.”56  
 The proper objects of this embodied faith are not personal gods or other 
supernatural entities, or even the “numinous” or mysterium tremendum posited 
by German theologian Rudolf Otto. They are, rather, the actual and possible 
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events of this world (nature/the environment) insofar as they take on ideal, 
consummatory value for selves (nature/organisms). The religious faith Dewey 
envisages, when properly exercised, results in a piety toward nature, not in a 
romantic or submissive sense, but in terms of a vital appreciation of nature as a 
constitutive part of ourselves and as the ground and source of ideals. It is this 
reconstructed notion of “natural piety” that provides coherence to the following 
frequently cited, but just as frequently misunderstood, statement from A 
Common Faith: “Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles 
and in spite of threat of personal loss because of conviction of its general and 
enduring value is religious in quality.”57 
  According to Dewey, the crucial mistake made by traditional religions, 
one innate to human nature, is to take ideals and project them onto “a 
supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanction.”58 The father of 
psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, and German materialist philosopher Ludwig 
Feuerbach argued essentially the same point in their respective criticisms of 
religion.59 Dewey viewed this as a primary cause of the division between 
fundamentalist and liberal forms of religion, which accurately describes the 
division among churches today, as well as the form most science-religion debates 
take. Dewey persuasively argued that the only way to rid individuals and thus also 
society of this error-prone cognitive tendency was to subject all human values 
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and ideals to the critical scrutiny of scientific method, which opposes all forms of 
doctrine and dogma—basically all bodies of knowledge that claim to be settled in 
advance.60  
 In what is perhaps the most controversial passage of A Common Faith, 
Dewey goes on to identify the human actualization of ideals within experience 
with “the divine” and “God.” Take, for instance, the following passage, which will 
be revisited in its specific details later: 
 This idea [of the divine] is…one of ideal possibilities unified through imaginative 
 realization and projection. But this idea of God, or of the divine, is also connected with all 
 the natural forces and conditions—including man and human association—that promote 
 the growth of the ideal and that further its realization. We are in the presence neither of 
 ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, 
 fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the 
 ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is 
 this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name “God.” I 
 would not insist the name must be given.61 
 
Dewey’s reworking of hallowed religious notions along naturalistic lines caused 
significant controversy among philosophers, theologians, and the larger public of 
his day. The controversy over Dewey’s religious views persists today, several 
decades after A Common Faith was published. I believe that much of this 
controversy lies in Dewey’s use of plain English to communicate what are highly 
original and complex ideas. One can only wonder if Dewey could have prevented 
much confusion and disagreement over his religious views by inventing a new 
vocabulary with which to express them, like his contemporary Alfred North 
Whitehead did. Forever a philosopher of the people, however, Dewey resisted the 
lure of neologism at all costs. 
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The Standard Interpretation 
 
 
 Dewey’s advocacy of empirical inquiry into religion in A Common Faith 
has led to a wide range of interpretations, both negative and positive, over time. 
This owes not only to Dewey’s unorthodox approach (for an early 20th century 
thinker), but also to certain ambiguities of language in which he packaged his 
ideas. Early reactions included those of Max Otto, who spoke for the majority 
when he complained “it almost seems as if Mr. Dewey were saying that every 
activity in the world may take on a religious character, excepting religion.”62 
Otto’s skepticism was echoed by Norbert Guterman, who argued: “The 
unification accomplished by Dewey’s ‘religious’ is not essentially different from 
that accomplished by religions.”63  
 Other commentators detected a more subversive purpose behind Dewey’s 
retention of traditional religious terminology. Most notably, Henry Hazlitt 
questioned whether Dewey was simply “attempting to exploit the traditional 
prestige of words that he has emptied of all their traditional meaning” for his own 
peculiar agenda. He further claimed Dewey’s naturalization of religion had 
basically “the same relation to old-fashioned religion as beef bouillon poured 
through a filter has to beef.”64 
 In effort to bring order to the growing controversy surrounding the 
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meaning of A Common Faith, a well-known religious journal at the time, The 
Christian Century, devoted an entire symposium to the work titled “Is John 
Dewey a Theist?” The intention was to give Dewey an opportunity to respond to 
his harshest reviewers and critics.65 That Dewey could be considered a “theist” in 
the classical sense, given his extended objection to all forms of supernaturalism, 
should have been a non-question. In a separate discussion in that journal, Dewey 
explicitly distanced himself from those who “insist upon a particular being or 
object, a God, and particular methods and channels of approach,” and, as he had 
on numerous other occasions, expressed extreme reproach toward “the exclusive 
and jealous God of Israel.”66  
 Despite Dewey’s sustained attempts at clarification, secularists and 
religionists found plenty else in his religious views to censure. John Herman 
Randall, Jr., one of Dewey’s former students, ridiculed A Common Faith as a 
provincial expression of liberal Protestant values which ignored the diverse 
insights of the historical religions.67 Secularist Corliss Lamont condemned 
Dewey’s entire project with the following harsh words: “Every defense or 
justification of the idea of God, even the most refined and well-intentioned, is a 
justification of a reaction.” For Lamont and those sympathetic to his position, 
Dewey’s attempted reconstruction of God, even in wholly naturalistic terms, 
                                                        
65 For details on this exchange, see Corliss Lamont, “New Light on Dewey’s Common Faith,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 58, no. 1 (1961): 21-28.  
66 “Dr. Dewey Replies” (1933), LW 9: 216.  
67 John Herman Randall, “The Religion of Shared Experience,” in The Philosopher of the 
Common Man: Essays in Honor of John Dewey to Celebrate his Eightieth Birthday, John 
Dewey, ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940), 106-145.  
 33 
testified to “the necessity for honest and uncompromising minds to repudiate his 
leadership.”68  
 The reaction of committed religious thinkers to A Common Faith was 
equally, if not more, severe. Mortimer Adler declared in a notorious speech that 
Dewey was an atheistic, antireligious thinker “who posed a greater threat to 
democracy than did Hitler.”69 Curiously, it was neo-orthodox theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr who was perhaps most balanced in his critique, finding little 
wrong with Dewey’s general approach or the content of his argument. Niebuhr’s 
problem with the book, rather, was simply that it was too short: “this little 
volume…is something of a footnote on religion added by America’s leading 
philosopher to his life work in philosophy….[It] is disappointing only in the sense 
that it is too brief to do full justice to the problem or allow the author scope in 
elaborating his thesis on religion.”70  
 Little resolution resulted from these early back-and-forth disputes 
between Dewey and his contemporaries. This interpretive gridlock has not 
improved with time, with Nel Noddings claiming over 70 years later: “A Common 
Faith is arguably one of John Dewey’s least effective books. In it, he tries to 
persuade readers that the best of two epistemologically different worlds can be 
reconciled in a common faith—one that employs the methods of science with a 
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generously religious attitude.”71 Noddings’s desultory rehashing of earlier 
negative assessments of A Common Faith is unfortunate, for as Bradley Baurain 
notes,  
 Though [A Common Faith] has been criticized, mostly in passing, its ideas and arguments 
 have only rarely been analyzed. Scholars tend to summarize A Common Faith and 
 Dewey’s thoughts on religion briefly on their way elsewhere. Only a handful of articles in 
 the past fifteen years or so have expended significant effort on A Common Faith…and I 
 would argue that none of them have made explicating the specifics of Dewey’s positions 
 and arguments a top priority.72  
 
A survey of the academic literature of the past few decades proves Baurain correct 
on this point.73  
 There exist a few major works in Dewey studies that have engaged A 
Common Faith in more than a passing manner. For the most part, however, they 
closely track the simplistic interpretations made shortly after its publication. The 
three most influential treatments of Dewey’s religious thought are Steven 
Rockefeller’s John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism, Michael 
Eldridge’s Transforming Experience: John Dewey’s Cultural Instrumentalism, 
and Melvin Rogers’s The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the 
Ethos of Democracy.74 Each of these books is a masterpiece of Dewey 
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scholarship; along with the earlier work of Richard Rorty,75 they have made 
Dewey’s philosophy, and pragmatism more generally, relevant and compelling to 
an entirely new generation of philosophers.  
 Yet, while generally supportive of Dewey’s democratic common faith, each 
of these works denies that Dewey’s philosophy has any properly “religious” 
dimensions. I cannot deal with the analyses of each of these works in detail, but 
Eldridge speaks for the lot when he states in a separate article: “To limit the 
religious to an attitude within experience is to truncate it. Given the diversity of 
religions as they exist, I do not think we should cut the religious to fit Dewey’s 
naturalistic views.”76 According to pragmatism scholar Stuart Rosenbaum, for 
those aligned with Eldridge and his cohort, “the idea that pragmatism might have 
something interesting or useful to offer religious thinkers is at best naïve and at 
worst misguided.”77 What Eldridge forgets is that all experience is a part of nature 
according to Dewey’s evolutionary perspective; attitudes, emotions, and feelings 
are not psychological overlays written onto nature, but are physiological in and of 
nature.78 Experience is nature’s expansion, not its truncation.   
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 By far the most common view of John Dewey’s religious thought as 
presented in A Common Faith, widespread enough to be considered the 
“standard interpretation,” is that religion for Dewey is essentially a form of 
humanism. Humanism has a number of meanings, including ethical humanism, 
cultural humanism, philosophical humanism, and literary humanism, among 
others. When associated with Dewey’s name, scholars typically have in mind 
either secular humanism or scientific humanism. Alan Ryan makes this clear in 
his book, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, saying there 
are two basic ways to read A Common Faith: “one has seen [Dewey] as trying to 
unite the religious conviction that the world is a meaningful unity with a secular 
twentieth-century faith in the scientific analysis of both nature and humanity, 
while the other has seen him as an aggressive rationalist, someone who expects 
‘science’ to drive out faith, and a contributor to the twentieth century’s obsession 
with rational social management.”79 Scientific humanism is reductionistic in its 
outlook and methods; in its strongest form it is simply known as scientism. 
Secular humanism, on the other hand, allows for significant, socially patterned 
modes of belief and behavior that it is science’s job to help us understand and 
improve where possible. The scientific humanist reading of Dewey is best 
represented by Mortimer Adler’s comments above, with Michael Eldridge’s 
reflecting the secular humanist interpretation.   
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 Any project arguing for a richer interpretation of Dewey’s religious views 
must reply to the standard interpretation just outlined, and the following 
comments are made with this in mind. That Dewey holds a naturalistic, scientific 
view of humankind is uncontestable, but his naturalism is thoroughly non-
reductive, allowing for complex emergent meanings and intense experiences of 
value. As crisply stated by Andrew Jewett: “Dewey’s naturalism departed 
substantially from…the ‘billiard-ball physics’ of the materialists of yore.”80 
Materialists deny the existence of qualia, the “what it’s like” aspects of lived 
experience; Dewey rejected such a view as deficient from the very start of his 
career.81 We will tease apart the full meaning and implications of Dewey’s 
naturalism in future chapters, but it should be clear at this early stage that Dewey 
was not a scientific humanist. For, as Sandra Rosenthal reminds us, Dewey’s 
“systematic focus on science is not on the contents of science, but rather on 
science as method or as lived through human activity, on what the scientist does 
to gain knowledge.”82  
 To describe Dewey as a secular humanist is vastly more accurate, but with 
the important qualification that secular in this context be understood as “the 
maintenance of a strict division between Church and State.” Dewey’s rejection of 
absolute forms of authority and foundational knowledge claims leads directly to 
the promotion of secular values in the public sphere. If secular is taken to mean 
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“an unbridgeable division between religion and politics,” however, I do not think 
that Dewey rightfully can be called a secular thinker. Dewey’s commitment to 
democracy is infused with spiritual significance and the capabilities democratic 
forms of governance ideally make available to individuals are intrinsic to their 
well-being and self-actualization—hallmarks of the religious life from Dewey’s 
naturalistic perspective. The democracy Dewey passionately defended throughout 
his career was not the political democracy of frequent elections and majority rule, 
but rather democracy as a way of life.83 Moreover, it should be remembered that 
Dewey saw nature as an organic unity unblemished by radical discontinuities, 
including that between the secular and the religious. This was one of the many 
inherited dualisms Dewey believed philosophy had to overcome in order to enter 
a more progressive stage. Drawing a firm line in the sand between the secular and 
the religious is a classic reactionary response to the conflict between religion and 
science. This is a conflict that Dewey and the other pragmatists viewed as 
resolvable in the long run through concerted, cooperative effort.  
 Provided these brief remarks, I find the secular humanist reading of A 
Common Faith, although more generous and plausible than the scientific 
humanist reading, equally limiting. By focusing on the social, deliberative 
democratic side of Dewey’s philosophy, the secular humanist interpretation 
misses Dewey’s emphasis on the individual agent’s ongoing biotic adjustment to 
its surroundings, which he considered of utmost importance for achieving the 
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cumulative self-unification that is natural religion’s true goal and expression. The 
entirety of our communal copings with the world involves each person’s fund of 
prior adjustments and the skill to refocus and reenact them when necessary. 
These are the biological roots of both religion and democracy for Dewey. To view 
religious ideals as mere social constructions or “contracts” leads to a pernicious 
relativism that only serves to exacerbate the epistemic and axiological problems 
which accompany increased globalization and religious pluralism. It should be 
remembered that Dewey continually strove to meliorate such “problems of men,” 
not to exacerbate them, especially those problems that bridged cultural divides.   
 
Forging a Middle Path Between Realism and Idealism 
 
 The tension between the scientific and secular humanist readings of A 
Common Faith closely mirrors another tension typically uncovered in Dewey’s 
philosophy: that between realism and idealism. Realism, according to 
contemporary philosopher Nicholas Rescher, may be defined as follows: “Reality 
is mind independent. We live in a world not of our own making, a world whose 
constituents and their modes of operation are independent of our thought. 
Thought and its machinations have no bearing on the constituents and laws of 
nature, which are what they are independently of the existence of thinking 
beings.”84 Idealism, by contrast, refers to “the doctrine that reality is somehow 
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mind-correlative or mind-coordinated.”85 Idealism is routinely equated with the 
view that all reality is mental. Such was the essence of Irish philosopher George 
Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Yet, as Rescher smartly reminds us, idealism, like 
realism, comes in a variety of forms and degrees. Often it simply means that 
reality cannot be fully understood without reference to the operations of human 
minds. This more modest version of idealism is commonly called constructivism 
or antirealism, depending on the context it is used in.  
 Debates between realists and idealists are frequently intense and span 
considerations of ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Furthermore, 
philosophers are not always careful to distinguish at which level they are 
endorsing a realist or idealist position, a factor that complicates the process of 
interpretation. In what senses Dewey’s ontology and axiology can be considered 
idealistic will be discussed in Chapter 3. That Dewey was not an epistemological 
idealist in the Berkeleyan or Hegelian sense (as Hegel is normally interpreted) is 
evident from comments Dewey himself made in “The Realism of Pragmatism.” In 
this article he states:  
 Speaking of the matter only for myself, the presuppositions and tendencies of 
 pragmatism are distinctly realistic; not idealistic in any sense in which idealism connotes 
 or is connoted by the theory of knowledge. (Idealistic in the ethical sense is another 
 matter, one whose associates with epistemological idealism, aside from accidents of 
 history, are chiefly verbal).86 
 
 [T]he point that the critics of pragmatism have missed…is that in giving a 
 reinterpretation of the nature and function of knowledge, pragmatism gives necessarily a 
 thoroughgoing reinterpretation of all the cognitive machinery—sensations, ideas, 
 concepts, etc.; one which inevitably tends to take these things in a much more literal and 
 physically realistic fashion than is current. What pragmatism takes from idealism is just 
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 and only empiricism.87  
 
One should note, however, that pragmatism’s, and thus Dewey’s, empiricism is 
wider than the sensationalistic empiricism of the British Empiricists, which 
viewed experience as a passive response to the world as it impinges on the sense 
organs. Empiricism for the pragmatist is closer to the practical empiricism of 
Aristotle, concerned with the acquisition of embodied know-how that enables one 
to move skillfully through the world.88  
 Joseph Margolis has written extensively on the consilience between the 
empirical dimensions of (certain forms of) realism and idealism from a 
pragmatist perspective. In his latest book, Pragmatism Ascendant, he maintains 
the existence of a reality independent of human cognition while recognizing that 
we often, and legitimately, make claims about the nature of that reality.89 
However, as Margolis reminds us, the affirmations we make about reality are 
always made from a human perspective. Even the “objective” observations of 
fine-tuned scientific instruments are interpreted through our creaturely senses.  
Following the classical pragmatists before him, Margolis fashions an ecologically 
informed, “constructivist realism” that is always approached from the historically 
situated and finite human sphere. To posit a transcendentalist, “God’s eye view” 
of reality over and above the human is, for Margolis—as it is for Dewey, other 
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pragmatists, and ecological thinkers more generally—nonsensical:  
 The viability of the transcendental question (apart from the fortunes of 
 transcendentalism) makes no sense, unless we concede that the viability of empirical 
 realism cannot be separated from “idealism” (the “Idealism” already implicated in the 
 transcendental question itself): that consideration already signals the importance of 
 deciding whether the human version of “reason” reflexively affects what we affirm to be 
 possible regarding “what there is” in the whole of reality independent of human 
 condition….I take “realism” and “Idealism” to be inseparable within any “constructivist” 
 form of realism—it being the case that there is no other viable form of realism.90    
 
 Perhaps the most difficult problem A Common Faith poses to its 
interpreters concerns the nature of “religious ideals”—whether or not one chooses 
to refer to them by such theologically loaded concepts as “the divine” or “God.” 
That is, are religious ideals real, or are they merely constructed by means of our 
intellectual and imaginative faculties? Do they exist readymade, as already given 
in the world, or do we somehow carry them with us into our experience of the 
world? Do religious ideals correspond to settled objects, or do they more 
accurately refer to aspects of events?  
 Most religious doctrines and practices are built upon a firmly realist 
foundation. The claim that some God, Supreme Being, or divine principle exists 
independently of human thought plays a common constitutive role in 
explanations of religious behavior and doctrine. Prayer, for example, is intuitively 
supported by the belief that a person or force can act to alter the course of the 
world’s events.  
 Dewey states his position on the realism-idealism question as it relates to 
the category of ideals clearly in A Common Faith, but its composite nature has 
caused great confusion and disagreement: “An ideal is not an illusion because 
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imagination is the organ through which it is apprehended,”91 for it is “made out of 
the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience.”92 In Dewey’s 
system, ideals—religious or otherwise—are not subjective fantasies or social 
constructions. Ideals are real, precisely where and when they are real. Ideals 
speak to developing events in their consummatory reference, that is, in terms of 
their most satisfactory completions. 
  The ontology informing what I have been calling Dewey’s ecological 
framework undercuts the realism-idealism issue, which is built on dualistic, 
subjectivist presuppositions that Dewey explicitly denied.93 “Mind” and “nature,” 
“inner” and “outer,” and even “organism” and “environment” are polar 
expressions of the primordial coupling of organisms with their environments. 
Perception is a function of an organism’s activity in the world insofar as 
environmental objects are perceived in terms of the organism’s operational 
capabilities (e.g., a dried out gourd that can be used to hold water). And these 
capabilities depend not only on factors internal to the organism (e.g., being 
thirsty), but on external environmental conditions under which they are 
exercised as well (e.g., the need to store potable water in a setting where it is 
scarce). Dewey earlier addressed the realism-idealism debate, the artificiality of 
which he believed is revealed upon close examination of experience, in a footnote 
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to the “Introduction” of his Essays in Experimental Logic in the following 
manner: 
 The term “reality” is particularly treacherous for the careless tradition of 
 philosophy…uses “reality” both as a term of indifferent reference, equivalent to 
 everything taken together or referred to en masse as over against some discrimination, 
 and also as a discriminative term with a highly eulogistic flavor: as real money in 
 distinction from counterfeit money. Then, although every inquiry in daily life, whether 
 technological or scientific, asks whether a thing is real only in the sense of asking what 
 thing is real, philosophy concludes to a wholesale distinction between the real and the 
 unreal, the real and the apparent, and so creates a wholly artificial problem.94   
 
 Dewey’s recognition here—of the fabricated nature of the realism-idealism 
problem—is foundational to the newly created interdisciplines of enactivism and 
DEEDS, tenets of which come into play at later points in our study. As the 
sometimes-muddled language of A Common Faith struggled to make clear, it is 
necessary to study the full range of human experience and activity, the real and 
the ideal, the secular and the religious, in an ecologically valid manner. This is to 
say that all have their functional place in experience and in nature, because they 
are dispositions of appropriately skilled creaturely selves. To prevent ecology and 
its derivations from becoming meaningless buzzwords in the present study, 
however, we need to get a better hold on precisely what is meant by calling Dewey 
an ecological thinker and the challenges the ecological turn in contemporary 
philosophy poses to traditional approaches in philosophy of religion.                  
 What has been sketched up to this point is admittedly an incomplete 
response to the standard interpretation of Dewey’s religious thought. It will be 
rounded out in the chapters to follow where it is shown that Dewey’s religious 
views are best viewed not as a form of scientific or secular humanism, but as a 
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highly original religious naturalism. What should be noted at this point is that 
Dewey used the term ideal in several distinct, perhaps even contradictory senses. 
He also did not imply that all ideals were religious in nature. Yet nowhere does 
Dewey state that religious ideals are strategic plans of action settled upon by 
deliberative consensus or agreement (though he does at times speak of moral 
ideals in language close to this).95  
 Religion, under Dewey’s reconstructed view, is a way of perceiving and 
creating the world, which is simultaneously a way of perceiving and creating 
oneself. It is about enacting a profound, deep-seated kind of self-integrity, one 
that restores wholeness and integrity to the larger environment or “Universe” to 
which one belongs in tandem. To focus on only one side of this equation, whether 
the real or the ideal, the social or the individual, the objective or the subjective is 
an abstraction. Like all abstractions, it is useful for technical, conceptual 
purposes only. From Dewey’s ecological perspective, experience at all times and 
places implies active cooperation of organism and environment in the 
construction, destruction, and perpetual reconstruction of the lifeworld and its 
meanings.   
 
 
1.4 The Challenge and Promise of Ecological Thinking  
 
 
What does it mean to call John Dewey an ecological thinker? And precisely how 
does the turn to ecological thinking in contemporary theory place pressure on 
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traditional understandings of religion and, consequently, on philosophy of 
religion as it is practiced and taught in the academy today? The remainder of this 
chapter will answer the first of these questions, while the second is taken up in 
Chapter 2.     
 Dewey never identified with the field of ecology, despite the profusion of 
names he would give to his philosophy over the long span of his career. 
Nonetheless, Dewey is well remembered as a fierce advocate of naturalism, yet 
naturalism lends itself to a variety of formulations and interpretations. Further 
complicating matters is the fact that naturalism is typically only worked out for a 
particular subject matter (e.g., ethical naturalism, biological naturalism, religious 
naturalism, etc.), whereas Dewey’s naturalism transcends and encompasses the 
various individual naturalisms. Dewey’s global, inclusive understanding of nature 
is the subject of investigation in a later section, where it will be shown that his 
notion of what is “natural” is intimately tied to his conception of (event) 
“experience,” which in the human case implies an active, situated “self.” These 
three categories constitute developing nature in its physicochemical, 
psychophysical, and phenomenological dimensions for Dewey. To overlook any 
one of them is to commit a grave error:  
 The distinction between physical, psycho-physical, and mental is thus one of levels of 
 increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural events. The idea that 
 matter, life and mind represent separate kinds of Being is a doctrine that springs, as so 
 many philosophic errors have sprung, from a substantiation of eventual functions. The 
 fallacy converts consequences of interactions of events into causes of the occurrence of 
 these consequences—a reduplication which is significant as to the importance of the 
 functions, but which hopelessly confuses understanding of them.96 
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As the above quote makes clear, there are no sharp breaks or discontinuities 
between the three levels for Dewey. Nature, experience, and the self form a living 
organic unity or, to use a term with an equivalent connotation, an ecology.   
 Ecology is all the rage at the present moment, the buzzword of a new 
generation and ideology. The growing concern for environmental issues is not 
limited to popular sentiment or the alarming images of the news media that 
barrage us on a daily basis. A brief survey of recent scholarship turns up an 
impressive number of works hailing the importance of ecological economics, 
ecological education, ecological anthropology, ecological ethics, and, in public 
policymaking, the ecological footprint. It is difficult at first pass to see what 
connects these varied concerns aside from the shared adjective ecological, a fact 
that resonates with the many uses religious is put to in both daily and academic 
discourse.  
 Ecology, quite simply, is the study of the relationship between organisms 
and their environments. The English word ecology comes from the Greek oikos, 
meaning “house” or “dwelling,” linguistic roots shared with economy. The history 
of ecology in the West traces back to Aristotle whose naturalist philosophy was 
profoundly influenced by close observation of the plant and animal world. The 
first technical use of the term was by German biologist Ernst Haeckel in the 
middle of the 19th century to refer to the study of the constant reciprocal 
interactions of organisms with their environments—which Haeckel saw as 
inseparable parts of a larger whole—in the evolutionary “struggle for existence” 
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vividly described by Darwin.97 The close relationship between humans and their 
ecosystems has undergone, and presumably will continue to undergo, myriad 
changes and transformations for as long as humans are around. Not all of these 
changes are desirable or beneficial in their effects, as shown by the worsening 
global ecological crisis.   
 Environmental problems are by no means newly occurring phenomena. 
They are almost too numerous to list and include events as diverse as climate 
change, resource depletion, Africanized bees, chestnut blight, shark finning, 
Minamata disease, the Bhopal disaster, ozone depletion, the Chernobyl accident, 
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Holocaust, and the Iran-Iraq War. 
What is new, however, is the exponential growth of ecological destruction in the 
wake of the Second World War. It is specifically to two 20th century theorists that 
we owe recognition for specifying the immense relevance of ecological relations 
to human affairs and, conversely, human behavior to ecological well-being. These 
theorists are Rachel Carson and Lynn White, Jr.  
 In her 1962 book, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson carefully detailed the 
negative environmental impact of population explosion in developing countries 
and of technology and harmful pesticides in industrialized nations.98 The impacts 
of these events are felt by virtually all life-processes on earth. Furthermore, we 
are only beginning to come to terms with their present and potential long-term 
consequences. The book’s most evocative section, “A Fable for Tomorrow,” 
                                                        
97 For a detailed overview of the history of ecology, see Frank N. Egerton, Roots of Ecology: From 
Antiquity to Haeckel (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012).   
98 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, [1962] 2002).  
 49 
chronicles an unnamed American town where all life, including birds, fish, 
plants, and even human children had been “silenced” by the deleterious effects of 
DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane), one of the first chemicals in widespread 
use as a pesticide. Carson’s testimony before Congress on the overuse of 
insecticides triggered the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the environmental movement more broadly. 
 Shortly after a Silent Spring was released historian Lynn White, Jr. 
published a provocative article with the title “The Historical Roots of Our 
Ecological Crisis.” In this article, White traced the exploitative attitude toward 
nature in the Western world to the ethos of medieval Christianity that marked off 
humans as radically different from and as masters over the world of nature.99 
According to White’s textual and hermeneutic analysis, the ecological crisis is 
directly traceable to Biblical injunctions, including that of Genesis 1.27: “fill the 
earth and subdue it and have dominion over…every living thing,” as well as to 
certain theological doctrines, such as the imago Dei. To White’s mind, it is the 
pervasive anthropocentrism of Western religious and philosophical traditions 
that is to blame for the burgeoning ecological crisis. Reflecting on this 
development, he cautioned: “we shall continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis 
until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to 
serve man.”100 White’s analysis was not wholly condemnatory, however; he also 
argued that religion could serve as the basis for an ecologically sensitive ethic and 
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looked to Buddhism and the personage of Saint Francis as exemplars of a more 
ecologically wholesome religious outlook.   
 The fundamental challenge posed by Carson and White to the human 
community was to develop more humane and sustainable ways of acting toward 
nature. This is not only in the best interests of nature, it is favorable to us as well, 
for we are sustained by nature on every conceivable level. Even current society’s 
widespread obsession with mobile technology and virtual worlds is ultimately 
built from nature’s bounty—just think of the rare earth elements required for the 
manufacturing of personal technology and gaming devices. Failure to recognize 
this fact portends grave consequences for the immediate future of the human 
family. In Carson’s poetic words:  
 We stand now where but two roads diverge. But unlike the roads in Robert Frost’s 
 familiar poem, they are not equally fair. The road we have been long traveling is 
 deceptively easy, a smooth superhighway on which we progress with great speed, but at 
 its end lies disaster. The other fork of the road—the one less traveled by—offers our last, 
 our only change to reach a destination that assures the preservation of the earth.101 
 
 
 
Contrasting Conceptions of Ecology 
 
  
 Those familiar with the current literature on the subject will be aware of 
two competing conceptions over the nature and domain of ecology. The 
conception one adopts invariably colors the way Carson’s and White’s warnings 
are received. According to Kevin De Laplante, the first is the orthodox conception 
of professional ecologists, while the second is a more expansive conception 
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favored by environmentalist groups and interdisciplinary-minded academics.102 
“The orthodox view conceives ecology as a natural biological science distinct from 
the human social sciences. The more expansive conception views ecology as a 
science whose domain properly spans both the natural and social sciences. On 
the more expansive conception, non-traditional ecological disciplines such 
as…‘ecological economics,’ and ‘ecological psychology’, may be legitimately 
regarded as sub-disciplines of ecology, and the practitioners of such disciplines 
ecologists.”103 That Dewey would endorse an expansionist conception of ecology 
is obvious from the sharp critique of orthodox scientific practice he gives in 
Democracy and Education: “While in fact the progress of science was increasing 
man’s power over nature…the philosophy which professed to formulate its 
accomplishments reduced the world to barren and monotonous redistribution of 
matter in space. Thus, the immediate effect of modern science was to accumulate 
the dualism of matter and mind, and thereby to establish the physical and 
humanistic studies as two disconnected groups.”104 
 De Laplante offers a simple but compelling defense in support of the 
second, more expansive view of ecology. He basically argues that human beings 
are the most influential species on the planet, in terms of the impact of our 
collective habits and customs, and thus human activity and human nature 
demand to be studied from an ecologically informed perspective. Moreover, the 
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resistance of the orthodox conception to the ethical, social, and political 
dimensions of applied environmental problems unnecessarily limits ecology to 
the status of a descriptive science.  
 Against this view, expansionists believe ecology to be a science of 
“synthesis as well as analysis,” which makes it “better suited…to deal 
intellectually with problems that require integrating information from many 
topic areas, scales and levels within ecology, as well as collaboration and 
integration with the physical and social sciences.”105 The expansionist conception 
finds a deeper role for ecologists in helping uncover the factors of human 
psychology and behavior that lie behind our dominant environmental attitudes 
and practices. It is believed that if we can uncover the roots of such attitudes and 
practices, we just might be able to change them for the better.106  
 De Laplante cites ecological psychology, the discipline founded by 
perceptual psychologist James Gibson, as a clear example of the beneficial 
insights that come with a broader conception of ecology. Ecological psychologists 
regard human perception and action as essentially ecological phenomena. In 
other words, cognitive processes, to borrow a popular phrase from Andy Clark 
and David Chalmers, “ain’t (all) in the head!”107 This view more clearly points to 
fundamental problems of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology that the 
orthodox conception of ecology fails to raise, but which are extremely important 
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to any analysis of human belief and behavior that aims to be complete.  
 As De Laplante, Gibson, and Dewey likely before them saw, perception and 
action must be understood in relation to the information available in the total 
environment of an organism. Experience and behavior are fundamentally about 
adapting to one’s environment for the purpose of survival, which amounts to 
basically another way of saying that meanings and values reside in the natural 
environment and not in some abstract or transcendent realm. This recognition 
holds hugely important implications for any study of metaphysics, epistemology, 
and axiology—questions typically overlooked by ecologists and even philosophers 
working on ecological issues, who tend to focus on rational arguments for 
environmental preservation and conservation without addressing their root 
origins.  
 Further distancing itself from the orthodox conception, which depicts 
scientific theory and research as “value-free,” the expansive view of ecology is 
intrinsically normative on at least two accounts. First, as environmental 
philosopher Jane Howarth remarks, ecology “reveals values inherent in or 
intrinsic to the natural world.”108 This point was discussed briefly moments ago. 
Second, ecology “is geared to prediction, manipulation and control of 
nature…[and] thereby presupposes value.”109 This does not mean that ecology 
can operate free of facts, however. As Howarth shrewdly adds: “What we ought to 
do depends on essentially what we can do, and that depends on what our 
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capabilities are and on what the facts are…about the results of our activities.”110 
Facts and values are mutually specifying for all experiencing organisms, as two 
sides of the same coin.  
 Ecology’s value orientation is shared by many of the world’s religious and 
philosophical traditions. As a result, scientists, policymakers, and applied 
ethicists in recent years have begun calling for greater involvement of philosophy 
and religion in alleviating the symptoms of the current global ecological crisis.111 
Like Dewey’s view of philosophy as problem-solving, the expansionist view of 
ecology aims to radically improve human experience by more accurately 
describing the biological and cultural matrices it naturally emerges within. Only 
when equipped with a more accurate self-understanding can we expect to achieve 
tangible gains in harmonic functioning. This sheds new light on the Delphic 
maxim “know thyself” (gnōthi seuton), which lies at the root of all philosophy.     
 
 
The Turn to Ecological Thinking 
 
 
 One of the most important realizations to come out of an expansive view of 
ecology is that philosophies and religions are not abstract worldviews free from 
externalities. They are essentially praxes, modes of engaging and inhabiting the 
world; they thus should be judged on pragmatic, consequentialist grounds 
relevant to our survival and well-being. With such considerations in mind, 
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Thomas Berry has judged the symptoms of the global ecological crisis in mainly 
pathological terms: 
 A deep cultural pathology has developed in Western society and has now spread 
 throughout the planet. A savage plundering of the entire earth is taking place through 
 industrial exploitation. Thousands of poisons unknown in former times are saturating the 
 air, the water, and the soil. The habitat of a vast number of living species is being 
 irreversibly damaged. In this universal disturbance of the biosphere by human agents, the 
 human being now finds that the harm done to the natural world is returning to threaten 
 the human species itself.112 
 
It is for this reason that advocates of deep ecology, an ecological and 
environmental philosophy founded by Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, view 
the most pressing task of the current generation is to understand the world in the 
right way. Deep ecologists argue that given the correct understanding of nature 
and ourselves, our ethical and moral choices will become obvious. This is an 
insight that deep ecology shares with many Eastern philosophical and religious 
traditions. It is a theme central to John Dewey’s writings as well. To fully 
understand and solve “real-world” problems requires an entirely reinvented way 
of thinking and living, “a new philosophy of the relationship between humanity 
and nature.”113 
 With this express goal in mind, Næss proposed a distinction between the 
mainstream, “shallow ecology” movement and the long-range, or “deep ecology” 
movement in a now famous lecture given in Bucharest in the early 1970s. In 
Næss’s eyes, the shallow ecology movement expresses a genuine concern with the 
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symptoms of environmental damage and ecosystem degradation, but it remains 
rooted in the dualist, mechanistic worldview of the 17th century that established 
nature as a “resource” to be used and managed. By contrast, the deep ecology 
movement stresses the need for treating the root source of the global ecological 
crisis: deeply ingrained human values and practices, especially those of the 
industrialized nations.  
 According to Næss, “Ecologically responsible policies are concerned only 
in part with pollution and resource depletion. There are deeper concerns which 
touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, 
symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness.”114 The primary reason the Earth’s 
natural resources are rapidly growing scarce, the one thing that indisputably has 
led us to this critical moment in history, has been the way humans have acted 
within and upon nature. We have failed to view nature as a vital being with its 
own value and integrity, and instead have treated it as an object, a tool, a lifeless 
“thing” to be controlled and mastered.      
 Feminist philosopher Lorraine Code carefully outlines what is at stake 
with this deeper shift in ecological perspective in her recent Ecological Thinking: 
The Politics of Epistemic Location. Code states that “ecological thinking is not 
simply thinking about ecology or about ‘the environment,’ although these figure 
as catalysts among its issues. It is a revisioned mode of engagement with 
knowledge, subjectivity, politics, ethics, science, citizenship, and agency that 
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pervades and reconfigures theory and practice.”115 The most urgent task of 
ecological thinking, in both its descriptive and normative dimensions, is the 
articulation of a new understanding of the human self, one free from the faults of 
the Cartesian egoic self.116 This is also a fundamental tenet of classical American 
pragmatism, especially in Dewey’s formulation. As we saw earlier, pragmatism is 
an innately ecological philosophy driven by the self-reflective conviction that 
“inquiry into the practical effects of our thoughts and actions is the most 
important things we humans do.”117  
 The turn to ecology in contemporary theory, as with any drastic paradigm 
shift, is in actuality comprised of several smaller turns or theoretical 
recalibrations. For example, several aspects of what is typically referred to as the 
“postmodern turn”—characterized by a refusal of the theoretical presuppositions 
of modernism, which influenced various movements in philosophy, the sciences, 
and the arts in the late 20th century—show up earlier in the “social” and the 
“linguistic turns” brought on by the legacies of French intellectuals Émile 
Durkheim and Ferdinand de Saussure. Similarly, the ecological turn that is 
defined by a rejection of the pernicious dualisms inherent to what is rightfully 
called egoic thinking—our default mode of engaging the world given ontological 
status by Descartes and his philosophical successors—can be found in the 
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“practice turn,” the “feminist turn,” the “affective turn,” and the “corporeal turn,” 
all of which reflect core tenets of postmodernism.  
 The principle insight of the sciences of ecology involves recognizing the 
dynamic and irreducibly complex patterns of interaction that constitute living 
organisms, including humans. Ecology’s very existence poses a radical challenge 
to all static, substantive views of the self, such as those embedded in most 
modern and contemporary philosophies and worldviews. This explains why in a 
recent work cataloguing the history of revolutionary scientific concepts, ecology 
was described as “the most important revolution in general thinking in the last 
hundred and fifty years.“118 As Brian Eno succinctly puts it, ecology “has given us 
a whole new sense of who we are, where we fit, and how things work. It has made 
commonplace and intuitive a type of perception that used to be the province of 
mystics—the sense of wholeness and interconnectedness.”119 Ecology’s 
revolutionary potential is increasingly called upon to address questions 
concerning not only how humans do act, but also how they ought to act, in 
relation to the environment and their fellow creatures.  
 According to Code’s analysis, ecological thinking has the potential to effect 
for philosophy a revolution comparable in scope and impact to Kant’s self-
proclaimed “Copernican revolution.”120 This is because the ecological perspective 
spurns all transcendent beliefs and principles. It assumes no radical 
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discontinuities in nature, choosing to focus instead on the specific situations of 
knowers and their circumstantial negotiations with—and inside of—the natural 
world; there is no other, non-natural world. It further finds no place for absolute 
knowledge or propositional truth claims.121 In Code’s view, “ecological thinking 
points toward ways of developing a conceptual framework for a theory of 
knowledge—an epistemology—sensitive to human and historical-geographical 
diversity and well equipped to interrogate and unsettle the instrumental 
rationality, abstract individualism, reductionism, and exploitation of people and 
places that the epistemologies of mastery have helped to legitimate.”122 Like 
utilitarian social reformer John Stuart Mill before them, Code, Næss, Dewey, and 
other “ecologists” wisely recognize that “No great improvements in the lot of 
mankind are possible until a great change takes place in the fundamental 
constitution of their modes of thought.”123 
 Not all of the revised modes of thinking and acting heralded by the 
ecological turn can be examined here. Yet ecological thinking’s push “to relocate 
inquiry, ‘down on the ground,’ in everyday lives and situations”124 is directly in 
line with the stance advocated by Dewey and his pragmatist brethren. For Dewey, 
all human inquiry is situated within the contexts of specific problems. In 
connection to this point, Code reflects on the fact that social constructivism and 
empiricism (what Dewey would call idealism and naturalism or realism) are often 
                                                        
121 Ibid., 5-6. 
122 Ibid., 21. Italics original.  
123 Mill, John Stuart, Autobiography and Literary Essays, eds. John M. Robson and Jack 
Stillinger (New York: Routledge, 1981), 245.   
124 Code, Ecological Thinking, 1.  
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planted against each other as incommensurable ontological and epistemological 
positions. In contrast to this position, Code persuasively argues, as Dewey did in 
various writings, that both perspectives are operative in successful inquiry. Our 
existential location within a particular situation provides the conceptual and 
practical material out of which we create knowledge; when we recognize this fact, 
it allows us to continually refine our knowledge-making processes as well as 
calibrate them more ethically and humanely. Code is in firm agreement with 
Dewey when he asserts that all available knowledge—whether scientific, moral, or 
religious in quality—should be used for humane and social ends.125    
 
 
Dewey’s Ecological Naturalism 
 
 
 Now, then, let us return to Dewey’s relationship to ecological thinking. 
Provided Dewey’s diverse, seemingly contradictory commitments to meliorism, 
pragmatism, experimentalism, idealism, and evolutionary naturalism, his overall 
philosophical system is best described as a variety of what Lorraine Code terms 
“ecological naturalism.”126 Ecological naturalism is a holistic, non-reductive form 
of naturalism that incorporates realist and constructivist (idealist), objectivist 
and subjectivist, descriptive and normative components. It starts from the 
recognition that human meaning and value are not prefixed a priori but naturally 
                                                        
125 ETH2 (1932), LW 7: 283. 
126 See Code, Ecological Thinking, 64-94. I do not use the term precisely how Code uses it. For 
instance, her analysis is much less concerned than Dewey is with the organic, biological roots of 
human knowledge and action. Further, Code employs the term in primarily an epistemological 
sense. I argue it rightfully describes Dewey’s approach to ontological and axiological matters as 
well, for these concerns are inextricably intertwined in his perspective.   
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emerge from our engaged interactivity with environmental objects and events, 
mediated through our enculturated habits and practices (which are also part of 
nature). Ecological naturalism fundamentally rejects the idea that our experience 
is opaque, whereby our perceptual systems have to construct internal 
representations of the world to which meanings and values are superadded. 
 Among the chief obstacles in arriving at a richer interpretation of Dewey’s 
religious thought is the resistance of commentators to look past the arguments 
presented in A Common Faith. Another obstacle, linked to and likely a direct 
cause of this one, is a persistent lack of agreement over the aim, scope, and 
content of Dewey’s naturalism among philosophers and Dewey scholars. Though 
Dewey the experimentalist resisted placing firm boundaries around his ideas, we 
simply must get a better grip on his ecological naturalism if we expect to make 
any headway in comprehending the full sweep and significance of his religious 
thought. 
 At the epistemological level, ecological naturalism is a direct challenge to 
absolute or subjective idealist theories that leave the knowing process to the 
rational ego’s synthetic mental activity alone, like those of George Berkeley and 
Bernard Bosanquet. Dewey severely critiqued such forms of idealism as unduly 
stressing the cognitive, intellectual dimension of experience to the neglect of its 
noncognitive, affective and somatic dimensions. These are equally important for 
understanding the totality of human being and knowing. For Dewey, the felt 
immediacy of lived experiencing is basic and irreducible to cognition alone. This 
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is an insight Dewey shared with his philosophical contemporary, French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, though the two never met or engaged 
each other’s work.   
 Ecological naturalism also challenges naive realist theories that attempt to 
insulate the objects and events of knowing from the mind’s organizing structure, 
as advocated by New Realists Ralph Barton Perry and William Pepperell 
Montague, among others. Yet by viewing “reals” as directly knowable as we 
perceive them and not admitting any mind-transcendence for reality as such, the 
naive realist position does not appear to be all that different from the idealist 
position (as an epistemological thesis at least). Regardless, against both views, 
Dewey viewed knowing as a practical, partly realistic, partly constructive 
(idealizing) activity aimed at adjusting our situated, embodied transactions with 
the environment. It is the purpose of thinking to anticipate the consequences of 
actions beforehand, through a process of imaginative “dramatic rehearsal,”127 and 
alter the course of one’s behavior according to the (situationally) objective 
desirability of those consequences.  
 Given the commitments just outlined, Dewey is often charged with being 
an antirealist, insofar as he appears to deny the existence of objective reality or at 
least that any statements about it can be wholly verified. While Dewey would 
surely gladly accept the second, weaker aspect of antirealism, it is more accurate 
to say that he sought to forge a middle path between the epistemological 
                                                        
127 ETH (1908), MW 5: 292. 
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extremes of realism and antirealism. Neurobiologist Jay Schulkin gives clear 
expression to the balancing act of Dewey’s ecological naturalism by maintaining 
human knowing is realistic—that is, our conceptions “are constrained by the 
contours of nature”—but only in a qualified, critical sense of the term, for inbuilt, 
cognitive rules ultimately “provide coherence” to our conceptual categories.128 
According to Dewey, all human forms of perception and action, including the 
religious, are essentially outgrowths of organic, creaturely copings with a 
tumultuous and unpredictable environment.  
 It is important to clarify at this juncture that ecological naturalism is not 
simply an epistemological theory for Dewey. Dewey’s holism understood human 
epistemology as intimately connected to our ontological constitution and innate 
axiological inclinations. This is just a brief general overview of Dewey’s ecological 
naturalism; more will be said on Dewey’s ecological approach to specific issues of 
epistemology, ontology, and axiology in Chapter 3.    
 
DEEDS: Core Themes and Concepts 
 
 To those familiar with recent theoretical and experimental work in 
philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences falling under the enactivist and 
DEEDS headings, Dewey’s views of perception as active, of inquiry as situated, of 
the self as an organism-environment system, and of value and meaning as 
emergent may appear less than groundbreaking. If we keep in mind that Dewey 
                                                        
128 Jay Schulkin, Naturalism and Pragmatism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 5.   
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began working from a post-Cartesian, ecological perspective in the late 19th 
century, however, the revolutionary character of his work, especially as regards 
his views on religion, shines clearly through. Virtually no scholarship in 
philosophy of religion has investigated religion from within the ecological 
framework represented by these radical theoretical perspectives.129 The situation 
is not much different within the current cognitive science of religion, which 
remains wedded to superseded computationalist theories of the human mind and 
outdated supernaturalistic definitions of religion (themes we return to in Chapter 
4).130 A significant opportunity thus stands in front of philosophers to rethink 
what religion is and can be in an unfinished, interactive, and continuously 
evolving universe. An unlikely and reluctant prophet, it was John Dewey who set 
the stage for this paradigm shift in religious consciousness. Before moving 
further in our investigation of Dewey’s religious naturalism, it will be useful to 
summarize the core themes and concepts of enactivism and DEEDS at this early 
stage to see exactly where they, and thus Dewey, depart from mainstream 
scholarship. Various aspects of these schools of thought will be picked up again in 
the remaining chapters of the dissertation.   
 DEEDS and enactivism are frequently presented as “radical” alternatives 
or challengers to what is variously called “traditional,” “standard,” or 
                                                        
129 A notable exception is the recent work of Nathaniel F. Barrett. See his “Toward an Alternative 
Evolutionary Theory of Religion: Looking Past Computational Evolutionary Psychology to a 
Wider Field of Possibilities,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78, no. 3 (2010): 583-
621; and “The Perception of Religious Meaning and Value: An Ecological Approach,” Religion, 
Brain & Behavior (2013): 1-20. 
130 Both of these tendencies are forcefully critiqued by Barrett in his “Toward an Alternative 
Evolutionary Theory of Religion.” 
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“establishment” cognitive science (perceptual theory/philosophy of mind).131 
Establishment cognitive science draws from a variety of disciplines, including 
psychology, linguistics, philosophy, and computer science. Its overarching 
theoretical commitment is that cognition consists of an algorithmic process over 
symbolic representations, which are the main units of perception. This view 
traces back to the application of British mathematician Alan Turing’s ideas on 
information processing to the human mind in the 1960s. According to the 
computational view of the mind, thinking is essentially a form of computation, 
defined as a systematic set of laws governing the relations among internal 
representations, with a mental (perceptual) state representing something when 
there is a causal relation between the mental state and a particular worldly object 
or event. To give a universal, organically occurring example: “fire means heat” is 
the result of a correlation between the thought of fire and perceiving heat, as fire 
is a source of heat (to heat sensitive organisms). A culturally specific example 
might be “green means go,” where an association between the color green and 
“safe to drive” has been adopted as a convention intended to guide driving 
behavior on publically shared roads; there is nothing inherent to the color green 
that indicates safety in this case (though it has been shown that green plant life, 
even when artificial, is soothing to humans). On most computational accounts, 
mental (i.e., representational, something re-presented in the mind’s eye) content 
is determined solely by an individual’s intrinsic, internal properties; relations to 
                                                        
131 I prefer the “establishment” descriptor as it draws attention to the political and institutional 
factors that work to influence which theories and schools of thought are deemed worthy of 
transmitting to future generations of students.   
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one’s natural and social environment play little to no constitutive role as far as 
the contents of perception are concerned.    
 Philosopher John Searle was an early critic of the view that the mind was 
essentially no different from an information processor. His “Chinese room” 
thought experiment was an attempt to refute claims that artificially intelligent 
systems like computers were capable of intentionality and understanding on par 
with human minds.132 Searle asks us to imagine a scenario where a monolingual 
English speaker is locked in a room with a large collection of Chinese writing, a 
second collection of Chinese script, and a set of rules in English matching the 
latter to the former. Presumably this would allow the English speaker to give back 
certain Chinese symbols in response to questions from a native speaker of 
Chinese outside the room. While, Searle admits, the room-bound speaker’s 
formal responses might be indistinguishable from those of a Chinese speaker, 
they do not really understand a word of Chinese, nor would a computer program 
exchanging the same semantic inputs and outputs, no matter how sophisticated 
or human-like its responses might seem. Several replies and rejoinders have been 
leveled against Searle’s Chinese room argument over the years, but the point he 
raises has succeeded in casting serious doubt over whether artificial systems can 
ever fully match human intelligence. Researchers sympathetic to Searle’s views 
have advanced various theories in support of their suspicions about the 
reproducibility of human minds, which can be summed up by the adjectives 
                                                        
132 John R. Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 
(1980): 417-457.  
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comprising the letters of the D-E-E-D-S acronym. We will review each of these in 
turn.    
 Dynamic: Given the perceived insufficiency of computer metaphors for 
understanding human cognition, theorists like W. Ross Ashby, Michael Wheeler, 
and Tim van Gilder have argued persuasively for a view of the mind as a complex 
system.133 These scholars put forward dynamic systems theory as a more suitable 
theoretical framework for situating mental phenomena because the neurological 
underpinnings of cognition in the brain are made up of organic molecules and 
cells that, as part of the natural world, change over time and exhibit variable 
qualitative behavior that is difficult, if not impossible, to predict in advance. 
Human thinking is just too complex and unique, dependent upon a seemingly 
infinite number of factors and influences, from the biological to the cultural 
levels, to be effectively reduced to discrete inputs and outputs (stimuli and 
responses). Computational models cannot even explain basic human decision-
making for their staticity and linearity have difficulty accounting for all of the 
relevant empirical data, including temporal issues and ancillary factors such as 
affect and context. Dynamical models, on the other hand, treat these elements as 
variables evolving interactively over time, and are thus believed to provide a more 
accurate account of how intelligent beings make decisions.134    
 Embodied: The central statement of the embodied cognition movement is 
                                                        
133 For an overview, see Tim van Gelder, “The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science,” 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21, no. 5: 615-628.  
134 Tim van Gelder, “Dynamic Approaches to Cognition,” in The MIT Encyclopedia of the 
Cognitive Sciences, eds. Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001): 
243-244. 
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the 1991 work The Embodied Mind, by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and 
Eleanor Rosch.135 The authors, a biologist, a philosopher, and a cognitive 
scientist, respectively, reject computationalism as a deficient basis for a robust 
science of mind. Perception they contend must be linked to action, for human 
experience is indelibly shaped by our physical capabilities and the types of bodies 
we have (more accurately: are). A logical consequence of the thesis of 
embodiment means that the world is not “pre-given” (realism), nor is it purely 
the creation or projection of an experiencing individual (idealism). Rather, 
embodiment implies a middle ground position between the extremes of realism 
and idealism: the world is perceiver-dependent, but we share a mutual world 
with conspecifics because of our common perceptual and bodily structures. 
Experience involves less the “passive reception” of intrinsically meaningless 
information and more one’s “embodied action” in a dynamically unfolding 
environment pregnant with vital meanings (e.g., on account of their impacts on 
our physical, sensate bodies). As explained by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch: 
 By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first, that cognition 
 depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various 
 sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
 themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural 
 context. By using the term action we mean to emphasize once again that sensory and 
 motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally inseparable in lived 
 cognition.136      
  
 Extended: The thesis of “the extended mind,” first proposed by Andy Clark 
and David Chalmers, posits that the environment plays an active, constitutive 
                                                        
135 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind.  
136 Ibid., 173.  
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role in cognitive processes.137 In reviewing various cases of human problem-
solving, Clark and Chalmers found that humans frequently offload cognition onto  
features of the environment for future action. To illustrate this principle, which 
goes against computational, “internalist” models of cognition that posit that 
mental contents correspond to properties of our brains-bodies alone, they offer 
the example of Otto, an Alzheimer’s patient who relies on environmental cues 
and information to help structure his daily activities. Otto routinely writes down 
new information for future access, with his notebook serving the same functional 
role that memory does.138 According to the extended mind thesis, Otto’s “beliefs” 
stored in his notebook are on par with those stored in a normally functioning 
brain—we should consider both genuine cases of cognition. The only thing that 
prevents us from equating the two is our stubborn adherence to the skin-skull 
boundary. According to the Clark-Chalmers analysis, intelligent problem-solving 
is not something the brain can achieve on its own; it is, more properly, the 
outcome of the brain and body working together in an information-rich 
landscape. At any given time, the human mind is extended by technology, from 
language and basic writing instruments, to more sophisticated machinery like 
calculators and flight simulators. Knowledge, skills, and technology are shared 
among individuals by virtue of their embodiment in tools and artifacts, rituals 
and habits. To fully understand human problem-solving, cognitive scientists (in 
                                                        
137 Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7-19.  
138 An illustrative example from popular culture would be the main character from the 2000 
psychological thriller Memento, who searches desperately for his wife’s murderer but, suffering 
from anterograde amnesia, must rely on written clues to reconstruct his memory each day.   
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addition to philosophers and other theorists of human nature) need to investigate 
the human mind-body system in conjunction with relevant features of the 
physical and sociocultural environment.       
 Distributed: Closely related to the notion that cognition is extended 
beyond our brains is the idea that it is distributed. Meaning and information are 
conditioned by the physical and functional properties of the environment. 
Cognition can thus be considered as “stretched” over mind, body, activities, space 
and time, as well as other actors. Distributed cognitive models are inspired by 
research in the natural and social sciences. Insect behaviorists and sociologists, 
for exampled, both point to the seeming “mindlessness” of group-level behavior, 
where a large number of individuals follow the direction of others by means of 
simple information-processing rules to accomplish joint goals, such as nest 
building in the case of insects. The most recognized proponent of distributed 
cognition is Edwin Hutchins, who upon studying how navigation is coordinated 
on military ships, posited the mind as being in the world—challenging the age-old 
dictum, tracing back to Descartes, that the world resided in the mind.139 
Hutchins’s empirical observations demonstrated that the complex knowledge 
required to operate a naval vessel does not exist in one’s head alone, but is 
contained in the coordinated interaction between mental processes and the 
environmental objects and tools one uses.   
 Situated: That perception and cognition are situated means, quite simply, 
                                                        
139 Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). 
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that they are context-dependent. A further tenet of the situated cognition 
hypothesis is that many complex human behaviors do not require the internal 
representations of the world and its contents. The structures of behavior are 
accounted for by structures in the environment, with an agent recruiting external 
entities during her ongoing action. Knowledge is inseparable, on this reading, 
from action with both taking place across physical and sociocultural contexts. As 
William Clancy points out, situational feedback—much like that received from the 
forces of gravity, forward motion, and so on—is of paramount importance to 
understanding the nature of coordinated activity. According to Clancey, “situated 
cognition research explores the idea that conceptual knowledge, as a capacity to 
coordinate and sequence behavior, is inherently formed as part of and through 
physical performances. The formation of perceptual categorizations and their 
coupling to concepts provides material for reasoning (inference), which then 
changes where we look and what we are able to find.”140 This holds true even for 
activities that appear uniform regardless of the situations in which they are 
performed, like computation. Yet early studies on arithmetic by Jean Lave 
showed the ways in which people approach structurally identical cognitive tasks 
differ across settings—such as while grocery shopping or taking school tests—
ultimately depend upon how the problem is presented.141 For instance, when 
asked how many apples there are between two individuals when one has four and 
                                                        
140 William J. Clancey, Situated Cognition: On Human Knowledge and Computer 
Representations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4. Emphasis original. 
141 See Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1-18.   
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the other has five, a test-taker will answer “nine,” while a person shopping for 
food might answer “nine, “ thirteen,” or “twenty-one,” as the math problem is 
recast in the course of locating an answer depending upon bodily and social 
factors over and above the purely cognitive.  
 Enactive: Enactivism combines various tenets of the DEEDS framework 
and thus for analytical purposes can be examined alongside it.142 Enactivism is 
built on the idea that the perceiver is an active agent and not a passive receiver, as 
noted above. Motivated by the failures of establishment approaches to cognition, 
which leave opaque how computational processes could produce consciousness, 
enactivism stresses the importance of understanding experiences as they are 
undergone by embodied subjects situated in an environment. As philosopher of 
perception Alva Noë puts this point: “Perception is not something that happens 
to us or in us. It is something we do.”143 To illustrate the difference between 
enactivism and establishment approaches to various forms experience, consider 
the example of vision. While computational theories of vision are built upon the 
idea that the visual system acts like a camera, providing snapshots of the world in 
the form of internal representations (which the visual cortex processes and builds 
into coherent visual experience), enactive theories view vision as “an activity in 
which the perceiver is constantly moving his eyes, head and body picking up task-
                                                        
142 A more accurate, but somewhat cumbersome acronym describing the alternative framework 
might be DEEEDS. Richard Menary has popularized the “4E” (Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, 
and Extended) moniker to collectively refer to these radical approaches to cognitive science. For a 
concise introduction, see Richard Menary, “Introduction to the Special Issue on 4E Cognition,” 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 4: 459-463.  
143 Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 1.  
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relevant information from the world when it is needed.”144 According to 
enactivism, all organismic experience—not just visual experience—emerges from 
perpetual feedback between the body’s internal and external dynamic systems 
and the larger environment. What we see is dependent upon what we do and 
what we need at any given moment.     
 This brief rundown of the core themes and concepts of enactivism and 
DEEDS cognitive science help us to understand the essence of Dewey as an 
ecological thinker, which will be taken up in its specific details in the chapters to 
follow.145 It is apparent that Dewey’s ecological naturalism holds rich insights for 
many areas of philosophy, including philosophy of perception, philosophy of 
action, and philosophical anthropology. Philosophy of religion also has much to 
gain from Dewey’s ideas, especially given its current state of “crisis,” which now 
has been announced by a number of scholars in the field. In order to better 
understand the exact meaning and implications of contemporary philosophy of 
religion’s disorderly state, Chapter 2 will begin with a succinct history of 
philosophy of religion from its beginnings up to the present. Once this 
background information is provided we will then move on to a discussion of the 
potential contributions of Dewey’s ideas for creating a healthier, more 
progressive, more ecological future for the discipline.  
                                                        
144 Nivedita Gangopadhyay and Julian Kiverstein, “Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and 
Action,” Topoi 28 (2009): 63.  
145 I do not mean to imply that Dewey would agree with all of the views just presented without 
qualification. The specific theses which line up with Dewey’s thinking will come through later as 
we discuss his ontology, epistemology, axiology, and theory of experience in greater detail in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Toward an Ecological Philosophy of Religion 
 
 
I have always thought that two issues—namely, God and the soul—are chief 
among those that ought to be demonstrated with the aid of philosophy rather 
than theology. For although it suffices for us believers to believe by faith that the 
human soul does not die with the body, and that God exists, certainly no 
unbelievers seem capable of being persuaded of any religion or even of almost 
any moral virtue, until these two are first proven to them by natural reason.        
                -René Descartes1 
 
 
 
2.1 Philosophy of Religion Before and After Descartes 
 
 
Philosophy of religion, as with most fields of inquiry, is well described by the set 
of problems its concepts and methods were designed specifically to address. This 
holds true even if one disagrees with the general conception of philosophy as 
problem-solving advanced by Dewey and outlined in Chapter 1. Making a list of 
the problem sets for the main branches of philosophy is a fairly straightforward 
task. Epistemology focuses on problems of knowledge (episteme), including those 
over its origins, structures, and justification. Ontology addresses itself to 
fundamental problems of existence or being (ōn). What is it? Where is it? When 
is it? Axiology poses similar questions about value (axios), and whether value 
should be conceived of in terms of beauty, justice, goodness, or something else. 
Significant overlap exists between these categories—no self-consistent 
philosopher would deny that knowledge is valuable or that it exists, for example—
                                                        
1 Réne Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. 
Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [1637] 1998), 47.  
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though for the most part they are treated separately.    
 What are the philosophical problems of religion? And are these problems 
the same for each religion, or do they more accurately apply to the religious as a 
universal dimension or feature of human existence, as Dewey would phrase it? 
Given the comments made so far on the subject, the apparent answer to this last 
question is: both. A philosophical, problem-solving approach to religion proceeds 
from a generalized and naturalistic perspective (as it does for knowledge, being, 
value, and so forth), while the problems a naturalistic conception of religion-in-
general poses to philosophy exert pressure on historically determinate forms of 
religion in turn. It is by the coherence and functionality of a particular religion’s 
answers to philosophical problems that its theological sophistication and 
existential appeal are typically appraised.   
 The problems addressed by philosophers of religion have shifted 
throughout history, but have remained somewhat static since the modern period 
with René Descartes’s quest for the absolute foundations of knowledge, as 
reflected in the opening quotation to this chapter. I believe this places philosophy 
of religion’s future into question, for unless it can adapt to the challenges posed 
by the ecological turn, which above all is marked by a rejection of Western 
philosophy’s Cartesian heritage, its credibility within the present-day research 
university, along with its relevance to daily living, appear bleak. The types of 
problems a post-Cartesian, ecological philosophy of religion must prove itself 
capable of addressing will be outlined shortly. Before introducing these problems, 
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however, we first will take a closer look at philosophy of religion before and after 
the pivotal figure of Descartes.   
 
 
Philosophy of Religion as a Western Product 
 
 
 Philosophical rumination upon religion can be traced back to the earliest 
instances of reflective thought. It carries on today and, much like religion itself, 
shows no signs of abating. In the West it turns up in the fragments left behind by 
the Pre-Socratic physiologoi, as part of their inquiries into nature and humanity, 
before officially entering the philosophical canon as part of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. In the East it animates the sacred hymns of the Vedas, the earliest 
writings of Hinduism and oldest surviving texts of human history, until receiving 
a more critical formulation in the pre-Buddhistic Upanishads. And this is to say 
nothing of philosophy of religion’s role in predominantly oral cultures like those 
of the African continent, a geographical area traditionally and still today 
neglected by professional philosophers, a trend directly traceable to a colonial 
bias against unwritten thought. This fact is rendered richly ironic by philosophy’s 
most famous talker Socrates’ claim, made in Plato’s Phaedrus, that “writing is 
inhuman.”2 
 Philosophy of religion as a distinct field of study, however, is a uniquely 
Western product. As such, it is related to the unique historical and cultural 
                                                        
2 On this point, see the various articles comprising H. Odera Oruka, ed., Sage Philosophy: 
Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 
1990).   
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circumstances of the European continent and the countries coming under its 
influence, including the English-speaking nations of North America and 
Australasia. Although philosophical inquiry into religious matters, including the 
essence of religion, the nature of the sacred, humankind’s relation to God or the 
divine, and the content and significance of religious and spiritual experiences, 
has existed since the very beginnings of philosophy, what academic philosophers 
typically mean by “philosophy of religion” is really an intellectual product of the 
last two hundred years.3 
 In the summary that follows, our focus thus will be exclusively on 
philosophy of religion as it has been practiced in the West. This is not because I 
take the Western tradition of philosophy, or the Abrahamic faiths it typically 
engages, as the best or only way of thinking about religion. Dewey certainly would 
not propose this to be the case. It simply reflects the fact that, as Bryan Rennie is 
wise to point out, “this tradition is…the most highly operative single tradition of 
thought in the history of the study of religion in the Western academy.”4 The 
Western tradition, as Rennie goes on to note, has its “inherent faults,” but our 
relationship to it need not be wholly negative. Yet the faults and limitations of 
Western philosophy must be consciously recognized and reflected on. With that 
said, the present study can be better located within its historical and sociocultural 
situation, even though its analysis and recommendations might be applicable to 
                                                        
3 William J. Wainwright, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 3.   
4 Bryan Rennie. “After this Strange Starting: Method, Theory and the Philosophy of Religion(s)” 
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22 (2010): 117.  
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other times and places. Such is the lofty aim of all philosophical treatises. 
 I further would like to emphasize at this point that philosophy of religion 
is not the same thing as theology, despite the fact that it is often criticized as 
being a form of theology in disguise. Theologians examine a particular religious 
tradition from the inside. It is not necessary for theologians to be religious 
believers; theologians merely operate from the basis of what cultural 
anthropologists call an emic perspective—“a subjective approach which looks 
from within, and uses local criteria…as a search for the native’s point of view.”5 
Philosophers of religion, on the other hand (at least according to the definition of 
philosophy adopted here) attempt to analyze religion-in-general systematically, 
from an outsider or etic perspective—“an objective approach that uses external, 
scientific criteria and concepts in an effort to understand the phenomenon being 
studied.”6  
 Another way to state the point being made is to say that theology takes the 
doctrines and dogmas of a particular religion as unquestionably and irrevocably 
true. Philosophy of religion, on the other hand, seeks to get behind the various 
cultural manifestations of religion to their true, universal core. As Edgar Sheffield 
Brightman elegantly defined it early on in the last century, “Philosophy of religion 
is an attempt to discover by rational interpretation of religion and its relations to 
other types of experience, the truth of religious beliefs and attitudes and the value 
                                                        
5 Yael Avrahami, The Senses of Scripture: Sensory Perception in the Hebrew Bible (London: 
Continuum, 2012), 42.    
6 Ibid.  
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of religious attitudes and practices.”7 Brightman’s interpretation nicely lines up 
with Dewey’s problem-solving approach to philosophy, which he extended to his 
treatment of religion in A Common Faith.  
 The specific problems with which philosophers of religion must contend, 
especially in light of the critique leveled against philosophy of religion’s 
traditional scope and methods by the turn to ecological thinking, are stipulated in 
Section 2.4. In order to present the fundamental presuppositions of an ecological 
approach to philosophical problems of religion in a coherent fashion, I focus 
specifically on the figure of René Descartes. As the “father of modern 
philosophy,” his importance to any philosophical consideration of religion is 
without question. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the following analysis, the 
philosophical anthropology underpinning Descartes’s Enlightenment rationalism 
is directly (even if not fully) responsible for contemporary philosophy of religion’s 
conceptual shortcomings, including its continued adherence to varieties of 
foundationalism and dualism. 
 
 
From Modern Principles to Contemporary Shortcomings 
 
 
 Philosophy of religion’s timeline can be divided into four main periods: 
ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary.8 The principle concern of the 
present section is with philosophy of religion’s modern and contemporary 
                                                        
7 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), 22.  
8 Chad Meister, Introducing Philosophy of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2009), 9.  
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periods. A general summary of the ancient and medieval periods will be provided 
first, however, to lay some background for later discussion.  
 As George Boys-Stones recounts in the multi-volume The History of 
Western Philosophy of Religion, masterfully edited by Graham Oppy and Nick 
Trakakis, philosophy of religion as practiced in the ancient world differed greatly 
from the way modern philosophers would perceive it later.9 As a first 
consideration, pre-Christian religion was not defined in terms of propositional 
belief statements; rather religion was understood principally in terms of ritual 
involvement and adherence to local customs (in agreement with Pierre Hadot’s 
assessment of ancient philosophy discussed earlier). Second, the nature and 
source of religious authority was conceived of in a radically different fashion. 
There was no Bible, Torah, or Quran for the ancient Greeks, who looked instead 
to the epics of Homer and Hesiod for religious inspiration and moral guidance. 
Third, ancient Greek cosmology admitted the existence of several gods, all who 
regularly interacted with the human world in both beneficial and harmful ways, 
and were the topic of frequent discussion by philosophers such as Xenophanes, 
Heraclitus, and Socrates. Fourth, religious and philosophical problems were 
viewed as inextricably intertwined and were thus approached in a similar way. 
Plato, Philo, and Plotinus, for instance, all saw the problems of creation, the 
Creator, and evil as essentially metaphysical issues, as opposed to moral or 
theological ones. These philosophers and their peers made no attempt to 
                                                        
9 George Boys-Stones, “Ancient Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction,” in The History of 
Western Philosophy of Religion, Volume 1: Ancient Philosophy of Religion, eds. Graham Oppy 
and Nick Trakakis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1-22.  
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attribute human intentions to the religious first principle or Platonic One.  
 It is only later with the advent of Christianity and writers like Paul of 
Tarsus and Origen that we find philosophers speaking of a personal God’s 
intentions and concerns for creation from decidedly theistic and moralistic 
perspectives. Doctrines and principles developed during the ancient period that 
would influence philosophizing about religion for the next fifteen hundred years 
include Plato’s cosmological theory of Pure Forms (abstract ideas corresponding 
to the sensible effects and qualities of particular objects); Aristotle’s metaphysical 
theory of the “unmoved mover” of the physical universe; the idea of natural law 
as advanced by the Stoics, especially Seneca; the skeptical teachings of Lucretius 
and Sextus Empiricus; and Roman statesman Cicero’s treatise on The Nature of 
the Gods (De natura deorum), which 18th century French Enlightenment thinker 
Voltaire praised as among very the best books of antiquity.   
 A succinct presentation of philosophy of religion as it was practiced in the 
medieval period is impossible. A significant number of transitions took place in 
the manner that students of philosophy and religion understood and approached 
their subjects and the relationship between them in the long period from Rome’s 
collapse to the start of the 16th century.10 A few important transitions to make 
note of here include the appropriation by early Christians of Greek philosophical 
ideas, ideas that were creatively synthesized with fundamentals of Christian 
theology and later transmitted to, while undergoing modifications by, Jewish and 
                                                        
10 G. R. Evans, “Medieval Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction,” in The History of Western 
Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2: Medieval Philosophy of Religion, eds. Graham Oppy and Nick 
Trakakis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1-17.  
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Muslim theologians. For a time, access to Aristotle’s works was severely limited 
by restrictions of language, while Platonic philosophy, especially Plato’s theory of 
the Forms and his mystical notion of the “World Soul” introduced in the 
Timaeus, thrived as mediated through the works of figures as dissimilar and 
distant in time as Augustine and Marsilio Ficino.  
 The thought of Aristotle was available to and directly engaged by Jewish 
scholars, including Maimonides, and Islamic philosophers, including Al-Kindi, 
Al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina. Most of these thinkers took from the ancient Greeks only 
that which supported their fixed theological agendas; ideas not amenable to this 
purpose were significantly refashioned or abandoned. It is for this reason that 
Paul Spade is essentially correct when he made the following quip about 
philosophy as practiced in the medieval period: “Here is the recipe for producing 
medieval philosophy: Combine classical pagan philosophy, mainly Greek but also 
in its Roman versions, with the new Christian Religion. Season with a variety of 
flavorings from the Jewish and Islamic intellectual heritages. Stir and simmer for 
1300 years or more, until done.”11  
 The greatest execution of this intellectual “recipe” is surely Thomas 
Aquinas’s wedding of Aristotelian concepts and methods with those belonging to 
the tradition of natural theology. Within natural theology, a deep experiential 
understanding of the existence and attributes of God is sought by means of 
human reason and the evidence of the senses, with no appeal being made to 
                                                        
11 Paul Vincent Spade, “Medieval Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 
July 15, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-philosophy/#Ingredients. 
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divine revelation or religious scripture. This hybrid philosophico-theological 
method famously produced Aquinas’s “Five Proofs” for the existence of God as 
presented in his massive Summa Theologica, the pinnacle of scholasticism and 
widely considered a classic in the history of Western literature. Probably the 
largest transition in the way medievals perceived philosophy and religion took 
place much later, however, when proto-scientist Francis Bacon began to test 
time-honored philosophical and religious claims about the natural world by 
experimental means. This ultimately led to the breakdown of the previously tight 
cooperation between philosophy and theology that characterized the ancient 
period. This breakdown would be cemented further by Renaissance and 
Reformation philosophers and theologians Bernardino Telesio, Giordano Bruno, 
Martin Luther, and John Calvin, among others. It is these men that set the stage 
for the complete separation of philosophy and religion by radical Enlightenment 
thinkers.     
 The discussion of ancient and medieval philosophy of religion just 
presented has been kept intentionally brief. A comprehensive treatment of both 
periods would require a close examination of many specific examples and cases 
studies beyond the scope of this dissertation. Perhaps the best way to sum up the 
general outlook of the two periods, before moving on to address the defining 
trends of modern and contemporary philosophy of religion, is to say that both the 
ancients and medievals used philosophy mainly as a set of tools to enhance and 
edify already held religious beliefs—what 11th century Christian thinker Anselm 
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of Canterbury referred to as fides quarens intellectum, or “faith seeking 
understanding.”  
 The relationship between religion and philosophy during the transition to 
the modern period initially followed this conciliatory pattern, but with some 
important differences. Christianity remained the dominant religion within 
Europe at this time, even as it faced various challenges and underwent significant 
changes. As a result, most modern philosophers, including Descartes, Locke, 
Hume, Kant, and Hegel, engaged religious themes and topics from a 
predominantly Christian or Christian-like standpoint, as exemplified by the 
“clockmaker” and “prime mover” God of Deism.  
 This brings us to the modern period. While surveying modern philosophy 
of religion’s central concerns, David Antsey finds that while we see an early focus 
on the further development of rational arguments for theism—many of which 
Descartes reworked anew by means of his “clear and distinct” rationalism—the 
value placed on rational theology gradually eroded as the modern period 
unfolded.12 This is partly due to the fact that the claims of rational theology were 
increasingly evaluated from outside the frameworks of orthodox or Deist 
Christianity, both well represented in Locke’s On the Reasonableness of 
Christianity, and from the perspective of “natural religion,” as set down most 
clearly in Hume’s The Natural History of Religion.  
 After the publication of Hume’s treatise, one notices a substantial shift of 
                                                        
12 David Antsey, “Early Modern Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction,” in The History of 
Western Philosophy of Religion, Volume 3: Early Modern Philosophy of Religion, eds. Graham 
Oppy and Nick Trakakis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1-18. 
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focus from logically proving the existence of God to interrogating how a 
Supernatural Being could possibly act upon and within a wholly natural world. 
The Cambridge Platonists solved the God-nature problem by altering the doctrine 
of physical matter, while Benedict De Spinoza solved it by denying God’s 
transcendence and endorsing, in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, an 
imaginative rather than literal reading of the miracle stories recorded in the 
Bible. Along with Thomas Hobbes, who upheld a strict materialist metaphysics, 
Spinoza’s views were entertained as atheistic and damaging to religion during 
their time.   
 The Enlightenment’s assault on traditional religious and metaphysical 
systems continued with the natural philosophy of Nicolaus Copernicus, Johannes 
Kepler, Galileo Galilei, Pierre Gassendi, and Robert Boyle. In stark contrast to the 
ancient and medieval periods, the dominant intellectual stance or attitude of 
philosophy of religion in the modern period can be characterized, by inverting 
Anselm’s famed phrase, as one of intellectus quarens fidem, or “rational 
understanding seeking fulfillment by faith.” Rational demonstration was of 
paramount importance and formed the sole proper basis for religious faith—a 
common faith meant to be accessible to and assessable by all rational inquirers (a 
program picked up by John Dewey centuries later, though significantly altered). 
As we will see shortly, this philosophical sea change in regards to religion persists 
far into, and in many ways still defines, contemporary philosophy of religion. 
Before proceeding to the contemporary period, however, the treatment of religion 
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by the most towering figure of modern philosophy demands careful attention. 
 Remembered most notably as a philosopher, Descartes was also a brilliant 
mathematician and scientist, inventing the eponymous coordinate system still 
used today and writing an early work on physics that defended a heliocentric 
model of the solar system similar to that of Galileo. Since he is the fountainhead 
of modern rationalist philosophy, any focus on Descartes in a work being written 
in the post-modern, and hence post-Cartesian age, is likely to be critical in 
orientation. Yet, as Stephen Toulmin urges us, Descartes’s rationalism must be 
assessed against its historical context, where “social and political life could no 
longer be based on the authorities of the past because these authorities’ divergent 
claims had led Europe into the chaos of the Thirty Years War.”13 As Toulmin 
powerfully recounts them, such were the external causes of Descartes’s “inward 
turn.”  
 The importance of Descartes for the development of modern philosophy of 
religion is twofold. First, Descartes is credited with establishing the doctrine 
known as foundationalism, according to which all genuine knowledge claims 
must be built on a foundation that is itself foolproof and error free.14 Descartes’s 
model for sure knowledge was axiomatic geometry, first set down by Euclid. 
Euclid’s geometry contains two noteworthy features: (1) axioms that are self-
evident and thus immediately justified (e.g., the whole is greater than the part), 
                                                        
13 Nancey Murphy and Brad J. Kallenberg, “Anglo-American Postmodernity: A Theology of 
Communal Practice,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 27.  
14 Charles Taliaferro, Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion since the Seventeenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58.  
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and (2) theorems that follow from self-evident axioms on the basis of pure logic 
(e.g., it is true that all right angles are equal to one another). For Descartes, self-
evident beliefs included the simple necessary truths of logic and mathematics as 
well as beliefs about one’s inner state of mind.  
 Descartes’s quest for absolutely certain knowledge begins in his Discourse 
on the Method (the full title of which is Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences) where he 
advocates a method of skeptical doubt toward all knowledge claims. This method 
resulted in his famous rule “to accept as true only that which is so clear and 
distinct that it cannot be doubted.”15 Descartes’s aim was to find a logical method 
that could reliably guide us in solving all of our intellectual problems. This 
rationalist methodology grows out of his famous assertion “I think, therefore I 
am” (Cogito ergo sum in Latin).  
 Through introspective analysis, Descartes found that, unlike just about 
everything else in the external world, one’s self-existence was indubitable. As 
such, it provided the surest and most secure foundation on which to build any 
system of knowledge. According to James Byrne, the clearest account of this 
principle is found in Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy, a volume more 
accessible than the Discourse and widely considered to be his most important 
work.16 It is in this piece that Descartes addresses over six intellectual 
meditations whether or not he could be deceived about his own existence by an 
                                                        
15 James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 57.  
16 Ibid., 58-59.  
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all-powerful and malicious demon. Descartes ultimately concludes that God’s 
goodness precludes such deception.  
 After presumably defeating skepticism in the first two meditations using 
the methods of doubt and analysis, Descartes argues for the reality of other 
innate ideas (besides that he exists as a thinking thing), including, most notably, 
the idea of God, defined as a perfect being upon whom all imperfect beings 
depend for their existence. Thus, while Descartes broke with medieval philosophy 
by holding that religion was justifiable through reason without the aid of 
revelation, he remained firmly stuck in the scholastic mindset by accepting 
without question the traditional attributes of God and using them in his search 
for foundational knowledge of self and world. For Descartes, it went without 
saying that “all knowledge which is true depends on prior knowledge of God.”17    
 Second, and directly following from his epistemological foundationalism, 
is Descartes’s strict ontological separation between mind and body. This view has 
proven so influential in the history of ideas that it is now simply referred to as 
Cartesian dualism. As Descartes writes in the Sixth Meditation: “On the one 
hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am a thinking and 
not an extended thing, and, on the other hand, a distinct idea of the body, in so 
far as it is only an extended and not a thinking thing, it is certain that I am really 
distinct from my body, and can exist without it.”18 Under Descartes’s analysis, the 
self is primarily a “thinking thing” that is unextended in space, unlike physical 
                                                        
17 Ibid., 63.  
18 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and 
Replies, trans. Michael Moriarty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 127.  
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objects which have obvious spatial dimensions: “No thought can exist apart from 
a thing that thinks, and in general no activity or accident can be without a 
substance in which to exist….There are activities which we call intellectual….The 
substance in which they reside we call a thinking thing or a mind.”19 Descartes 
further views the thinking self as a “substance” that can survive death—once 
again clearly demonstrating his (a priori) allegiance to a Christian metaphysics.  
 Descartes’s philosophy is richer in scope and content than has been 
described here. Let me offer a tough but fair evaluation before moving forward. 
Descartes’s philosophy makes a subjectivist, foundationalist epistemology into 
the basis for a dualistic ontology and anthropology, resulting in an impoverished 
understanding of the human self as self-consciousness with no essential links to 
anything outside of it. As Charles Taliaferro explains, this maneuver 
unfortunately leads to an acute “severance between appearance and reality”20 for 
modern philosophers, one that we find mirrored in contemporary philosophy of 
religion in its dominant analytic and Continental expressions, which remain 
hopelessly rooted in Cartesianism (i.e., egoic thinking) in some form or other. We 
see this, for instance, in analytic philosophy’s insistence on rational 
demonstration via logical proof, and Continental philosophy’s preference for 
personal narrative over empirical investigation. Yet virtually all aspects of the 
Cartesian philosophical project have been called into question by the results of 
the ecological sciences, which show that there is no knowledge apart from 
                                                        
19 René Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 64.  
20 Taliaferro, Evidence and Faith, 66.  
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context, no self apart from world, no mind apart from body. Each is tightly 
knotted to the other. The stubborn adherence to Cartesian, pre-scientific ideas by 
analytic and Continental philosophers has directly contributed to philosophy of 
religion’s present crisis, the exact contours of which are spelled out next.21  
 
 
2.2 A Contemporary Call to Arms 
 
 
As mentioned previously, philosophical reflection upon religious ideas and 
practices has a rich and varied history, despite the Western origins of the 
conceptual categories “philosophy” and “religion.” Furthermore, the field of 
philosophy of religion is currently experiencing a critical renascence, with several 
contemporary philosophers seeking to actively reshape its research methods and 
social agenda to fit 21st century realities. For the majority of these scholars, this 
means at the very least expanding the scope of philosophy of religion beyond its 
historically limited focus on the Abrahamic, monotheistic traditions of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. Fundamental theological claims of these traditions are 
increasingly undermined by scientific and technological advancements. 
 Given its long pedigree, one reasonably might assume philosophy of 
religion to have a well-defined aim, clear and defensible boundaries, and a 
distinct set of methods, as do, say, philosophical logic or philosophy of language. 
                                                        
21 I realize that speaking of two kinds, “analytic” and “Continental,” of philosophy of religion is 
somewhat problematic, as is the analytic-Continental distinction within philosophy more 
generally. However, the distinction is well recognized in the literature and significant enough 
differences of style and substance exist between philosophers of religion to justify its use on 
heuristic grounds.  
 91 
Our brief excursion into philosophy of religion’s history has proved this 
assumption to be extraordinarily incorrect. This assessment is confirmed by a 
survey of recently published meta-level works in the field. The titles of but three 
monographs are enough to give some impression as to the current disorderly 
state of the art: The End of Philosophy of Religion by Nick Trakakis,22 Religious 
Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry: Envisioning a Future for 
the Philosophy of Religion by Wesley Wildman,23 and Philosophy and the Study 
of Religions: A Manifesto by Kevin Schilbrack.24  
 The consensus reflected by the core arguments of these works—and a 
growing list of others, which cannot be addressed in significant detail here25—is 
that philosophy of religion, rather than representing a coherent and unified field 
of study, is actually a field in crisis and in desperate need of reconstruction. With 
this sober appraisal I am in full agreement; it comprises half the reason this 
dissertation and not another is being written (the other being a desire to deepen 
the critical appreciation and application of John Dewey’s religious thought). 
                                                        
22 Nick Trakakis, The End of Philosophy of Religion (London: Continuum, 2008). 
23 Wesley J. Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry: 
Envisioning a Future for the Philosophy of Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2010). 
24 Kevin Schilbrack, Philosophy and the Study of Religions: A Manifesto (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2014).   
25 Including, most notably, John Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Human 
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), and Timothy D. Knepper, The Ends of 
Philosophy of Religion: Terminus and Telos (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). 
Cottingham sharply critiques “standard” philosophy of religion for its narrow focus on intellectual 
arguments at the expense of the personal and emotional commitments that shape religious and 
spiritual lives. Knepper’s excellent hermeneutic analysis of philosophy of religion’s crisis is a 
direct response to Trakakis’s work. I focus on the analyses by Trakakis, Wildman, and to a lesser 
extent that of Schilbrack as they are the most systematic in their critiques of contemporary 
philosophy of religion and each carefully lays out a distinct roadmap for the discipline’s future.      
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Nevertheless, the exact causes of and, consequently, the prescribed remedies for 
philosophy of religion’s crisis differ significantly across its separate treatments, 
leaving the field’s future state ultimately up in the air. In most intellectual 
settings such diversity of opinion is to be welcomed, celebrated even. 
Unfortunately, in the case of the meta-level works mentioned above, when read 
alongside one another, it has the unfortunate effect of obfuscating the general 
lessons they might hold, leaving the student of contemporary philosophy of 
religion with a baby’s impression of the field’s current state and prospective 
directions, unable to synthesize the blooming, buzzing confusion—to borrow an 
apt phrase from William James—of critical insights into a meaningful whole.  
 Lest this problematic state of affairs continue, it calls out for a more 
insightful metaphilosophical treatment. As we will see, the conceptual and 
procedural differences within contemporary philosophy of religion ultimately 
stem from disparate conceptions of philosophic activity. For philosophers wary of 
metaphilosophy, of either its possibility or its value, this claim will likely render 
suspect the agenda of the present section which is to put forward yet another 
diagnosis of what “really ails” contemporary philosophy of religion: its stark 
inability, by virtue of its persistent adherence to a scientifically impoverished 
anthropology, to provide an account of religion that is grounded in common 
human experience and accepted reality. To skeptics of metaphilosophy I 
sanguinely repeat neopragmatist Richard Rorty’s candid insight that philosophy 
requires periodic metaphilosophical reflection if it is to remain unbiased and self-
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consistent.26  
Regardless of one’s philosophical allegiances, one must acquiesce with 
Rorty on this point. No prudent philosopher of religion would deny that without 
the occasional conceptual tidying up, philosophy of religion’s house would fall 
into disrepair. I should add that in no way are these comments directed solely at 
philosophy of religion; they apply to any intellectual endeavor that seeks 
relevance beyond the narrow confines of the ivory tower. After several decades of 
isolated productivity and stubborn resistance to the call for greater pluralism in 
content and method in philosophy, however, philosophy of religion’s 
housekeeping is long overdue. In effort to make transparent exactly why I take 
this to be the case, we will first review the arguments of the two meta-level works 
introduced above. Doing so will establish the context for subsequent discussions 
of the specific challenges posed to philosophy of religion by the ecological turn 
and the promise of John Dewey’s thinking for constructing a truly ecological 
philosophy of religion.  
 
 
The Intrinsic Limits of Analytic Philosophy 
 
 Nick Trakakis’s The End of Philosophy of Religion is somewhat 
deceptively named, for its target is not philosophy of religion in toto but rather 
analytic philosophy of religion. This is what philosophy of religion in most 
                                                        
26 See Richard Rorty, “The Limits of Reductionism,” in Experience, Existence, and the Good: 
Essays in Honor of Paul Weiss, ed. Irwin C. Lieb (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1961): 100-116.  
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introductory texts and college programs amounts to, however, and so the work’s 
provocative title is justified. As is the case with analytic philosophy more 
generally, which is built from the work of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, analytic philosophy of religion tends to focus on 
epistemological matters and on the building of formal arguments. The following 
kinds of problems receive extensive treatment by analytic philosophers of 
religion, both past and present: Is evil evidence against belief in God? Is eternal 
damnation compatible with the Christian concept of God? Does science discredit 
religious belief? Is religious language rational? By formatting such problems 
axiomatically—that is, in terms of basic propositions and logical conclusions—
analytic philosophers of religion, by their own admission, rarely consider “the 
history, context, or cultural milieu of the positions” they argue for or against.27    
 While philosophically interesting, problems like those sketched above 
display little resemblance to how actively engaged religious persons conceive 
religion. It is for this reason that Trakakis aims “to show that the analytic 
tradition of philosophy, by virtue of its attachment to scientific norms of 
rationality and truth, cannot come to terms with the mysterious transcendent 
reality that is disclosed in religious practice.”28 Trakakis is not content to stop at 
the level of critique; his work includes a compelling proposal that if philosophy of 
religion aims to survive into the long or even near future, it must begin to 
incorporate the kinds of narrative and literary approaches employed by those 
                                                        
27 Meister, Philosophy of Religion, 1. 
28 Trakakis, Philosophy of Religion, 2.   
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working in the Continental tradition of philosophy, which draws upon the 
methods and insights of figures like Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and 
Jacques Derrida.29   
 In what is perhaps the work’s strongest contribution, Trakakis condemns 
the perennial obsession of analytic philosophers of religion with the so-called 
“problem of evil,” otherwise known as theodicy. As he sees it, the project of 
theodicy, of attempting to offer reasoned justification for an all-loving God’s 
permission of horrendous and seemingly gratuitous evil, is both “morally 
confused” and “morally scandalous.”30 By describing evil as a logical problem to 
be “solved,” Trakakis believes that analytic philosophy of religion privileges the 
cold observer’s point of view to the neglect of the people actually suffering. This 
would be like asking a culinary photographer how a particular food or dish 
tasted—it is necessarily limited in the insight it can provide and we therefore 
should not absorb its lessons uncritically. 
 Trakakis carefully details the limitations of the overly rational focus of 
analytic philosophers of religion, best exemplified by Alvin Plantinga’s 
resuscitation of Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. 
Plantinga aims to place the ontological argument on a rigorous epistemological 
foundation in order to establish the rationality (and veracity) of theistic belief in a 
solider fashion than Anselm could with the medieval logic at his disposal. 
                                                        
29 For a variety of perspectives on the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy, 
see the essays comprising C. G. Prado, ed., A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and 
Continental Philosophy (New York: Humanity Books, 2003).   
30 Trakakis, Philosophy of Religion, 29. 
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Anselm’s famous argument is known by many formulas, but if one sticks close to 
the Latin original, it goes something like the following: 
1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought. 
2. God exists in the mind since even the Fool can think of (have in mind) something than 
which nothing greater can be thought. 
3. But we can think of something which is greater than something existing only in the 
mind. 
4. So something than which nothing greater can be thought cannot only exist in the mind.31  
  
 Anselm’s argument faced harsh criticism by his contemporary, and fellow 
monk, Gaunilo who claimed that something can be both in the mind and in 
reality without being what Anselm posited as God. It received more refined 
criticism from Immanuel Kant when he posited that “existence is not a 
predicate.” Kant followed David Hume who expressed some puzzlement over 
what existence could add to an object—what is the difference between a brown 
dog and an existing brown dog, for instance? For Kant and Hume, saying that a 
thing exists is saying one thing too many; existence is not a property on top of an 
object’s other authentic properties.   
 Plantinga takes up Anselm’s argument, originally made in the 1078 work 
Proslogion, in the 1970s and attempts to give it a more robust form. His 
reworked version of the proof unfolds as follows: 
1. The proposition that a thing has maximal greatness if and only if it has maximal 
excellence in every possible world is necessarily true.  
2. The proposition that whatever has maximal excellence is omnipotent, omniscient, and 
morally perfect is necessarily true. 
3. There is a possible world in which the property of possessing maximal greatness is 
exemplified. 
4. The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every possible world. 
5. God exists.32   
                                                        
31 Brian Davies, “Anselm and the Ontological Argument,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Anselm, eds. Brian Davies and Brian Leftow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
160. 
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It is difficult to see what is to be gained from Plantinga’s additional logical 
maneuvers, aside from an internally consistent, well-ordered argument. But its 
soundness ultimately rests upon the acceptance of semantic equivalences that 
may or may not hold ontologically. For example, we simply cannot know that 
omnipotence, if it exists, goes hand-in-hand with moral perfection; perhaps being 
morally perfect requires one to give up one’s power. The point being made here is 
that the argument’s conceptual framework is defined beforehand, making dissent 
difficult if not outright impossible. 
 Trakakis is right to take issue with analytic philosophy of religion’s modus 
operandi of utilizing deductive logical methods to arrive at presumably 
universally valid conclusions about religion, for such conclusions are abstracted 
from the actual existential situations within which religious beliefs and practices 
arise and operate. He cogently argues against the analytic tendency to present 
arguments in terms of individual propositions and inferential relationships as too 
sterile to handle the seriousness of the truths revealed in religious experiences.33 
In place of analytic philosophy of religion’s detached objectivity and limited focus 
on scientific forms of knowledge and discourse, Trakakis recommends embracing 
Continental philosophy’s stance of perspectivalism, also called perspectivism, 
which is a direct reaction against the conception of an objectively existing reality 
that admits impartial, observer-independent information. After all, 
                                                        
32 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 214-216. 
Quoted in Michael Tooley, “Plantinga’s Defence of the Ontological Argument,” Mind 90 (1981): 
422.  
33 Trakakis, Philosophy of Religion, 37-40. 
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postmodernist and feminist critiques of Western reason, in addition to certain 
scientific advancements like relativity theory and quantum mechanics, have 
proven this type of objectivity to be but a fantasy. One need only speak to a 
forensic psychologist to understand that qualitative descriptions of physical 
phenomena differ between observers and can change for the same observer when 
viewed under a variety of conditions.  
 Trakakis puts forward D. Z. Phillips as an exemplar of the Continental 
perspectival method. This leads inevitably to his endorsement of religious non-
realism, for perspectivalism argues that religious belief has less to do with 
proving the existence of particular objects or entities, such as God, and more to 
do with concrete ways of living. One might look to the differences between Zen 
Buddhism, with its focus on compassionate, mindful living from moment to 
moment, and other forms of Mahayana Buddhism that emphasize faith in 
supramundane cosmologies, for an illustration of the distinction Trakakis is 
making. Rather than constructing tight logical arguments, like those advanced by 
analytic (or dharmic) philosophers, Phillips prefers to explore the possibilities of 
religious meaning latent in the world’s creative literature and poetry.  
 The following selections from R. S. Thomas’s poem “Death of a Poet” serve 
as an elegant example of what Phillips, and thus Trakakis, intends: 
 Laid now on his smooth bed 
 For the last time, watching dully 
 Through heavy eyelids the day’s colour 
 Widow the sky, what can he say 
 Worthy of record, the books all open, 
 Pens ready, the faces, sad, 
 Waiting gravely for the tired lips 
 To move once—what can he say? 
 99 
 His tongue wrestles to force one word 
 Past the thick phlegm; no speech, no phrases 
 For the day’s news, just the one word ‘sorry’; 
 Sorry for the lies, for the long failure 
 In the poet’s war; that he preferred 
 The easier rhythms of the heart 
 To the mind’s scansion; that now he dies 
 Intestate, having nothing to leave 
 But a few songs, cold as stones 
 In the thin hands that asked for bread.34    
 
Like the practitioners of Zen, Phillips is sensitively aware of the failure of human 
language to capture the outpouring of felt meaning typically associated with the 
religious life, a point he communicates through analyzing Thomas’s poetry. 
Consequently, Phillips looks not to religious texts but to everyday experiences of 
meaning and value for insight into the true nature of religion. For Phillips, 
Trakakis, and the majority of Continental philosophers of religion, religious 
propositions are not referential; there simply is no God or religious reality 
independent of the way humans think about Him (or Her or It). As Trakakis 
succinctly states this point, “religion is one area where the existential and lived 
dimension cannot be neglected or reduced to purely abstract concerns without 
doing violence to the very object of inquiry.”35 
 The stylistic differences between analytic and Continental philosophy, 
including their respective approaches to religious subject matters, can be viewed 
as two different reactions to the philosophy of Descartes. Analytic philosophy 
seeks to emulate the logical and rational methods of modern science, which are 
rooted in the Cartesian quest for absolute epistemic foundations. By rejecting 
                                                        
34 D. Z. Phillips, R. S. Thomas: Poet of the Hidden God (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 
1986), 40.  
35 Trakakis, Philosophy of Religion, 115.  
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rationality and scientific method, however, Continental philosophy reflects an 
implicit commitment to Cartesian ontological dualism that treats God as a 
transcendent object wholly other and forever separated from worldly, bodily 
selves. God is simply not an existent that we can ever attain clear and distinct 
knowledge of. Belief in God, according to the Continental philosopher of religion, 
is resistant to all forms of logical analysis or rational theorizing.  
 While I am sympathetic to Trakakis’s critique of analytic philosophy of 
religion’s narrow focus on scientific forms of thinking, I believe his argument is 
overblown at many points. For example, Trakakis’s wariness of the limits of 
rational analysis and scientific method need not result in the outright rejection of 
both in favor of irrationality and non-realism. His assessment of philosophy of 
religion’s crisis does presciently hit on what John E. Smith viewed as the “tension 
between direct experience and argument” that serves to divide Continental and 
analytic approaches to religion, however.36 Yet where Trakakis recommends 
abandoning logical argument in favor of rich descriptions of direct experience, 
Smith more moderately pushes for the creation of a method that can incorporate 
both direct experience and argument in an intelligible and persuasive manner.  
 In deciding between following Trakakis or Smith in steering a course away 
from analytic philosophy of religion’s conceptual cul-de-sacs, contemporary 
practitioners of the discipline would do well to choose the latter. Failing the 
adoption of Smith’s balanced method, philosophers are faced with 
                                                        
36 John E. Smith, “The Tension Between Direct Experience and Argument in Religion,” Religious 
Studies 17 (1981): 487-497. 
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insurmountable difficulties of translation between competing interpretations of 
immediate experience, and the application of philosophy of religion to real-world 
problems is rendered a remote possibility. It should come as no surprise to learn 
that Smith aligns himself with the pragmatist philosophical tradition, especially 
with the figure of John Dewey. Dewey was a lifelong critic of the intellectualism 
characteristic of analytic philosophy, which he summed up in an article published 
early in his career in the following dispassionate manner: “Analysis of 
conceptions, with the law of identity or non-contradiction for criterion. To 
discover truth is to analyze the problem down to those simple elements which 
cannot be thought away, and reach a judgment whose predicate may be clearly 
and distinctly seen to be identical with its subject.”37 Dewey knew this 
reductionistic method to be deficient because, as Kant showed (Dewey’s 
dissertation was on Kant’s psychology), it is unable to explain causation and 
furnishes no method for moving from the realm of ideas to existence. Under the 
aseptic rules of analytic philosophy, the move from theory to praxis is rendered 
miraculous, reflecting the optimism but also the inevitable limits of 
Enlightenment rationality.  
 
The Virtues of Multidisciplinarity and Multiculturalism 
  
 Wesley Wildman comes close to creating the kind of method Smith has in 
mind with his Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry, 
                                                        
37 “Kant and Philosophic Method” (1884), EW 1: 34. 
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which is strategically subtitled Envisioning a Future for the Philosophy of 
Religion.38 Wildman is in basic agreement with Trakakis that there is no 
“unifying method or vision” governing contemporary philosophy of religion, but 
further argues that its practitioners, by their strict allegiance to the language and 
conventions of either analytic or Continental styles of philosophy, end up 
pursuing “diverse and often mutually allergic projects.”39 Rather than 
abandoning the quest for rationality in favor of personal narrative, as Trakakis 
recommends, Wildman seeks to reconstruct a theory of rationality that is able to 
make sense of the widest variety of human activities and projects, including 
religion. As Wildman explains, we need “a third epistemological path that rejects 
both the futile modern quest for certain foundations and the equally self-
defeating refusal of foundational theorizing.”40 Such a balanced position is hard 
to find in philosophy of religion, or philosophy in general nowadays, which like 
most other academic disciplines has fractured along different methodological 
fault lines into a dizzying assemblage of competing intellectual factions.  
 In clearing the way for this alternate path, Wildman, like Smith, marshals 
the conceptual and practical resources of philosophical pragmatism, which 
promotes fallibilist models of inquiry open to perpetual feedback and self-
                                                        
38 Wildman’s future vision for philosophy of religion includes its rebranding as “religious 
philosophy.” Though I do not adopt his suggested terminological shift in the dissertation, for 
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language’s role in shaping our perceptions, a name change could help facilitate the discipline’s 
fresh start. Compare Colin McGinn’s impassioned case for relabeling philosophy as “ontics” in 
“Philosophy by Another Name,” The New York Times, March 4, 2012, accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/philosophy-by-another-name/?_r=2. 
39 Wildman, Religious Philosophy, x.  
40 Ibid., 61. 
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correction based on their external consequences. Pragmatism holds a richer, 
more robust view of human rationality than that of either the analytic or 
Continental philosophical traditions by looking to its biological roots: “The 
biologically basic character of exploratory, hypothetical interactions with the 
ambient environment explains why inquiry, from the commonsense to the 
sublime, has the structure of a dynamic dialectic between perception and 
action.”41 Fallibilist, embodied, environmentally embedded models of inquiry, if 
they are to be successful (i.e., if they are to lead to more adaptive and intelligent 
behavior), cannot rely on rational analysis alone. The artificiality of the dilemma 
faced by Buridan’s ass, which would never starve to death willingly, proves this to 
be the case.42  
 Wildman champions a multidisciplinary approach for its ability to open up 
novel kinds of research that so far have been left unexplored by philosophers of 
religion by virtue of their limited concern with defense or critique of arguments.43 
Whereas Trakakis centers his critique on Alvin Plantinga, Wildman singles out 
the work of Richard Swinburne for scrutiny. Swinburne’s philosophy of religion is 
largely apologetic in nature, as the titles of some of his major works signal. These 
include Faith and Reason, The Christian God, The Evolution of the Soul, The 
                                                        
41 Ibid., 186.  
42 The paradox of Buridan’s ass is named after philosopher John Burdian (1300-1358) and 
depicts a donkey that finds itself halfway between two equally appetizing piles of hay. Given the 
identical properties and location of the hay piles relative to the donkey, the donkey has no 
sufficient reason to choose one over the other and so starves to death. The story is typically used 
to demonstrate that free will does not exist; whether it does so persuasively is an open question. It 
further serves to point out the limitations of relying solely on rational factors in any vital decision 
making situation.    
43 Wildman, Religious Philosophy, xvi.  
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Resurrection of God Incarnate, and The Coherence of Theism.44 In this last work 
Swinburne argues, in Anselmian fashion, that God’s existence necessarily must 
be understood as the being on which all else depends. In Plantiganian fashion, he 
argues that God’s existence logically depends upon his having the divine 
properties typically assigned to him. These points shine through most clearly in 
the following passages from The Coherence of Theism worth quoting at length: 
 I wish now to argue for…the [divine] properties discussed. The first is that any person 
 who is omnipotent and omniscient will be of logical necessity an omnipresent spirit. A 
 person who is omnipotent is able to bring about effects everywhere by basic actions. One 
 who is omniscient at a certain time has justified true beliefs about all things which are 
 going on anywhere at that time. Now if he depended for his knowledge on the proper 
 functioning of intermediaries such as eyes and ears, then if they were to behave in 
 unusual ways, his beliefs would be false (as are ours when our eyes and ears malfunction). 
 But if there were such intermediaries, as an omniscient being he would know if they were 
 behaving unusually and so would correct his beliefs in the light of this knowledge. 
 Malfunctioning of intermediaries could not lead an omniscient being astray. Hence an 
 omniscient being does not depend for his knowledge on the correct functioning of 
 intermediaries. Hence an omnipotent and omniscient person…is of logical necessity an 
 omnipresent spirit.  
  The other entailment for which I shall argue is that an eternally omnipotent 
 person…is necessarily the creator of the universe. A person P who is omnipotent at a time 
 t...is able to bring about the existence of any logically contingent state of affairs after 
 t…given that he does not believe that he has overriding reason for refraining from 
 bringing it about. Now consider for any time t all the logically contingent things which 
 exist at that time. At a time t’ immediately precedent to t, an omnipotent being P would 
 have had it in his power to bring about the non-existence of all those things—with the 
 exception to which we will come shortly. In that case, if they exist, they only exist because 
 he brought them about (or permitted them to exist) or made or permitted some other 
 being to bring them about. For each time t there will be a precedent time t’ of which this 
 holds. Hence an eternally omnipotent being will at some time have brought about (or 
 permitted to exist) or made or permitted other beings to bring about the existence of, all 
 the things which exist.  
  The only kind of thing existent at t such that an omnipotent being P would not at 
 t’ have had the power to bring about its non-existence is anything such that P believes 
 that he has overriding reason for refraining from bringing about its non-existence, viz. 
 anything for which he believes that he has overriding reason for bringing about its 
 existence. But then, although P’s being omnipotent does not entail that he brings about 
 the existence of such things, it follows from his being omnipotent, omniscient, and 
 perfectly free that he will do so. For being omnipotent he will have the power to do so. 
                                                        
44 Bibliographic details for these works are as follows: Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); The Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); The 
Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); The Resurrection of God Incarnate 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977).  
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 Being omniscient and perfectly free, he is perfectly good, and hence will bring about those 
 things.    
  The complex argument of the last two paragraphs may be summarized as follows. 
 If there is an omnipotent being, whatever exits at some time must have existed because 
 he did not stop existing. The only things which he could stop from existing are any things 
 which he has overriding reason to bring about. If he is also perfectly free and omniscient, 
 of logical necessity he will bring those things about. I conclude that an eternally 
 omnipotent person who is omniscient and perfectly free is of logical necessity the creator 
 of the universe.... 
  So then I have claimed that a person who is eternally perfectly free, 
 omnipotent, and omniscient will have the other divine properties which I have 
 considered. He will be an omnipresent spirit, creator of the universe, perfectly good, and 
 a source of moral obligation.45   
 
 Reflecting on the above argument, it seems more accurate to call 
Swinburne a philosophical theologian, a Christian philosopher, or even a 
religious philosopher rather than a philosopher of religion. Swinburne’s 
apologetic agenda aside, he should be applauded in that he is not afraid to engage 
the methods of science and mathematics to leverage philosophical arguments in 
his many works. However, his embrace of scientific method does little to justify 
his unquestioned endorsement of divine attributes that contravene the strongest 
known scientific evidence in their disfavor. Furthermore, Swinburne’s sustained 
advocacy of mind-body dualism à la Descartes—note the ample usage of “spirit” 
and its identification with “person” in the passages quoted—reveals the 
intellectual immaturity of his particular brand of philosophy of religion in a 
scientifically informed era.  
 Wildman is quick to censure Swinburne for advancing intellectually callow 
positions, calling him to account for not exploring “ideas of God beyond such 
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simple variations on the idea of God he wishes to defend.”46 This same criticism 
could be leveled against a host of contemporary philosophers working on religion 
who operate from within single traditions or approaches. While we might pardon 
Descartes or Anselm for advancing such arguments, given the social conditions 
and limitations of knowledge of their times, such intellectual transgressions are 
less forgivable coming from our contemporaries. Quite frankly, they should know 
better, because anyone who calls herself a philosopher should abandon old ideas 
when presented with evidence inconsistent with those ideas.  
 Wildman is not one to let our naive philosophical forbearers off the hook 
easily, and so Anselm is hauled onto the intellectual chopping block along with 
Swinburne. Wildman’s problem with Anselm’s famous “proof” mirrors that 
advanced by Trakakis, by way of his critique of Plantinga: basically, Anselm’s 
ontological argument is too “strongly conditioned by his Platonic philosophical 
heritage, his personal mystical experience,” and “the emphasis of his monastic 
community on a life of prayer.”47 In Wildman’s opinion, philosophers of religion 
working from prior held beliefs exhibit an apologetic interest and, consequently, 
a professional blindness inappropriate to a genuinely philosophical approach, 
which requires a certain level of abstraction and generality. As Wildman astutely 
expresses this point: 
 [T]he tradition of religious philosophy associated with the hypothesis of classical 
 Christian theism continues to defend a substantivist, personalist conception of God as an 
 omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, infinite, intentional, aware, and active divine 
 being. Meanwhile, postmodern religious philosophy tends to refuse this conception of 
                                                        
46 Wildman, Religious Philosophy, 104.  
47 Ibid., 97.  
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 God as anthropomorphic, morally dubious, in thrall to mythology, and covertly biased in 
 favor of the perceived needs of living religious traditions. There are extremely intelligent 
 people on both sides with rather a lot in common, yet they routinely dismiss one 
 another’s perspectives without thorough consideration. This situation stands as a stern 
 warning to religious philosophers to make sure they peer out of their local tradition-caves 
 from time to time in order to avoid intellectually embarrassing parochialism. This is also 
 why religious philosophy must be a comparative venture as well as an interdisciplinary 
 form of philosophical inquiry.48  
  
It is for this reason that Wildman identifies inherited religious bias—bias that 
frequently goes undiagnosed and, even when diagnosed, often remains obstinate 
in its presence—as “the most profound intellectual defect in traditional 
philosophy of religion.”49 Surveying the currently available literature, it would be 
hard to argue against Wildman here.   
 Wildman ultimately sees a more practical role for philosophy of religion 
than Trakakis. Under his enriched view, philosophers of religion should seek not 
only to clarify religious ideas and practices, but should also “inform people about 
religion so as to increase mutual understanding and global security, and to guide 
diplomacy and political policy decisions.”50 Here we see evident hints of Deweyan 
pragmatism, with Wildman’s advice for philosophy of religion following the 
general pattern Dewey sought to establish for all philosophical inquiry.    
 Wildman’s pluralism is not limited to the level of methodology. In addition 
to his promotion of multidisciplinarity, Wildman lobbies for a more positive 
embrace of multiculturalism on the part of philosophers of religion. This once 
again cuts against the dominant analytic grain of contemporary philosophy, 
which largely views multiculturalism as a threat to hallowed Western concepts of 
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truth and objectivity. Renowned, octogenarian philosopher John Searle vocally 
speaks out against multiculturalism in philosophy for precisely this reason: 
“Knowledge is typically of mind-independent reality. It is expressed in a public 
language, it contains true propositions—these propositions are true because they 
accurately represent that reality—and knowledge is arrived at by applying, and is 
subject to, constraints of rationality and logic. The merits and demerits of 
theories are largely a matter of meeting or failing to meet the criteria implicit in 
this conception.”51 From Searle’s perspective, conceptions that deviate from this 
view can be tolerated, but they do not warrant any real consideration or critical 
engagement. Yet, as Wildman persuasively asserts, if philosophy of religion is 
ever to become a progressive research program, contemporary philosophers of 
religion must move beyond mere toleration of group differences; they must be 
willing to subject religious beliefs and cultural practices to more stringent 
scrutiny: “Fruitfulness depends on the degree to which inquiry can be organized 
in such a way that with time philosophical hypotheses about religious matters can 
be improved through finding and activating sources of correction.”52 
 Under Wildman’s reformed view of the discipline, philosophers of religion 
can and should still be interested in the religious beliefs, behaviors, doctrines, 
and experiences of the historically determinate religions, including the tradition 
(Western Christianity) that delivered and in many ways continues to shape it. But 
they need not and should not let their inquiries be stifled by adherence to 
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52 Wildman, Religious Philosophy, 51. 
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inflexible dogma or prefixed ideologies. To allow such a course of action to 
continue, as it invariably does in so many philosophy departments and academic 
journals across the United States and Europe, would be to unnecessarily limit the 
geographical and intellectual scope of philosophy of religion.  
 By the same token, for up-and-coming philosophers of religion to proceed 
unquestioningly with “business as usual” would be to further risk losing all 
contact with the actual meaning and functioning of religion in the lives of the 
majority of the world’s faithful, which inescapably involves the free exercise of 
human intelligence in doubt, inquiry, and experimentation. This fact holds even 
where such questioning results in the strengthening of one’s pre-critical faith. 
The credibility and vitality of philosophy of religion in a progressively 
multidisciplinary and multicultural academy crucially depends on broadening its 
current limited focus and making Wildman’s bold vision a vibrant reality.  
 
Probing Religion’s Noncognitive Dimensions 
 
 Kevin Schilbrack follows Wildman’s lead in the more recent (but less 
granular in its analysis) Philosophy and the Study of Religions: A Manifesto. In 
this work, Schilbrack likewise calls out traditional philosophy of religion for its 
narrowness, intellectualism, and insularity. These shortcomings are evidenced in 
what he sees as the basic division in the field along theistic, belief based lines, 
“between those theists who argue that there exists a being worthy of worship and 
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those who argue that there does not (or that, if there does, we cannot know it).”53 
Schilbrack rebukes philosophers of religion for this shortsighted focus, as it omits 
a significant amount of material relevant to religion from its scope. In 
Schilbrack’s opinion, this only serves to weaken philosophy of religion’s 
intellectual standing before a global audience, for it presumes to equate theism 
with religion, when theism represents but a fraction of religious belief worldwide.  
 Broadening its focus to include data from religions globally and 
throughout history will help cure philosophy of religion of its tendency to dry 
intellectualism. Questions of doctrine have animated philosophers of religion 
since the Middle Ages when philosophy of religion began as the intellectual 
fusion of Christian theology and Greek philosophy. This explains, at least in part, 
the narrow Christian and monotheistic focus the questions philosophers of 
religion like Swinburne continue to address, questions that would more 
accurately be categorized as philosophical theology or Christian philosophy. The 
overt emphasis on Christian doctrine and monotheism is, in a religiously pluralist 
world and a methodologically pluralist academy, uncritical and thus 
unphilosophical. 
 As Schilbrack’s insightful analysis shows, most religions boast dimensions 
over and above the doctrinal dimension focused on advancing arguments for 
specific religious ideas, including what he identifies as the experiential-affective, 
ethical, political, and ritual dimensions. Probing these noncognitive dimensions 
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will require philosophers of religion to abandon their warm insularity and go out 
and actively engage other academic disciplines, in addition to other branches of 
philosophy, in a broadly conceived, interdisciplinary program of “religious 
studies.” Note the use of the plural here; the offspring of a marriage between 
philosophy and the interdisciplinary study of religions is multiple, by both 
necessity and design. Schilbrack is evidently a student of Wildman’s pluralistic 
philosophy of religion. 
 Implicit in Schilbrack’s denunciation of philosophy of religion’s narrow 
focus on issues of doctrine and epistemology is a critique of its preoccupation 
with conceptual forms of thought and propositional knowledge—what 
philosophers commonly refer to as “know that”—at the expense of other ways of 
knowing that humans have at their disposal and which are surely operative in 
religion and other higher orders of intelligent exploration and expression. This 
focus is judged to be negative because over-emphasizing the intellectual, rational, 
and mental aspects of human experience invariably misses important aspects of 
religion as it actually functions in the lives of religious people. Moreover, it 
explicitly or implicitly supports an impoverished philosophical anthropology that 
closely tracks Cartesian dualism, the view that the mind is a nonphysical, non-
extended substance removed from the material world it inhabits. This view is 
now nearly universally rejected for multiple reasons.  
 Further yet, by arguing that the justification of religious belief is or can be 
wholly internal, dependent only upon one’s private, privileged access to their 
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mental content—content which in the religious case is typically cast in 
supernaturalist or immaterialist terms—contemporary philosophy of religion 
ultimately rests on unstable idealist or irrealist ontological foundations. 
Ontological objects and mental contents of this sort are seriously called into 
question by the reigning naturalist and realist orthodoxy of other fields of 
philosophy that deal with epistemological matters, namely, philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science. 
 Even if we grant that religion is partly a social construction, this does not 
mean that religion and its objects do not exist “out there” in the world. As 
Schilbrack notes in a separate work, the religious is made known by its functional 
effects in experience. The ontological status of religion is not a naive realism we 
simply mirror with human concepts; religion does not exist apart from embodied, 
experiencing human subjects. Religion is, rather, a critical realism we enact and 
perform, a world we create and subsequently inhabit:  
 The Thai boy, for instance, is not merely called a monk; he becomes a monk. This 
 religious status—his monkhood—exists not merely because a religious word is used to 
 describe him, not merely because he is seen, so to speak, through [sic] the lens of a 
 religious vocabulary. He embodies this religious status because his hair has been cut in 
 tonsure, because he has been given and wears his robes, because of the creation of the 
 monastery and the arrangements of the finances and laws to support it, because of its 
 Vinaya code and the discipline he takes from it, and because of the boundaries of the 
 sangha as a group distinct from the householders and exclusive of women. In this way 
 one can speak of religious hair, religious clothes, religious buildings, religious behavior, 
 and religious communities as social realities in the world, and one can speak of religion 
 as the abstraction that refers to the set of such things. In these ways, religions are not 
 merely concepts but also inhabited worlds.54    
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2.3 The Significance of Dewey’s Ideas for Philosophy of Religion 
  
As the percipient analyses of Trakakis, Wildman, and Schilbrack show, 
philosophy of religion is a field in peril. The postmodern and feminist critiques of 
authority and reason have seriously called into question the preference of analytic 
philosophers of religion for linguistic-logical “analysis,” for rationally justifying 
particular religious beliefs, doctrines, and principles. In similar fashion, the rise 
of naturalist and relational modes of thinking has greatly weakened the favored 
strategy of Continental philosophers of religion of substituting personal narrative 
for rational argument so as to insulate religious faith from external scrutiny.55 
 The increasing appeal of postmodern and feminist perspectives, along with 
naturalist and relational theoretical frameworks, is a direct reflection of the 
growing influence of what Lorraine Code has called “ecological thinking.” To 
recap on the argument of the last chapter, ecological thinking eschews the barren 
abstractions and reductive dualisms of Western modes of thinking that have 
reigned supreme since the Enlightenment. The ecological turn now rapidly 
transforming theory and practice in both the sciences and the humanities is, at its 
base, an exercise in philosophical anthropology, one marked by a rejection of the 
rational, ahistorical, autonomous ego-self foundational to modern thought—said 
to have begun in earnest with Descartes’s Cogito—and adoption of a wider view 
                                                        
55 For these reasons, analytic philosophers of religion are typically said to continue in the 
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of the self that embraces affectivity, relational interdependence, and 
sociohistorical location.   
 Within philosophy of religion, both analytic and Continental approaches 
traditionally operate on the basis of a Cartesian, egoic conception of the self that 
sharply separates subject from object, experience from nature, self from world.56 
The same dualistic view of human nature underlies many of the world’s spiritual 
and religious traditions. The Western monotheisms, for instance, stress the 
absolute transcendence of God over immanent nature, in addition to the soul’s 
(or mind’s) supremacy over the body. These should not be viewed as naive 
religious beliefs or innocent theoretical claims, free of external costs and 
consequences. It reasonably can be argued that their adoption and perpetuation 
has led to a significantly reduced concern for the environment among generations 
of their adherents, religious and irreligious alike.  
 
The Poverty of the Egoic Self 
 
 The individualistic, egoic view of the self has led to the remarkable 
technological accomplishments of modern human beings. At the same time, 
however, the failure to view the larger world of nature as supportive and 
                                                        
56 By describing the philosophical anthropology of contemporary analytic and Continental 
philosophy of religion as “Cartesian,” one may charge that I am merely setting up a straw person 
argument, for many of Descartes’s views have been subjected to severe critique by philosophers 
since at least the middle of the past century. Yet this does not diminish the fact that much analytic 
and Continental philosophy—and much contemporary psychology and cognitive science, for that 
matter—remain beholden to a Cartesian view of the self to a degree that almost seems 
anachronistic. 
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constitutive of the self unquestionably has contributed to the global ecological 
crisis now threatening humanity’s, as well as countless other species’, survival. 
The negative externalities endemic to egoic thinking can be seen in the 
widespread processes of deforestation, soil erosion, toxic chemicals, land, air, and 
water pollution, in addition to accelerated population growth. A remedial, 
radically ecological way of thinking and being in the world is needed if we are to 
stave off the immanent doom portended by these developments and secure our 
long-term future and stability.   
 Taking its cue from recent developments in the natural and social sciences, 
including chaos theory, complexity theory, and dynamic systems theory,57 the 
ecological conception of the self challenges the dualistic divisions inherent to 
egoic thinking and shows that what is commonly referred to statically and in 
isolation as subject, experience, or self is really a dynamic open system of beliefs 
and practices emerging from ongoing, tightly coupled transactions of a biological 
organism with a complex environment shaped by material, as well as social and 
cultural, factors. Under the ecological view, our personality—the core of our very 
being, which most of us like to think is stable and fixed—is really a bundle of 
habits and dispositions constantly forming and reforming from one moment to 
the next. Dewey made this point forcefully over half a century ago: “Human 
nature exists and operates in an environment. And it is not ‘in’ that environment 
                                                        
57 For an overview of these scientific developments, see, respectively, James Gleick, Chaos: 
Making a New Science (New York: Penguin, 2008); Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided 
Tour (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A 
Primer (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2008).   
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as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil. It is of them, 
continuous with their energies, dependent upon their support, capable of 
increase only as it utilizes them and as it gradually rebuilds from their crude 
indifference an environment genially civilized.”58 This brief statement 
encapsulates Dewey’s ecological naturalism and holds revolutionary implications 
for any academic discipline or research field that includes theories of nature and 
the self, which includes philosophy of religion.      
 The significance of Dewey’s political and educational thought for 
philosophers working in those research areas is evident. The causes of liberal 
democracy and educational reform possess an innate attraction for the public’s 
imagination and affections. From the challenge of nation building to the task of 
creating a standardized curriculum, Dewey’s philosophy is rich in theoretical and 
practical insights, perhaps the most crucial being that theory is a form of practice 
and vice versa. The fundamental aim of both politics and education for Dewey is 
not to convey information but to develop critical thinking and real-world 
problem-solving skills so that every individual might recognize and partake in the 
good life. That Dewey viewed religion, ecologically reconstructed in terms of a 
common faith in the ideal possibilities of nature, as an integral part of this self-
cultivation process has been routinely missed by philosophers and Dewey 
scholars.  
 This is precisely where modern philosophy and, by extension, philosophy 
                                                        
58 HNC (1922), MW 14: 296. 
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of religion errs in Dewey’s eyes. Modern philosophy was—and, in many cases, 
contemporary philosophy still is—beholden to a Cartesian perspective that 
sharply divides the knowing human subject from the known, objective world. 
According to Descartes, for knowledge to be trusted as secure, it must either be 
self-evident (i.e., direct and intuitive) or arrived at deductively (i.e., inferred from 
established general laws of reason). This goes too for religious knowledge, the 
authority of which rests safely not in nature and human experience, but in 
scripture and the Church. On the Cartesian view, religious knowledge is 
foreordained; it is arrived at by individuals through two channels only: revelation 
or rational demonstration. Such an understanding of religious knowledge works 
just fine for a community of like-minded believers committed to a rigidly 
dualistic and supernaturalistic picture of the world. In an age of religious 
pluralism and scientific naturalism, however, it reveals itself as severely deficient 
and serves only to perpetuate religious divisiveness, intolerance, and ignorance.  
 Current philosophy of religion and Dewey studies, by virtue of their 
intellectual nearsightedness—for example, in remaining beholden to a faulty 
Cartesian, egoic conception of the self in the face of overwhelming contradictory 
evidence—each suffer from a condition that we might call “chronic hermeneutic 
myopia.” They are not the only areas of scholarship to suffer this debilitating 
condition, though they are the focus of the present study; all domains of 
intelligent human inquiry that fail to revise their grounding anthropologies in 
light of the latest scientific discoveries are its potential victims. They are what 
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philosopher of science Imre Lakatos designated as “degenerating research 
programs.”59 Fortunately for both fields, corrective lenses come not only in their 
usual physical forms, but also in the shape of theoretical modifications and 
conceptual adjustments. 
 
 
Escaping the Christian-Cartesian Legacy: Dewey versus Marx 
 
 
Having described philosophy of religion as a form of practical problem-
solving, it goes without saying that rehabilitating the discipline requires making 
use of a variety of investigative methods and data sources. It is not without 
significant irony, then, that scholarship in philosophy of religion traditionally has 
not proceeded in either a multidisciplinary or comparative fashion. There are 
several historical and geographical reasons why this is so, the most significant 
being that philosophy of religion, as a cultural product of the “medieval 
synthesis” of Greek philosophy and Catholic theology, has chiefly aligned itself 
with the concerns and interests of Western Christian thinkers (though it owes 
much to the Arabic translations of Aristotle by Muslim scholars). As a result, 
what typically passes under the label of “philosophy of religion” in textbooks and 
the classroom would scarcely be recognized by philosophers working with the 
experiential and textual resources of Eastern and non-Abrahamic religious 
traditions, or those working outside the frameworks of the historical religions 
altogether. While such a restricted focus was perhaps defensible at a more 
                                                        
59 Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, eds. John Worrall and 
Gregory Curried (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).    
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innocent time in our intellectual history, that time is surely past given what we 
now know about the historical development of and interconnections between the 
world’s religions, and it is the persistence of its Christian-cum-Cartesian 
moorings in a religiously pluralist academy that has led to philosophy of 
religion’s programmatic stagnation while research in other fields of philosophy is 
flourishing. 
 Numerous philosophers and other theorists have strove to rethink religion 
in broadly non-Christian, non-Cartesian terms. In order to fully understand the 
novelty and significance of Dewey’s ecological approach, it will prove useful to 
compare him with one of his contemporaries who also advanced a naturalistic 
approach of sorts, but with significant differences: Karl Marx. Marx is an obvious 
comparator to Dewey for various reasons. Both philosophers boasted impressive 
intellectual ranges, writing on almost every area of public and private concern in 
their day. Furthermore, Marxism and pragmatism are often closely associated on 
account of their shared focus on the immanent, material world, as opposed to 
anything transcendent or supernatural.  
 In a comprehensive analysis of the core tenets of Marxism and 
pragmatism, John Ryder finds striking parallels between their ontological and 
epistemological positions: “One of the aspects of dialectical materialism that 
makes it dialectical is its emphasis on the constitutive nature of relations, a 
position that is at the same time one of the defining characteristics of American 
Pragmatism and Naturalism….[As regards epistemology] both Pragmatism and 
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Marxism vigorously reject the conception of knowledge as a more or less passive 
reception of impressions of one kind or another, and insist rather that knowledge 
is praxis, which is to say that knowledge and action are inextricably related.”60 
Ryder further points out the connection between Dewey’s and Marx’s conceptions 
of philosophy, noting that each saw a given society’s intellectual products as 
largely dependent upon its economic foundations and dominant mode of 
production. It is specifically over their critical appreciations of religion that the 
theorists sharply diverge.61   
 Marx’s views on religion can be summed up in two sentences from his own 
pen: “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world 
and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.”62 Compare this 
with the following two lines from Dewey’s 1908 Ethics: “When freed from 
interdependence with kinship, economic, and political association, religion has 
an opportunity to become more personal and more universal. When a man’s 
religious attitude is not fixed by birth, when worship is not so closely bound with 
economic interests, when there is not only religious ‘toleration,’ but religious 
                                                        
60 John Ryder, “Community, Struggle and Democracy: Marxism and Pragmatism,” Studies in 
Soviet Thought 27, no. 2 (1984): 107. 
61 Aside from the fact that both Marx and Dewey greatly influenced the course of 20th-century 
religious thought, their ideas on religion are interesting and worthy of study in their own right. To 
those who fail to see the connection between them, I point out they should be read as differing 
responses to Hegel, a philosopher each was deeply indebted too. Recall that, for Hegel, anything 
serving to impede the development of the consciousness of freedom—including orthodox religion, 
which demands believers surrender their freedom of thought and action in many ways—is a force 
to be resisted. Hegel’s ultimate goal, a goal inherited by Marx and Dewey, is to restore humanity 
to a state of harmony with the given actualities and possibilities of the natural world. Where the 
three thinkers differ is over what constitutes this “harmony” and on how it is best achieved.   
62 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right,’ ed. Joseph O’Malley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, [1843] 1977), 131. 
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liberty, the significance of religion as a personal, spiritual relation comes to 
view.”63 As lifelong students of history, Marx and Dewey each were keenly aware 
of the sufferings and injustice regularly perpetrated by and in the name of 
religion. As committed naturalists, both thinkers called upon reason and human 
experience to fashion a practical solution to the problems of religion. 
For Marx, the solution was as straightforward as it was severe: religion, 
everywhere and in all its forms, must be overcome. According to Marx’s 
materialist understanding of history, all religion amounts to nothing more than a 
sinister, subversive means (merely one of many) by which those who control the 
modes of production exploit the psychic vulnerability of the working classes who, 
in effort to restore wholeness of meaning to a fragmented and ineffectual reality 
beyond their command, are given to place their faith in a heavenly future outside 
the hells of their present experience. Once the material (physical) factors that 
continually give rise to religious ideas and institutions were effectively 
transformed under revolution to communism, Marx argued, there would no 
longer be a place, because there would no longer exist the human need, for 
religion.  
Serious religious persons are quick to dismiss Marx for so much of what he 
had to say about religion does not accurately frame the contours of their 
particular faith situation. Nonetheless, Marx was correct in pointing to the 
analgesic effects of religion as among its essential functions; recent work in the 
                                                        
63 ETH1, MW 5: 181.  
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psychology of religion and coping indicates a strong connection between degree 
of religious commitment and a person’s ability to tolerate mild to extreme 
physical pain and mental anguish.64 Moreover, as historians of religion have 
carefully documented, certain (if not all) religious traditions, Buddhism being the 
go-to example, were founded upon explicit recognition of the ubiquity of human 
suffering, with their doctrinal teachings and ritual forms being shaped chiefly 
around suffering’s acceptance and eventual extinction through carefully 
cultivated practices of self-discipline.   
Where Marx erred as a reasonable theorist of religion’s origins and future 
was by incorporating into his analysis at least two logical mistakes, namely, those 
of: (1) “circular reasoning,” by supposing religion has but a single function (thus 
allowing him to begin with what he wanted to end up with); and (2) 
“confirmation bias,” by favoring religious forms that suited his preset purposes 
and ignoring known counter instances (again permitting him to end up at a prior 
determined conclusion). Religion’s ability to alleviate biogenic and psychogenic 
disturbances, to smooth over life’s recurrent episodes of stress and chaos in order 
to reestablish harmony and balance of function, indeed boasts ameliorative 
effects for its participants, as do a great deal of other human beliefs and practices. 
What Marx failed to see in the final analysis was that this fact alone does not 
render religion a fantasy any more than the adaptive effects of arithmetic for 
                                                        
64 For a comprehensive scientific overview on religion and coping, see Kenneth I. Pargament, The 
Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice (New York: The Guilford Press, 
1997). For a concise analysis on this topic from a religious studies perspective, see Susan Kwilecki, 
“Religion and Coping: A Contribution from Religious Studies,” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 43, no. 4 (2004): 477-489.        
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reducing cognitive load renders mathematics fictitious.          
For Dewey, a subtler, but in many ways equally aggressive, course of 
action recommended itself: the genuinely “religious” dimensions of nature and 
human experience must be liberated from the inflexible dogma and uncivilized 
clannishness of organized “religions.” From the perspective of Dewey’s ecological 
naturalism, genuine religion concerns not the salvation of a select group of 
people from their earthly circumstances, but rather the universal integration of 
human need, desire, and purpose with nature and its most prodigious 
possibilities. Once the ecological (biological, psychological, and cultural) factors 
of religious inquiry were properly understood and accounted for, religion’s place 
in human life would be accepted and its relevancy admitted—though with radical, 
far-reaching changes in religion’s inward experience and external expression 
coming about as a result. Dewey hints at the prospective benefits such a 
progressive transformation of our collective religious consciousness might bear in 
the following passage from his 1929 essay “The Construction of Good”: 
It is both astonishing and depressing that so much of the energy of mankind has gone 
 into fighting for (with weapons of the flesh as well as of the spirit) the truth of creeds, 
 religious, moral, and political, as distinct from what has gone into the effort to try creeds 
 by putting them to the test of acting upon them. The change would do away with the 
 intolerance and fanaticism that attend the notion that beliefs and judgments are capable 
 of inherent truth and authority; inherent in the sense of being independent of what they 
 lead to when used as directive principles.65   
  
 For the most part, serious religious persons remain unknowledgeable or 
confused about Dewey’s religious outlook, likely because it ventures so far afield 
from anything recognizably “religious” to their own religious upbringing and 
                                                        
65 “The Construction of Good” (1929), LW 4: 221.  
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development (this seems especially true for those brought up without religion). 
Yet, as Dewey’s analysis suggests and surely he would agree, we should no more 
expect religion to not change as our knowledge of its root origins and meanings 
increases than we would expect scientists to continue using Newton’s universal 
theory of gravitation to describe the attraction of physical bodies in a relativistic, 
Einsteinian frame of reference.     
Our persistent collective failure to innovate novel, arguably better ways of 
being religious stems not from any factors intrinsic to the religious mode of life; it 
results, instead, from our habituated, culturally conditioned senses of what 
religion is or should be. Like Marx, Dewey was correct in viewing religion as a 
powerful support tool humans make use of in order to manage and enrich their 
lived experience. He ultimately proved a more reasonable theorist of religion 
than Marx did, however, by his sober recognition that religion’s instrumental 
nature does not de facto make it out to be a mere symptom or epiphenomenon, 
as something that can be explained away easily. Rather, the universal presence 
and persistence of religion throughout history and across human cultures speaks 
to something about the way the world and human beings really are, deep down. 
Religion thus deserves the same careful scrutiny and constructive criticism that 
we lend all worthwhile human endeavors. The aim of the next three chapters, 
broadly, is to analyze, refine, and further develop Dewey’s approach to religion. A 
secondary goal, one not attempted overtly here, is to demonstrate the probable 
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impossibility, together with the practical unnecessity, of Marx’s.66         
 Contrary to the opposing opinions of their critics, and they are legion, both 
strategies represent thoughtful, sophisticated attempts on the part of 
philosophers—a group not customarily viewed as either thoughtful or 
sophisticated in their treatment of religion—for dealing with the historically 
harsh reality of religious pluralism. Marx’s is undoubtedly the better known of 
the two and has exerted a considerable, albeit mixed, influence on world social 
and political affairs from the time of its introduction to the present. Dewey’s 
generated much discussion among public intellectuals and theologians in the first 
half of the last century and, after a period of comparative neglect, is receiving 
renewed attention by scholars working within the burgeoning deep ecology and 
religious naturalism movements. It is somewhat ironic, then, that neither Marx’s 
atheistic humanism nor Dewey’s religious naturalism has gathered a substantial 
following or support among philosophers of religion to date.67  
 To appreciate the force of this last point, consider the fact that in Michael 
Rea’s and Louis Pojman’s Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, a long-running 
                                                        
66 Considerations of space preclude a detailed defense of these remarks here. In brief, I suggest 
Marx’s position that religious belief and behavior will definitely fade as the material factors which 
necessitate it do is “probably impossible” in light of a host of recent persuasive arguments by 
philosophers, anthropologists, and neuroscientists that humans are innately religious in some 
sense or other. For a compelling, highly interdisciplinary account of homo sapiens as homo 
religiosus, see Wesley J. Wildman, Science and Religious Anthropology: A Spiritually Evocative 
Naturalist Interpretation of Human Life (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009). I further suggest 
Marx’s position is “practically unnecessary” in plain recognition that there exist myriad forms of 
non-institutional, non-dogmatic religion immune to his materialist critique. 
67 The philosophies of Dewey and Marx go by several names and those used here, intended to 
encapsulate specifically their views on religion, will likely face resistance from some interpreters. 
Even those who reject the labels provided, however, would likely readily admit that, given the 
sheer breadth of Marx’s and Dewey’s intellectual concerns, it is extremely difficult to break down 
their positions into easily digestible chunks, let alone a single descriptive phrase.    
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textbook in undergraduate philosophy of religion courses, Marx and Dewey fail to 
appear in either the Table of Contents or Index.68 Similarly, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, a more inclusive work edited by William 
Wainwright and geared toward graduate-level study, Marx is discussed briefly 
and only in relation to the Continental philosophers of religion whom he, along 
with the other “masters of suspicion”—Freud and Nietzsche—influenced, while 
Dewey is introduced as a pioneer figure in the post-Darwinian attempt to 
reconstruct religion along more naturalistic lines, but the engagement with his 
thinking ends there (on page 5 of a 560 page work!).69   
  So as not to be wholly unfair to these (in many ways fine) works, it should 
be admitted that philosophers typically have good reasons for embracing or 
avoiding a particular thinker or school of thought. These reason are not always 
confessed or made explicit to their publics, however; in such cases, we merely are 
left to our powers of intellectual empathy to discern a cause. In this case, it seems 
safe to say that philosophers of religion have shied away from Marx because fully 
embracing his atheistic humanism would spell the undoing of their very 
discipline by, for instance, reducing its methods and main concerns to those of 
psychology or sociology. “Good reasons” why Dewey’s religious naturalism hasn’t 
                                                        
68 Michael Rea and Louis P. Pojman, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Boston, MA: 
Wadsworth, 2012).      
69 William J. Wainwright, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). There are individual exceptions in the philosophy of religion literature 
that reference Dewey, but focus more directly on one or another of his pragmatist colleagues, 
including Robert Cummings Neville (who draws mainly from Peirce) and Sami Pihlström (who 
draws mainly from James). The point being made is that until now Dewey has not attracted 
considerable attention in philosophy of religion, nor does he seem well poised to do so in the near 
future, insofar as his ideas are ignored or glossed over by the very works designed to initiate and 
train new scholars in the field.  
 127 
figured prominently in philosophy of religion are a bit tougher to apprehend. 
While it is true that, like Marx, Dewey found little meaning or value in the 
concerns that have traditionally occupied philosophers of religion—such as 
logically proving God’s existence, the soul’s immortality, and the reality of 
miracles; or solving the much-bemoaned “problem of evil”70—Dewey was 
convinced all the same that certain forms of religious belief and practice have 
their rightful place in a democratic, scientifically advanced society. Besides, 
Dewey found meaningful and thus continued to regularly employ much 
traditional religious language, including, to the confusion and even 
embarrassment of his fellow naturalists, the term “God.”  
 In order to make sense of this on-the-surface-strange maneuver, we must 
keep in mind Dewey’s pragmatist pedigree. As a philosopher of the tradition 
concerned above all with those “differences that make a difference,” Dewey’s 
problem with philosophy of religion’s traditional concerns was not with their 
religious orientation or subject matter per se; it was, strictly speaking, with the 
fact that philosophy of religion’s traditional concerns remained largely 
theoretical. It was increasingly difficult in a science and technology dominated 
age to see the practical upshot or “cash value”—to borrow William James’s 
notoriously misunderstood phrase—of such concerns to the tasks of daily living, 
the yardstick against which the relevance, truth, and value of all conceptual 
                                                        
70 It seems important to restate at this point that the “problem of evil,” or theodicy (literally: “the 
justification of God”), only becomes a problem if one accepts at face value the logically 
contradictory maximal properties attributed to God by the Western monotheisms.  
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matters are always measured in the end.71 By shifting focus to this deeper-than-
surface level, Dewey’s religious naturalism presents itself as less a challenge to 
philosophy of religion’s theoretical existence than one to its practical relevance, 
yet one that carries with it an implicit proposal for the discipline’s progressive 
transformation if it is to meet real-world religious needs and interests.   
 Sadly, philosophers of religion remained mostly deaf to Dewey’s positive 
recommendations; any mention of Dewey in the philosophy of religion literature 
is usually, as it is with Marx, to his critical, deconstructive efforts. Even scholars 
with a vested interest in Dewey’s overall philosophical development tend to 
overlook the continuation and logical next step of his critical, deconstructive 
efforts, which is philosophical reconstruction. Nowhere is this truer than in 
regards to Dewey’s treatment of religion. To provide just one example here, in his 
landmark study The Naturalists and the Supernatural, William Shea, a highly 
respected interpreter of American philosophical and religious thought, states 
matter-of-factly: “Dewey had no constructive interpretation of religious 
languages, practices, and institutions. The reason for this is straightforward 
enough: in his view traditional religion, religious beliefs, and religious 
institutions invariably distract from the business of intelligent human living.”72 
                                                        
71 Dewey nowhere takes issue with specifically philosophy of religion in his writings; 
specializations within academic philosophy weren’t as hard and fast in Dewey’s time as they are 
today. Rather, these comments reflect Dewey’s dissatisfaction with philosophy on the whole.  
72 William M. Shea, The Naturalists and the Supernatural: Studies in Horizon and an American 
Philosophy of Religion (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984), 127. Against Shea’s 
interpretation, Dewey himself claims in The Quest for Certainty (1929): “What is needed is 
intelligent examination of the consequences that are actually effected by inherited institutions 
and customs, in order that there may be intelligent consideration of the ways in which they are to 
be intentionally modified in behalf of the generation of different consequences.” LW 14: 218. 
 129 
While the second half of this statement is true without qualification, the first half 
neither follows from nor supports it.73 Shea, in lock step with the majority of 
Dewey’s religious critics and secular interpreters (groups defined and critically 
engaged in Chapter 1), unfairly stacks the hermeneutic cards, so to speak, against 
Dewey’s philosophical reconstruction of religion. Yet as the sudden infusion of 
scientific data and methods into philosophy, especially those issuing from the 
holistic sciences of ecology, poses fresh obstacles to our inherited understandings 
of human belief, perception, and behavior—including their religious modes or 
qualities—it is time that the deck of standard Dewey interpretation is unstacked. 
 
 
2.4  Fleshing Out Dewey’s Religious Naturalism 
 
 
John Dewey challenged the Cartesian, egoic tendencies of Western philosophy 
head on. Following Charles Sanders Peirce and William James before him, Dewey 
gestured toward the fallible, experimental nature of the human knowing 
process—and the human self along with it. On Dewey’s naturalistic, ecologically 
grounded view of inquiry, all knowledge originates within the context of concrete 
experiences for the instrumental purpose of meeting particular needs or 
achieving specific goals.74 For Dewey, the focus on everyday human activities and 
experiences challenges the common understanding of religion as an inborn 
attitude prefixed to a static and infallible body of supernatural, that is, extra-
                                                        
73 Of all Dewey’s verbal excesses, using words emptily and without a set purpose is not one of 
them.   
74 This topic will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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experiential knowledge and beliefs. Rather, lived experience reveals religion as 
essentially dynamic in nature, as a “personal, spiritual relation”75 obtaining 
between individuals (organisms) and the world (environment)—one with a 
melioristic and unifying function that mankind’s present and future well being 
crucially depends upon cultivating. Dewey offered various subtle hints as to how 
the actual individual self is integrated into and identified with this larger ideal 
whole. Once again, this reflects Dewey’s trailblazing efforts at forging a viable 
middle path between dualistic extremes, cognizant that the most sensible 
position more often than not lies between them.  
 
Humanism and Naturalism in Religion 
 
 Dewey was fully aware and warned of the negative effects of organized 
religion and religious extremism, and yet he advocated a natural piety toward the 
environing conditions that support engagement with the religious ideals of the 
world. In fact, he argued that the future of genuine religion depended upon such 
engagement: “The future of religion is connected with the possibility of 
developing a faith in the possibilities of human experience and human 
relationships that will create a vital sense of the solidarity of human interests and 
inspire action to make that sense a reality.”76 For these reasons, if for none other, 
it seems important to call Dewey’s religious thought a variety of naturalism to 
                                                        
75 ETH1 (1908), MW 5: 181. The passage later continues: “But as the conception of religion as a 
spiritual relation becomes clearer, the tendency must be to disclose religion as essentially a 
unifying rather than a divisive and discordant force.”  
76 “What I Believe” (1930), LW 5: 273-274. 
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mark it off from positions having a purely human focus. Dewey was a humanist 
in that he firmly believed in the intrinsic value of human persons and their ability 
to achieve healthy, holistic self-functioning. Dewey was not a humanist, however, 
in the narrow sense advanced by Charles Taylor who forcefully argues for a “self-
sufficient humanism” that set and measures all of life’s goals, including that of 
religious or spiritual fulfillment—what he in language similar to Dewey’s calls 
“fullness”—without the aid of anything beyond the human sphere.77 Taylor’s 
restricted religious humanism finds no meaning or significance apart from our 
joint social relations and collaborative undertakings.  
 Contrary to religious humanists, religious naturalists, as Donald Crosby 
notes, “find religious meaning, value, and importance...in nature or in some 
aspect of the natural order….Nature and its ongoing changes are metaphysically 
ultimate for religious naturalists….Nature in some shape or form is all there is 
now, ever has been, and ever shall be.”78 Nature, of course, encompasses human 
sociality and culture, especially under Dewey’s expansive view, but nature’s sheer 
vastness outstrips any narrow identification with purely human interests and 
desires. Dewey’s ecology-minded religious naturalism makes this point clear on 
several levels to which we will return at later points in our study. 
 In building a case for Dewey as a serious religious thinker, however, we 
must have further reasons to reject the standard interpretation of his religious 
views. Fortunately, such reasons exist. The standard interpretation of Dewey’s 
                                                        
77 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 18.  
78 Donald A. Crosby, “Religious Naturalism,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of 
Religion, eds. Chad Meister and Paul Copan (London: Routledge, 2007), 672. 
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religious thought tracks what can be called the standard interpretation of his 
general philosophical development, which views it as a linear, progressive 
movement from a version of absolute idealism to a pragmatic naturalism. Both 
standard interpretations have led to countless debates about the actual character 
of Dewey’s philosophical and religious views. Yet, as outlined in the sections 
below, we find several scholars recently arguing for a drastically revised reading 
of Dewey that finds his commitments to idealism and naturalism as integral parts 
of a larger, more holistic philosophical vision. It is this modified reading that 
justifies our identification of Dewey as an ecological thinker and as a religious 
naturalist. It thus needs to be addressed in some detail before moving forward.  
 
The Twin Influences of Darwin and Hegel 
 
 The standard narrative of John Dewey’s philosophical development has 
Dewey abandoning an early identification with Hegelian absolute idealism, which 
was extremely influential during the time of his academic training, especially 
under his mentor G. S. Morris, for a Darwin-inspired pragmatic naturalism by 
the start of the 20th century. Richard Bernstein advances this view in his classic 
study on Dewey in a chapter appropriately titled “From Hegel to Darwin.”79 Here 
Bernstein claims that the Darwinian concept of the interacting organism 
cemented Dewey’s rejection of Hegel’s preexisting synthesis of subject and object 
in absolute mind. After William James’s publication of the Principles of 
                                                        
79 Bernstein, John Dewey, 9-21.  
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Psychology, which was more biologically informed than Dewey’s own 
Psychology, Dewey substituted all talk of subject/object for that of 
organism/environment. The majority of philosophers and Dewey scholars follow 
Bernstein’s lead, and quote Dewey’s late autobiographical essay “From 
Absolutism to Experimentalism” as evidence of Dewey’s complete break with his 
youthful fascination with Hegel.80  
 However, as H. S. Thayer, one of the most respected interpreters of 
classical pragmatism, claims, Dewey’s philosophical development is not as neat 
and linear as typically depicted. In truth, much of his early philosophy survives 
into his later thinking: “Dewey’s thought exhibits a gradual transition from early 
Hegelian and neo-Kantian idealism to a philosophic naturalism….While Dewey’s 
intellectual history had its marked changes in subject matter and methods of 
analysis, however, there was continuity—appropriately so, for a philosopher who 
made so much of continuity—in which something of the old was carried into the 
new.”81 As Thayer rightly recognizes, when assessing the potential scope and 
significance of influences on any given thinker, it is prudent to begin with what 
he or she has to say on the matter. For instance, it is in the same autobiographical 
essay that Dewey admits he will likely seem “unstable, chameleon-like, yielding 
one after another to many diverse and even incompatible influences; struggling 
to assimilate something from each and yet striving to carry it forward in a way 
                                                        
80 “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930), LW 5: 147-160. 
81 H. S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The Classic Writings (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1982), 254. 
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that is logically consistent with what has been learned from its predecessors.”82 It 
is in this essay that he also confesses Hegel “left a permanent deposit” in his 
thinking.83  
 The first philosopher to take Dewey’s appreciation of Hegel seriously was 
John Shook, who in his book, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and 
Reality, views Dewey’s seemingly contradictory commitments to 
instrumentalism, naturalism, empiricism, and idealism as forming part of larger, 
integrative philosophical system.84 Together with James Good, Shook has 
explored Dewey’s combination of empiricism, idealism, and experimentalist 
psychology in another work, John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, which includes 
an important lecture on Hegel that Dewey gave in 1897.85 Along with recently 
published works by Donald Morse, James Johnston, and Hugh McDonald,86 
Shook and Good view Hegel’s holism, organicism, social focus, and repudiation of 
all dualisms as fundamental to Dewey’s philosophy, in both its early and later 
versions. Together these works offer a powerful defense of a “coherentist” reading 
of Dewey’s philosophy that views the early, middle, and later Dewey as intimately 
                                                        
82 “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930), LW 5: 155. 
83 Ibid., 154.  
84 John R. Shook, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (Nashville, TN: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 2000). As Shook notes on page 15: “The traditional account of 
Dewey’s development, by stressing an abrupt break with idealism and a heavy reliance on 
[William] James, tends to ignore Dewey’s own rare but penetrating observations concerning the 
primary stimulants and positive influences on the course of his thought.”  
85 John R. Shook and James A. Good, John Dewey’s Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture 
on Hegel (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).  
86 Donald J. Morse, Faith in Life: John Dewey’s Early Philosophy (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2011); James Scott Johnston, John Dewey’s Earlier Theory (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2014); Hugh P. McDonald, John Dewey and Environmental 
Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
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connected and mutually reinforcing.  
 Take Dewey’s empirical and physiological psychology, for instance, which 
was positioned in its day as a rival to all forms of idealism. As Shook carefully 
points out, Dewey’s approach to human mentality was deeply influenced by neo-
Hegelian scholars (and by Hegel himself), as well as by Wilhelm Wundt, who 
combined various aspects of empiricism and experimentalist psychology with 
idealism. A basic tenet of Hegel’s idealism that informed Wundt’s, and as a result 
Dewey’s, outlook was that experience is essentially active and dynamic, which is 
to say that it has a history. That experience could be reduced to a string of 
isolated mental states was fundamentally rejected by the empirical approach to 
mind advanced by thinkers like Wundt and Dewey.87 That experience is the 
outcome of constant transactions between an organism and its environment is 
also essential to Darwin’s evolutionary naturalism. Adaptation or adjustment 
stems from the reciprocal action of organism and environment. The theme of 
organism-environment interaction was central to both Hegel’s and Darwin’s 
approach to adaptation; organism and environment form a single whole of 
interacting parts that codetermine each other’s properties. Dewey traces the 
import of this shift in thinking about nature and the self for philosophy in The 
Quest for Certainty: 
 Neither self nor world, neither soul or nature (in the sense of something isolated and 
 finished in its location) is the centre, and more than either earth or sun is the absolute 
 centre of a single universal and necessary frame of reference. There is a moving whole of 
 interacting parts; a centre emerges wherever there is effort to change them in a particular 
                                                        
87 Scott Johnston, “Dewey’s ‘Naturalised Hegelianism’ in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as 
Self-Consciousness,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46, no. 3 (2010): 455. 
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 direction. 
  The reversal has many phases, and these are interconnected. It cannot be said 
 that one is more important than another. But one change stands out with an 
 extraordinary distinctness. Mind is no longer a spectator beholding the world from 
 without and finding its satisfaction in the joy of self-sufficing contemplation. The mind is 
 within the world as part of the latter’s own ongoing process. It is marked off as mind by 
 the fact that wherever it is found, changes take place in a directed way, so that a 
 movement in a definite one-ways sense—from the doubtful and confused to the clear, 
 resolved and settled—takes place. From knowing as an outside beholding to knowing as 
 an active participant in the drama of an on-moving world is the historical transition 
 whose record we have been following.88  
 
 From the perspective of Dewey’s transactional approach, human selves 
must be understood firstly as organisms interacting with an environment. This 
insight meant that what holds for biological forms also holds for psychological 
meanings and logical forms as well. Surely one of the principle reasons Dewey’s 
religious views remain little understood or appreciated is due to the lack of a full 
appreciation of his early psychology and logical theory, which echo deeply 
throughout his later pragmatism and form the conceptual backdrop for his views 
on religion. Rather than viewing Dewey’s idealism as being eclipsed by his 
naturalism, then, it is more accurate to say that Dewey’s idea of nature grew to 
encompass ideals, including those ideals that are religious in quality. The works 
cited above, along with Dewey’s own comments on the matter, provide us with 
good reason to move beyond the arguments of A Common Faith in seeking a 
richer account of Dewey’s religious thought, one more clearly aligned with the 
broader vision of what I have called his ecological naturalism.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
88 QC (1929), LW 4: 232.  
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The Real Problems of Religion for Philosophy and Dewey 
 
 
 Earlier I claimed that John Dewey’s philosophy, when treated to a 
coherentist reading, reveals a robust religious naturalism, one that, if taken 
seriously by philosophers of religion, promises to “ecologize” the noticeably stale 
problems and methods that continue to dominate their field. Those problems 
include that of proving God’s existence and the problem of evil, which 
philosophers of religion traditionally have relied on the methods of a priori 
reasoning and deductive logic for resolving. A properly naturalistic, ecological 
approach to religion, however, points to the egoic—defined in narrow terms of 
the rational, detached ego—presuppositional patterning of such problems and 
methods, and demands a new problem set and methodology rooted in the 
evolutionary dynamics and lived phenomenology of the organism-environment 
unit.89   
 In terms of method, an ecological philosophy of religion resolves to be 
both empirically responsible and phenomenologically faithful in its descriptive 
and argumentative functions. This is because the ultimate normative-
constructive function of philosophy (of all intelligent practice, really) from the 
adaptationist perspective of ecology, consists in existential transformation. The 
very same insight lays behind Dewey’s problem-solving view of philosophy, 
                                                        
89 Commenting on the egoic nature of traditional philosophical problems, Dewey states: “The 
problem of evil is a well recognized problem, while we rarely or never hear of a problem of good. 
Goods we take for granted; they are as they should be; they are nature and proper….What of it all, 
it may be asked?” EN (1925), LW 1: 45-46. 
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marking him as one of the first post-Cartesian thinkers to fully appreciate the 
practical, instrumental nature of human knowledge and action.  
 It is one thing to critique the problems philosophers of religion in the West 
have traditionally directed their energies toward articulating and solving. It is a 
wholly different and difficult matter to manufacture a more comprehensive, more 
discerning problem set. Under Dewey’s problem-solving view of philosophy, 
however, such a reconstructive task is necessary if progress is to be made. As 
Dewey insightfully puts this point: “Whether or not philosophy is exhausted in 
the clearing up of conceptions, it is certain that without an occasional clearing-up 
philosophy will get so entangled in the impedimenta of its own notions as to be 
hindered in its onward march.”90 
 One way to clear philosophy of religion’s impedimenta would be to pattern 
its problems after philosophy’s main branches, leaving us with the problems of 
religious ontology, religious epistemology, and religious axiology. Many of the 
problems in the history of philosophy of religion can be squeezed into one or 
more of these categories. Yet it is immediately apparent that these categories are 
too broad to be useful, at least for our purposes of fleshing out John Dewey’s 
philosophical approach to religion. The basic categories of ontology, 
epistemology, and axiology do not accurately reflect the actual problems that 
have occupied philosophers throughout history anyway. Philosophical problems 
are never as tidy and compartmentalized as its standardized divisions might 
                                                        
90 “On Some Current Conceptions of the Terms ‘Self’” (1890), EW 3: 56. 
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suggest. As an example, the mind-body problem, a perennial favorite of analytic 
philosophers, transverses simple questions of being, knowledge, and value. The 
problem of the relation of the mind to the body (if one accepts it as a genuine 
problem) presumes their ontological difference, their role as epistemic faculties, 
and sets up a hierarchy of value among them. This blending of philosophical 
categories and concerns holds for all humanly important problems and forewarns 
of the dangers of reductionism and intellectualism inherent to increased 
specialization within philosophy and academia more generally.   
 The most fundamental philosophical problems of religion, conceptually 
mixed in their content and expression, are those that I will call: (1) externality, or 
“the problem of religious meaning and value,” 2) inwardness, or “the problem of 
religious experience,” and (3) ultimacy, or “the problem of religious existence.” 
These three problems directly mirror philosophy’s main goals, presented in the 
last chapter, of being empirically responsible, phenomenologically faithful, and 
existentially transformative, respectively. These categories are specific enough to 
be informative, but sufficiently vague to accommodate comparison between a 
variety of perspectives (not just Dewey’s which is the main concern here).  
 Vagueness might seem like something to be avoided in philosophical 
discourse—analytic philosophers certainly maintain this to be the case. But as 
Charles Sanders Peirce—the founder of pragmatism and a former teacher of 
Dewey’s—persuasively argued, perfectly determinate language is a practical 
impossibility, even when we are “speaking” to ourselves:  
 No communication of one person to another can be entirely definite, that is, nonvague. 
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 We may reasonably hope that physiologists will some day find some means of comparing 
 the qualities of one person’s feelings with those of another, so that it would not be fair to 
 insist upon their present incomparability as an inevitable source of misunderstanding. 
 Besides, it does not affect the intellectual purport of communications. But wherever 
 degree or any other possibility of continuous variations subsists, absolute precision is 
 impossible. Much else must be vague, because no man’s interpretation of words is based 
 on exactly the same experience as any other man’s. Even in our most intellectual 
 conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more unattainable precision seems. It 
 should never be forgotten that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue, and though 
 mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection of language.91  
 
As Peirce rightly recognized, vagueness, rather than being an intellectual 
impediment, can actually help to facilitate communication and demonstration in 
highly effective ways.92 Professional translators working in the field of 
international law and the film industry rely on the utility of vagueness on a daily 
basis. So do some philosophers.   
 The vague category of “ultimacy” incorporates under its scope ideas about 
the most fundamental or important forms of being or existence—of what there is 
and how it is. It is not limited to considerations of ontology; it incorporates 
concerns of ultimate knowledge and ultimate values. Its usefulness lies precisely 
in its ability to give tight expression to a wide array of approaches to “the Platonic 
triad” of beauty, goodness, and truth. “Inwardness” is used here to denote human 
experience in its direct immediacy and qualitative fullness, much like the German 
word Erlebnis, in contrast to the more constructive and conceptually mediated 
                                                        
91 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover, 
1955), 295.  
92 On the virtues of vagueness for purposes of communication, see Mats Bergman, “Experience, 
Purpose, and the Value of Vagueness: On C. S. Peirce’s Contribution to the Philosophy of 
Communication,” Communication Theory 19 (2009): 248-277. For a specific defense of the value 
of vague categories for studying religious ideas, see Robert Cummings Neville and Wesley J. 
Wildman, “On Comparing Religious Ideas,” in Ultimate Realities: A Volume in the Comparative 
Religious Ideas Project, ed. Robert Cummings Neville (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2001), 187-210.  
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forms of experience denoted by Erfahrung. Dewey understood and employed the 
term experience in this fuller sense. This is not meant to imply that experience is 
a wholly subjective or one-sided affair. It is meant to speak to the interior pole of 
lived experiencing which discloses things that frequently escape rational thought 
and intellectual mediation, much like the category of the “ideal” does for Dewey. 
Finally, “externality” deals with the objective side of experience, which depends 
not only on the internal states of singular agents; environmental structures have 
a large but often overlooked role to play here. Externality further recommends 
itself as a fitting term for the objective aspects of experience because particular 
events, meanings, and values are ordinarily made known and judged in light of 
their diffuse consequences. This is how economists employ the concept of 
externality, as a reminder that every idea and practice has its unique class of 
costs. 
 The vagueness-cum-concreteness expressed by the problems of ultimacy, 
inwardness, and externality helps to make clear what is at stake in genuine 
philosophical investigations of religion. This is a particularly heavy conceptual 
burden for comparative philosophy according to Warren Frisina. As he states it: 
“the trick is finding precisely the right balance between logical vagueness and 
concreteness. On the one hand, theories that are too far removed from the 
concrete problems of life will not address issues that philosophers and religious 
thinkers are interested in pursuing. On the other hand, cross-cultural 
conversations that are overly concrete often founder on the rocks of cultural 
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differences.”93  
 Though Dewey did not speak in terms of religious ultimacy, inwardness, 
and externality, his writings imply definite positions on these problems. If we are 
to be successful in teasing them apart, however, we will need a working 
“Deweyan” definition of religion to guide us along the way, even if Dewey himself 
famously avoided providing one. Locating supplemental sources of Dewey’s 
religious views to assist us in our definitional task is difficult at first pass. Dewey 
took a global view of philosophy and its problems; his treatises never fixed on 
discretely defined topics. Even the concisely named Psychology, Ethics, and 
Logic all contained detailed explorations of areas not generally associated with 
their title subjects. So did A Common Faith, though this likely went unnoticed by 
Dewey’s critics who chose to focus on the work’s retention of traditional religious 
language to convey what are highly original, untraditional ideas.             
  
A Deweyan Definition of Religion 
 
 What Dewey sought to do with A Common Faith was outline a naturalistic 
account of religion, one informed by the most recent historical and scientific data, 
and which did not unduly favor any culturally particularistic, insider view of 
religion. In Dewey’s view, a properly philosophical approach to religion eschews 
scientistic, eliminative reduction of religion, as well as all approaches to religion 
                                                        
93 Warren Frisina, “Pragmatism, Logical Vagueness, and the Art of Comparative Engagement,” in 
Theology in Global Context: Essays in Honor of Robert C. Neville, eds. Amos Young and Peter 
Heltzel (New York: T & T Clarke, 2004), 167.  
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that see it as originally given or established by God, Allah, Yahweh, or other non-
human, non-natural being. As noted earlier, many took issue with Dewey’s 
attempt to speak of religion in general terms. To his critics, speaking of religion 
from a nominalistic standpoint seemed more legitimate in that, while there are 
various identifiable religions, there is no “religion in general.” However, as John 
E. Smith insightfully points out, just because only individual religions appear 
historically, does not mean that there is “no such thing as a religious dimension 
in human existence, nor does it prove that religions fail to have a generic 
structure that can be defined and illustrated.”94 Smith, following Dewey, saw that 
it was the job of philosophy to interrogate and describe this generic structure.  
 It bears repeating that philosophical definitions do not aim merely at 
faithful description. They equally intend to be transformative in their practical 
outcomes and effects. A philosophical definition of religion thus runs the risk, but 
with every intention of doing so, of excluding phenomena and practices normally 
considered religious, such as the ascetic mendicant living apart from—and thus 
not contributing to—society. It may also include others not typically construed in 
religious terms, like the atheist capitalist who donates millions of dollars to fight 
world hunger and disease. Dewey recognized this when he announced of his own 
approach to religion that it “will seem to cut the vital nerve of the religious 
element itself in taking away the basis upon which traditional religions and 
                                                        
94 John E. Smith, Experience and God (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), 9.  
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institutions have been founded.”95  
 Like philosophy, the term religion clearly intimates a way of life to those 
who engage and practice one or more of its determinate forms. The high 
incidence of religious conflict worldwide is frequently and, to a degree, rightly 
depicted as a conflict over different ways of living coming into contact with one 
another. This idea is colorfully expressed in Samuel Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations” thesis.96 Also like philosophy, religion can be described as a 
specialized form of problem-solving. Historian of religion Stephen Prothero 
presents a problem-solving view of religion in his recent and highly acclaimed 
book God is Not One.97 In that work, Prothero with characteristic wit and clarity 
shows the various manners in which each world religion articulates: “a problem; 
a solution to this problem, which also serves as the religious goal; a technique (or 
techniques) for moving this problem to this solution; and an exemplar (or 
exemplars) who charts this path from problem to solution.”98 
 Prothero describes religion in problem-solving terms in order to critically 
undermine what he calls the “pretend pluralism” of the so-called “perennial 
philosophy” that views all religions as essentially the same in structure and 
                                                        
95 CF (1934), LW 9: 2. 
96 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
97 Stephen Prothero, God is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World—and Why 
Their Differences Matter (New York: HarperOne, 2010).  
98 Ibid., xxiii. Italics original. To give just one example, Prothero claims that for Christianity, “the 
problem is sin; the solution (or goal) is salvation; the technique for achieving salvation is some 
combination of faith and good works; and the exemplars who chart this path are the saints in 
Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy and ordinary people of faith in Protestantism” (xxiii-xxiv).   
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content.99 This view has exerted great influence over the discipline of religious 
studies from its founding up to the present. Prothero’s critique has much in it to 
commend for, as Kelly Besecke rightly notes, “emphasizing religious similarities 
can lead to a too-facile denial of religious difference,” a denial that dangerously 
fails to understand religions as dynamic social forces.100 By emphasizing cultural 
difference over similarity, however, Prothero’s account sets up too strict of a 
nature/culture divide—when, in fact, there is a close organic relationship between 
the two. In doing so, it fails to locate the biological-ecological roots of the human 
problems to which the world’s various religious concepts and beliefs have evolved 
as practical coping solutions. “Forming concepts and beliefs,” as ecological 
psychologist Harry Heft tells us, “is something that complex biological creatures 
such as ourselves do in order to be better in touch with the flow of experience, 
rather than uncovering fixed and transcendent universal truths.”101  
 This, of course, is not Prothero’s goal as a religious historian and his 
account functions perfectly well at the historico-descriptive level. It simply will 
not do for our purposes at the philosophical level, which seeks to go beyond local 
and insider descriptions of religion to their shared structure. A properly 
philosophical approach attempts to look “behind the masks of God,” to borrow 
                                                        
99 Prothero sees this pretend pluralism underlying, for instance, Huston Smith’s The World’s 
Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions (New York: HarperCollins [1958] 1991), a highly 
popular religious studies textbook that has enjoyed several reprintings. He sees his own text as a 
timely replacement to Smith’s, one that compliments his call for greater religious literacy in his 
Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know—And Doesn’t (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2007).    
100 Kelly Besecke, You Can’t Put God in a Box: Thoughtful Spirituality in a Rational Age 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 167, note 15. 
101 Harry Heft, Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy 
of William James’s Radical Empiricism (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001), 45.  
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the title of a book by Robert Cummings Neville, to religion’s universal 
experiential core.102 
 Following insightful treatments by theoretical physicist David Bohm and 
comparative linguist Sarah Hoyt, I believe a hint as to what this core is can be 
found by carefully considering the etymology of religion, which is either from the 
Latin, relegare, meaning “to bind together,”103 or relegere, meaning “to go 
through or over again in reading, speech, or thought.”104 As suggested by its 
double-barreled etymology, religion is an inherently practical affair, one 
concerned with bringing experiences and individuals to closure, to completion, to 
wholeness—as more clearly conveyed by the associated religious term holy. 
Understood in this way, religion describes a special faculty of perception, a 
sensitive way of discerning ideals—which correspond not to imaginary fantasies 
but to real possibilities or capabilities—latent in one’s current, actual self in the 
experiential context of a problematic situation (event) that, if followed through, 
would bring about a restorative balance, a felt wholeness to the self-world unit 
that is rightly deemed religious by its integrative, unifying effects.  
 Dewey never defined religion, preferring instead to focus on probing the 
religious aspects or qualities of experience. In his 1932 Ethics, co-written with 
James Hayden Tufts, Dewey describes the experience of religious quality and the 
                                                        
102 Robert Cummings Neville, Behind the Masks of God: An Essay Toward Comparative 
Theology (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991). 
103 David Bohm, “Fragmentation and Wholeness in Religion and in Science,” Zygon 20, no. 2 
(1985): 125.  
104 Sarah Hoyt, “The Etymology of Religion,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 32, no. 2 
(1912): 127.    
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self-actualization process it helps to facilitate in the following telling manner:  
 The kind of self which is formed through action which is faithful to relations with others 
 will be a fuller and broader self than one which is cultivated in isolation from or in 
 opposition to the purposes and needs of others. In contrast, the kind of self which results 
 from generous breadth of interest many be said alone to constitute a development and 
 fulfillment of self, while the other way of life stunts and starves selfhood by cutting it off 
 from the connections necessary to its growth.105  
 
Dewey earlier states this point in more explicitly religious terms in his 1887 
Psychology thusly: “Religious experience is the sphere in which the identification 
of one’s self with the completely realized personality, or God, occurs.”106 The God 
Dewey speaks of here should not be taken as the supernaturalistic God of 
orthodox Christianity; he elsewhere makes clear that by the term “God” he means 
not a transcendent Being but “the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and 
actions.”107 Dewey’s naturalistic religion of ideal self-actualization shares many 
overtones with secular humanistic psychologies, but with certain important 
differences.108 It also meshes well with several recent scientific theories of 
religion that approach religion’s ultimate goal and purpose in terms of behavioral 
homeostasis,109 emotional coherence,110 or a strengthening of executive self-
control.111 We will revisit some of these theories later.    
                                                        
105 ETH2 (1932), LW 7: 302.   
106 PSY (1887), EW 2: 290.   
107 CF (1934), LW 9: 29. 
108 For a compelling interpretation of Dewey’s philosophy as one focused on the goal of self-
realization, see Robert J. Roth, S.J., John Dewey and Self-Realization (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1962).  
109 Uffe Schjødt, “Homeostasis and Religious Behavior,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 7 
(2007): 313-340.    
110 Paul Thagard, “The Emotional Coherence of Religion,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 
(2005): 58-74.  
111 Patrick McNamara, The Neuroscience of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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 148 
 Given Dewey’s suggestive comments in the Ethics and Psychology, and 
considering religion’s root etymology, we can now construct a heuristic definition 
of religion that will serve as our guide for the remainder of the study. Firmly 
delimiting our understanding of religion at this point is necessary so as not to get 
overwhelmed by the sheer vastness of available data about the world religions. It 
also serves as a reminder that Dewey’s ecological naturalist approach to religion 
is not associated with the historical religions, and thus the dissertation will not 
deal with the substance of those traditions in great detail. With these disclosures 
and disclaimers made, I offer the following Dewey-inspired definition of religion: 
Religion is living enactment of the ideal self through one’s skillful perceptual 
attunement to the ideal action possibilities of nature’s orders that harmonize the 
actual self, bringing it to ideal consummatory fulfillment. Whether this Deweyan 
approach to religion can capably address the problems expected of a philosophy 
of religion in an age of science and ecology is an open question that the 
remainder of this study will seek to answer.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Events, Nature, and the Self  
 
 
The concept of substance as a simple, immutable, independent entity seems to be 
inadequate today as the basic category of interpretation of reality. Science and 
philosophy in the last 200 years, in their effort to understand physical and 
human facts, have not only accumulated weighty proofs demonstrating the 
limitations of the substantialist conception but have suggested the categories 
which must be substituted for that idea. Better adapted to the explanation of 
reality in general and [self] in particular are the more recent concepts of function, 
process, relation, activity, and Gestalt.     
-Risieri Frondizi1  
 
 
 
3.1 The Threefold Primacy of Events  
 
 
By way of review, in the previous chapter we identified the core problems of 
philosophy of religion, when undertaken from a generalized and naturalistic 
perspective, as those of: (1) religious externality: Where do religious meanings 
and values qua religious ideals come from? What are their objective organic and 
cultural structures?; (2) religious inwardness: How are religious ideals 
experienced by active-agent selves? What are their subjective phenomenological 
forms?; and (3) religious ultimacy: On what bases are religious ideals 
existentially significant and worth engaging? Other problems might be identified 
apart from these three. The crucial point being emphasized is that philosophy of 
religion in an age of ecology at least must be capable of addressing the problems 
of externality, inwardness, and ultimacy, which, as was stated earlier, mirror 
                                                        
1 Risieri Frondizi, The Nature of the Self: A Functional Interpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1953), v.  
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philosophy’s main goals of being empirically responsible, phenomenologically 
faithful, and existentially transformative.  
 The composition of these problems is a direct reflection of the organism-
environment patterning of ecological existence. They are offered up as a 
constructive advance over the egoic defined problems that traditionally have 
occupied philosophers of religion, incisively critiqued by Nick Trakakis as unduly 
analytical in focus, Wesley Wildman as culturally biased and insular in approach, 
and Kevin Schilbrack as neglectful of religion’s noncognitive dimensions. It is our 
task over the next three chapters to show how classical American philosopher 
John Dewey provides compelling answers to philosophy of religion’s 
reconstructed problems from an ecologically grounded perspective. Yet, as is 
often the case with his writings, there exists much “Dewey’s texts did not (or 
perhaps could not) say.”2 Therefore, some hermeneutic assistance will be 
required along the way in order to make our case for Dewey as a serious religious 
thinker convincing.  
 As my rephrasing of philosophy of religion’s core problems in the form of 
questions above indicates, religion, or what Dewey preferred to call “the 
religious,” is fundamentally about “the ideal” and its realization in experience. 
Recognition of the world’s or the self’s incompleteness, of the possibility for 
achieving better, more whole, more complete experiences and states of being is a 
theme running undercurrent to all religions throughout history, whether 
                                                        
2 Aisemberg, “Dewey’s Naturalistic Mysticism,” 30.  
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supernaturalistically or naturalistically inclined. Therefore, if we can settle upon 
a firm understanding of how the concept of ideality functions in Dewey, we will 
have the key to his religious thought.  
 In this task our work is cut out for us. Dewey spoke of ideals in various 
ways throughout his lectures and writings, often switching between positive and 
critical senses of the term within the same work.3 This has resulted in a range of 
conflicting interpretations of Deweyan ideals and none fully satisfying. Two 
interpretations by leading Dewey scholars will be critically discussed, and a new 
interpretation presented, below. This novel interpretation is argued to be 
superior because it is rooted more firmly in the primacy of events for ecological 
naturalism, which shaped Dewey’s approach to all considerations of being, 
meaning, and value, their ideal forms included.   
 Over a half century after his death, much confusion remains over the exact 
tenets of Dewey’s ontology, epistemology, and axiology, even as other aspects of 
his philosophy, such as his educational and political theories, have been widely 
embraced and implemented. As should be clear up to this point, Dewey was a 
holistic, if not systematic, thinker. Thus, one cannot expect to arrive at a proper 
                                                        
3 For example, in Experience and Nature, considered a definitive statement of Dewey’s mature 
philosophy, Dewey criticizes interpretations of the ideal associated with the absolute and 
subjective idealisms popular during his day, as well as similar interpretations advanced by the 
ancient Greeks and medieval theologians that posited ideals as prefixed, immutable, and world-
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experienced values, as traits of experience, as guides to conduct, as stable meanings, as qualities 
accrued to good objects, as satisfactions of need, as archetypes or models, as mental existences 
(viz., ideas), as a faculty of the imagination, as emotions accompanying experienced goodness, as 
actualities that first reach us through potentiality, as values not yet existent, as honorifics given to 
prized goods, and, finally, as meanings continuous with existence. See EN (1925), LW 1: 6, 10, 14, 
54, 54, 57, 58, 103, 107, 132, 182, 193, 310, 310, 311, respectively.   
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understanding of his religious views—or his educational and political theories, for 
that matter—without first establishing a firm grasp of his ecological ontology, 
epistemology, and axiology, which have been discussed in only a cursory manner 
so far.  
 To remedy this situation, the present chapter further aims to clarify what 
are perhaps the most significant, but at the same time least well understood, 
concepts of Dewey’s philosophy—“event,” “nature,” and “self”—by placing them 
into conversation with the naturalist philosophies of Justus Buchler and Risieri 
Frondizi, the ecological psychology developed by James Gibson, and certain 
principles of Gestalt psychology. Dewey’s use of these concepts, like that of the 
“ideal,” cuts across philosophy’s basic categories in highly original ways, a point 
that is missed by his detractors, especially those critical of his religious views. 
“Nature,” for example, is not solely an ontological category for Dewey; it is 
equally epistemic and axiological in its intensions and implications, for it is 
within natural events that we uncover natural meanings and natural values, 
including those that are properly deemed “ideal” and “religious” on account of 
their integrating, unifying effects on natural selves.   
 The cornerstone of Dewey’s approach marks a profound sea change from 
how philosophy traditionally has proceeded in the West. In place of Western 
philosophy’s pathological focus on objects, Dewey raises events to the level of 
first philosophy. In broad strokes, Dewey’s ecological naturalism is one of 
dynamically unfolding, qualitatively rich, uniquely determinate events—what he 
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elsewhere calls “experience-events” or “situations” when the perspective of an 
active perceiver is involved. Dewey’s event-based conception of nature is miles 
away from the modern, Cartesian view of nature as a hunk of physical matter 
devoid of intrinsic meaning and value, to which meaning and value are added by 
disembodied ego-subjects. In opposition to the dominant tendency of Western 
philosophy, modern and contemporary alike, Dewey relocates meaning and 
value, along with their ideal religious forms, within the sensorimotor and 
affective dynamics of organism-environment systems and their homeostasis-
seeking and sense-making drives. It is from within this ecological framework that 
Dewey’s views on religion and the ideal ultimately must be appreciated and 
worked through. I begin this interpretive process in the present chapter by 
focusing on the external structures through which religious ideals are made 
manifest, before moving on to describe their inward forms and ultimacy 
conditions in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  
 
 
Limning Deweyan Ideals 
 
 
 Just a small number of scholars have attempted to illuminate Dewey’s 
religious thought in finer detail than he was able or perhaps willing to, with the 
majority reducing it to a form of scientific or secular humanism. The scientific-
secular reading of Dewey is so pervasive in the literature that is was referred to 
earlier as the “standard interpretation.” Even fewer works have taken to examine 
Dewey’s position on ideals in a sustained fashion. In fact, most secondary works 
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on Dewey’s philosophy fail to even include “ideal” or “ideality” as entries among 
their expansive indices, when virtually all of his primary works do.  
 Discussions of ideality in Dewey are chiefly made in relation to his 
movement away from a youthful allegiance to neo-Hegelian idealism to a Darwin-
inspired evolutionary naturalism, a journey Dewey himself recounts—but not in 
as cut and dried terms as his commentators4—in the autobiographical essay 
“From Absolutism to Experimentalism.”5 The truth is that Dewey never stopped 
speaking of ideals; he employed the term regularly in his writings until the very 
end of his career. What we are left with then is either a serious oversight on the 
part of Dewey scholars, or a widely shared assumption among them that when 
Dewey speaks of ideals he is really speaking of something else—that the term is 
used interchangeably with another more amenable to a naturalist reading. Two 
significant pieces of Dewey scholarship speak directly to this matter. Michael 
Eldridge asserts the latter case to be true in Transforming Experience: John 
Dewey’s Cultural Instrumentalism,6 while Victor Kestenbaum, in The Grace and 
Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent, argues the former case 
                                                        
4 On this issue, see the excellent analysis in John R. Shook and James A. Good, John Dewey’s 
Philosophy of Spirit, with the 1897 Lecture on Hegel (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2010). The twin influence of Hegel and Darwin on Dewey’s thinking was discussed briefly already 
in Chapter 2. 
5 “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930), LW 5: 147-160. For instance, it is in this 
revealing essay that Dewey claims: “Hegel’s synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the 
divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense 
release, a liberation. Hegel’s treatment of human culture, of institutions and the arts, involved the 
same dissolution of hard-and-fast dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me.” LW 5: 153.  
6 Michael Eldridge, Transforming Experience: John Dewey’s Cultural Instrumentalism 
(Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998). Eldridge most directly addresses the role of 
ideals in Dewey’s philosophy in a section titled “Deweyan Ideals as Generalized-Ends-in-View,” at 
102, through about 113.  
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against Eldridge and outlines a controversial alternative to mainstream, 
naturalistic interpretations of Deweyan ideals.7      
 As mentioned in the first chapter, Michael Eldridge is a main proponent of 
the standard interpretation of Dewey’s religious thought, viewing it exclusively in 
connection to his secular and humanist commitments. This already provides us 
with some idea as to the approach that will be taken to ideals in Transforming 
Experience. The main thrust of Dewey’s entire philosophical project, as defined 
by Eldridge, is to make human practice more intelligent, to improve experience 
by helping it grow in what he calls “ordered richness.” This is a concept used by 
Dewey to denote value-rich experience in the 1939 essay, “Creative Democracy—
The Task Before Us,”8 and which Eldridge identifies with the central task of 
modern deliberative democracy.  
 According to Eldridge’s praxis-level argument, the idea of ordered richness 
is an ideal guide for decision-making concerning means and ends when 
attempting to resolve social and political problems—basically, problems of shared 
existence. No person is an island, after all; humans are living, social organisms 
interacting with their natural and built environments in myriad ways with each 
passing breath. This is a fairly accurate description of how Dewey describes the 
                                                        
7 Victor Kestenbaum, The Grace and Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). Kestenbaum’s is arguably the most 
multidimensional investigation of ideals in Dewey, including explorations of connections between 
Dewey and philosophers John N. Findlay, Michael Oakeshott, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah 
Arendt, and poet Wallace Stevens. The most direct and to the point arguments concerning ideals 
can be found in Chapter 1: “Under Ideal Conditions,” 1-27, and Chapter 8: “Faith and the 
Unseen,” 175-199.     
8 “Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us” (1939), LW 14: 224-230. 
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process of valuation (presented in detail shortly), when a decision has to be made 
regarding conflicting possible courses of action. It is also why Eldridge identifies 
ideals with instrumental “ideas,” “imaginary general aims,” or “generalized ends-
in-view.”9 These are the types of aims and ideas we find outlined in political and 
social policymaking platforms, like affordable education, universal healthcare, a 
fair minimum wage, and so on.   
 Deweyan ideals are not context-transcending eternal truths or timeless 
entities. As Eldridge explains it, ideals are “useful ideals,” ones that “are 
constructed by us to solve problems. One generalizes an ‘end-in-view,’ making it 
an ideal. Ideals do not have antecedent existence; nor are they valuable in 
themselves. Human beings develop and deploy them because they are useful in 
transforming problematic situations into ones that are more satisfying.”10 This 
intelligizing of cultural practice—“cultural” in the broad sense of shared ways of 
thinking and acting, which for Eldridge is synonymous with “secularity”—by 
striving to actualize ideal ends is an emergent extension of sense-making 
activities with deeper biological roots. Nature and culture are in fact reflections of 
each other.    
 In support of his strictly instrumentalist approach to ideals, Eldridge 
quotes approvingly the following lines from Dewey’s Theory of Valuation: 
 Generalized ideas of ends and values undoubtedly exist. They exist not only as 
 expressions of habit and as uncritical and probably invalid ideas but also in the same way 
 as valid general ideas arise in any subject. Similar situations recur; desires and interests 
 are carried over from one situation to another and progressively consolidated. A schedule 
                                                        
9 Eldridge, Transforming Experience, 102.  
10 Ibid., 111. Italics added. 
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 of general ends results, the involved values being “abstract” in the sense of not being 
 directly connected with any particular existing case but not in the sense of independence 
 of all empirically existent cases….These general ideas are used as intellectual 
 instrumentalities in judgment of particular cases as the latter arise; they are, in effect, 
 tools that direct and facilitate examination of things in the concrete while they are also 
 developed and tested by the results of their application in these cases.11 
 
Eldridge believes Deweyan ideals to be the product of thinking, though it might 
be hard to tell as the quote cited nowhere references the ideal, focusing on idea 
formation instead. The sentences introducing the passage do, however, so it is 
clear that Eldridge regards it as an accurate description of how ideals are formed. 
Ideals are mental constructs, symbolic representations of possible courses of 
action devised by rational thinking subjects.  
 Under Eldridge’s view, there are no genuinely religious dimensions to the 
ideal. He insists that Dewey’s impassioned criticisms of traditional religious 
institutions and practices are evidence enough that all of Dewey “can be 
translated back into secular discourse without remainder.”12 Dewey’s use of the 
term God to denote the actualization of ideals in experience is deemed 
counterproductive to his core project of intelligizing practice, an unfortunate 
linguistic slippage on his part.13 Eldridge finds religious language to be so deeply 
entrenched with accepted meanings that philosophical programs of religious 
reconstruction, along with all attempts at religious dialogue, are rendered moot.      
 In The Grace and Severity of the Ideal, Victor Kestenbaum finds several 
things wrong with Eldridge’s ideational-instrumentalist reading of ideality in 
                                                        
11 Ibid., 103.  
12 Ibid., 10.  
13 Ibid., 168. 
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Dewey. First, it is too cognitive. Kestenbaum does not believe ideals are 
“intellectual instrumentalities” tested out by their consequences. He further 
denies ideals can be seen and viewed, even imaginatively, in the mind’s eye. As 
Kestenbaum rightly notes, Dewey speaks of ideals in a variety of ways, including 
the absent, the possible, the universal, the sense of the whole, and not all of these 
can be reduced to dry thought-forms. Second, Eldridge’s interpretation is too 
superficial, on account that Dewey “frequently confounds such unrelieved 
instrumentalist interpretation.”14 Writings such as Dewey’s early Psychology 
textbook and his late study on aesthetics, Art as Experience, make Kestenbaum’s 
claims against Eldridge on these points credible and persuasive. Both of these 
works discuss the essential role of emotion and bodily feeling in discerning ideals, 
and further describe experiences of ideal meaning as intrinsically—and not 
merely instrumentally—valuable.  
 Rather than equate ideals with possible courses of action, Kestenbaum, in 
deliberate challenge to the majority of Dewey scholarship, views ideals as objects 
and locates their origins in transcendence. This could be a plausible 
interpretation, provided one adopted a naturalistic understanding of 
transcendence such as self-transcendence, context-transcendence, transcendence 
of immediate experience, or some other “soft” form of transcendence. Despite 
intimations to the contrary,15 however, Kestenbaum has not naturalized the 
                                                        
14 Kestenbaum, The Grace and Severity of the Ideal, 16.  
15 In an early footnote, Kestenbaum claims he takes “transcendent” to mean “whatever is 
significantly discontinuous with the ordinary, the everyday, the taken-for-granted and which 
eludes reflective verification.” Ibid., 227. I see no problem with Dewey accepting this 
 159 
meaning of this term; he intends transcendence in the neo-Kantian or Platonic 
sense of transcending the known, perceivable world. Most scholars agree Dewey 
explicitly rejected all “otherworldly” senses of transcendence, just as he rejected 
supernaturalism, with plenty of confirmatory evidence. Yet, in Kestenbaum’s 
opinion, ideals cannot be the product of natural perceptions or cognition, for the 
ideal meanings revealed in experience seem to always surpass “the inquirable, the 
reflective, and the practical.”16 In other words, ideal meaning overflows presence. 
This is a fact that Dewey himself recognizes in the Ethics: “The genuine ideal…is 
the sense that each…[situation] brings with it its own inexhaustible meaning, that 
its value reaches far beyond its direct local existence.”17 It is not clear from this 
statement that Dewey would endorse anything approaching Kestenbaum’s 
understanding of transcendence, however.   
 To bolster his position, Kestenbaum advances a phenomenological reading 
of ideals he believes consistent with Deweyan pragmatism.18 According to 
phenomenology, which 20th century German philosopher Edmund Husserl built 
upon Cartesian and Kantian insights, ideal meanings are “discontinuous” with 
ordinary, everyday meanings. Like Kant’s noumena, ideals are “intangible” and 
                                                        
interpretation; however, as we will see, Kestenbaum later makes a most unDeweyan conceptual 
jump from “discontinuous with the ordinary” to “supersensible,” “unseeable,” and “untouchable.”  
16 Ibid., 2.  
17 ETH2 (1932), LW 7: 273.  
18 This is a continuation of a project begun in an earlier book; see Victor Kestenbaum, The 
Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey: Habit and Meaning (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1977). This work is full of rich insights and stays much closer to a naturalist 
interpretation of Dewey. 
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“unattainable”; their meanings “transcend what is given now to the senses.”19 
Kestenbaum attempts to give expression to the noncognitive aspects of ideals by 
equating them with intentionally nonexistent objects, with the help of John N. 
Findlay’s notion of “inward grasp.”20 Findlay used this notion to assert the reality 
of what is subjectively possible for the isolated, introspective agent beyond the 
evidence of the world. This maneuver renders ideals private, empirically 
unverifiable, and thus fundamentally at odds with Eldridge’s instrumentalist 
view.21  
 In further support of a phenomenological-transcendentalist interpretation 
of ideals, Kestenbaum quotes Dewey’s statement, made in Human Nature and 
Conduct, that the ideal “marks something wanted, rather than something 
existing. This something is wanted because existence as it now is does not furnish 
it. It carries within itself, then, a sense of contrast to the achieved, to the existent. 
It outruns the seen and touched.”22 For a reason unexplained to the reader, 
Kestenbaum takes this last sentence to mean ideals outrun the “seeable” and the 
“touchable”—in other words, what can be determined by the senses.23 As 
supersensible, transcendent objects, ideals exist in a realm removed from nature, 
that is, the ordinary world of sense experience.  
 On account of this fact, we come in touch with the realm of ideals only 
                                                        
19 Kestenbaum, The Grace and Severity of the Ideal, 17, 29. 
20 Ibid., 34.  
21 Ibid., 175.  
22 Ibid., 25.  
23 Ibid., 25, 100.  
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through maintaining what Kestenbaum calls “faith in the unseen.”24 This makes 
Deweyan ideals not only epistemologically transcendent, but ontologically 
transcendent as well. This sounds suspiciously like the supernaturalism Dewey 
denounces in A Common Faith and countless other works, as does Kestenbaum’s 
lengthier description of the faith that directs us to ideals of a religious nature: 
“Faith…is not an anticipation of the visible or sensible. Faith, like ideality, cannot 
provide evidence or justification for the meanings it intends. Dewey made it clear 
that religious faith and religious experience intend meanings which cannot be 
naturalized by the usual processes of naturalistic certification: knowledge, 
reflection, observation, thought, practical activity.”25 
 Kestenbaum rightly takes Eldridge to task for advancing an overly 
cognitivist understanding of Deweyan ideals. This brings Dewey too close to 
mainstream analytic philosophy, a movement that pragmatism and ecological 
thinking give sweeping censure to. Ideals are not the product of mere thinking, 
even if our ideas of what the ideal might be are. Nor are values, which Eldridge 
discusses in conjunction with his treatment of ideals. Value and ideality are 
qualities of experiences, even if we can generalize from experience to speak of 
them in the abstract. Like values, ideals are relevant to specific situations—
something Eldridge rightly hits on in his description (as will be shown 
momentarily).26 Further, Eldridge stays truer to Dewey’s language than 
                                                        
24 Ibid., 198. 
25 Ibid., 184.  
26 Eldridge, Transforming Experience, 111.  
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Kestenbaum by claiming human fulfillment is confined to the natural, temporal 
order. However, in identifying the goal of intelligent practice with an individual 
bringing about “what he or she wants,”27 or finds “more satisfying”28 and 
“preferable,”29 Eldridge betrays his own socially oriented focus. He further 
completely misses the “sense of the whole” that for Dewey implies—bodily, 
feelingly, and not necessarily visibly, as Kestenbaum seems to demand30—the 
genuinely desirable and satisfactory ideal for the objective situation, as opposed 
to the subjectively wanted or satisfying, which, as anyone knows, is often 
objectively undesirable and unsatisfactory. Despite his naturalistic starting point 
then, Eldridge ends up viewing ideals largely through a subjectivist, egoic lens. 
This perspective contradicts basic tenets of Dewey’s ecological naturalism, which 
always looks to both sides of the organism-environment system. Ideals may be in 
some sense imaginative, but genuine ideals are never imaginary, as Eldridge at 
one place claims.31  
 Kestenbaum advances the same faulty egoic reading as Eldridge in 
removing Deweyan ideals from the realm of sense. Unseen does not mean unfelt 
or unsensed. If this were true, it would mean that we never achieve ideals, 
making the term meaningless. As physical creatures, how can we have knowledge 
about that which outstrips our senses? Such arguments are possible, of course, 
                                                        
27 Ibid., 200.  
28 Ibid., x. 
29 Ibid., 198. 
30 Kestenbaum asks, “What is the naturalistic—or supernaturalistic—status of meanings which, in 
fact and in principle, cannot be viewed?” Kestenbaum, The Grace and Severity of the Ideal, 184.  
31 Eldridge, Transforming Experience, 102.  
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but they have no place in philosophy as Dewey understands the term. They 
belong to theology or parapsychology.  
  Ideals are capable of realization, Dewey claims in Human Nature and 
Conduct, “only as they appeal to something in human nature and awaken in it an 
active response.”32 As embodied organisms, such “appeals” and “responses” come 
to us through our sensual and perceptual systems while radiating sensible effects 
out into the larger environment. Dewey explicitly rejects a supersensible view of 
ideals in Art as Experience, which was written the same year as A Common Faith, 
with the following statement: “The elevation of the ideal above and beyond 
immediate sense has operated not only to make it pallid and bloodless, but it has 
acted, like a conspirator with the sensual mind, to impoverish and degrade all 
things of direct experience.”33  
 By creating a division between the knowing subject and the known world—
which is the ground and source of ideals—Kestenbaum reinstitutes divisions 
where Dewey argued there were none. This is a mistake reproduced in 
representationalist theories of perception and knowledge, a topic we pick up 
again in the next chapter. Further, Kestenbaum’s move to place ideal meaning 
wholly beyond the present existential context runs afoul of comments made by 
Dewey in the penetrating essay “Appearing and Appearance,” written only a few 
years after Human Nature and Conduct:   
 We find meaning as a describable, verifiable empirical phenomenon whose genesis, 
 modes and consequences can be concretely examined and traced….The realm of 
                                                        
32 HNC (1922), MW 14: 4. 
33 AE (1934), LW 10: 38.  
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 meanings, of mind, is at home, securely located and anchored in an empirically 
 observable order of existence. And this order stands in genetic continuity with physical 
 and vital phenomena….34 
 
 Though Kestenbaum’s phenomenological-transcendentalist rendering of 
ideals ultimately falls short, there is a source within the phenomenological 
tradition that supports many of Dewey’s views: French theorist Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. Like Dewey, Merleau-Ponty saw the human subject as an embodied 
organism constantly reshaping itself in relation to its environment. As Patrick 
Bourgeois and Sandra Rosenthal, scholars whose collaborative work illuminates 
the thematic connections between pragmatism and phenomenology point out, 
“Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental dimension of Husserl’s philosophy 
because, in his interpretation, it misses the natal bond between man an the world 
as the truth of naturalism.”35 For Merleau-Ponty, and I would argue also Dewey, 
what appears on this primordial level of openness to the world is not fully 
contained within the visible or seen at the present moment. This is Kestenbaum’s 
point in claiming ideal meaning overflows presence. But this does not mean 
ideals are in principle invisible or supersensible. The space between the present 
and the absent, the actual and the ideal in experience is not an unbridgeable 
ontological gap. Nor is it a permanent epistemological gap, however—the 
phenomena-noumena distinction of Husserlian phenomenology is an artificial 
one for the naturalist; it is a product of the same, overly cognitive approach that 
Kestenbaum critiques.  
                                                        
34 “Appearing and Appearance” (1927), LW 3: 50.  
35 Patrick L. Bourgeois and Sandra B. Rosenthal, Thematic Studies in Phenomenology and 
Pragmatism (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: B.R. Grüner, 1983), 5.  
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 Dewey would agree that our contact with the actual and ideal aspects of 
experience is bridged by faith. Not a supersensible faith in a realm of 
otherworldly objects, however, but a “perceptual faith” in the full warp and weft 
of reality, which contains both revealed and hidden aspects constantly flowing 
into each other. The visible is always in touch with the (contextually, temporarily) 
invisible, each shaping our thinking and sensuous, perceptual contact with the 
world. Merleau-Ponty speaks directly to this point in his Phenomenology of 
Perception with the following remarks: 
 The real is a closely woven fabric. It does not await our judgment before incorporating the 
 most surprising phenomena or before rejecting the most plausible figments of our 
 imagination. Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate 
 taking up of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is 
 presupposed by them. The world is not an object such that I have in my possession the 
 law of its making, it is the natural setting of, and field for, all of my thoughts and all my 
 explicit perceptions.36 
 
By placing ideals in a transcendent realm removed from the world, Kestenbaum 
renders them inaccessible and, ultimately, ineffective.  
 Despite their fundamentally opposed interpretations, I believe Eldridge 
and Kestenbaum each get something right about Deweyan ideals. Eldridge 
correctly describes the process by which we construct and evaluate our ideas of 
what might be ideal. What his analysis misses is the plain fact that we never know 
if our ideals are “genuine ideals”—a phrase frequently employed by Dewey—until 
after the fact, when the effects of particular actions are fully understood and 
accounted for.37 Before execution, imagined ideals are only possible ideals, just as 
                                                        
36 Ibid., 6.  
37 EN (1925), LW 1: 62.  
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values are only possible values. As Dewey recognized, we are often left reeling 
from the negative effects of false or wrong ideals. “The best laid plans…,” as the 
Scottish proverb reminds us. Against Eldridge, Kestenbaum rightly connects 
ideals with what is possible for an individual in a given situation. In other words, 
what is ideal for some individuals might not be so for others; ideals are universal 
or objective in the “positional” sense only.38  There are no “pure possibilities” 
removed from context; there are only “possibilities for,” which are always related 
to the structural dynamics of particular agents in actual situations. “Every ideal is 
preceded by an actuality,” as Dewey states.39   
 The deficiencies in Eldridge’s and Kestenbaum’s respective approaches to 
Deweyan ideals stem partly from the sources they draw on. Eldridge relies almost 
exclusively on Dewey’s Theory of Valuation, while Kestenbaum, though he casts 
a considerably wider net than Eldridge, draws heavily on Human Nature and 
Conduct. Despite the difference in their titular subject matters, both of these texts 
are mainly epistemological in orientation.40 Theory of Valuation outlines the 
steps and criteria by which values come to be known and judged; Human Nature 
and Conduct investigates the role of human habit in guiding intelligent conduct 
                                                        
38 For an overview of this concept, see Amartya Sen, “Positional Objectivity,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs  22, no. 2 (1993): 126-145.  
39 HNC (1922), MW 14: 20. Shane Ralston helps explicate what Dewey means here, stating that 
“‘Actuality’ for Dewey denotes the putative conditions of an inquirer’s situation and ‘ideality’ 
signifies either a possible course of action that will improve the terms of a situation or the 
imaginatively reconfigured result.” See Shane Ralston, “John Dewey ‘on the side of the angels’: A 
Critique of Kestenbaum’s Phenomenological Reading of A Common Faith,” Education and 
Culture 23, no. 2: 66. 
40 This is a slightly reductive generalization on my part for, as already mentioned, Dewey 
eschewed the concerns of traditional epistemology and all of his works included a range of 
philosophical concerns.  
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(with significant treatments of ethics, values, psychology, education, and art 
along the way). Neither work provides us with a satisfactory answer of what 
ideals really are, or why they are valuable and worth engaging. In other words, by 
limiting their analyses to the two works mentioned, Eldridge and Kestenbaum 
leave us with an incomplete picture of the ontological and axiological dimensions 
of ideality in Dewey. Moreover, the epistemologies of ideals they separately 
sketch are foundationally wrong; ideals do not come to us primarily through 
thinking, à la Eldridge, nor are they wholly foreclosed from our perceptual 
faculties, à la Kestenbaum. To see how and why this is so, we must return to a 
theme introduced above, that of the threefold primacy—ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological—of events for Dewey. After discussing this 
aspect of Dewey’s philosophy in some detail, we move on in the next section to an 
investigation of Dewey’s logic of situations, for it is within particular existential 
situations that ideals emerge as possibilities. It is at this juncture that I offer a 
revised interpretation of Deweyan ideals better aligned with ecological 
naturalism’s focus on action, process, and situatedness.   
 
 
Events as Ontologically Basic 
 
 
 Object and its cognates have become the watchwords of the cultural 
moment. Empirical science’s greatest virtue is considered to be its objectivity. In 
legal proceedings, the defense and prosecution alike seek the most objective 
eyewitness account. Yet most of us are taught from an early age that treating 
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persons like objects is to dehumanize them, as is objectifying their bodies or the 
words they use. In the same way, the accumulation of material objects for its own 
sake strikes the majority of persons as a severe defect in character. Objectivity is 
linked to reliability, reality, and truth, notions that are all anchored to physical 
objects presumably existing independently of perceiving subjects, while the moral 
errors of objectification and object-hoarding spring from misperceptions of the 
proper meanings and values of objects.     
 The human inclination toward an ontology of objects is an evolved product 
of our brain’s organizational machinery.41 It is reflected in our everyday discourse 
as well as specialized scientific and technical languages.42 Physical objects form 
the rudimentary axis around which we group the raw elements of our perceptions 
into larger, more meaningful wholes.43 Even our use of metaphor and other 
literary devices is built largely upon the orientational sense we have of own 
bodies, as the interdisciplinary collaborations between cognitive linguist George 
Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson show.44 It thus comes as no surprise that 
in philosophic activity, too, the object has reigned supreme. One need only call to 
mind the wondrous variety of ontological building blocks, including atoms, 
                                                        
41 For a clear and concise overview of this topic, see Arlette Streri and Elizabeth Spelke, “Effects of 
Motion and Figural Goodness on Haptic Object Perception in Infancy,” Child Development 60 
(1989): 1111-1125.  
42 Roger Säljö, “My Brain’s Running Slow Today—The Preference for ‘Things Ontologies’ in 
Research and Everyday Discourse on Human Thinking,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 21 
(2002): 389-405.   
43 Jacob Feldman, “The Role of Objects in Perceptual Grouping,” Acta Psychologica 102 (1999): 
137-163. This was the fundamental insight of Gestaltists, whose pioneering work in psychology 
will be discussed in greater detail shortly.  
44 See their several co-authored works, especially Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2003).  
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substances, monads, elements, and other “stuff,” put forward as basic by 
philosophers over the ages to see the truth in this point.  
 We perceive objects as constant, stable, and unchanging. The persistence 
of objects through space and across time—at least as these terms are defined 
relative to humans—accounts for their classical determination as the 
fundamental units of existence and as sources of ultimacy (whether conceived in 
terms of primordiality, value, importance, etc.). The connection between these 
two premises is neatly expressed in the ancient Greek idea of the unmoved 
mover.45 The primacy of objects for philosophical ontology is further evidenced 
by the chronic use of visual examples to illustrate ontological concepts and 
principles. While vision-based descriptions are highly compelling to vision-
oriented creatures like ourselves, Western philosophy’s fixation with sightedness 
has brought with it certain negative consequences. These consequences include 
the inappropriate application of visual principles to other senses and an 
impoverished model for human perception more generally, as David Hilbert has 
recently astutely observed.46  
 The excessive concentration on objects by philosophers is not limited to 
ontology or metaphysics,47 but extends to issues of epistemology and axiology as 
                                                        
45 It was Aristotle who presented the most systematized account in which an eternal, unmoved 
mover and final cause served as the ultimate explanation of the universe’s existence and 
orderliness.  
46 These consequences are catalogued in detail in David R. Hilbert, “Vision,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, ed. Mohan Matthen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015) 257-273.  
47 Ontology, or the study of being, is usually considered a sub-field of metaphysics, the study of 
the general features of existence, which is considerably broader than the concerns of being alone. 
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well. The immediate data of consciousness are typically identified with objects in 
the external, physical world. Knowledge claims are for this reason commonly 
posed in terms of the objects to which they purportedly apply: the red that Mary 
the neuroscientist sees when she emerges from her achromatic laboratory is the 
red of red apples, red roses, and red traffic lights.48 As far as values are 
concerned, hedonists view pleasure-providing objects as ultimate goods, as do 
utilitarians, though for different reasons and in different ways. Finally, artistic 
and aesthetic objects are traditionally formally appraised on account of the 
coherence or harmony exhibited by their individual object-parts taken as a whole. 
This is why so many find cubism and abstract expressionism utterly disorienting 
upon first contact. 
 Our perceptual attunement to well-defined objects is physically and 
psychologically innate. Environmental objects and obstacles are either there or 
not there, and this brute fact makes a measurable difference in terms of our 
survival. Our attunement to objects is additionally reflected in our collective 
tendency to binary thinking. A vestige of Cartesianism, binary thinking describes 
                                                        
As Sandra Rosenthal and Patrick Bourgeois note, however, pragmatists tend to alternate between 
or abandon the two terms altogether, given their historical encumbrances: “There is no crucial 
distinction within pragmatism between the use of the terms ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’. These 
are interchangeable…one must be careful not to give traditional meanings to them.” See Sandra B. 
Rosenthal and Patrick L. Bourgeois, Pragmatism and Phenomenology: A Philosophic Encounter 
(Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1980), 78. I mostly use the term ontology in this study, especially 
given the fact that Dewey often used the term “metaphysics” as a term of abuse. On this point, see 
Richard J. Bernstein, “John Dewey’s Metaphysics of Experience,” The Journal of Philosophy 58, 
no. 1 (1961): 5-14.  
48 “Mary’s room” is a widely used thought experiment in philosophy of mind first proposed by 
Frank Jackson and clarified in two seminal papers. See Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 127-136; and Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know,” 
Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 291-295.  
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systems of thought that are two-valued in orientation: valid-invalid, true-false, 
good-bad, right-wrong, and so forth. In the censoriously titled The Quest for 
Certainty Dewey argued that all of the problems of modern philosophy—a 
critique he would see no problem extending to most contemporary philosophy—
derive from compulsive ontological attachments to what are essentially false 
binaries.49    
 The ontological principle of Dewey’s ecological naturalism consists in a 
repudiation of the primacy of objects. Each individual existence is not an object 
for Dewey, but rather an event. “Every existence is an event,” as Dewey claims in 
his central work on ontology, Experience and Nature.50 With this statement, 
Dewey establishes event as the fundamental category of his philosophy, not 
experience as most commentators have presumed.51 “Event,” or what Dewey later 
calls an “experience-event” or “situation,” more clearly suggests a confluence of 
subjective and objective, organismic and environmental factors compared with 
the solipsistic connotation of “experience” when taken by itself.52 Experience and 
nature, knower and the known, form an integrated unit.    
 As Dewey recognized through years of careful observation of his own 
children and pupils at the Laboratory School, a situated event of experience is not 
                                                        
49 QC (1929), LW 4. See, especially, Chapter 3 on “Conflict of Authorities,” at pages 40-59. 
50 EN (1925), LW 1: 63. 
51 Barry E. Duff, “‘Event’ in Dewey’s Philosophy,” Educational Theory 40, no. 4 (1990): 463-470. 
It is telling that many book-length works written by Dewey contain a sizable entry for events in 
their indices, yet I could not find one in the secondary literature that listed it among their terms.   
52 It is because of the close historical association of “experience” with subjectivist doctrines that 
Dewey late in his career was prepared to abandon the term altogether in favor of “culture” in the 
anthropological sense. For details, see the draft for a new introduction to Experience and Nature 
(1925), LW 1: 329-364. 
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something that happens purely within an individual agent as opposed to the 
world. On the contrary, it represents an active, developing “transaction” that 
reaches across the organism-environment divide. Dewey’s ontology of events has 
received very little discussion by his interpreters, with the early exception of 
George Santayana.53 This, among other factors, has greatly impacted the 
reception of Dewey’s religious naturalism, which is geared toward the 
actualization of ideal events where existing events lack something essential to 
their satisfactory completion.       
 Contemporary thought is dominated by an implicit commitment to an 
object-oriented ontology that traces back to ancient Greek thinkers like 
Parmenides.54 This view was given its modern formulation by the dualistic 
physics of Descartes, which reduced the world to extended matter and perpetual 
motion, in contrast to the mind, which Descartes defined as unextended in space 
and, for this reason, strangely exempt from change in most respects. Rather than 
accepting Descartes’s authority as so many philosophers and scientists before 
him, Dewey saw his theory for what it was: an abstraction from the processive, 
continually unfolding events of nature in which matter and mind, body and 
feeling are copresent as qualitative characteristics.55  
 Developments in 20th century physics, including most notably quantum 
mechanics, have shown the idea of static, stable objects to be false, or at least 
                                                        
53 Duff, “‘Event’ in Dewey’s Philosophy,” 453, n. 7. 
54 Mark H. Bickhard, “Some Consequences (and Enablings) of Process Metaphysics,” Axiomathes 
21 (2011): 3.  
55 EN (1925), LW 1: 5. 
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incomplete. At the subatomic level, all objects undergo constant movement and 
modification. The process philosophy developed by English mathematician and 
logician Alfred North Whitehead makes essentially this same point. In his 
magnum opus, Process and Reality, Whitehead claims that all “actual occasions” 
(the fundamental category of his ontology) are momentary events in a continual 
state of becoming.56 Actual occasions are not substantial entities, which is how we 
intuitively come to think of the furniture of the world. Rather, actual occasions 
consist of the braiding together in a process Whitehead terms “concrescence” of 
the sum total of inheritances of “prehensions” (non-conscious feelings) of past 
actual occasions. The enduring objects we perceive are in actuality comprised of 
serially ordered “societies” of actual occasions flowing into each other, providing 
the illusion of a temporally extended object. These societies correspond to 
microscopic phenomena such as atoms, molecules, and cells, as well as to 
macroscopic objects like trees, mountains, and even human persons. Whitehead 
explicitly adopts the terminology of events when he claims that human 
perception and knowledge of the natural world consists essentially of event 
perception and event knowledge: “What sense-awareness delivers over for 
knowledge is nature through a period” and, as a result, “Our knowledge of nature 
is an experience of activity (or passage). The things previously observed are active 
entities, the events.”57     
 Dewey’s events can be viewed as analogous to Whitehead’s actual 
                                                        
56 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, [1929] 2010).  
57 Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
[1920] 2015), 38, 118. 
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occasions in several respects. Events and actual occasions are temporary 
stabilities in a world marked by perpetual motion and change. Both admit a 
qualitatively immediate element that can only be denoted or pointed to on 
account of its uniqueness. Moreover, each category is built upon the use of the 
results of the natural sciences to interpret human experience; events and actual 
occasions deny the bifurcation of experience into subjective and objective, inner 
and outer parts. Dewey praised the organicist perspective of Whitehead’s process 
philosophy in a short article in 1937. The following extended quote from that 
piece sheds light on the close connection between Whitehead’s process ontology 
and Dewey’s own ontology of events: 
 There are revolutionary consequences for the theory of experience and of knowledge 
 involved in this view of the subject-object relation. I select, as illustration of these 
 consequences, the relation of [Whitehead’s] philosophy to the idealism-realism problem. 
 Simplifying the matter, idealism results when the subject-object relation is confined to 
 knowledge and the subject is given primacy. Realism results when the object is given 
 primacy. But if every actual occasion is ‘bipolar’ (to use Mr. Whitehead’s own expression) 
 the case stands otherwise. The terms ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ can be used only in abstraction from 
 the actual totalities that exist. When we talk about the physical and the psychical as if 
 there were objects which are exclusively one or the other, we are, if we only know what we 
 are about, following, in an over-specialized way, the historic routes by which a succession 
 of actual occasions become enduring objects of specified kinds. Nor are these routes 
 confined to institution of just two kinds of objects. Some are in the direction of those 
 objects that are called electrons; some in that of astronomic systems; some in that of 
 plants or animals; some in that of conscious human beings. The differences in these 
 objects are differences in historic routes of derivation and hereditary transmission; they 
 do not present fixed and untraversable gulfs.58           
  
 The Western fascination with objects and object-centeredness turns a 
blind eye to the empirical results of the natural and humanistic sciences. It 
further betrays the phenomenology of lived experiencing. As Dewey clarifies 
when outlining the ideal aims of education in Democracy and Education: 
                                                        
58 “Whitehead’s Philosophy” (1937), LW 11: 149.  
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 The only way in which we can define an activity is by putting before ourselves the objects 
 in which it terminates—as one’s aim in shooting is the target. But we must remember that 
 the object is only a mark or sign by which the mind specifies the activity one desires to 
 carry out. Strictly speaking, not the target but hitting the target is the end in view; one 
 takes aim by means of the target, but also by the sight of his gun. The difference objects 
 which are thought of are means of directing the activity….The doing with the thing, not 
 the thing in isolation, is his end.59 
 
 To most contemporary philosophers, particularly those affiliated with the 
analytic camp, an event denotes an occurrence or something that happens.60 
Dewey calls such kinds of events “bare events” and, on his existential-level 
analysis, such events are not events at all. It is important to be clear on the 
meanings of the terms being used here. As already noted, Dewey frequently 
employed terms in ways that departed from their accepted, everyday meanings. 
For Dewey, bare events are the natural, causal events that occur independently of 
the presence of conscious beings, much like a tree falling in a remote forest. At 
the level of intelligent organismic existence, however, events designate not mere 
occurrences, but histories. And histories, Dewey notes, are “characterized by 
beginning, process and ending.”61 This is an insight shared between Dewey and 
Whitehead, as well as Continental philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Alain 
Badiou.62  
 Attempting to clarify the distinction between the two distinct senses of 
event, Dewey tells us in a key statement from Experience and Nature that 
                                                        
59 DE (1916), MW 9: 112.  
60 For a comprehensive survey of analytic approaches to events, see Roberto Casati and Achille C. 
Varzi, eds., Events (Aldershot, United Kingdom: Dartmouth, 1996).  
61 EN (1925), LW 1: 92. 
62 See Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990); and Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum, 
2006).  
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“Events [by which he means “bare events”] are present and operative anyway; 
what concerns us is their meanings expressed in expectations, beliefs, inferences, 
regarding their potentialities.”63 It is always the meaning and prospective 
direction of dynamically unfolding events that concern minded, meaning-making 
organisms and these are “revealed in experience as the immediately felt quality of 
things.”64 Though often dependent upon the exercise of intelligence for their 
recognition, meaningful qualitative events are not constituted by thinking alone. 
Rather, Dewey argues that they are “wholly natural” and “realistic,” comprising 
“the sticks and stones, the bread and butter, the trees and horses, the eyes and 
ears, the lovers and haters, the sighs and delights of ordinary experience.”65 It is 
the job of an empirical, naturalistic ontology, according to Dewey, to denote the 
generic traits and qualities of meaningful events as they are revealed in 
experience’s dynamic flow, and not beforehand. This ultimately renders ontology 
as phenomenology for Dewey, a theme that Martin Heidegger explores from a 
different angle in his profoundly influential Being and Time.66    
 
 
Meaning as Affordance 
 
  
 Objects are events that change slowly or with significant effort; as a result, 
their structures are perceived to be more or less stable. This was Whitehead’s 
                                                        
63 EN (1925), LW 1: 244. 
64 Ibid., 6. 
65 New introduction to EEL (1918), MW 10: 339. 
66 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, [1953] 2010), especially at 26-36. 
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point referenced above. Stable objects are what Dewey calls “events with 
meanings” and include things as diverse as “tables, the milky way, chairs, stars, 
cats, dogs, electrons, ghosts, centaurs, historic epochs and all the infinitely 
multifarious subject-matter of discourse designable by common nouns, verbs and 
their qualifiers.”67 Such events acquire fixed epistemic meanings within 
experience when their results become important and predictable. Take noises, for 
instance, on which Dewey says the following in his Essays in Experimental 
Logic:  
 Noises, in themselves mere natural events, through habitual use as signs of other natural 
 events become integrated with what they mean. What they stand for is telescoped, as it 
 were, into what they are. This happens also with other natural events, colors, tastes, etc. 
 Thus, for practical purposes, many perceptual events are cases of knowledge; that is, they 
 have been used as such so often that the habit of so using them is established or 
 automatic.68  
  
 As Dewey correctly saw, it is only after we begin to view the meaning of 
select events as resolved and settled that we tend to view them as distinct objects. 
Regularity of perceived meaning leads directly to the formation habits of 
inference and interaction. To further illustrate the general pattern of this 
meaning attribution process, Dewey chooses the civilizationally significant 
example of fire: 
 Fire burns and the burning is of moment. It enters experience; it is fascinating to watch 
 swirling flames; it is important to avoid its dangers and to utilize its beneficial potencies. 
 When we name an event, calling it fire, we speak proleptically; we do not name an 
 immediate event; that is impossible. We employ a term of discourse; we invoke a 
 meaning, namely the potential consequences of the existence….[T]he ultimate meaning, 
 or essence, denominated fire, is the consequences of certain natural events within the 
 scheme of human activities…69           
                                                        
67 EN (1925), LW 1: 240. 
68 EEL (1918), MW 6: 110.  
69 EN (1925), LW 1: 150. 
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Fire is significant on account of what we can do with it and what it can do to us. It 
is an instrument, one that we can better or less control. For extremophiles and 
organisms living in the Arctic fire does not exist, at least not in the burnable, 
cook-withable, light-providing sense that it does for humans. Fire’s meaning is 
not one-dimensional; its meaning, rather, includes the entire range of 
possibilities fire portends to a particular creature.  As Dewey states elsewhere:  
 What a physical event immediately is, and what it can do…are distinct and 
 incommensurable. But when an event has meaning, its potential consequences become its 
 integral and funded feature. When the potential consequences are important and 
 repeated, they form the very nature and essence of a thing, its defining, identifying, and 
 distinguishing form. To recognize the thing is to grasp its definition. Thus we become 
 capable of perceiving things instead of merely feeling and having them. To perceive is to 
 acknowledge unattained possibilities; it is to refer the present to consequences, 
 apparition to issues, and thereby to behave in deference to the connections of events. As 
 an attitude, perception or awareness is predictive expectancy, wariness.70 
 
 On Dewey’s reading, objects without acquired meanings cannot be events 
for us at all; they are, in ordinary terms, uneventful. Like strange fruits and hand 
gestures in foreign countries, such events remain deterrents or mere curiosities 
until we learn what their existential consequences are, which we discover through 
experimentation—tasting and gesturing in the cases just described. Only 
afterwards can we be said to “know” them in the full sense of the term. Dewey 
understood that a significant portion of human knowledge is of this skilful 
“know-how” sort and is gained through embodied experience. There simply are 
no self-evident or absolute rational principles that can tell someone what a 
durian fruit tastes like or that giving a “thumbs up” in Russia is terribly offensive.  
 Dewey’s conception of objects as events-with-meanings is one that he 
                                                        
70 Ibid., 143. 
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shared with his colleague and fellow pragmatist George Herbert Mead, the 
founder of the school of symbolic interactionism in sociology. Under Mead’s 
interactionist view, “We grasp what we see in terms of what we can do with it.”71 
Physical objects represent bundles of possible manipulatory acts: grasping, 
holding, bending, carrying, ingesting, and so on. It is for this reason that Mead 
insightfully referred to objects as “collapsed acts.” As Mead states in The 
Philosophy of the Present: 
 The physical thing has arisen in experience through the direct control of our conduct 
 toward it in so far as it is related to our organisms by the distance senses lodged in the 
 head, when this relation through the distance-senses calls out in advance and controls the 
 manipulatory reactions toward the distant object we are seeking or avoiding. The 
 perceptual object answers to a collapsed act, and if we are in doubt as to the reality of 
 what we see or hear, we must carry the act out to the point of actual contact. The doubting 
 Thomas can be convinced only by his hand. Even tactual illusion can only be dissipated 
 by other contacts.72  
 
 This is simply another way of saying that objects, in their capacity as 
events or collapsed acts, are comprised of the sum total of opportunities for 
action that they afford an individual at any given moment. When we see a cup (an 
isolated actual object), for example, we typically do not see an oval-shaped piece 
of porcelain or plastic; rather, we see something we can grasp, pick up, drink 
from, or even throw (multiple possible events). As Dewey defines it, meaning just 
is awareness of these various action consequences before they occur. Raymond 
Boisvert usefully summarizes Dewey’s action-based theory of meaning and 
knowledge, which he formed under the close influence of Mead, with the 
following explanation:  
                                                        
71 Cornelis de Waal, A Pragmatist World View: George Herbert Mead’s Philosophy of the Act 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 165. 
72 George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present (London: Open Court, 1932), 116. 
 180 
 Knowledge is the awareness of what something is. This, in turn, means a sensitivity to its 
 multiple possibilities. To know something is to be aware of what might happen to it, what 
 behavior to expect, what results will follow, what expectations to assume, under specified 
 conditions. Maple syrup processors know what will happen to the sap under various 
 environmental conditions. They know what an early thaw means, what warmer than 
 typical nights mean for the flow of the sap. The burgeoning of our knowledge grows 
 proportionately with our ability to anticipate what possibilities will be realized under 
 various circumstances. It grows with new circumstances which reveal more about the 
 natural process [event]. Knowledge is not an affair of coming directly into the presence of 
 the “really real” once and for all. Knowing is temporally conditioned. It grows with the 
 varying circumstances as we become more sensitive to the possibilities that can be 
 realized in the varying circumstances in which we and whatever it is we are trying to 
 understand are placed.73 
 
 It was on account of the intimate relationship between action and 
knowledge in experience that Charles Sanders Peirce formulated the “pragmatic 
maxim” of meaning determination that is considered as ushering in the 
pragmatist movement in philosophy. Against the verificationist theories of 
meaning popular during his day (whereby a statement’s meaning consists in its 
methods of verification), Peirce argued: “In order to ascertain the meaning of an 
intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might 
conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of 
these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.”74 
According to Peirce, meaning is not something built up from sensory 
impressions, nor is it a superfluous quality tacked on to experience after the fact, 
as the establishment, cognitivist model of perception presupposes. Meaning is 
anticipatory and predictive at every turn.    
 Dewey clarifies this matter with the multivalent example of paper. In most 
                                                        
73 Raymond D. Boisvert, John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1998), 24-25. 
74 Quoted in Thayer, Pragmatism: The Classic Writings, 53. Peirce’s maxim takes various forms 
over the course of his writings, some more convoluted than others. The quoted version is among 
the clearest of expressions.  
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contexts, paper simply means “something to be written upon,” but it can also 
mean “something to start a fire with,” “made of wood-pulp,” “property in the legal 
sense,” among other things. Dewey continues, “And if we say that after all it is 
‘paper’ which has all these different meanings, we are at bottom asserting that the 
existence whose usual, standardized meaning in discourse is paper, also has a 
multitude of other meanings; we are saying in effect that its existence is not 
exhausted in its being paper, although paper is its ordinary meaning for human 
discourse.”75  
 Thomas Alexander emphasizes the importance of this point for 
understanding Dewey’s philosophy by stating that “the act,” as opposed to raw 
thoughts, becomes the fundamental “unit of meaning.”76 This is precisely what 
James Gibson, the founder of the discipline of ecological psychology, had in mind 
with his complex and frequently misunderstood notion of “affordances.” 
According to Gibson, the natural environment is far from a passive source of 
meaningless information—a position backed by behaviorist and cognitive 
psychologies that leave the task of meaning construction to our subjective mental 
activity alone. On the contrary, the environment actively broadcasts meaningful, 
value-laden information that invites or affords opportunities for specific types of 
responsive behavior by specific types of organisms. This information is specified 
through the basic structures of action-dependent invariants (e.g., optic flow, 
                                                        
75 EN (1925), LW 1: 241. 
76 Thomas Alexander, John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience and Nature: The Horizons of 
Feeling  (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 124. 
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surface heights, passage widths, texture gradients, etc.).77 Environmental 
information is objective, but it is simultaneously a product of a perceiver’s bodily 
involvement with the environment. For example, the possibility of opening a 
closed jar exists, but having opposable thumbs makes a difference for executing 
that action successfully.   
 Where it is ontology’s job to denote the qualitative traits of events in their 
felt immediacy, it is the task of an empirical, naturalistic epistemology (what 
Dewey will rebrand as inquiry or logic), to help us perceive and direct the 
changes intervening between the beginning and closing of indeterminate 
experience-events, so as to control their eventual results. This makes knowledge 
ultimately a form of action for Dewey:  
 Physical science makes claim to disclose not the inner nature of things but only those 
 connections of things with one another that determine outcomes and hence can be used 
 as means. The intrinsic nature of events is revealed in experience as the immediately felt 
 qualities of things. The intimate coordination and even fusion of these qualities with the 
 regularities that form the objects of knowledge, in the proper sense of the word 
 “knowledge,” characterizes intelligently directed experience, as distinct from mere casual 
 and uncritical experience.78 
 
Learning and education involve the acquiring and exercise of embodied skills, 
rather than collecting a series of lifeless facts.79  
 
 
Value as a Gestalt Quality 
 
  
 Value theory, also known as axiology, is the area of philosophy concerned 
                                                        
77 James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1966), 23. Gibson’s ecological psychology will be discussed in greater detail in later sections.    
78 EN (1925), LW 1: 6. 
79 This is a theme Dewey explores at length in Experience and Education (1938), LW 13: 48-60. 
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with the nature of value and the kinds of things having value. Philosophers over 
the ages have identified several general forms of value,  “intrinsic” and 
“instrumental” being the two most frequently discussed. Intrinsic value is 
considered basic; it is the value something has for its own sake, considered by 
itself. An object, event, or action is believed to have instrumental value if it 
causally contributes to something having intrinsic value.80  Value theorists study 
general forms of value in addition to specific values, including the ethical values 
of right and wrong, the aesthetic values of beauty and ugliness, the epistemic 
values of truth and falsehood, among many others.  
 There exists broad consensus across the humanistic and policy-oriented 
disciplines that the greatest value for humans lies in achieving and sustaining a 
“good life”—what Amartya Sen describes as the kind of life one “has reason to 
value,”81 and what Dewey refers to as a life marked by “self-realization” and 
positive “growth.”82 There exists considerably less agreement, however, as to 
what the goal of such a life consists in and what the best methods are for bringing 
such a life about. The varying economic, social, and political governance systems 
existing across the globe are products of this discord.  
 The impasse between differing approaches to values and the good life owes 
                                                        
80 Philosophers have also identified “inherent” and “relational” types of value. Inherent value 
describes the value a thing has if its experience or contemplation is intrinsically valuable. 
Relational value describes the value a thing has in virtue of its relation to something else. These 
are the most common understandings of the four main categories of value; individual 
philosophers’ understandings often depart from them in highly different and significant ways.        
81 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999), 87. 
82 For an overview on this theme in Dewey’s philosophy, see Roth, John Dewey and Self-
Realization. 
 184 
in part to the vagueness and seeming incomparability of value judgments such as 
“good,” “right,” “true,” “beautiful,” and the like. It owes in equal part to three 
common and interwoven tendencies when it comes to how values are approached 
in theory as well as in practice. These include: (1) the tendency to view values as 
fixed and final, though they are continually subject to review and revision; (2) the 
tendency to formulate and evaluate means distinctly from ends, though the two 
are reciprocally determined; and (3) the tendency to equate the individual 
character of value experience with value subjectivism, though it is wholly 
compatible with an objective stance on values. Dewey spoke out against each of 
these errors in his writings on value and his many speeches on issues of public 
importance.  
These value tendencies evince a commitment to what is perhaps best 
termed axiological apriorism. Axiological apriorism is the position that values 
exist apart from and can be determined prior to experience. At the same time 
they attest to the positivism latent in all fields of social evaluation and policy. 
While in its weaker, epistemological formulation, positivism’s search after 
empirical causes and rules is innocent enough, in its stronger, more metaphysical 
formulation, positivism sharply isolates such facts from the values that give them 
shape and significance, frustrating concerns to bridge the two. 
A first step in clearing the ground for open dialogue and collaboration 
among the varying conceptions and policy systems aimed at the good life involves 
uncovering the experiential nature of values and facts. The same can be said for 
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advancing dialogue and collaboration among the world’s religious traditions, 
institutionally affiliated and otherwise. As Dewey insisted, values only ever 
present themselves within the factual context of lived experience: as behavioral 
solutions to felt problems, as instrumental guides to desired goals, as 
satisfactions or consummations of events. To use Hilary Putnam’s popular 
phrasing, our values are forever “entangled” with the facts of reality and not at 
variance with them.83 Axiological positions that deem values illusory—as, say, 
emotive ejaculations in the Ayerian sense84—or attempt to determine values 
aprioristically, ignore the real but provisional nature of all human values.  
 The good life is fundamentally a proposition about values. Examples 
abound in the literature of the qualities or values deemed most conducive to 
human well-being: rational, scientific, and modern. Such values are grouped by 
advocates and critics alike as “Western” and are contrasted with the values they 
seek to displace: irrational, religious, and traditional—values commonly 
designated, by mere contrast, as “non-Western.” Assuming for a moment that 
this “West versus the rest” binary is meaningful, Western countries do enjoy 
living standards above those of many non-Western countries. This is also true of 
certain geographically non-Western countries highly influenced by Western 
modes of industrial production and political governance like South Korea and 
                                                        
83 See Hilary Putnam, “Objectivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction,” in The Quality of Life, ed. 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 143-157.  
84 The view that moral and value statements are merely expressions of emotional attitudes, 
widely known as “emotivism,” was stated most clearly by A. J. Ayer in his Language, Truth and 
Logic (New York: Dover, 1936). For a more recent treatment, see Colin Wilks, Emotion, Truth 
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 186 
Japan. To some scholars, the responsibility for a country’s lack of progress 
(economic, social, or otherwise) thus falls squarely upon the cultural beliefs and 
practices, including religion, of its people. In other words, values, or what are 
better termed, highlighting their behavioral-dispositional nature and following 
Dewey’s terminology, “valuings” are to blame.85 
 The argument that “culture matters”86 is by no means novel; scholars have 
fallen back on the explanatory power of culture since Max Weber suggested the 
Protestant origins of capitalism.87 And not only are cultural accounts for non-
progress common, they are compelling in that they lend themselves to a kind of 
empirical testing. One can, for instance, plot a country’s reported desires, 
interests, and habits—its valuings—as measured by the World Values Survey or 
other cross-national survey instrument,88 against its economic realities and 
identifiable patterns emerge. Employing this method, one group of scholars 
uncovered that achievement motivation has a direct, positive effect on a country’s 
rate of economic growth.89 A similar study found societies valuing individual 
resources, emancipative values, and freedom rights rank highest in 
socioeconomic standards worldwide.90 By the same logic, economic inefficiency 
                                                        
85 Dewey, Theory of Valuation, 5. 
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90 Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “The Theory of Human 
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and social backwardness might be explained by a culture’s lacking these values.91 
Such studies depend upon an assumed correlation between human happiness 
and economic factors, however, when there is not necessarily a causal relation 
between the two. Furthermore, other factors than cultural values, including 
geographical location and environmental makeup, play an obvious part in 
shaping not only the form of economic outcomes, but also their very possibility.  
Sensitive to the paternalism inherent in any estimation of a culture’s 
beliefs and practices, yet aware that reasoned deliberation of past valuings in 
light of their experienced consequences is a natural feature of human inquiry, 
conceptions of the good life that look past the economic sphere are the end 
product of the process Dewey termed “valuation.”92 Valuation is the evaluative 
process whereby our immediate, unreflective valuings, routinized as personal 
habits and cultural customs, are subject to reasoned assessment. Valuation takes 
place when our desired beings and doings fail to prove desirable and require a 
choice, often vital, to be made—as when a sweets-loving person who develops 
insulin resistance must weigh her desire for good health against the recurrent 
impulse to sate her sugar cravings. In situations such as these, an immediately 
enjoyed habit is brought under reflective scrutiny in light of its negative future 
consequences and is transformed accordingly in effort to avoid those 
                                                        
Development: a Cross-Cultural Analysis,” European Journal of Political Research 42, no. 3 
(2003): 341-379. 
91 For an overview of this argument in the Indian context, see Meera Nanda, Prophets Facing 
Backward: Postmodern Critiques of Science and Hindu Nationalism in India  (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003).  
92 Dewey, Theory of Valuation, 5. 
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consequences.  
Valuation also takes place at the collective (familial, societal, national, etc.) 
level. A clear case in point: the religiocultural practice of “female circumcision” is 
no longer dismissed as a customary or sacred rite of passage, but is increasingly 
recognized for the fundamental violation of bodily integrity and human rights 
that it is. The result of this collective valuation has resulted in the practice’s 
growing international criminalization and its rebranding as “female genital 
mutilation,” a linguistic shift that is intended to facilitate a global behavioral-
dispositional shift—basically, the remaking of the valuings that enabled and 
habituated the practice in the first place. Such critical shifts in perception and 
practice are the very stuff by which positive social transformation occurs. 
Unfortunately, they are long coming and hard-won, owing to the extreme 
difficulty with which habits and customs are broken.  
 As the previous examples illustrate, the natural aim of all valuation is the 
transformation of experience through the creation of better conduct-guiding 
valuings. There is an important but often ignored lesson here for all policy-
oriented disciplines, and it is that values are in no sense plucked from a fixed, 
acontextual source. Values emerge only and always within particular situations, 
as instruments for resolving the unsettled relations or felt imbalances that arise 
time and again between humans (or other organisms) and their environments. 
Failure to recognize this fact persistently results in the promotion of 
predetermined values that, though viable in one context—say, treating natural 
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resources as subservient to human comfort in an environment where they are 
plentiful—may very well prove disastrous in another—the very same behavior in 
an environment where mere survival is tied to resources that are scarce. As both 
the cause and effect of valuation, values are forever subject to criticism and 
revision relative to what is “valuable,” not simply what is “valued,” in the 
situation under consideration. 
 The ability to consistently generate and enjoy experiences of value is the 
hallmark of mature, intelligent behavior. Until actualized, however, values are 
hypotheses, experimental tools to be tested, compared, and judged for their 
effectiveness in bringing about better states of affairs for individuals and society. 
Determinations of this sort are best reached not by appeal to a priori standards, 
but by careful and continuous deliberation on means and ends.  
 The conventional treatment of means and ends begins first by sharply 
distinguishing the two. An end is considered that which is valuable in and of 
itself; ends are valued for their own sake. In axiological terms introduced earlier, 
ends have intrinsic value. A mean, by contrast, is that which is valuable for the 
sake of something else. As such, means have instrumental value only. Put 
differently, ends are considered worthy aims or goals and means are but the 
“causal conditions employed to achieve intended ends—their value lies solely in 
their power to produce ends.”93  
 Economic conceptions of the good life follow this conventional view by 
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positing wealth as the end goal; all other factors, including culture and religion, 
are to be used in the course of that pursuit. They have no value save that 
conferred upon them as instruments of profit. Yet income is only one of several 
means to living well. Other equally important means include life expectancy and 
educational achievement.  
 The tendency to separate means and ends in this fashion is, from Dewey’s 
pragmatic vantage point, wrongheaded for two reasons. The first reason is 
ethical. It is but a small step from the separation of means and ends to an “ends 
justify the means” mentality. Such an attitude leads only to bad practice, as when 
the drive for increased happiness or education at the collective level turns a blind 
eye toward their unequal distribution among individuals, or when the fixation on 
economic growth by way of industrial output disregards the high transaction 
costs, known as “externalities,” that material consumption incurs to the 
environment.  
 The second reason the conventional separation of means from ends is 
misguided under Dewey’s view is logical. Ends and means are in all cases 
reciprocally determined. As Dewey states in Theory of Valuation: “ends are 
determinable only on the ground of the means that are involved in bringing them 
about.”94 To illustrate this point by returning to an earlier example: the insulin-
resistant person who desires good health views that goal necessarily in terms of 
the actions needed to achieve it—namely, the maintaining of stable blood sugar 
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levels and the dietary habits this requires. Neither the maintenance of blood 
sugar levels nor good health are valued intrinsically, as ends-in-themselves (even 
if casually spoken of in this fashion). Rather, both are valued instrumentally, as 
functional means to further ends, such as being able to work, enjoy a full social 
life, and prevent premature mortality. Only experiences are intrinsically valuable. 
C. I. Lewis, a frequently neglected pragmatist, states the point at issue here with a 
clarity of expression that often escaped Dewey’s pen:  
In this sense of ‘intrinsic value’ as the value of that which is valued for its own sake, no 
 objective existent has strictly intrinsic value; all values in objects are extrinsic only. This 
 is so because the end, by relation to which alone anything is ultimately to be judged 
 genuinely valuable, is some possible realization of goodness in direct experience. The 
 goodness of good objects consists in the possibility of their leading to some realization of 
 directly experienced goodness. What could by no possibility ever be an instrument for 
 bringing any satisfaction to anybody, is absolutely without value, or the value of it is 
 negative.95 
 
 The point being made may seem so obvious as to not need mentioning. Yet 
it is entirely lost on policymaking efforts that attempt to isolate ends from means. 
The crux of Dewey’s naturalistic reconstruction of the means-ends dichotomy is 
that the process of ends-formation is never final. There are no ends-in-
themselves in a world marked by events, novelty, and change. Ends are only ever 
what Dewey called “ends-in-view” that, when reached, become means to newly 
sought after ends.96 As such, ends-in-view are subject to instrumental evaluation 
(as are all values) for their effectiveness in resolving the fragmented situations 
that occasion them. In Dewey’s instrumentalist language, ends-means “are 
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appraised or valued as good or bad on the ground of their serviceability.”97 
Dewey clarifies this point thusly: “The ‘value’ of different ends that suggest 
themselves is estimated or measured by the capacity they exhibit to guide action 
in making good, satisfying, in its literal sense, existing lacks.”98     
 To say that all values are instrumental is not to say that values are the 
product of human caprice or that they aim at practicality simpliciter—that is, at 
what works apart from considerations of consequence. By all accounts, values are 
functional—What would it mean, besides linguistic confusion, to value something 
that carries no weight for how one lives one’s life?—but theirs is a practicality 
secundum quid, one that aims ever toward progress and improvement. People 
do, of course, maintain values (at least as this word is used in everyday language) 
that carry no or negative weight for their lives, but such beliefs and practices are, 
for precisely this reason, better termed non-values or disvalues, respectively. 
This is not to say that a Deweyan, ecological approach to values lays claim to 
know what should, or, for that matter, could be desired or valued in all 
situations,99 but it does assert that many actions and events clearly aren’t 
desirable or valuable and that these are known directly by experience of their 
unsatisfactory consequences, by their failure to resolve the problem at hand. As 
bluntly put by Lewis: “Without the experience of felt value and disvalue, 
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evaluations in general would have no meaning.”100  
 Likewise, objects and actions which are genuinely desirable and valuable 
are determinable only by experience of their satisfactory consequences, by their 
ability to transform a “problematic” situation marked by difficulty or uncertainty 
into what Dewey called a “unified” one marked by ease and security.101 These are 
the types of fulfilling experiences Dewey calls “consummatory,” a term meant to 
give expression to the felt closure and wholeness that results when the varied and 
disconnected parts of the vital flow of experiencing are combined into more 
meaningful wholes.102  
 This was a founding insight of Gestalt psychology, which named the 
organic wholes populating our perceptual experience gestalten, plural for gestalt, 
the German word for “form,” “shape,” or “configuration.”103 Dewey does not seem 
to have studied the Gestaltists104 in any depth, yet his entire corpus is littered 
with references to “whole” and “form” qualities.105 It is clear that he was aware of 
the central role played by gestalts in organizing experience. Dewey also 
recognized that such configurations were not confined to purely visual 
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phenomena, but applied to other perceptual modalities as well as to our emotions 
and bodily feelings, an insight the psychotherapeutic field of Gestalt therapy 
would later build upon.106 He further seems to imply that whole configurations 
are not merely the product of cognition, of our brain’s organizational machinery, 
as Gestalt psychology does, but actually exist in nature. In fact, Dewey states that 
we often hit upon consummations “spontaneously and accidentally—as the baby 
gets food and all of us are warmed by the sun—before they can be the objects of 
foresight, intervention, industry.”107 Before we can learn to finish events, 
satisfactory completions must first occur naturally. This reflects the continuity 
Dewey proposed between experience and nature, a theme we will return to 
momentarily.       
 The role of values in creatively integrating disparate parts of experience 
into meaningful wholes makes it possible to speak of value as a gestalt quality. 
This was an implicit insight of Dewey’s, and one made explicitly by Risieri 
Frondizi, an Argentinean philosopher greatly influenced by the traditions of 
American pragmatism and naturalism. Frondizi’s major contribution to value 
theory was to define values as gestalts. What Frondizi meant by this was that 
values, as experienced, are always more than the aggregate of their constituent 
parts—they are new qualities that emerge from a unique configuration of those 
parts in a dynamic event of experience.108 Frondizi argued it was incorrect to 
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posit values as existing apart from experience, a point echoed by Lewis’s 
statement above. To be a value is to be experienced. Except for the coin or 
currency collector, income alone offers little in direct contribution to “a life which 
would be found good in the living of it.”109 Income in itself is a non-value of the 
good life. Only when income is met with the capabilities that enable its use does it 
become a possible value. Finally, only when those capabilities are exercised in a 
valuable way does either become an actualized value, a felt increase in subjective 
well-being, and a genuine component of the good life. 
 This seemingly innocent claim—that values must be experienced to be 
genuine—is open to charges of value subjectivism. Put simply, value subjectivism 
is the position that no absolute, universal, or objective values exist. Rather, values 
are considered to be relative to individual perspective and interest. At first glance, 
this position is compelling, commonsensical even. It guides our postmodern 
society’s belief in the inviolability of personal conscience. It also implicitly 
undergirds approaches to value rooted in axiological apriorism, wherein the 
validity of what counts as valuable depends upon the strict separation of objective 
and impersonal facts—those provided by economic theory, for instance—from 
subjective and personal values—supplied, in turn, by culture and religion.  
 The fact of the matter, however, is that in the wake of positivism’s collapse 
axiological apriorism is no longer tenable. This is especially so since the 
philosophical and scientific turns to ecology. Recent advances in quantum 
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physics, chaos and dynamic systems theories, and the cognitive sciences, for 
example, point to the natural world, dynamic and constantly evolving, as the 
ultimate foundation of all human being and knowing.110 Long before these 
scientific advances, Dewey railed against all forms of apriorist thinking. At its 
base, Dewey’s philosophy is rooted in ecological thinking. Its commitments are 
best summed up by Dewey’s conviction, rephrased by Larry Hickman, that 
“human beings are in and a part of nature, and not over against it.”111 This holds 
for all human meanings (affordances) and values (gestalts).   
 This fact imposes significant limits and constraints on the way we obtain, 
organize, and transmit knowledge, including knowledge of values. Nowhere do 
we find knowledge in a realm of rational, pure ideas existing apart from lived 
experience—wherefrom economic principles are often depicted as originating. 
Rather, it is through the reciprocal interaction between our physical, sensate 
bodies and the larger natural and cultural environments in which we abide that 
we primarily come to know and value the world. Ecological axiologies, in contrast 
to their egoic (e.g., supernaturalistic and apriorist) counterparts, work from the 
recognition that values represent more than subjective preferences; values 
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correspond to objective properties and features of the environment as those 
properties and features fund and further our ability to adapt to novel 
circumstances.   
 Subjectivism about values is frequently offered as sufficient reason for 
denying values any role, or granting them only an auxiliary role, in public affairs. 
Yet it merely reflects the recognition that external conditions of value experience 
must be met with internal conditions for its realization or its promises count for 
naught. This position is wholly compatible with value objectivism, a recognition 
that should grant values a properly constitutive role in public affairs, which aims 
ever at mutual understanding of common ideals and purposes—the very fabric 
values are woven from. At the same time, it serves as a humble reminder that we 
are often wrong, individually and collectively, about what is genuinely valuable 
for making life better.  
 Only by open inquiry and reasoned deliberation can the genuinely valuable 
be discovered. Only through systematic training and education will the genuinely 
valuable also be desired. The objective value of this fact serves as a clarion call for 
renewed dialogue and active collaboration between competing conceptions of the 
good life among philosophers and theorists working in other disciplines. Further, 
it forces perpetual reevaluation of the problematic situations in which we find 
ourselves and, as a corollary, the ongoing refinement of the tools selected for 
solving them. The crucial point to remember, especially as we prepare to return 
to our discussion of ideals, is that the processes of problem framing and tool 
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refinement are, for natural organisms in a world of changing events, never final.  
 This was a driving insight of Dewey’s early psychology and logical theory, 
to which we now turn our attention. Both of these interact to form Dewey’s 
situational (i.e., not abstract, deductive, or one-dimensional) logic, or “theory of 
inquiry.” Note that I do not provide a thorough exegesis of Dewey’s psychology 
and logic in what follows, but rather an overview of these topics in terms of their 
relevance for understanding his thinking about religion and the ideal.   
 
 
 3.2 Dewey’s Logic of Existential Situations  
 
 
British analytic philosopher Bertrand Russell once argued that all genuine 
philosophical problems could be reduced to problems of logic. “Every 
philosophical problem,” claimed Russell, “when it is subjected to the necessary 
analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or 
else to be…logical.”112 According to this view, the philosophical problems of 
religion identified in this study—namely, those of externality, inwardness, and 
ultimacy—would be contradictions in terms, for surely no dimension of human 
life is as far removed from the concerns of logic than is religion. Yet, as F. C. S. 
Schiller, a German-British philosopher aligned with pragmatism wisely observed 
long before Russell, logicians “differ widely as to the nature, the function, the 
value, and even the existence, of their science.”113  
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 The denial of a logical role to religion holds water only if one adheres to a 
supernaturalistic understanding of religion or an overly rationalist conception of 
logic. Dewey’s rejection of supernaturalism was a refusal of its protectionist 
strategy of removing religion and its concerns from the natural world, a world 
marked by change and uncertainty. Traditional rationalist approaches to logic 
employ this same strategy when they assert that logical principles belong to a 
separate metaphysical realm, one insulated from the vagaries of human character 
and experience (think of Spock from Star Trek). 
 Dewey’s naturalism, which begins from the ubiquity of organism-
environment transaction, posed a direct challenge to the rationalist propositional 
logic popular during his day, of which Russell was a prime exponent. In Dewey’s 
opinion, “To regard the thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as 
qualifications of ‘pure thought apart from any differences in objects,’ instead of as 
successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material (or 
objects), is the fallacy of rationalism.”114 For Dewey, the context and subject 
matter of rationalist logic were as impoverished as those of supernaturalistic 
religion and needed to be reconstructed to match existential realities.  
 Part of this reconstruction involved recognizing that logic was not just a 
mental process—emotions and bodily feelings play a crucial role in diagnosing 
and resolving the problematic situations we find ourselves confronted with daily. 
The dialectical process of problem diagnosis and resolution involves somatically 
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and affectively attuning ourselves to the environmental structures that support 
ideals and their realization in experience. The remainder of this chapter will focus 
on elucidating these general structures, while the next chapter will take a closer 
look at the phenomenology of religious ideals qua possible events as individuals 
perceive and enact them. Discussion of the differences between aesthetic, moral, 
and religious situations and their ideal consummations is also put off until the 
next chapter to prevent unnecessary redundancy.  
 Though not widely remembered as a logician, Dewey believed logic to be 
the most important branch of philosophy and the area most in need of 
reconstruction.115 Many of Dewey’s early articles are focused specifically on 
logical method116 and he continued to write papers on logical themes until the 
end of his career. By Dewey’s own admission, logic was his “first and last love.”117 
Like much of his work in other areas of philosophy, Dewey’s work in logic was 
prompted by the deficiencies he saw contained in the “spectator theory of 
knowledge”—a dualistic epistemological-ontological theory that separates acts of 
knowing from the contents of knowledge—subscribed to by both supernaturalists 
and rationalists in Dewey’s day. The failure of both schools or trends of thought 
to faithfully mirror lived experiencing (i.e., to meet the demands of 
phenomenological fidelity) issued from their neglect of the organic roots and 
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function of thinking, as well as the contextual factors that invariably shape 
thought’s antecedents and eventual outcomes (i.e., to be empirically responsible). 
These combined shortcomings call into question the practical utility of 
supernaturalism and rationalism for improving experience in any measurable 
way (i.e., to be existentially transformative).    
 Consequently, we find in Dewey’s logic less of a focus on propositions, 
symbolic formulations, and the formal assessments of arguments.118 For Dewey, 
the principal concern of logic, rather, is with the problems confronting intelligent 
organisms in the struggle for existence, from the seemingly mundane to the 
obviously profound. The purpose of inquiry—Dewey’s preferred term for the 
intellectual and practical operations typically described as logic—is practical 
problem-solving; inquiry is a means of controlling ourselves and the world 
around us for particular purposive ends. In the holist and meliorist language of 
Dewey’s ecological naturalism, “Inquiry is the controlled or directed 
transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original 
situation into a unified whole.”119 This quote hints again at Dewey’s close 
connection to the Gestaltists, which will be explored in further detail below as 
well as in the next chapter.     
 Most historical conceptions of logic associate its methods closely with 
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those of mathematics. Gottlob Frege, whose work contributed significantly to the 
development of modern logic, was a mathematician by training. Frege’s formal 
mathematical language influenced the design of logic as a separate field of study 
throughout the 20th century and continues to do so today. Unlike Frege and 
other formal logicians such as Alfred Tarski, Kurt Gödel, and Saul Kripke, 
Dewey’s logic was concerned with a broader range of issues, including biology, 
psychology, aesthetics, and religion. As a result, Dewey’s conception of logic was 
developed not out of the fundamental problems of mathematics, but “in the 
context of trying to understand the reciprocal relationships between learning and 
experience, knowledge and action, and other disparate features of human nature 
which are ordinarily not considered to be part of the subject matter of logic.”120 It 
is crucial to keep this point in mind when evaluating the coherence of Dewey’s 
logic and its implications for understanding his views on religion.     
 
 
Dewey on the Reflex Arc 
 
 
 Dewey’s logic constructively builds upon his psychology, as does his entire 
philosophy.121 This is evident from his early 1896 article, “The Reflex Arc Concept 
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in Psychology,” which informed his later approaches to ethics, education, value 
theory, epistemology, and ontology. One of Dewey’s most well respected if not 
widely known pieces, it is considered a crucial step in the development of 
pragmatism and a catalyst to the development of empirical and functionalist 
psychology in the United States. Its analysis would prove so influential that in 
1942 a panel commissioned by the editors of the Psychological Review selected 
Dewey’s article as the single most influential essay in the journal’s history up to 
that time. It remains among the most cited articles in psychology today and offers 
nothing less than a complete reconstruction of psychology’s traditional 
understanding of the fundamental unit of purposive activity, known as the “reflex 
arc,” which Dewey argued was based on questionable atomistic and dualistic (i.e., 
egoic) assumptions.  
 It is somewhat surprising then that Dewey largely has been forgotten as a 
psychologist, especially when considered alongside the fact that he wrote the first 
psychology textbook in the United States and even served as President of the 
American Psychological Association. Like virtually all other aspects of his 
thinking, however, Dewey’s approach to psychology diverged from the majority of 
theory and research at the turn of the 20th century. By this time, psychologists 
had begun to abandon the dualistic presuppositions of associationist psychology, 
which traced all the way back to Plato and Aristotle—by way of Hume, Mill, Bain 
and other representatives of the British Associationist School.122 Associationists 
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held that mental processes primarily functioned by the association of a mental 
state with its successor states, an insight that influenced early experimental work 
on operant conditioning. Associationist ideas still hold sway with some 
contemporary psychologists who view known causes or conditions and observed 
effects as the sole basis for all mental operations.  
 The concept of the reflex arc, novel at the time, was intended to displace 
the mechanistic approach implicit in associationism, which saw events as the 
result of law-governed interactions between objects, much like the “billiard ball” 
model in physics. As far as human thinking or learning was concerned, physical 
interactions were believed to result in elementary sensations that are transmitted 
to the mind and joined with more complex ideas based upon past experience. 
Combined with basic tenets of physiology, associationists viewed human behavior 
through the lenses of distinct stimuli and responses, mediated through our 
peripheral and central nervous structures. Against this idea, the reflex arc 
proposed to locate sensations and ideas in a single process taking place in the 
brain and thus resolving the matter-form and mind-body dualisms implicit in the 
associationist framework.  
 A common illustration of stimulus-response psychology, one both Dewey 
and William James made use of, is that of a child reaching for a bright candle and 
getting burned. When viewed in linear terms of reflex action, the event can be 
described in the following sequence: the child sees a lit candle, reaches for it, feels 
pain caused by the hot flame, and so withdraws her hand. Schematically, the 
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situation looks like the following.  
 Stimulus 1 (candle) ! Response 1 (reaching) ! Stimulus 2 (getting 
 burned) ! Response 2 (withdrawing)  
 
In the traditional reflex arc model, each of these stages is considered a separate 
event, defined and explainable in isolation from the others. This renders human 
behavior akin to that of a computer or Cartesian automaton, as the illustration in 
Figure 1 suggests (with “s” standing for sensory stimulus and “m” for motor 
response). 
 
 
Figure 1: Finger-withdrawal Reflex123 
 
 
 Dewey took issue with this standard formulation, arguing that the 
assumption that a complex behavior consists of a sequence of elementary 
“stimulus” and “response” units was similar to the specious associationist notion 
that complex ideas were formed from the mind’s combination of more primitive 
ones.124 Dewey pointed out that the reflex arc, which was rooted in a physiological 
distinction between peripheral and central nervous structures, simply repeated 
                                                        
123 Public domain image.  
124 Eric Bredo, “Evolution, Psychology, and John Dewey’s Critique of the Reflex Arc Concept,” 
The Elementary School Journal 98, no. 5 (1998): 452. 
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the older dualisms between sensation-idea and body-mind, which are themselves 
abstractions from unified, coordinated activities. 
 Dewey admitted that there were obvious simple reflexes, such as the knee-
jerk, but to his mind complex acts could not be explained in terms of the reflex 
theory. To return to the previous example, Dewey posited that the child’s 
response of touching the candle is not triggered by the stimulus of the candle 
alone, but is more accurately described as the child’s attempt to reach for the 
candle, to satisfy a curiosity, a (situational) need for meaning. It represents a 
goal-directed coordinated action, not a muscular reflex or response. The 
following two passages from the 1896 article neatly express Dewey’s critique and 
proposed correction of the reflex arc concept:  
 Instead of interpreting the character of sensation, idea and action from their place and 
 function in the sensori-motor circuit, we still incline to interpret the latter from our 
 preconceived and preformulated ideas of rigid distinctions between sensations, thoughts, 
 and acts. The sensory stimulus is one thing, standing for the idea, is another thing, and 
 the motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a third. As a result, the reflex arc is 
 not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical 
 conjunction of unallied processes.125 
 
 Upon analysis, we find that we begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensori-
 motor coordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the movement 
 which is primary, and the sensation which is secondary, the movement of the body, head 
 and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. In other words, the real 
 beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of light. The sensory 
 quale gives the value of the act, just as the movement furnishes its mechanism and 
 control, but both sensation and movement lie inside, not outside the act.126   
 
 As Dewey rightly recognized, we are actively exploring and interacting 
with other objects and individuals in our environments from the very beginning 
of our lives; under no circumstances do we passively receive raw sensory inputs. 
                                                        
125 “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896), EW5: 96-97. 
126 Ibid., 97. 
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The real impetus of purposive activity, the ground of all experienced meaning and 
value, is not some external stimulus prodding a creature to action, but a 
sensorimotor coordination, an organic unity or homeostasis that, when 
disrupted, sets a live creature on a path to restore coordination to the transactive 
relationship existing between it and its larger environment. The reflex arc, in 
Dewey’s view, is cut from a larger circuit, or series of cycles, of action. Considered 
out of context, it provides an impoverished model of human action.  
 In any particular situation, what is taken to be the stimulus, and what the 
response, can be determined only in relation to the organism’s goal for the 
situation, the end-in-view. Stimulus and response, like organism and 
environment, are ultimately functional distinctions, not separate entities 
distinguishable beforehand.127 John Shook clarifies this important point thusly:  
 The mechanical model of the reflex arc fails to account for the phenomena basically 
 because it is too simple. On its premises perception can be a contributing cause of an 
 action, through judgment and willing, but the reverse cannot be true: action cannot be a 
 contributing cause of a perception….Yet the specific qualities of the perception of the 
 candle light would not exist without the contribution of the act of looking: the motion of 
 the head, the focusing of the eyes, the continued attention fixed upon the light, and so 
 forth. The character of any perception is, Dewey argues, at least in part a result of the 
 organism’s activity which brings it to the perception.128  
 
 It is not until a prior coordinated activity breaks down, when the ordinary 
flow of events is disrupted, that stimulus and response, perception and action 
appear as separate elements. All human behavior, from the simple to the refined, 
is a biological-physiological process of coordination, an attunement of organism 
and environment to each other as both seek to achieve a state of optimal 
                                                        
127 Ibid., 104. 
128 Shook, Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality, 112.  
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adaptation and harmonic functioning for, on a more fundamental level, they form 
a tightly coupled unit. Dewey’s criticism of the reflex arc concept and its 
replacement with circuits of intentional activity held important implications for 
his thinking about the relationship between nature and culture. By dissolving the 
rigid barriers between inside and outside, like those separating stimulus and 
response, organism and environment, and mind and body, Dewey found a new 
way of relating biology and culture (and thus science, art, morals, and religion) 
without reducing the latter to the former.  
 
 
Bottom-up Inquiry: From Homeostasis to Sense-making 
 
 
 Logic is the clarification of the natural process of adjusting means to 
consequences. It is here that we see the intimate connection between Dewey’s 
logic and his theory of valuation, which was described at length in the previous 
section. The analysis presented there of Dewey’s event-based value theory was 
more extensive than those of his ontology and epistemology preceding it. The 
reason for this is that Dewey saw values as lying at the root of all organic 
knowledge and existence, a key factor behind our association of his philosophy 
with ecological thinking at the start of this study.  
 As living, functional organisms, humans are programmed to find value in 
that which contributes to their safety, comfort, and survival. The meanings and 
bodies of knowledge we build up as secure are trusted on account of their 
serviceability to our harmonic biological and cultural functioning. Finally, the 
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stable objects that anchor our perceptual experience are events with resolved and 
repeatable meanings and values. It is when our prior held meanings and values 
break down that we get “logical” and inquiry begins.   
 This is what Dewey means when he states that all inquiry and valuation is 
occasioned by situations that have become problematic. Generally speaking, a 
situation is an event of experience, as described in Section 3.1 above. But it is also 
more than this. It is the full context of environmental objects and events—past, 
present, and future—as experienced by an organism.129 As the “full context” of 
experience, a situation contains not only material factors, but qualitative factors 
as well. Situations are unique and distinguishable from others by the distinct 
quality pervading them as, for instance, a Frank Lloyd Wright house or a Van 
Gogh painting are recognizable by gut feeling. In the 1938 Logic Dewey clarifies 
the meaning of situation in the following illuminating manner:  
 a situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality. When we describe it 
 from the psychological side, we have to say that the situation as a qualitative whole is 
 sensed or felt….The pervasively qualitative is not only that which binds all constituents 
 into a whole but it is also unique; it constitutes in each situation an individual situation, 
 indivisible and unduplicable.130  
 
 Along with other qualities, emotions and feelings are properties of 
situations; they are not “internal” to the individual, subjective side of experience. 
This includes the feeling of doubt, which spurs the search for settlement and 
reinstitution of surety and balance. A doubtful, or “indeterminate,” situation 
opens itself to inquiry on account of the fact that a previous balance and 
                                                        
129  LTI (1938), LW 12: 72. 
130 Ibid., 74. 
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integration has become unsettled; its constituents no longer “hang together,” as 
Dewey says (in a very gestalt sense).131 The various factors that comprise the 
situation have become incompatible with each other—the dramatic tension which 
usually serves to hold the disparate aspects of experience together buckles under 
the weight of its own ambition, to speak anthropomorphically. When we become 
aware of this failure to maintain cohesion, the situation has become 
“problematic.” A “determinate” situation, by contrast, is one marked by closure 
that brings with it a felt sense of completion and finishedness.  
 But how does this closure come about exactly? What are the steps involved 
between identifying an indeterminate situation as problematic to its eventual 
resolution as determinate?132 The first step involves the reorganization of a 
situation’s various factors so that possible solutions can propose themselves. This 
is why Dewey defined inquiry as an “art,” a “joint process of ascertainment and 
invention.”133 If a possible course of action is deemed hopeful for “solving the 
problem” it can be tried out imaginatively and its results assessed hypothetically 
(often based upon past experience). If enacted and found satisfactory, then we 
have arrived at a state of stabilized activity and “warranted belief” or “warranted 
assertion”—phrases Dewey preferred to the static, absolutistic overtones of the 
term “truth.”134 Basically, we were right as to what would solve the problem—
though, of course, there is always more than one solution, including an “ideal” 
                                                        
131 Ibid., 109. 
132 Ibid., 105-122. This section refers to Chapter 6, “The Pattern of Inquiry.” 
133 EEL (1918), MW 10: 335. 
134 Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 117.  
 211 
solution, to any given problem.   
 It is important to note that Dewey recognized that not all inquiry takes 
place at the cognitive level. In fact, thinking itself relies on bodily processes, as 
Richard Shusterman’s work on “somaesthetics”—which builds on Deweyan 
pragmatism and various movement-based education methods—shows. 
Channeling Dewey, Shusterman argues that “Mental life relies on somatic 
experience and cannot be wholly separated from bodily processes, even if it 
cannot be wholly reduced to them. We think and feel with our bodies, especially 
the body parts that constitute the brain and nervous system.”135 Against the 
rationalist orthodoxy of his day, Dewey argued the root basis of inquiry to be 
biological. The activities that mark organic life involve an environment in 
constant transaction with an organism, both directly and indirectly: “Breathing, 
the ingestion of good, the ejection of waste products, are cases of direct 
integration; the circulation of blood and the energizing of the nervous system are 
relatively indirect.”136 Animals anticipate and react to ecological perturbations as 
a function of internal regulation of physiological systems.137 Though Dewey did 
not employ these precise terms, inquiry is grounded in the instinctive striving to 
maintain homeostasis (i.e., regulation of the internal milieu) and allostasis (i.e., 
regulation of the social milieu) as an organism adapts and copes with its 
environment. Dewey says as much, employing different terms, in the following 
                                                        
135 Richard Shusterman, “Thinking Through the Body, Educating for the Humanities: A Plea for 
Somaesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 40, no. 1 (2006): 2.   
136 LTI (1938), LW 12: 32. 
137 Ibid., 33. 
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description from Experience and Nature: 
 By need is meant a condition of tensional distribution of energies such that the body is in 
 a condition of uneasy or unstable equilibrium. By demand or effort is meant the fact that 
 this state is manifested in movements which modify environing bodies in ways which 
 react upon the body, so that its characteristic pattern of active equilibrium is restored. By 
 satisfaction is meant this recovery of equilibrium pattern, consequent upon changes of 
 environment due to interactions with the active demands of the organism.138 
  
 Homeostatic mechanisms, underwritten by evolutionary design, generate 
appetitive and consummatory behavior to restore balance when physiological 
processes involving the brain, heart, lungs, kidneys, and other vital organs are 
disturbed.139 Hunger, itself the result of a state of imbalance between organismic 
and environmental factors, inevitably leads to the search for satiety, for food. We 
do not so much eat because we are hungry, however; rather, “Hunger…is a name 
for the organism’s tendency to seek food and eat as an entire event.”140 Similarly, 
when deficient in certain vitamins and minerals, people might crave foods 
specifically rich in them, as pregnant women often crave citrus fruits for the 
vitamin C boost it provides them and their developing children.    
 As Dewey’s reconstruction of the reflex arc concept showed, organisms are 
always inquiring. This is because life is inherently problem-laden. The points 
being made with these examples are that it is the transactive relationship 
between organism and environment which is primary for defining any situation 
and “solution” (contra Victor Kestenbaum), and that not all solutions come to us 
by cognitive, ideational means (contra Michael Eldridge). Emotions, feeling, 
                                                        
138 EN (1925), LW 1: 194. 
139 Most research on this topic follows the early investigations of Walter B. Cannon, The Wisdom 
of the Body (New York: W. W. Norton, 1932).  
140 Svend Brinkmann, “Dewey’s Neglected Psychology: Recovering his Transactional Approach,” 
Theory & Psychology 21, no. 3 (2011): 301. 
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desire, and intuition all work to tell us something about what is missing from a 
situation. The process of temperature regulation can further help illustrate what 
is meant here. While most mammals maintain internal temperature with little 
difficulty (under normal conditions and hospitable environments), other animals 
must regulate temperature behaviorally by making nests in cold conditions.141 It 
is when the natural rhythms of our organic activities meet resistance from the 
environment, or from some factor inside ourselves, that we begin “feeling” our 
way into a solution to the problem that is blocking our harmonic functioning.  
 Organismic coping is not only reactive, however, especially at the level of 
human intelligence. We seek homeostasis at the physiological, as well as at the 
psychological and behavioral levels. The concept of allostasis describes our ability 
to anticipate and cope with impending future events.142 It further gives 
expression to the fact that the human environment is a social environment; we 
rely on and use others to manage our needs, such as those for safety, human 
contact, and reproduction.143 This includes the development of adaptive social 
and cultural behaviors, such as the ability to be patient.144 Patience is adaptive in 
that it enables us to sustain viability in changing circumstances. It also speaks the 
to intertwining of nature and culture at the human level: “To a very large extent, 
the ways in which human beings respond even to physical conditions are 
                                                        
141 Jay Schulkin, Rethinking Homeostasis: Allostatic Regulation in Physiology and 
Pathophysiology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 12-14. 
142 Schulkin, Rethinking Homeostasis, 17.  
143 For a more detailed account, see that provided in Schulkin, Naturalism and Pragmatism, 138-
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influenced by their cultural environment,” as Dewey insightfully noted.145  
 Other adaptive social behaviors include maintaining meaningful contact 
through tight-knit family and group structures—the kind Durkheim saw as 
essential to religion’s origins and perennial appeal. Supportive social contact is 
absolutely essential to human mental health and emotional well-being.146 Such 
associative behavior is characteristic of animals, in addition to plants, atoms, and 
virtually everything else existing in nature.147 Finally, as Dewey also recognized, 
“the degree to which we share and participate toward common ends…linked to 
the considerations of others is one of our most important cognitive 
adaptations.”148 Recent work in the field of emotion research, such as that of 
Antonio Damasio, has persuasively demonstrated that basic emotions influence 
most higher-level cognitive capabilities, helping organisms to navigate and 
survive a world of constant threats and challenges.149 
 Some scholars have suggested even more strongly that the maintenance of 
equilibrium or homeostasis is the main organizing purpose of all cultural 
practices.150 English social anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, known for 
developing the theory of structural functionalism and coadaptation, argued that 
                                                        
145 LTI (1938), LW 12: 48.  
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“internal” adaptation must be met with “external” adaptation for optimal 
viability. Physiological homeostasis requires cultural homeostasis, bridging the 
physical-culture environment relationship nexus: 
 A living organism exists and continues to exist only if it is both internally and externally 
 adapted. The internal adaptation depends on the adjustment of the various organs and 
 their activities so that the various physiological processes constitute a continuing
 functioning system by which the life of the organism is maintained. The external 
 adaptation is that of the organism to the [cultural] environment in which it lives.151     
 
 Daphna Oyserman echoes Radcliffe-Brown in a recent article arguing that 
the general structure and recurrent patterns shared across world cultures reflect 
“good enough” solutions to universal needs with biological roots.152 Recent work 
in the scientific study of religion has leveraged similar insights for understanding 
the self-regulatory functions served by many religious behaviors, by specifying, 
for instance, “what believers should and should not eat or drink; if, how, when, 
and with whom the should have sex; and how believers should treat others and 
themselves.”153 This links up with Dewey’s assertion that cultures are emergent 
outgrowths and expressions of lower-level biological processes.154 
 The drive to maintain balance in our ongoing biological and sociocultural 
functioning directly influences the manner in which we attribute significance to 
our world. As adaptive organisms, we do not merely receive information from our 
                                                        
151 Quoted in John W. Bennett, The Ecological Transition: Cultural Anthropology and Human 
Adaptation (New York: Pergamon Press, 1976), 249. 
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environments in a passive manner; rather, we actively participate in generating 
meanings that matter us. In other words, as centers of activity, human agents 
enact the world they inhabit. This is a central insight of recent theoretical work 
within the enactivist research paradigm falling under the heading of “sense-
making,”155 but with obvious antecedents in Dewey’s biologically grounded logic. 
The way active agents make sense of the world is by open “questioning” (i.e., 
inquiry) of the environment which “responds” to our inquiries in turn. For 
example, as Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo have observed, “The 
softness of a sponge is not to be found ‘in it’ but in how it responds to the active 
probing and squeezing of our appropriate bodily movements (e.g., with the 
fingers or the palms of the hand)….The confluence of lawful co-variations in this 
dialogue stabilises the cogniser’s sense-making into an object. Movements are at 
the centre of mental activity: a sense-making agent’s movements…are the tools of 
her cognition.”156 This mirrors Charles Peirce’s description of how the pragmatic 
criterion of meaning formation works (e.g., diamonds are deemed hard because 
they cannot be scratched by most things). The central insight of work on sense-
making is that the possession and appreciation of meaning and value is a 
characteristic human need. This explains why even adults frequently reach out to 
candles and other environmental objects known capable of injuring us.    
 As Dewey saw, at the most basic level experience entails the emergence of 
certain patterns arising from our ongoing transactions with our natural and 
                                                        
155 See Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, “Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive 
Approach to Social Cognition,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007): 485-507.  
156 Ibid., 489. 
 217 
cultural environments, or “organism-environment coupling” in the language of 
contemporary neurobiology.157 This process is evolutionarily adaptive and crucial 
to an organism's survival, consisting of the “interactive coordination between a 
specific organism and recurring characteristics of its environment.”158 Common 
illustrations of this process include the ability of the amoeba's cell membranes to 
respond to the presence of chemical substances that effect changes in the 
consistency of its protoplasm, as well as bacterial locomotion by means of 
flagella.  
 Citing examples of more complex animals like hydras, frogs, and owls, all 
the way to humans, Mark Johnson and Tim Rohrer show how for humans “this 
coupling process becomes the basis of all meaning and thought.”159 The very 
awareness of our bodily experience and the patterns of physical interaction with 
our environment serve to establish abstract structures of images, called “image 
schemas” within the field of cognitive linguistics, a subfield of DEEDS cognitive 
science, that enable us to make sense of, reason about, and navigate our physical 
and cultural environments. Image schemas describe the prelinguistic, 
preconceptual ordering of our active experience without which experience would 
be incomprehensible. For instance,     
 the VERTICALITY schema arises from our inclination to utilize an UP-DOWN orientation 
                                                        
157 Similarly called “structural coupling” by Humberto Maturana and Francisco J. Varela in their 
The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding, (Boston: Shambala, 
1998).   
158 Mark Johnson and Tim Rohrer, “We are Live Creatures: Embodiment, American Pragmatism, 
and the Cognitive Organism,” in Body, Language, and Mind, eds. Tom Ziemke, Jordan Zlatev, 
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 in structuring our experience. We subsequently perceive this structure of verticality in 
 thousands of perceptions and activities we experience every day, such as perceiving a tree, 
 our felt sense of standing upright, the activity of climbing stairs, forming a mental image 
 of a flagpole, measuring our children's heights, and experiencing the level of water rising 
 in the bathtub. The VERTICALITY schema is the abstract structure of these 
 VERTICALITY experiences, images, and perceptions.160   
  
 These structures of experience are gestalt structures consisting of parts 
related to unified wholes and which influence bodily movement, object 
manipulations, and perceptual interactions, thus providing order and coherence 
to our ongoing experience. It is important to note, however, that image schemas 
do not exist physically in the world as objects, which may be misleading when 
discussing them in this manner (and when depicting them pictorially, as will be 
done below). Rather, they emerge (experientially) from embedded neural 
structures that are part of our brains' sensorimotor systems.161 As a result, much 
of our inference about the world is sensorimotor inference, including inferences 
of UP/DOWN, IN/OUT, CLOSE/DISTANT, COLD/WARM, and so on.  
 From childhood onwards we are subject to physical forces, as are all 
organisms. For humans, the very meaning of physical force depends upon 
publicly shared structures “that emerge from our bodily experience of 
force...‘external’ and ‘internal'’ forces such as gravity, light, heat, wind, bodily 
processes, and the obtrusion of other physical objects.”162 It is from our basic 
bodily experience of force that we further come to understand all motion, action, 
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and causation, including notions of agency for both animate and inanimate 
objects.163 Basic-level experiences of this variety trigger higher-level rational 
inferences, as well as our cultural and religious imageries. Though considerations 
of space preclude a detailed investigation of this process here, it becomes 
apparent upon a cursory investigation of the manner in which bodily experiences 
of force are meaningfully appropriated and interpreted. According to 
experimental studies in cognitive linguistics, a number of basic features frame 
our sense of force, including: force is always experienced through interaction (or 
potential interaction); force most often involves the directional movement of 
some mass through space; motion typically follows a single path; forces have 
sources as well as targets; and, as interactive, forces always involve a structure or 
sequence of causality.164  
 These inherent features of force give rise to common FORCE schemas such 
as COMPULSION (being moved by external forces, such as physical objects or 
other people), BLOCKAGE (obstacles that resist or prohibit our force), 
DIVERSION (a force diverted as the result of a causal interaction), REMOVAL 
OF RESTRAINT (the removal of barriers), ENABLEMENT (a felt sense of power 
or lack thereof to perform an action), and ATTRACTION (being physically pulled 
to another object).165 It is our bodily understanding of basic FORCE schemas that 
enables our rational inference of forces requiring sources and causes, 
                                                        
163 Ibid., 43.   
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undergirding both the scientific investigation of physical laws of cause and effect 
and the religiocultural imagination that invisible agents or entities operate 
through and perhaps can even suspend such laws.  
 Consider the FORCE schema of COMPULSION, represented in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: COMPULSION166 
 
 
The schematic structure of COMPULSION describes our common bodily 
experience of being moved or impacted by external forces, such as wind, water, 
other people, or a speeding car. When attempting to rationally infer a cause of the 
motion, based on the repeated experience of forces having causes, one looks for a 
physical force, object, or agent, as noted by F1 in the diagram.  
 The same structure is leveraged when inferring a sort of transcendent or 
supernatural agency when a cause is not discernible, as characteristic of many 
religious beliefs. This is shown in Figure 3, a possible adaptation of the 
COMPULSION schema.  
 
Figure 3: COMPULSION (indiscernible cause) 
 
 
When an object is moved and the cause is unknown or indiscernible, one might 
posit a spirit or invisible entity where the question mark lies in this diagram. 
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Although such unseen entities “are widely seen as lacking direct empirical 
support…resulting from an inability to identify causes correctly,”167 the religious 
inference is entirely rational (at least initially; further investigation would prove 
it difficult to support), for the patterns of our embodied experience teach us that 
effects need causes. If something moves, something or someone must have 
caused it to be the case, whether it was a speeding car, a gusting wind, or the 
“hand of God.” Whichever mode of explanation is most salient to an individual in 
a given situation indelibly shapes the inference made.    
 A related type of embodied structure integral to our understanding is 
conceptual metaphor, broadly conceived as “a pervasive mode of understanding 
by which we project patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure 
another domain of a different kind.”168 In the cognitive linguistic sense, metaphor 
is more than a mere literary device. It is one of our primary cognitive structures, 
one that makes use of images schemas and yet is constrained by them, in order to 
organize our higher-level, abstract understanding.  
 A clear example of an image schema that via metaphorical projection 
structures our mundane experiences, as well as those that might be described as 
spiritual or religious in nature, is that of CONTAINMENT. Humans universally 
develop—and thus can intelligibly share in communication—a basic CONTAINER 
image schema as a result of the frequent recurrence of putting things into and 
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taking them out of contained, bounded spaces. Figure 4 represents the general 
image-schematic structure of physical containment. 
 
Figure 4: CONTAINMENT169 
 
 
CONTAINMENT patterns, according to Rohrer:  
 
can then be metaphorically extended to structure non-physical, non-tactile and non-
visual experiences…We wake up out of a deep sleep, drag ourselves up out of bed and into 
the bathroom, where we look into the mirror…we might wander into the kitchen, sit in a 
chair at the breakfast table and open up the newspaper and become lost in an article. 170  
 
 Conceptual metaphorical projections of image schemas, including that of 
CONTAINMENT, also seem to shape religious ideas and language. For example, 
mystics of various traditions might claim to lose themselves in God. According to 
the theological notion of “panentheism,” everything is in God. Both of these 
concepts rely on metaphors of God as CONTAINER. Also, consider the phrase 
“You've got a long way to go to get to God” or, similarly, when discussing one's 
moral actions, “Heaven is a long ways away.”171 Such imaginative phrases are 
understandable due to their use of a recurring conceptual metaphor called 
PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, by means of which “some cultures 
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understand progress toward some nonphysical goal as progress moving toward a 
destination.”172 The same metaphor underlies the secular notion of “science as 
progress.”   
 There is good reason to believe that all abstract conceptualization works 
through conceptual metaphor and a small number of other principles of 
imaginative extension. The PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS 
metaphor emerges directly from our bodily experience, providing us with the 
conceptual tools to imagine and reason about abstract notions such as a “life” 
(i.e., the duration one lives, spoken about as a distinct object), linking it to the 
more concrete notion of a physical journey.  As Lakoff and Johnson elaborate on 
this point: 
A purposeful life requires planning a means for achieving your purposes. Purposeful lives 
may have difficulties, and you should try to anticipate them. You should provide yourself 
with what you need to pursue a purposeful life. As a prudent person with life goals you 
should have an  overall life plan indicating what goals you are supposed to achieve at 
what times and what goals to set out to achieve next.  You should always know what you 
have achieved so far and what you are going to do next.173          
 
Such introspective self-reflection clearly touches upon topics of both secular and 
religious concern, requiring reason and imagination, and emerging from basic 
image schemas and their metaphorical projections in effort to cope with, survive 
in, and give meaning to the world, influencing our decision-making processes and 
even providing us with normative guidance. 
                                                        
172 Johnson and Rohrer, “We Are Live Creatures,” 15. Other common conceptual metaphors 
include: AFFECTION IS WARMTH (“They greeted me warmly.”), HAPPY IS UP (“I'm feeling up 
today.”), and TIME IS MOTION (“Time flies.”). For a comprehensive list, see George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western 
Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 50-54. 
173 Ibid., 62. 
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Ideals are Events and Can Be Perceived 
 
 
 Religion is a fact of nature, as are all other human beliefs and practices. 
Religion’s various forms emerge from our corporeal and corporate existence as 
shaped by the conceptual and ideological vehicles of the dominant culture in 
which we live. To be fully understood, then, religion as a natural phenomenon 
must be viewed as a product of the same invariant structures, both individual and 
collective, of which other behavioral phenomena are likewise the outward 
symbols and expressions. As Edward Scribner Ames, a empiricist theologian of 
the Chicago School and a student of Dewey’s, has noted:   
 When the systems of the famous philosophers are seen in relation to the background of 
 actual life these systems appear as the projections of ideas from the customs, attitudes, 
 arts and literature worked out through several generations of living….The religious 
 dramas and ceremonials celebrate the recurring tensions and triumphs of life in the 
 changing seasons of the year and in the fortunes of war and peace. And order of the 
 world was recognized in the processes of nature and in the prevailing customs of society 
 to which all men were subject. 174 
 
 As the organic and cultural origins of all meanings and values show, 
inquiry is not a process that takes place “in the mind” alone. It is a process of 
transforming a situation from one sort (i.e., indeterminate) into another (i.e., 
determinate). The impulse to inquiry is a direct cause of our emotions and bodily 
feelings in a situational context—something seems “off.” An indeterminate 
situation—whether representing hunger, strained social relations, or uncertainty 
of an object’s functionality—all mark breakdowns of organism-environment 
integration, where formerly synergistic activity is ground to a halt by some 
                                                        
174 Edward Scribner Ames, Edward Scribner Ames’ Unpublished Manuscripts, eds. John N. 
Gaston and W. Creighton Peden (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 124.   
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disturbance in its constituent components or of its context. These are the internal 
and external factors that initiate inquiries and provide the materials for their 
resolution, including their ideal resolution.   
 Looking back to Dewey’s comments made in A Common Faith, ideals 
might be understood as synonymous with values, or optimal forms of value, even 
if other levels or dimensions (e.g., ontological, epistemological, etc.) to the ideal 
can be detected. This is because ideals are fragile; like values, they vanish once 
actualized in discrete events of experience (situations).175 Being and meaning are 
equally fragile and precarious in a world of changing events. Past events retain 
ideal meaning and value in their function as instruments for actualizing further 
ideals in experience. This is what was meant by saying ends and means exist on 
an evolving continuum.   
 When discussing ideals, we commonly speak retroactively, of events now 
finished and which we wish to experience, to undergo, to feel the effects of once 
more. It is in this way that remembered ideals come to serve as imaginative 
projections to guide future actions (“If I could only recreate that moment…”). In 
this sense ideals are like ideas, as Michael Eldridge’s analysis suggests. This 
explains the linguistic root shared between the two terms.176 Dewey’s language 
supports this common usage, yet he moves considerably past colloquial 
understandings of ideals by further defining them as creative possibilities 
resident in nature that, when skillfully discerned, come to exercise an authority 
                                                        
175 “Values, Liking, and Thought” (1923), MW 15: 20. Italics in the original.  
176 Both derive from the Greek idein, meaning “to see,” via the Latin idea, meaning “form” or 
“pattern.” Interestingly, this is a meaning shared with the German gestalt. 
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over one’s present conduct. It is the demand-character of ideals that speaks to 
their reality. When such ideals are subsequently enacted, they produce or restore 
wholeness to a fragmented, incomplete event. It is when ideals resonate with 
one’s deepest emotions and bodily feelings that they become religious, along with 
the actions taken toward their actualization. This is a direct challenge to Victor 
Kestenbaum’s interpretation of ideals as imperceptible or supersensible objects.   
 The competing interpretations of Deweyan ideals among Dewey scholars is 
understandable, for it seems as if Dewey is claiming we are aware of two worlds 
at once—the actual and the ideal—and that we are forever striving to get the 
events of the first to match up with those of the second. I will speak more on this 
curious feature of Dewey’s theory shortly. Yet, in light of my analyses of Dewey’s 
ontology, epistemology, and axiology, it is clear that ideals are not mere ideas, 
nor are they simple objects. All existences, including ideal existences, are eventful 
in character. Perceived meanings are event meanings, possibilities for action 
neatly expressed by the term affordances. Actualized values are satisfactory 
completions of events, also describable as gestalts.  
 Having clarified the threefold primacy of events for Dewey, we are thus led 
to a richer and arguably more accurate interpretation of Deweyan ideals. Ideals 
are actionable events perceivable by their gestalt quality and in terms of the 
affordances required for their actualization. However, like all value-laden 
experiences, we only ever know retrospectively whether an ideal event was “really 
ideal,” by its impact and lasting results. Before actualized in experience, ideals are 
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perceived as absent and mainly in terms of possibility. While this may seem 
counterintuitive—to claim that we can perceive what is absent—it is obvious upon 
close reflection that human experience constantly moves beyond the present; we 
anticipate future actions and outcomes via feeling and the imagination and 
proceed to realize some of these possibilities based upon their presumed “fit” 
with the needs of problematic events.  
 Like meanings and values, ideals speak to developing events in their 
consummatory reference.177 There are better and worse ways of completing 
events, however, so we need to say more at this stage as to what distinguishes 
ideals from ordinary event meanings and values. For instance, when thirsty, 
water is more nourishing than vinegar, though both may prove initially 
satisfactory for resolving a “thirst” event (the search for liquid representing a 
coordinated perception-action cycle, an active inquiring). Yet, under normal 
conditions, water eventually will be sought out as a result of a new “thirst” event, 
or, to view it another way, the unsettling of the original event’s closure—the 
original completed event, with its prior settled meaning and value now disturbed, 
opens back up and demands closure once more. The event “itches” at us until 
complete, the way a heated argument with a friend or loved one demands 
meaningful closure.  
 Sticking with the language of Gestalt psychology, ideals can be considered 
good gestalts, meaning events that have been brought to a stable and positive 
                                                        
177 DE (1916), MW 9: 61. 
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result, with the maximum equilibrium possible. Gestalt configurations are 
deemed “good” when they have become as good as prevailing conditions allow.178 
“Every ideal is preceded by an actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition in 
inner image of the actual. It projects in securer and wider and fuller form some 
good which has been previously experienced in a precarious, accidental, fleeting 
way,” states Dewey.179 Events of this kind are known directly by their inner 
coherence and harmony. As an example, one is witnessing a good gestalt unfold 
“when one watches a group of dancers all seemingly making exactly the same 
movements and finds that the eyes are constantly drawn to a particular dancer 
whose movements are perfectly centered and integrated in a harmonious 
whole.”180 
 Dewey’s naturalization of ideals spanned concerns of ontology, 
epistemology, and axiology, concerns that, given philosophy’s splintering into 
competing subfields, are customarily dealt with separately. However, the 
actualization of ideals within experience—things do get better, sometimes 
noticeably so—affirms their reality at each level for Dewey. Thus, even though we 
have been discussing ideals as closest to values, the ideal can be viewed as an 
ontological category of sorts, as an epistemological mode of perceiving, and as an 
achievable value of experience. Each of these descriptions is an abstraction from 
                                                        
178 Max Wertheimer described this organizational tendency as the Law of Prägnanz, a German 
word that lacks a precise English meaning, but is often translated as “pregnance,” “precision,” or 
“pithiness.” Reviewed in Kurt Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and Co., 1935), 110. This and other Gestalt laws will be introduced at a later section.  
179 HNC (1922), MW 14: 20 
180 Stephanie Sabar, “What’s a Gestalt?,” Gestalt Review 17, no. 1 (2013), 16. 
 229 
a dynamic situation that is a complex whole. The three levels or dimensions of the 
ideal account for the deliberate redundancy in the Deweyan definition of religion 
offered at the end of the Chapter 2. I repeat that definition here, noting in 
parentheses the nature of each claim implied about the ideal:  
 Religion is living enactment of the ideal self (ontological claim) through one’s skillful 
 perceptual attunement to the ideal action possibilities (epistemological claim) of nature’s 
 orders that harmonize the actual self, bringing it to ideal consummatory fulfillment 
 (axiological claim).  
 
The ontological claim is that the ideal self is an event, a temporal achievement; 
there is no unchanging “realm” of ideality. The epistemological claim is that the 
ideal self-event is perceived in terms of the affordances required for its 
actualization. The axiological claim is that the ideal self represents the best 
possible gestalt completion of the actual self’s present lacks or deficiencies.  
 This explanation already points us in the direction as to what distinguishes 
religious ideals from other ideals, such as ideals of a moral or aesthetic nature. 
The particular event that religious ideals are consummations of is the actual 
(contextually located) self, when the self’s ability to adjust and interact adaptively 
with the larger environs it is a part of, and which are a part of it—the integrated 
unit Dewey called the “Universe”—is disrupted in an existentially significant and 
emotionally resonant way. The reality of religious ideals as good gestalts is 
vouched for by their ability to restore wholeness of integrity to a deficient self-
event: “The religious experience is a reality in so far as in the midst of effort to 
foresee and regulate future objects we are sustained and expanded in feebleness 
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and failure by the sense of an enveloping whole.”181  
 To gain a clearer understanding of what Dewey means by this statement 
and others on religion, as well as what the differences are between various kinds 
of ideals, we need to take a closer look at Dewey’s broad and inclusive 
conceptions of nature and the self. For it is nature, as Dewey asserts in A 
Common Faith, that furnishes “the hard stuff…of physical and social 
experience”182 from which ideals are born and toward which natural, needful 
selves forever strive.     
 
 
3.3 Nature, Possibility, and Ideality     
 
 
Before we move on to probe deeper into where the ideals that speak to religious 
problems are located in nature and what effects they have on the self that 
perceives and enacts them, it will be useful to discuss some important criticisms 
of Dewey’s logical theory in order to fully understand its radical nature and 
implications. Bertrand Russell critiqued what he viewed as Dewey’s 
oversimplification of logic’s methods and subject matter immediately upon the 
publication of Dewey’s Essays in Experimental Logic (1916) and again with his 
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938).183 In this latter work, considered by some 
the crowning work of Dewey’s career, Dewey compared the notion of inquiry to a 
                                                        
181 HNC (1922), MW 14: 234. 
182 CF (1934), LW 9: 33.  
183 See Bertrand Russell, “Professor Dewey’s ‘Essays in Experimental Logic,’” The Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 16, no. 1 (1919): 5-26; also Bertrand Russell, 
“Dewey’s New Logic,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 
1939): 135-156.   
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cooking process, whereby the particular manner in which problems are 
perceived, framed, and solved is influenced, or “cooked,” by one’s personal 
(physiological, psychological, behavioral) traits and cultural environment. Russell 
rejected the subjectivism and relativism he saw implied by this comparison with 
the acerbic wit that colored the majority of his published interactions with 
Dewey:   
 [Dewey’s position] seems to be that there is a certain activity called “inquiry,” as 
 recognizable as the activities of eating or drinking; like all activity, it is stimulated by 
 discomfort, and the particular discomfort concerned is called “doubt,” just as hunger is 
 the discomfort that stimulates eating, and thirst is the discomfort that stimulates 
 drinking. And as hunger may lead you to kill an animal, skin it, cook it, so that though you 
 have been concerned with the same animal throughout, it is very different when it 
 becomes food from what it was to begin with, so inquiry manipulates and alters its 
 subject-matter until it becomes logically assimilable and intellectually appetizing. Then 
 doubt is allayed, at least for a time. But the subject-matter of inquiry, like the wild boar of 
 Valhalla, is perpetually reborn, and the operation of logical cooking has to be more 
 delicately performed as the intellectual palate grows more refined. There is therefore no 
 end to the process of inquiry, and no dish that can be called “absolute truth.”184 
 
 Russell’s main issue with Dewey’s logic of situations was that it seemed to 
deny that any accurate, true description of the world exists. The dynamic and 
contextual character of inquiry appears to abolish all traditional, fixed notions of 
truth, which, according to Russell, renders Dewey’s logic unsound—for, how can 
one possibly expect to arrive at a universally valid conclusion if all premises are 
theory-laden and culturally shaped? As Tom Burke makes abundantly clear, 
however, Russell’s critique misses its mark for the conception of inquiry it hinges 
on—namely, that inquiry or logic is a process by which propositional statements 
are judged to be either true or false—is one Dewey rejects from the start.185 Dewey 
                                                        
184 Quoted in Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 194. For a detailed investigation of Russell’s criticisms 
of Dewey’s approach to logic, see Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 190-213.   
185 Ibid., 195-205. 
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distinguished his existential, instrumental approach to logic from what he calls 
the “epistemological type of logic” as early as 1909, in his Studies in Logical 
Theory. An instrumental logic, as Dewey explains it, deals not with “pure 
thought” or “thinking in general,” but “with thinking as a specific procedure 
relative to a specific antecedent occasion and to a subsequent specific 
fulfillment….”186 In other words, under Dewey’s view, logic is context-bound and 
therefore particular with respect to time and place. Given the centrality of 
detached rationality to Russell’s absolutist, extra-perspectival conception of 
truth, we might refer to the view of logic that Dewey rejects as ego-logic.  
 Against Russell and other arithmetical logicians, Dewey posits that 
successful inquiry demands more than mere quantitative analysis; mathematics, 
though a powerful tool for analyzing reality, is poorly representative of inquiry in 
general. The texture and composition of concrete problems outstrip the 
propositional. Bodily affect, sensorimotor contingencies, and environmental 
structure, mediated by social and cultural patterns of interpretation, all play 
integral roles in capturing and shaping contextually indexed truths. By mere 
contrast to Russell’s position, then, Dewey’s position is suitably named an eco-
logic. James Gouinlock’s description of Dewey’s alternative approach to logic 
sums up these various aspects nicely:  
                                                        
186 SLT (1909), MW 2: 304. Dewey’s harsh critique of epistemological logic continues thusly: 
“From its point of view, an attempt to discuss the antecedents, data, forms, and objective of 
thought, apart from reference to particular position occupied, and particular part played in the 
growth of experience is to reach results which are not so much either true or false as they are 
radically meaningless—because they are considered apart from limits. Its results are not only 
abstractions (for all theorizing ends in abstractions), but abstractions without possible reference 
and bearing.” 
 233 
 It is an inquiry into the nature of nature as we find it exhibited within the ambit of 
 experience, articulated in terms of the traits there disclosed. It is a work of both art and 
 science. It is nothing so grimly methodic as a sort of check-off list of matters to attend to. 
 Its aim is at once panoramic and profound. In its way, it provides an integrated vision of 
 the whole; it articulates the primal moral functions of nature...while furnishing the 
 imagination with a sense of the richness and power of nature’s possibilities.187 
 
 As this quote makes clear, Dewey railed against all conceptions of logic 
removed from the concerns of concrete living. As Robert Roth further argues, in 
order to appreciate Dewey’s novel approach to logic, we must understand it in 
relation to his “interest in human experience, human fulfillment, [and] the effort 
of man to derive the greatest possible meaning out of every situation. Then logic 
as a theory of inquiry becomes an instrument by which man may make the most 
fruitful connections with the world about him.”188 If we keep in mind the similar 
language Dewey employed in A Common Faith, the religious overtones of his 
logic can be clearly heard. As with science, ethics, and all other forms of human 
technology, religion and logic are essentially methods of developing the self.  
 While Russell and analytic philosophers generally view Dewey’s logical 
theory as an aberration or deviation from logic’s traditional concerns, it in fact 
more accurately describes how natural creatures in a natural—and thus 
developing, uncertain—world think, act, and feel. For Dewey, logical forms 
(ideas, laws, propositions, etc.) emerge in the context of specific situations that 
call out for resolution and completion. Just because logic is relative and context-
bound did not mean its purposes and methods are purely subjective in Dewey’s 
                                                        
187 James S. Gouinlock, Eros and the Good: Wisdom According to Nature (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2004), 79. 
188 Roth, John Dewey and Self-Realization, 13.  
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opinion.189 The existential situations of human beings are the objective wholes 
out of which logic was originally developed and continues to be used. Dewey 
clarifies this position in the following response to Russell’s criticisms:  
 The exclusive devotion of Mr. Russell to discourse is manifested in his assumption that 
 propositions are the subject-matter of inquiry….But according to our view—and 
 according to that of any thoroughgoing empiricist—things and events are the material 
 and objects of inquiry, and propositions are means in inquiry, so that as conclusions of a 
 given inquiry they become means of carrying on further inquiries. Like other means they 
 are modified and improved in the course of use.190  
  
 It is by means of disciplined cognitive and noncognitive investigation—this 
is the full meaning of the term inquiry for Dewey—into the flow of experience 
that we come to learn about the essential features of situations and ourselves, in 
addition to potential ways for improving both. Without a firm understanding of 
Dewey’s ecology-minded logic, in addition to his rich psychology of bodily 
feelings and novel understanding of the imagination (both of which are 
investigated in the next chapter), one cannot understand the full force of his 
religious views. Recall from our previous statements on the issue that religious 
ideals for Dewey, like all ideals, are not transcendent beings or guaranteed truths. 
Ideals are possibilities for action that, when enacted, fill some deep-seated 
existential need or lack. And these ideal phenomena, these existential 
opportunities and lacks, are perceived primarily through the dynamic structures 
of organismic feeling and our corporeal relation to nature.     
 
                                                        
189 Reference the analysis of Dewey’s approach to values in section 3.1 above. 
190 John Dewey, “Experience, Knowledge, and Value,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul 
Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1939), 517-608. Quoted in Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, 205.    
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The Return to Lived Experiencing 
 
 Dewey’s return to lived experiencing, where qualitative events are primary 
and generative (i.e., there are no permanent substances, only states of becoming 
and relative stability), challenged the self-world, subject-object, and knower-
known distinctions, in addition to a host of other dualisms endemic to Western 
philosophy. A problem-solving approach to philosophy rooted in the existential 
situations organisms encounter daily indeed provides us with knowledge, but its 
higher purpose is to contribute to the survival, and hopeful flourishing, of our 
species. Science, art, morals, and religion all play integral roles in creating the 
ideal conditions under which human organisms can thrive. As we use these 
instrumentalities to learn about the world we live in (all of which can be viewed 
as adaptations to environmental events), we also change it and ourselves at the 
same time. It is for this reason that Chauncey Wright, an American philosopher 
of science allied with the classical pragmatists, declared, “man is a geological 
agent. He affects and alters…the physical forces and conditions of the globe.”191    
 To investigate religion instrumentally as an extension of human problem-
solving runs the risk of reducing its concerns to those of epistemology. As our 
study up to this point has hopefully shown, this would be highly distortive of 
Dewey’s position. For one thing, it over intellectualizes the methods of attaining 
knowledge. Dewey routinely criticized the tendency of philosophers to describe 
                                                        
191 Wright wrote this in a letter to Charles Darwin. Quoted in Chauncey Wright, The Evolutionary 
Philosophy of Chauncey Wright, Volume 1, ed. Frank X. Ryan (Bristol, England: Thoemmes 
Press, 2000), 245.   
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theories of knowledge in wholly or mainly cognitive terms, going so far as to call 
it the “intellectualist fallacy.”192 Philosophers of religion commit this fallacy when 
they describe religious knowledge as conformity to a set of intellectual 
propositions or reasonings.    
 According to Dewey’s ecological, existential-level analysis, “The 
assumption of ‘intellectualism’ goes contrary to the facts of what is primarily 
experienced. For things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, 
enjoyed and endured, even more than things to be known. They are things had 
before they are things cognized.”193 As sharply restated by John Stuhr, experience 
for Dewey is not exclusively a cognitive affair, but rather is “eventful, continuous, 
historical, qualitative, experimental, meaningful, social, and world-
constitutive.”194 This means that the knowing process is not primarily passive and 
disengaged, but actively aimed at enriching human experience. Genuine knowing 
is geared toward the creation and advancement of greater meaning and value. 
The conflict over meanings and values characteristic of inter-religious 
disagreements and most science-and-religion debates would greatly decrease or 
possibly dissolve altogether if the experimental, event-structure of human 
meaning were rightfully recognized. The same holds true for values, which, like 
                                                        
192 Several commentators have chronicled Dewey’s rejection of epistemology as philosophers 
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meanings, are revealed to us in discrete events of experience.   
 This last statement should not be taken to imply that meaning and value 
are purely personal matters for Dewey. On the contrary, the existence of 
organismic needs is reflective of the fundamental structure of reality, which 
Dewey described as a potent mixture of the precarious and the stable. It is on the 
basis of recurrent, ongoing engagement with “the needful and needed quality of 
things” that intelligent organisms like humans are able to project satisfactions 
and consummations correspondent to objective factors in the world, and not 
merely the subjective whims of individual choice.195 As imaginative projections, 
ideal satisfactions obviously admit a subjective element to them, but, as Dewey 
reminds us, they are “conditioned by objective partialities and defections and 
made real by objective situations and completions.”196 The imagination for 
Dewey is not only an organ of projection, but one of realization as well.197   
 From the perspective of an ecological naturalism, meaning and value 
emerge from the constant transactions taking place between organisms with their 
environments. They are not holed up in an inner, mental realm closed off from 
the external, material world. Meanings are affordances; they speak to the 
possibilities for action resident in nature for skilled perceivers. Values are 
gestalts, satisfactory completions of events that enable organisms to move 
effectively from one event to another.  
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196 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
197 CF (1934), LW 9: 34 
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 Given a naturalistic definition of religion, religious meaning and value are 
to be understood in the same fashion, as a class of affordances and gestalts that 
are distinguished from others by the specific purposes they serve and the 
particular effects they produce. Thus, an empirically responsible account of 
religious externality would seem to require nothing more than describing the 
natural origins of meaning and value in general, which we have largely done up to 
this point (admittedly at a relatively abstract level). However, insofar as religion 
is inextricably bound up with ideality, we must further account for certain 
qualities of ideals that appear to outrun explanation by natural means. 
Specifically, we must account for the possibility dimension of ideals for, until 
actualized, ideals remain simply that—possibilities. We must also account for the 
role of the imagination in projecting and realizing ideals. Though touched on in 
the comments below, the imaginative (importantly—not imaginary) aspect of 
ideals will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, with their possibility 
dimensions occupying us presently.     
 Dewey never quite satisfactorily explained to his critics how ideals as 
possibilities were continuous with nature, the physical world in which our 
everyday, ordinary interactions unfold. Insofar as ideals in their connection to 
ideas, to human mentality, seem to transcend the immediate material order of 
reality—one cannot grab or touch an idea, after all—they have been viewed as 
existing apart from nature as divine, otherworldly objects, or as figments of the 
human imagination. In order to tease apart the connection Dewey saw between 
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ideals and reals, between possibility and actuality, it will help to take a closer look 
at the reciprocal relationship he posited between experience and nature.   
 
 
Experience and Nature as Continuous 
 
 
 Arguably no concept has sustained as much use and abuse in philosophic 
discourse as that of nature. Political philosophers invoke the term with equal 
measure censure and paternalism each time they hark back to the “state of 
nature” when discussing human social relations. Legal theorists draw on the 
term’s moral authority when distinguishing “positive,” or manmade, law from its 
“natural” counterpart, ostensibly untainted by personal interest and inclination. 
Animal and environmental ethicists employ both tactics in their defense of 
Mother Nature and the intrinsic value of her living, feeling creatures. 
Epistemologists and metaphysicians use it willy-nilly and almost always without 
adequate definition or explanation, as they do the equally common but elusive 
term experience. 
 Considerations of the relationship between nature and experience within 
philosophy are ineluctably bound up with the doctrine of naturalism. Rather 
than a single doctrine, naturalism can mean several things. As Richard Gale has 
quipped, “There are as many different versions of naturalism as there are 
naturalists.”198 For our purposes here, a main division can be made between 
“reductive” and “non-reductive” naturalisms. A key example of a reductive 
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naturalism would be materialism, the belief that everything that exists is a form 
or function of matter; this position is roughly synonymous with physicalism. 
Typically, materialism is taken to diminish or deny the reality of qualitative 
thought and feelings—these are but epiphenomena entirely reducible to brain 
states and neural impulses. Paul Churchland’s eliminative materialism is based 
upon this principle and is a widely endorsed form of reductive naturalism.199  
 Other versions of reductive naturalism include Gilbert Ryle’s earlier 
behaviorism, which posited the mind as an aspect of the body’s behavior.200 Ryle 
saw mental states as identical to behavioral states; the feeling of being in pain is 
simply the reaction of the body to a painful stimulus and nothing more. Although 
one of the first views to recognize an empirical connection between the mind and 
body, behaviorism was deemed phenomenologically unsound in that it reduced 
the mind to a public aspect of human activity, completely ignoring its private 
inner aspect. Behaviorism could never satisfactorily account for the fact that our 
mental states “feel” a certain way to us. 
 A later form of materialism, mind-brain identity theory, agrees with the 
close connection posited by behaviorism between the mind and body, but goes 
considerably further in affirming that mental states are identical to their 
associated brain states; mind and brain are one and the same.201 This claim was 
intended as an empirical one, driven by an explosion of neuroscientific 
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developments of the 1950s. Identity theory was challenged strongly, however, by 
Hilary Putnam's critique of the “multiple realizability” of mental states.202 The 
main thrust of Putnam’s critique was that one cannot logically explain mental 
states as identical to physical states if various physical states might lead to the 
same mental state. As a result, individual qualities are not believed to be identical 
with individual brain states.203   
 Although behaviorism and strict identity theories have fallen out of 
fashion due to the challenges they faced, various current forms of physicalism 
known as functionalism are clear descendants of those views. Functionalism puts 
forth the idea that mental states merely correspond to functional states; that is, 
they play some role in cognition, but they do not determine it. Functionalism also 
admits several varieties, yet they all basically agree that mental states are physical 
states that fill functional roles within the cognitive system. Different mental 
states are defined by their causal roles in this system.   
 Various form of dualism have arisen, or have been revived—dualism is an 
old view in the history of philosophy—based upon widespread dissatisfaction 
with the inconsistencies resulting from reductive approaches to nature. Most 
notably, this includes the existence of a so-called “explanatory gap” between 
physical and phenomenal, or what philosophers during Dewey’s time often called 
psychical, facts. The explanatory gap is a variation of the mind-body problem 
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that David Chalmers has called the “hard problem” of consciousness.204 
Contemporary dualist arguments against materialism and other reductive 
naturalisms work from the existence of an explanatory gap between the physical 
and the phenomenal to asserting the complete independence of the latter from 
the former, much like Descartes did several centuries earlier.  
 There are two main strains of dualism within contemporary philosophy of 
mind, both of which hold that the mind is fundamentally distinct from the body 
(or brain). The variety of dualism known as interactionism claims that the mental 
and the physical are different substances (essences, properties, etc.), but are 
capable of casually interacting with each other. For interactionists, physical states 
affect mental states and vice versa. Epiphenomenalism, on the other hand, holds 
that, although mental and physical states are distinct, only physical states are 
efficacious in the world. Mental states, due to the causal closure of the universe 
under the laws of physics, cannot affect physical states in any causal manner. 
Most modern day dualists are epiphenomenal dualists.  
 Epiphenomenalism is seen by its proponents as a form of dualism 
defensible by science, or at least in accord with current science, in that by 
ascribing no causal efficacy to mental states it avoids any contradiction with 
physics. However, this position faces a daunting challenge in that it contravenes 
common sense. For instance, if the mind has no effect on physical behavior, one 
could conceive of beings without minds, yet acting much the same, such as those 
                                                        
204 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).  
 243 
described in Raymond Smullyan's creative fable “An Unfortunate Dualist.”205 
This vivid thought experiment is nowadays cashed out in terms of the 
conceivability of “zombies”—beings physically identical to humans, yet void of 
phenomenal experience. 
 A significant weakness of dualist arguments against materialism is that 
they only get off the ground by differentiating (a priori) physical and phenomenal 
facts.206 They further draw unwarranted conclusions between the epistemological 
irreducibility of qualia—the “what it’s like”207 aspects of experience—to their 
ontological irreducibility.208 The favorite qualia of philosophers include what it is 
like to feel pain and what it is like to see red; both feeling pain and seeing red 
have qualitatively distinctive “feels,” much different than what is experienced 
when not in pain or when seeing yellow or blue, for instance.209 Reductive forms 
of naturalism, like most forms of materialism, reject the existence of intrinsic 
qualia as a myth, one related to the “myth of the given”210—knowledge directly 
presented to consciousness—trenchantly critiqued by Wilfrid Sellars in the 
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middle of the 20th century.  
 What has been provided just now is only a surface view of a complex and 
highly nuanced area of study at the intersection of philosophy of mind, 
metaphysics, and epistemology. Aspects of it will be picked up again later in our 
study when we turn more fully to the subject of experience, specifically religious 
experience. What I would like to assert at this point is that the belief that if you 
grant existence to phenomenal experience you are automatically forced into some 
form of dualism is fallacious. The appeal of dualism is based on an assumed 
distinction between knowledge of physical and phenomenal facts and from an 
apparent explanatory gap between the two to an unbridgeable ontological one. 
Somehow this is taken to affirm the nonphysical nature of quality. This is why 
materialism and physicalism survive as viable and dominant positions in the 
literature. On the other hand, reductive forms of materialism and physicalism 
have great difficulty making sense of qualitative experience—just where do 
qualities exist in the world if not in the subjective mind? This is an important 
question, one we can already begin to see Dewey’s answer to if we recall our 
earlier analysis of his value theory where it was shown that values correspond to 
objective features of natural events, and not to the private interests of individuals. 
 
The Generic Traits of Existence 
 
 
 What I have been calling Dewey’s ecological naturalism in this 
dissertation is a form of naturalism, but it is thoroughly non-reductive in its 
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outlook and methods. For Dewey, the problem of the relation between the 
physical and the phenomenal, like all problems, could not be decided beforehand 
by definitional fiat or logical maneuvering. It is the job of a broad, inclusive 
naturalism to interrogate the structures of lived experiencing for a viable answer. 
By doing this, we detect both as manifestations of “the generic traits of 
existence.”211  
 As Dewey was quick to remind his detractors, we never begin with the 
refinements of experience as described by philosophical and scientific concepts. 
Rather, we begin “with experience in gross, experience in its primary and crude 
forms, and by means of its distinguishing features and distinctive trends, note 
something of the world which generates and maintains it.”212 It is the discovery of 
these natural features of existence that grounds Dewey’s ecological version of 
realism. Nature’s “generic traits” are the tools by which we come to learn to direct 
developing events toward their satisfactory completion. When an event’s ideal 
possibilities are converted into actualities, we achieve a measurable increase in 
meaning and value that facilitates our readiness to adapt to rapidly changing 
events. In doing so, we grow as persons and express a natural form of religiosity.     
 This onto-phenomenological approach informed Dewey’s novel solution to 
the physical-phenomenal relation, which was to free qualia from their 
imprisonment in the human mind (or brain). Qualities such as fear and 
frustration, joy and sorrow are not purely mental functions in Dewey’s view, but 
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are functions of the organism-environment system. It is not our minds (or brain 
states) which are fearful in reaction to certain stimuli; it is rather the case that 
“man fears because he exists in a fearful, an awful world. The world is precarious 
and perilous.”213  
 Dewey argued it was false to “first endow man in isolation with an instinct 
of fear and then…imagine him…irrationally ejecting that fear into the 
environment.”214 To give a more positive example, one from his early Psychology 
(further showing continuity between his early and later periods), Dewey says: “All 
natural, healthy feeling never has an independent existence in 
consciousness…The pleasure of eating an orange seems a part of the orange.”215 
While somewhat counterintuitive, this view makes sense if we remember that the 
environment is part of ourselves. We are bound to nature’s anatomy and destiny 
by our every action. Richard Bernstein, an early commentator on Dewey’s 
philosophy, makes this same point when he poses the following question:  
 If one asks, "Does Dewey seriously believe that there are qualities such as 'cheerfulness' 
 which exist in the external world independently of an individual who feels cheerful ?," he 
 misses the point and the subtlety of Dewey's phenomenological analysis. For the question 
 presupposes the very dualism of mental and physical which Dewey is attempting to 
 undercut. Any specific quality of experience is the resultant or ending of a transaction of 
 organism-environment. There could not be any qualities of experience unless there were 
 an experiencer. But it does not follow that the qualities belong exclusively to the one who 
 experiences them.216 
 
 A fundamental error of both ancient and modern philosophy was the 
artificial cleaving of human thought, emotion, and feeling from the natural world. 
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Experience reveals not private feelings, but qualitative traits of existence. As 
Dewey asserts in Experience and Nature, “The intrinsic nature of events is 
revealed in experience as the immediately felt qualities of things.”217 This is a 
restatement of a point he made in the early article “The Postulate of Immediate 
Empiricism,” where he claimed, “Anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-
technical use of the term ‘thing’…are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one 
wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as 
being.”218 The appeal of this view is that it better lines up with our common sense 
experience than many of the dualist and materialist positions outlined above.  
 Dewey believed that granting an external existence to qualities was the 
only way to avoid the intractable philosophical problems that accompany all 
reductive naturalisms: “The only way to avoid a sharp separation between the 
mind which is the centre of the processes of experiencing and the natural world 
which is experienced is to acknowledge that all modes of experiencing are ways in 
which some genuine traits of nature come to manifest realization.”219 Qualities 
are not so much indicative of our responses to nature as they are revelatory of our 
union with nature. It is the purpose of a properly ecological ontology, reflected in 
what Dewey called the “denotative-empirical” method, to allow the immediate 
qualities of primary experience to speak to us without imposing any of our 
preformed ideas or categories onto them. This method departed significantly 
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from traditional understandings of ontology “as a system of beliefs about being as 
such” that is “developed through rational arguments.”220   
 Dewey’s denotative method is designed to allow the world speak for itself 
in its qualitative fullness. Thomas Alexander explains the radical nature of this 
approach and how it connects to Dewey’s larger problem-solving view of 
philosophy with the following detailed description. I quote from it at length as it 
helps tie together various of the moving pieces of our study up to this point: 
 What then is the “denotative-empirical method”? Negatively it says: Do not begin to 
 philosophize thinking upon the objects of secondary, cognitive experience. Do not equate 
 the Real with the Known—even inquiry instrumentally conceived is not all there is in life. 
 Do not cut off an individual event of being from its context or environment. Positively it 
 enjoins: Begin and end all reflections with an awareness of the world that transcends 
 thought. Approach that world with humility and with an open mind: have a receptive awe 
 of and curiosity in the world. This is a double-process: to see how the world is transmuted 
 by an individual event is different from discerning how that event affects the world. It 
 discerns the structures of the world in the varied responses human beings have—
 responses symbolized and expressed in religion, myth, art, and culture. It teaches us to 
 see “events” rather than fixed identities or essences. Events are not bare happenings, but 
 the outcomes of natural histories. The method teaches us to think in terms of 
 evolutionary histories. Nor do we cut off the horizon of creative future from the being of 
 an event, but remain mindful of the open-ended future possibilities that anything carries 
 within it here and now….The goal of our attentive receptivity and awareness of the world 
 is the enrichment of human existence. .221  
 
 Bucking the dominant trend of Western philosophy and psychology, both 
of which separate experience from nature, Dewey places experience back into 
nature.222 Experience is not a veil that shuts us off from the outer world. Rather, 
experience is the method by which we feel our way in and through the world. 
Experienced qualities are not limited to sense qualities, however; what Dewey 
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refers to as “pervasive” qualities also show up in our experience. Pervasive 
qualities are those that unify an event and express its ineffable uniqueness. The 
consequence of approaching the topic this way is that everything experienced is 
taken to be equally a part of reality: “all modes of experiencing are ways in which 
some genuine traits of nature come to manifest realization.”223 This statement 
holds tremendous import for investigations of religious experience from a 
naturalistic standpoint.  
 One “mode” of experience relevant to religion identified by Dewey in A 
Common Faith is that of wholeness, marked by an enveloping feeling of a whole 
(gestalt) that guides us to an event’s completion. Another is that of possibility, 
which, given the forward-looking nature of intelligent experience, colors our 
perceptions at every turn. Wholeness and possibility are intimately connected. 
According to Dewey: “To perceive is to acknowledge unattained possibilities; it is 
to refer the present to consequences, apparition to issue, and thereby to behave in 
deference to the connections of events. Since potential consequences also mark 
the thing itself, and form its nature…future consequences already belong to the 
thing.”224 The qualities of wholeness and possibility speak to all types of ideals 
and are thus of special concern to us here. Such qualities are the existential 
conditions for any religious experience and are revealed to us primarily through 
feeling.   
 Like all present, actual qualities, ideal qualities are found in experience 
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and, as traits of existence, consequently are to be considered “as genuine as the 
characteristics of sun and electron,” as Dewey candidly puts it.225 The 
fundamental rhythm of existence is that it consists of events in continual process, 
events that admit unique qualities and exhibit a mix of stable and precarious, 
settled and unsettled, determinate (actual) and indeterminate (possible) aspects. 
Dewey identified dozens of generic traits over the years, many of which are listed 
in the following table. 
 
Table 1: List of Proposed Generic Traits of Existence226 
 
stability  continuity  repetition  interaction 
movement  arrest   potentiality  unity 
safe and sane  structure  precariousness quality 
contingency  discontinuity  incompleteness finishedness 
variation  hazard  uncertainty  association 
change  ambiguity  irregularity  specificity 
indeterminateness openness  possibility  temporality 
logicibility  tendency  bias   certainty 
preference  direction  potentiality  constant relations 
pluralism of values pluralism of ends diversity  qualitative 
         individuality 
 
  
 Need (incompleteness, indeterminateness), satisfaction (finishedness, 
certainty), and ideal consummation (unity, stability, qualitative individuality) are 
situational traits. But it is still not clear from Dewey’s explanations of ideality 
what world the ideal world is, or where in existence ideals are located. 
Admittedly, these questions are difficult to answer within Dewey’s language, for 
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he never set down a systematic ontology that clearly articulated the various 
principles he professed. Furthermore, Dewey’s denotative-empirical method is 
primarily descriptive, rather than explanatory. We thus must look elsewhere for 
assistance in interpreting and clarifying Dewey’s position on possibility and the 
wholeness feeling associated with ideals, especially those deemed to be of a 
religious character. Justus Buchler’s ordinal naturalism is a useful conversation 
partner to help clarify the first of these concerns, while Risieri Frondizi’s gestalt 
anthropology helps with the second. James Gibson’s ecological psychology serves 
as an effective theoretical bridge between the two. We will discuss aspects of 
Buchler’s philosophy straightaway and Frondizi’s immediately after in section 
3.4. Gibson’s work has been introduced briefly already, but will be discussed in 
further detail in the next chapter.   
 
The Principle of Ontological Parity 
 
 
 From the vantage point of Dewey’s event-based ontology, nature is not a 
receptacle or container of all the beings it contains, but is the enabling conditions 
of their possibilities and structural actualities. This means that possibility is 
ontologically on par with actuality for Dewey—provided that possibility is 
properly delimited and understood. As a generic trait of existence, possibility is in 
conformity with actuality from the perspective of meaning as well. We routinely 
discriminate possibility in relation to actuality in our daily affairs (e.g., it is 
possible for me to cross the street by walking at the crosswalk or smack in the 
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middle of it, but not by jumping from one side to the other). As far as value is 
concerned, the connection is more nebulous; obviously, values need to be 
possible before they can be actualized (i.e., the conditions for value must exist), 
and some possibilities might be as valuable as some actualities. Various 
conceptions of possibility have been proposed by philosophers over time and not 
all of them are compatible with the statements just made, so we need to tease out 
further what is intended here and to do that we turn to the philosophy of Justus 
Buchler. 
 Along with Charles Sanders Peirce, Buchler is esteemed as one of the most 
distinguished systematic philosophers to emerge from the American context. 
Buchler developed an original philosophic system that Beth Singer, a leading 
interpreter of his thought, has named ordinal naturalism.227  Though Buchler did 
not call his system a form of naturalism, the term accurately reflects his 
commitment to there being no reality different from or discontinuous with any 
other, which is a stance clearly opposed to all forms of dualism, 
transcendentalism, and supernaturalism. “Nature” has no opposite for Buchler, 
so it is often left implicit in his analyses of various topics.    
 Like John Dewey before him, and whom he was greatly influenced by, 
Buchler worked out “an analysis of the basic traits of nature and man, experience 
and judgment, method and meaning, art, science, and philosophy that differs 
                                                        
227 Beth J. Singer, Ordinal Naturalism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler 
(East Brunswick, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1983). 
 253 
strikingly from the analyses provided or presupposed by other philosophers.”228 
This makes a comparison between the two thinkers’ views reasonable and 
potentially quite fruitful. However, unlike Dewey, who strictly avoided the use of 
neologisms, Buchler expressed his philosophy through a vocabulary of his own 
creation in effort to avoid the heavy encumbrances of traditional philosophical 
concepts and categories.229 
 Of Buchler’s many contributions to philosophy, one of the most significant 
and resonant with Dewey’s thought is his process-oriented view of nature, 
summed up in the notion of a “natural complex.” According to Buchler, 
“Whatever is, in whatever way, is a natural complex.”230 This is an ontological 
category as wide as “event” is for Dewey’s system—both were offered to capture 
the reality of whatever is. Furthermore, both were founded upon recognition of 
there being no ontological simples, no unanalyzable atoms lying at the root of 
reality; modern science shows everything is interconnected and in constant 
transaction on some level. Natural complexes include items as diverse as 
“Relations, structures, processes, societies, human individuals, human products, 
physical bodies, words and bodies of discourse, ideas, qualities, contradictions, 
meanings, possibilities, myths, laws, duties, feelings, illusions, reasonings, [and] 
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dreams.”231 Absences and lacks—traits that initiate the search for closure and the 
ideal for Dewey—can also be considered natural complexes.232  
 Nature, for Buchler, simply is “the presence and availability of complexes,” 
what he elsewhere describes as “providingness.”233 This statement affirms 
Buchler’s rejection of the substance, object-oriented ontology that has dominated 
Western philosophy since its very beginnings. This rejection is reinforced by 
Buchler’s claim that humans, too, are natural complexes, a claim that denies any 
set divisions between inner and outer, subject and object, experience and nature. 
Each self has what Buchler calls a “spread” that describes its extended nature by 
means of its various relations with other selves and the web of interrelated 
natural complexes that comprise its reality. Buchler’s naturalism, like Dewey’s, is 
non-reductive to its core.    
 There is a spirit of equity and charity underlying Buchler’s naturalistic 
ontology, for it posits that there is no ultimate kind of complex or being. Buchler 
challenged the foundationalism he saw implicit in most metaphysical systems, 
reflected in what he calls the principle of ontological priority. Ontological 
priority—a symptom of what Dewey referred to as the “fallacy of selective 
emphasis”—describes the tendency to erect a hierarchy of reality, claiming “a 
distinction between the ‘really’ real and the less than real, or between reality and 
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nonreality.”234 The Great Chain of Being derived by the medievals from the work 
of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus is an example of an ontological scheme built on 
the principle of priority.   
 Buchler offered what he believed to be an important theoretical and ethical 
corrective to this principle and named it, by contrast, the principle of ontological 
parity.235 Ontological parity asserts that nothing is more real or ontologically 
significant than anything else. Importantly, this principle applies to actual, 
physical objects and events, as well as to abstract ideas, values, judgments, 
dreams, and even possibilities. Fact and fiction are both equally real—but they 
are real in different ways and for different reasons. Our tendency to declare the 
former real and the latter false represents a shorthand of language and thought. 
For instance, Macbeth is a “real” work by Shakespeare and a “real” literary 
character, but different from the “real” historical King of Scotland upon which 
both were based. As was previously mentioned about ideals when discussing 
criticisms of Dewey’s religious thought in Chapter 1, things are real when and 
where they are real.   
 Much as Dewey would claim of the generic traits of existence, anything 
capable of discrimination is real under Buchler’s view: “The principle of parity 
obliges us to receive and accept all discriminanda. The conception of ontological 
priority, on the other hand, makes all ascertainable differences suspect, and 
instead of interpreting their relative character and ordinal location, always stands 
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ready to efface them.”236 As experiential discriminanda, possibility and actuality 
are not incommensurable categories. In fact, they are mutually entangled and 
bound to one another in the same world; certain possibilities exist because 
certain actualities obtain and vice versa.237 This is what Dewey meant by saying 
that possibilities—and therefore also ideals—are continuous with nature and are 
always preceded by specific actualities. In Buchler’s words, “Possibility is the 
reach of actuality, actuality the ballast of possibility.”238 
 To help illustrate the organic connection between possibility and actuality, 
Buchler gives the example of a tree, a common natural complex. In addition to all 
of its visible traits (e.g., leaves, bark of a certain texture and color, and a 
distinctive smell), Buchler claims that a tree’s possibilities, “its potentialities for a 
span of life,” are equally traits located in it as a complex, which become actual 
when conditions relevant to their actualization are met.239 The way in which a 
particular complex’s traits are ordered make it the kind of complex it is—exciting, 
leisurely, a baseball game, etc.  
 This is what Buchler refers to as a complex’s “integrity,” and each integrity 
obtains in a way that determines its prospective limits. Baseball can come to be 
the sort of sport it is only in a world where games exist; the game can be played 
only in a world of bipedal animals with various other physical characteristics and 
emotional needs for social bonding, and so on. To better articulate these 
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relevancy conditions, which will help us to more fully understand how Deweyan 
ideals qua possible events are continuous with actual events and conditionally 
implicit in them as their (potential) future courses, it will be useful to introduce 
another core tenet of Buchler’s naturalism known as the principle of ordinality.    
 
Ordinality and the Ideal 
 
   
 Like events, natural complexes are histories, each marked by a unique 
contour of alternative possibilities and concrete actualities. Possibility and 
actuality denote natural complexes in their own right, but they also refer to 
qualities or “traits” of other natural complexes. This is another way of saying that 
a natural complex is what it is by means of both its actualities (its obtenences) 
and its possibilities (its not yet occurrences). The dynamic relationship between 
the two is how the complex “hangs together,” as Dewey would phrase it. This 
echoes Dewey’s statement, made when discussing the processive nature of events 
in Experience and Nature: “It is equally important to note that the dark and 
twilight abound. For in any object of primary experience there are always 
potentialities which are not explicit; any object that is overt is charged with 
possible consequences that are hidden; the most overt act has factors which are 
not explicit.”240 
 Buchler introduced the concept of ordinality to describe the irreducible 
complexity of nature and the positionality (situatedness) of all natural 
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complexes.241 What this means is that complexes are located in networks of 
relations, what Buchler calls its “orders.” A natural complex’s ordinal position, 
what Buchler also defines as its “sphere of (and for) relatedness,”242 accounts for 
its relevance to and influence upon other complexes at any given moment. 
Further, not only are natural complexes in orders, they are themselves orders of 
related traits—such is the nested and intersecting nature of Buchler’s categories. 
Relevance relations can be either weak or strong: the fact that the dog barking 
incessantly outside my window exists in the order of “my neighbor’s property” is 
highly relevant to my deciding whether or not to file a public complaint, while the 
dog’s location in the order of “mammalian animals” is less relevant in this case.243 
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Martin O. Yalcin, Naturalism’s Philosophy of the Sacred: Justus Buchler, Karl Jaspers, and 
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 The multidimensional concept of ordinality helps clarify that just because 
everything is equally real does not mean that everything is equally possible. 
Buchler argued against the notion of “pure” possibility and denied the existence 
of any independent “realm” of possibility, as did Dewey.244 Buchler’s main 
opposition to the concept of pure, or “logical,” possibility—a favorite tool of 
analytic philosophers—was that it rested on faulty reasoning and thus was of little 
use for the practical purposes of query (a term akin to Dewey’s inquiry). 
According to the law of non-contradiction, anything free from internal 
contradictions is considered logically possible. Yet, as Buchler rightly saw, the 
application of this rule to real-world scenarios breeds confusion and a sense of 
chaos. Buchler uses the example of a talking insect to illustrate this point. Though 
biologically impossible, it might be stated that a talking insect is logically 
possible, because there is no logical contradiction involved in saying so (the same 
reasoning stands behind the argument for the conceivability of zombies, 
discussed above). But, as Buchler argues: 
 [a] contradiction certainly is involved, a contradiction of the concept “insect,” an area of 
 knowledge, and the conditions of linguistic meaning. That is, the so-called logical or pure 
 possibility turns out not to be about insects at all. The alleged pure possibility free from 
 all ordinal limitations is in fact determined in and by an order of complexes, but an order 
 covertly introduced—in this case, an order of envisioned images. It is this order that 
 serves as the guarantor of “non-contradiction.” For behold, we envision “insects talking.” 
 And indeed there are creatures plainly doing so in this visual order. But they are not 
 insects. Insects, of course, may belong also to an order of reverie. But the integrity 
 determined by this order must be reconcilable with the integrities determined by their 
 other ordinal locations, otherwise we are thinking only of animals arbitrarily given the 
 same name.245    
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 To claim that talking insects are possible, even logically, is to fail to 
appreciate all of the ordinal locations (traits) in which insects, as living 
organisms, are located. Further, it is to misunderstand the relations obtaining 
between different orders—that of fictional and actual creatures in this case. The 
various orders that insects belong to enable and limit their actuality. Every 
actuality can be considered incomplete, however, “in so far as any of its 
possibilities remain unactualized.”246 The difference between a concrete and a 
purely logical possibility is that a concrete possibility can be viewed as an 
extension of a complex (an event). It does not define its future per se, but prevails 
in the present as a sort of limit to where the event can go. In order for the 
possibility of a talking insect to arise, innumerable changes would have to occur 
in its traits and ordinal relations, and in those of an infinite number of other 
complexes. This is not to argue that possibilities do not change, however. It is a 
fact of nature that they do, otherwise they would prove indiscriminable. As 
Buchler explains:  
 [P]ossibilities are mortal and modifiable, even as actualities are. The possibility of all 
 Americans being literate by 1960 has ceased to obtain. Possibilities can be modified in 
 their relation to actualities. In order to have a status that would remain perfectly intact, in 
 order to be perfectly exempt from any kind of modification, a possibility would have to be 
 totally unrelated, insulated from all actualities and all other possibilities. This means that 
 it could not be located in any order whatever, and therefore could not have been 
 discriminated as that possibility.247     
 
The challenge of understanding the full range of possibilities for any given 
complex involves discerning all of the complex’s relevant traits at a particular 
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time. Dewey’s denotative-empirical method was designed to do precisely this, but 
employing it requires significant patience and faith in the process.   
 What does this clarification of possibility mean for our understanding of 
ideals? Basically, if possibilities are real and empirical, then all ideals—moral, 
aesthetic, religious, or otherwise defined—are ordinal. They are situated and 
relative to the relevancy conditions that support them. All ideals are “ideals for”; 
there is no realm of pure or absolute ideals, nor is it the case that ideals have 
always existed in an eternal sense. Furthermore, it should be noted that as an 
objective trait of existence, of ordinally located natural complexes, ideality qua 
possibility does not line up what is personally desired or wanted as ideal. 
Concerning the complex event that is myself, when considered alongside my 
needs, interests, and developed capabilities—intellectual and physical—it is more 
likely ideal that I become an educator in the future (in “solution” to the problem 
of requiring monetary resources to meet basic needs of survival, of requiring 
meaningful employment to provide a sense of self-worth, etc.) than a professional 
basketball player. Ideals as possibilities are objective, but positionally so; those 
that are open to some are foreclosed to others. 
 To repeat: not everything we speak of colloquially as possibilities are 
“actually possible,” just as we said earlier that not everything we speak of as ideal 
is “really ideal.” To better illustrate this point, take the example of democracy as 
an ideal, common when discussing Dewey’s thought. Democratic forms of living 
are possible ideals (traits, orders) for persons educated in their meaning and who 
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live in societies where the appropriate social, political, and legal structures exist 
to enable them. They are not possible ideals for persons or societies (complexes, 
situations) lacking these features, however, because they have no real chance of 
being actualized as things currently stand. In fact, trying to actualize them 
without laying the required groundwork can be negative, as evidenced by the 
disastrous effects of imposed democracy. As Dewey explains in Reconstruction in 
Philosophy: 
 It is false that the evils of the situation arise from absence of ideals; they spring from 
 wrong ideals. And these wrong ideals have in turn their foundation in the absence in 
 social matters of that methodic, systematic, impartial, critical, searching inquiry into 
 “real” and operative conditions which we call science and which has brought man in the 
 technical realm to the command of physical energies.248     
Democracy can and, indeed, does become ideal when the necessary personal and 
public changes are made. In the same way, iron-enriched foods are ideal for 
anemic persons when available and eaten; for those with sufficient levels of iron, 
such foods are not ideal and further are dis-valuable (because toxic) if ingested to 
excess.  
 Dewey chose the category of events as the basis of his philosophy in 
recognition that everything changes through time, altering its characteristics and 
relations to every other thing in existence. According to Buchler, it is this 
temporal aspect of actuality that has made the notion of possibility so difficult to 
interpret by philosophers, for possibilities can be viewed as existing prior to 
actuality. While this is true, it is true only on account of the fact that certain 
actualities have already occurred. Possibilities look forward and backward; they 
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come into existence and they expire. In other words, like concrete actualities, 
possibilities also are always changing. It is our ability to actualize ideals by 
apprehending and evaluating nature’s real—here, now, in this moment—
possibilities that makes us human: 
 The merest breath a man takes favors one possibility and renders others obsolete….At the 
 other end of his scale, where he is unique in the manner of his kind, he methodically 
 actualizes possibilities that he has produced or apprehended. In so doing, he also keeps 
 actualizing himself. He is not the sole or event the most basic determinate of his own 
 actualization. His is not the only kind of complex that is continually in process of 
 actualization. His kind alone, however, is able to dwell with the possibilities, and this is 
 crucial for his degradation or salvation.249 
 
 Dewey did not offer categoreal descriptions of the scope and kind Buchler 
did, but such descriptions, along with Dewey’s generic traits of existence, help us 
to make sense of the various qualities that permeate the situations we live 
through. Parity and ordinality, possibility and actuality, indeterminateness and 
wholeness are not intended as descriptions of transcendental realities into which 
we must squeeze experience or else it is rendered meaningless. They are 
instrumentalities we make use of to direct the future course of events and thus 
also ourselves. The real challenge becomes how do we get in touch with the ideal 
orders of nature and help shift their locations and relevancy relations to the 
places where and when they are most needed. This experimental process 
(inquiry, query) is sort of like attempting to get the right configuration on a 
Rubik’s cube. If we are infinitely connected to everything through feeling and 
ordinal relation, how can we become aware of all of our immediate possibilities or 
learn to bring a remote possibility closer? How can I shift enough of my 
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characteristics and those of the environments I inhabit in the right combination 
so that an ideal event, which looms forever in the background of feeling relations, 
can reveal itself more fully? 
 
 
3.4 The Self as a Dynamic Gestalt 
 
The scope of this chapter is broad and exploratory. So far I have reviewed the 
primacy of events for Dewey’s ecological naturalism; I have discussed the 
importance of this principle for understanding his ontology, epistemology, and 
axiology; I have traced how these theories, along with aspects of Dewey’s early 
psychology, informed his creation of an embodied logic of inquiry; and I have 
described the generic traits of nature, including those of actuality and ideality, 
that provide the tools for resolving problematic existential situations. In this last 
section I will deal with the implications of all of these areas for understanding 
Dewey’s ontology of selves, that is, his philosophical anthropology, which we have 
already touched on briefly in Chapter 2. As the “self” is implicated in many of the 
topics just listed, we begin this exploration with a fairly good grasp on what 
Dewey believes the self to be—or at least what he takes it not to be.  
 The self forms the bedrock of many philosophical systems, and yet it has 
proven incredibly slippery for philosophers to define. The authoritative 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, for instance, contains entries on “self-
deception,” “self-consciousness,” “self-determination,” “self-evidence,” and even 
“self-referential incoherence,” but none on the “self,” despite using the term 1,552 
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separate times.250 Defining the self may seem like a purely theoretical problem, 
but it is one with serious practical consequences. In addition to philosophy, 
virtually every world religion and school of psychotherapy attempts to deal with 
“problems of the self” in some manner.          
 How can something so near to us remain so strange, so elusive? This 
question was the motivation of Descartes’s investigations into the fundamental 
nature of knowledge. In an era of intellectual revolution, Descartes sought 
absolutely solid metaphysical foundations for all knowledge, including that of the 
self. In his central work of metaphysics, the Meditations, Descartes resolved that 
the self is primarily a thinking thing and, assured of the existence of thought—by 
thinking—he concluded the self must exist. This (syllogistic) phenomenological 
insight stands behind his famous Cogito, which can be translated in the active 
voice as, “I am thinking, therefore I exist.”                
 The trajectory of Descartes’s thinking on the self is rich and illuminating, 
but its specifics are not pertinent to the present investigation.251 What is 
pertinent is the dualism that resulted from Descartes’s inquiry into the self, which 
was described as a defining characteristic of egoic thinking early on in the 
dissertation. Dualism is the view that reality consists of two distinct parts or 
realms. The separation between facts and values, between appearance and 
reality, between empirical phenomena and transcendental noumena, between 
body and mind are just some of the versions of dualism proposed throughout 
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history, all of which seriously have been called into question by the ecological 
turn in contemporary theory. 
 Our dominant philosophical anthropological framework, shaped as it was 
in the modernizing project of the enlightened West, is atomistic, individualistic, 
and thinking-focused. An egoic ontology of selves is appealing for obvious 
reasons, including the unspoken sanction it lends our self-interested drives 
toward maximizing physical comfort and commercial benefit. Its downside 
includes the indiscriminate material production and energy consumption 
required to deliver such desired goods. Sadly, the ill effects of natural resource 
depletion, habitat destruction, and labor exploitation often are not enough to tilt 
our self-interested drives in the direction of environmental preservation and 
social justice. Recent work in animal studies, cultural and philosophical 
posthumanism, and ecological psychology, fortunately, is beginning to more 
forcefully protest our ethically narrow, humanist impulses. Such work challenges 
us to forge novel and less destructive ways of navigating a reality that is 
intrinsically social and relational. 
 
 
Criteria of Selfhood 
 
 
 A welter of criteria exists for delimiting the scope of “selfhood,” a cluster of 
attributes traditionally reserved for humans by humans. In effort at systematic 
organization yet succinct presentation, selfhood criteria typically include what 
can be termed empirical-material, supraempirical-metaphysical, and 
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semiempirical-cognitive varieties. Empirical-material criteria, shaped by biology 
and other natural sciences, include a highly evolved brain, specific body 
morphology, or symbolic language use. Supraempirical-metaphysical criteria, 
theological and religious in texture, include the possession of an immutable and 
eternal soul or spirit (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Dvaita Vedānta) or the 
temporal emergence, but eternal impermanence, of a rational essence or 
appetitive will (Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism). Finally, semiempirical-cognitive 
criteria, rooted in philosophy, psychology, and sociology, include a self-conscious 
mind as a locus of identity over time (Locke and Hume), the subjective mental 
experience of intentionality (Brentano and Husserl), or the ability to act with 
individual or collective agency (Aristotle onwards). The criteria listed here are 
neither collectively exhaustive nor mutually exclusive; historical and conceptual 
overlap exists between scientifically, philosophically, and religiously informed 
criteria of the self.  
 The capabilities, endowments, and traits described above, though 
seemingly disparate, are closely related. Singularly, or in some combination, they 
are believed to undergird self-dignity—what makes human beings inherently 
deserving of ethical and moral treatment, and self-responsibility—the normative 
obligations incurred by virtue of our ability to exercise choices that may 
negatively impact the dignity of others. Arguably then, it is the twin attributes of 
dignity and responsibility—what might be called socioempirical-corporeal 
(meta)criteria—that implicitly ground scientific, philosophical, and religious 
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conceptions of selfhood, though explicitly underpinned by one or more of the 
criteria listed above. Dignity and responsibility are “socioempirical” in that they 
arise solely amid the manifold relations particular to social contexts, unlike 
empirical, semiempirical, and supraempirical criteria. Dignity and responsibility 
are “corporeal” in that it is primarily through the lived body and its polymorphic 
interrelations with the worlds it inhabits that they and our social reality emerge.  
 At the risk of ontological logicism, ontologies of the self would seem to be 
best built upon socioempirical criteria. Empirical and semiempirical criteria tend 
toward greater essentialization and atomistic ontologization. While epistemically 
salient, such construction renders them highly vulnerable to the relational 
pressures of our lived social reality, as evidenced by bioconservative anxiety over 
the potential loss of dignity and responsibility through “transhuman” or 
“posthuman” modification.252 Yet dignity and responsibility, as socioempirical, 
are intrinsically relational; only problematically are they essentialized. The 
ontological strength of socioempirical criteria resides mainly in their flexibility. 
By earnestly avoiding contentious empirical, semiempirical, and supraempirical 
commitments, selfhood ontologies built upon socioempirical foundations better 
reflect  
 the complex, dynamic interplay of the humanity-constituting elements within our 
 processively individuating social selves—our bodily organs and functions interplaying 
 with our emotions, interplaying with our thinking, interplaying with our experiences of 
 world undergoing and our experiences of active effort and engagement—all of this self-
 becoming and patient-agent experience always involving profound social influences of 
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 other humans as individuals and group members, as well as social influences of our 
 participation in a wider biotic community.253 
 
Socioempirical ontologies arguably also provide superior ethical traction and, for 
this reason, are further preferable. Resistance to their widespread embrace, I 
believe, is in part a failure of ontological imagination. Fresh ontological 
perspectives therefore need to be accompanied by phenomenological disciplines 
that facilitate their inhabitation, by not only undercutting our taken-for-granted, 
“ontologically dumped”254 categories, but providing fluid, yet existentially 
compelling, substitutes. This was partly the intention of Dewey’s denotative-
empirical method.   
 
 
Body and Mind as One 
 
 
 The criteria of the self underpinning Dewey’s philosophical anthropology 
are intrinsically socioempirical and corporeal. As a pragmatist, Dewey protested 
most forms of dualism, but he viewed that between body and mind as the most 
pernicious in the history of philosophy: “I do not know of anything so 
disastrously affected by the tradition of separation and isolation as is this 
particular theme of body-mind. In its discussion are reflected the splitting off 
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from each other of religion, morals and science; the divorce of philosophy from 
science and of both from the arts of conduct.”255 This quote is from a 1928 
address Dewey gave to the New York Academy of Medicine, fittingly titled “Body 
and Mind.” In this address, Dewey criticized the body-mind dualism rampant in 
the philosophy—and science, including medical science—of his time not only 
from a conceptual angle, but from an ethical angle as well, on account of the 
disastrous practical results it has wrought, including the fundamentalist denial of 
evolution, the overt materialism of industry, and the aloofness of so-called 
“intellectuals” from engagement with real-world problems. For Dewey, 
recognition of the unity of the self through goal-directed action was supposed to 
dissolve the traditional barriers between mind and body. This was a point his 
groundbreaking article criticizing the reflex arc attempted to make clear. 
 From the very start of his career, Dewey argued against the mindy-body 
dualism pervading Western philosophy and religion, exemplified by Descartes's 
formulation of the internal soul or mind as immaterial, in distinction to the 
material nature of the external, physical world—including our bodies—over which 
the soul or mind is transcendent. As he insightfully saw, the transcendence of 
mind over body is also a working epistemological assumption of scientific 
methodology and its naive realism—the view that the external world exists as it 
appears to and does so independently of the mind that investigates its objects and 
their interactions via its ratiocinative faculties. Scientific methodology has 
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provided us with an immense wealth of knowledge about the world we live in; at 
the same time, however, it has arguably led to the division and fragmentation of 
the "self"—the very subject that constructs and employs its methods.   
 Dewey’s ecological reconstruction of philosophy and religion is grounded 
in the complementary relationship obtaining between organisms and 
environments in continually developing nature. Both Darwin’s and Hegel’s 
influence on Dewey’s thinking on the self are in clear evidence here: inner and 
outer, subject and world, self and nature are instrumentally related and co-
originating in the quest for wholeness.256 By the same token, the meaning and 
value of each component of this organic unity are rendered instrumental; each is 
an efficient means to a desirable outcome.  
 This includes the “body” and the “mind,” which describe the different ways 
a sufficiently complex creature reacts and responds to an ever-shifting matrix of 
internal and external conditions. Our everyday, common-sense view of the mind 
and body is that they interact in some fashion. Our perceptions, intentions, and 
desires compel us to action. In other words, our thoughts—traditionally defined 
as mental and immaterial—directly affect our bodies—conversely defined as 
physical and material. Similarly, our physical states (i.e., brain states), affect our 
mental states in turn. Yet how can something that is physical and something that 
is mental interact, especially if the laws of physics admit of only physical effects 
and causes? As we already have seen up to this point, Dewey rejected traditional 
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definitions like these rooted in Cartesianism. For Dewey, the body represents the 
mechanism of organic action, the enablings and constraints of behavior; other 
creatures have bodies as humans do.257 Minds, on the other hand, do not exist 
free floating; they emerge only within sufficiently complex organisms, as a 
function of social interactions, which requires adopting the perspectives of others 
for the purposes of communication and cooperative undertakings.258 The 
properties of our bodies limit the types of concepts we can acquire, as research on 
image schemas and conceptual metaphor in cognitive linguistics shows. On a 
more fundamental level, however, body-mind is one:   
 Body-mind simply designates what actually takes place when a living body is implicated 
 in situations….In the hyphenated phrase body-mind, “body” designates the continued 
 and conserved, the registered and cumulative operation of factors with the rest of nature, 
 inanimate as well as animate; while “mind” designates the characters and consequences 
 which are differential, indicative of features which emerge when “body” is engaged in a 
 wider, more complex and interdependent situation.259 
 
 The Hegelian and the Darwinian conceptions of the self, though frequently 
set against each other, as are the larger philosophies of Hegelianism and 
Darwinism, actually have much in common—hence the appeal and influence of 
both thinkers on Dewey’s philosophical development. Each rejects the Cartesian 
egoic view of the self as a dualistic entity; the self, rather, is organic in nature and 
always a whole. The main difference between the two approaches is that under 
the Hegelian view the whole that is the self is a manifestation of another, on some 
level more real, whole: Absolute Spirit—in one sense self-realizing, but in another 
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sense teleologically predetermined. The Darwinian view sees the whole self more 
as a self-regulating homeostasis-seeking system, recreated anew at each moment 
in the evolutionary process. Dewey came to form and reform his views on the 
nature of the self, existence, and religion through continuous examination of the 
structures and habits or, expressed differently, the “logic” of the self.  
 
 
The Integrity and Multiplicity of Selves 
 
 
 Dewey’s acknowledgement that organism and environment are 
reciprocally defined and influencing is a direct challenge to the substantializing 
tendencies inherent to egoic thinking (Cartesianism, Western modernism). 
Contrastingly, ecological approaches to the self are marked by a focus on 
transaction, process, and relation. This was an insight Dewey gained from 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory as well as from the social interactionism of his 
colleague George Herbert Mead who declared, “Any self is a social self.”260 What 
Mead meant by this statement was that what we call a “self,” though we may 
think of it as individual and isolated, is actually intersubjectively constituted by 
its relations to the community and the world at large. Mead’s intersubjective 
(ecological) theory of the self is complex and beyond the scope of our present 
inquiry. Steve Odin provides an excellent summary:  
 For Mead the human self is neither a separate self nor an absolute self but a social self 
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 with two poles, the I pole representing individuality and the Me pole representing 
 sociality. He asserts that the social self arises through an interaction between I or the 
 individual organism and the Me or the social environment including both human society 
 and living nature. The self is not something given at birth; it is something to be realized 
 through a developmental process of communicative interaction with others.261  
 
 Mead saw that our ability to role-play, to put ourselves in another’s 
“shoes,” so to speak, attests to the multiplicity of the self; the self is the sum total 
of the individual perspectives it can adopt at a given time. Enactivist theorist 
Evan Thompson makes a similar argument when he argues that empathy (and 
not rationality) is the foundation of consciousness.262 What this means for 
ecological theorists like Thompson, Mead, and Dewey is, in brief: (1) that the self 
(the I or individual consciousness) results from the dynamic interrelation of 
organism and environment; (2) that the encounter between distinct selves 
requires empathic role-playing and communication—this is how selves co-
determine one another; and (3) that empathic identification with others enables 
one to adopt a global, non-egocentric perspective whereby various aspects of the 
world can be taken up as parts of the self.  
 Perspective taking is not a purely mental affair, however; it is inherently 
dispositional, requiring the ability to act in a certain way, a “knowing what to 
possibly do” in specific situations. This insight sheds new light on conditions 
marked by what can be described as breakdowns of the self, such as 
neurodegenerative disorders like Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s. The fragmented 
selves manifest in those afflicted by such conditions is a difference in the ability 
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to maintain the complex web of relations that constitute a healthy functioning 
self. Likewise, sociopathy and narcissism can be described as a breakdown in the 
self’s ability to effectively dialogue between (or even recognize) what Mead 
described as its “I” and “Me” poles. As Dewey insightfully claimed in the “Body 
and Mind” address, an organism or self “is integrated in the degree that it utilizes 
and transforms its environment by means of incorporating some element of the 
latter within behavior.”263 This statement helps us to understand certain aspects 
of the conditions just mentioned and further places into perspective the tension 
between ecological and egoic modes of thinking and acting informing this study.  
 Nature and self, body and mind, environment and organism are functional 
descriptions. Each pair of terms is an abstraction from a dynamically unfolding, 
processive event that, on a prereflective level, exists as an integrated system. As 
different poles of the same whole, each fundamentally shapes the trajectory of the 
other. That being so, the generic traits of nature revealed to us in the course of 
experience additionally should be understood as traits of the self. This means that 
the self admits precarious and stable, present and absent, actual and ideal 
components to it. The balance of these multiple elements at any given moment 
define the self’s “integrity,” to repeat Justus Buchler’s terminology, or perhaps 
more accurately, the self’s “tensegrity,” to use a term coined by Luca Tateo and 
Giuseppina Marsico to describe the dynamic tension that invariably accompanies 
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the perpetual process of self-creation and self-organization.264 
 
Religion and Gestalt Anthropology  
 
 
 Following Dewey and Buchler, fellow naturalist Risieri Frondizi argued 
that most philosophical disputes could be reconciled by careful analysis of the 
dynamic structures of lived experiencing.265 Frondizi’s main contribution to 
philosophy, as introduced earlier, was his elucidation of the gestalt quality of 
values. Recognizing humans as value-seeking organisms, Frondizi went a step 
further and applied the concept of gestalt to the very structure of the self. 
According to what can be called his gestalt anthropology, an extension of his 
axiological naturalism, Frondizi argued that the self is an organic whole greater 
than the sum of its parts (body, mind) and inseparable from its functions in 
experience.266 The self comes not preformed, but emerges from its activities:    
 Experience shows us that the self does not depend upon any obscure or hidden 
 substantial core but depends upon what it does, has done, proposes to do, or is able to do. 
 The self is revealed in its action; it reveals itself and constitutes itself by acting. It is 
 nothing before acting, and nothing remains of it if experiences cease completely. Its esse 
 is equivalent to its facere. We are not given a ready-made self; we create our own self 
 daily by what we do, what we experience. Our behavior—in which both our actual doing 
 and our intentions should properly be included—is not an expression of our self but the 
 very stuff which constitutes it.267 
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Frondizi saw that the self’s manifold actions in the world subject it to constant 
change. This is revealed to us most markedly in our perceptual experience, which, 
though we take it to be mostly stable, is proven otherwise by simple visual 
experiments on figure-ground reversal.  
 Drawing upon the work of the Gestaltists, Frondizi found the instability of 
perceptual experience, commonly illustrated by the Rubin vase illusion depicted 
in Figure 5, to be an apt illustration of the dramatic tensions that comprise the 
self at all times. The Rubin vase is an ambiguous figure that can be perceived 
either as two black profiles facing each other against a white background, or as a 
white vase on a black background.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Rubin Vase268 
 
 
Blending insights from psychology and philosophy, Frondizi recognized that, 
although the self is felt immediately as a whole, its dynamic, needful, continually 
seeking nature always implies something is missing from its integrity; it is never 
perfectly whole. Yet what is felt as missing, as absent, is simultaneously felt as 
                                                        
268 Public domain image.  
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present—otherwise it would not be perceivable at all—much like in the figure-
ground reversal of the Rubin vase. Accurately detecting the self’s particular 
absence, its hidden aspects, might simply require a shift in perspective.   
 This is the classic meaning of a “gestalt shift”: allowing something 
subliminal in the background to presence in the foreground of perception. We 
cannot always invent or create what is missing; rather, sometimes we simply 
must “get out of our own way,” by loosening our cognitive grasping after a 
solution to allow an incipient solution to speak for itself. Dewey says something 
along these lines in his principle work on aesthetics, Art as Experience:  
 Every need, say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least a temporary 
 absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings. But it is also a demand, a reaching 
 out into the environment to make good the lack and to restore adjustment by building at 
 least a temporary equilibrium. Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls 
 out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either 
 through effort or by some happy chance. 269 
 
A need on the organism side of the organism-environment system that 
constitutes the self implies its satisfaction on the environment side and the other 
way around: “The [organism-environment] integration is represented upon the 
organic side by equilibration of organic energies, and upon the environmental 
side by the existence of satisfying conditions.”270 Together, these lacks and 
satisfactions sum up the self in process.     
 Frondizi believed the notion of a gestalt was the most fitting to interpret 
the self as a unity of multiplicity.271 Gestalts are never static; they emerge, 
                                                        
269 AE (1934), LW 10: 19. 
270 LTI (1938), LW 12: 38. 
271 Risieri Frondizi, “The Self as a Dynamic Gestalt,” The Personalist 57, no. 1 (1976): 55-63. 
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stabilize, unsettle due to dramatic internal tensions, and subsequently re-
stabilize. The concept of gestalt accounts for both the wholeness and the 
mutability of the self as it grows through new experiences, but it is our ability to 
maintain integration between the self’s various parts, as is the case with any 
gestalt, that “really counts.”272 As a gestalt configuration, a self “is the whole set of 
needs, expectations, aspirations and possibilities of fulfilling them.”273  
 Frondizi’s gestalt anthropology gives fresh expression to Dewey’s 
transactional account of the self that views the self as an emergent adaptive 
function of an organism in constant reciprocal exchange with an unpredictable, 
frequently hostile environment. It further helps us to understand how the self’s 
“actual” and “ideal” aspects are copresent in the self as a unity; ideals do not exist 
apart from the self that enacts them. The actual capabilities and achievements of 
the self define its unique contour of ideal possibilities. Conversely, the self’s ideal 
possibilities function to inform and shape its actual integrity and identity. It is the 
ability to maintain organic unity between the self’s ideal and actual components 
that Dewey controversially defined as God: “The true self-related must be the 
organic unity of the self and the world, of the ideal and the real, and this is what 
we know as God.”274 This integration is something to be achieved and describes 
the continual goal of self-realization at the heart of Dewey’s religious naturalism. 
Ideal self-realization, for Dewey, means developing the human personality to the 
                                                        
272 Ibid., 59. 
273 Frondizi, “Value as a Gestalt Quality,” 179.  
274 PSY (1887), EW 1: 227. Though this quote is from Dewey’s early Psychology, it closely 
resembles the language he employs in A Common Faith, as presented in Chapter 1.  
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fullest, most complete extent of its capabilities and energies (at the time).   
 As the sciences of ecology show us, the process of nature is ongoing and 
dynamic. Perhaps no philosopher appreciated this fact more than Dewey—at least 
no early 20th century philosopher—who allowed it to infuse his thinking to its 
core. The result was Dewey’s ontology of events, a postulate he extended to 
considerations of axiology and epistemology in turn. As a combination of these 
concerns, Dewey’s anthropology is also characterized by the primacy of events. 
The self, in Dewey’s view, is constantly forming, breaking down, and reforming in 
response to internal and external pressures, as are all homeostasis-seeking, 
dynamic gestalt systems.  
 Like nature, the self can be considered a system of transactions between 
present and absent, actual and ideal components. A fully actualized self is a 
religious self, one made whole (if only temporarily) by enacting the ideal action 
possibilities that consummate its creative lacks and strengthen the positive 
expansion of its capacities. The manner in which individuals perceive and enact 
ideal events brings us more fully to the topic of inwardness, defined in Chapter 2 
as the philosophical problem of religious experience. It is to this problem that we 
now turn our attention.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
An Ecological Approach to Religious Experiencing 
 
 
An important fact about the affordances of the environment is that they are in a 
sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which are often 
supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But, actually, an affordance 
is neither an objective property nor a subjective property, or it is both if you like. 
An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to 
understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of 
behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both 
ways, to the environment and to the observer.   
-James Gibson1 
 
 
 
4.1 Naturalism, Perception, and Knowledge 
 
John Dewey’s philosophy, clarified with the help of insights from other naturalist 
philosophies, embodied cognitive linguistics, ecological and Gestalt psychology, 
and enactivism, offers an empirically responsible account of the origins and 
essential functions of religious meaning and value. From a Deweyan perspective, 
religious meaning and value, as do meaning and value in a generic sense, emerge 
from the sensorimotor-affective dynamics of an organism’s coupled transactions 
with a natural environment layered in both organic and cultural forms. It is by 
humans’ homeostasis-seeking and sense-making praxes that meanings and 
values emerge, are given stable shape, and on account of which they are to be 
judged and either justified or proven wrong (i.e., dis-valuable), namely, by means 
of existential inquiry and valuation. Religious meanings and values are 
                                                        
1 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 129.  
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customarily exempted from the second step of this logical process, a fact that has 
only served to exacerbate global interreligious conflict and stunt humanity’s 
collective spiritual progress. Dewey greatly lamented this fact in his writings, 
even though he did not couch it in explicitly logical terms.2     
 Owing to the threefold primacy of events for an ecological naturalism, 
nature, or the organic-cultural environment, can be viewed as a nested structure 
of orders of dynamically unfolding, qualitatively rich, uniquely determinate 
events experienced in terms of the action possibilities (meanings, affordances) 
they furnish appropriately skilled agents. Ideal actionable events presence as 
consummatory fulfillments (values, good gestalts) of existential situations that 
have become unsettled or problematic in some manner. This general structure 
holds for all ideals, regardless of the type of situation they arise in, be it moral, 
aesthetic, religious, or differently toned. The epistemic status and function of 
ideals, especially religious ideals, in addition to their felt phenomenology within 
experience, have yet to be discussed in detail. These considerations fall under the 
topic of religious inwardness and are taken up in the immediately following 
sections. A discussion of the ultimacy dimensions of religious ideals, though 
glossed in the above comments, is put off until the next chapter.    
 Religious inwardness constitutes a special case of the problem of 
experience more generally—how an individual subject, agent, or consciousness is 
able to “get in touch with” and accurately represent the world outside it. This 
                                                        
2 CF (1934), LW 9. See, especially, the arguments at pages 1-6; 21-24; and 55-58. 
 
 283 
traditional way of posing the problem finds little traction in Dewey’s system, 
however, which severely critiqued the autonomous atomic self, the psychology of 
representation, the propositionality of human thought and knowledge, and a host 
of other egoic postulates foundational to Western philosophy and psychology. 
The persuasiveness of an alternative, ecological approach to religious perceiving 
and knowing flows primarily from the return to lived experiencing as the source 
and final arbiter of all meaning and value.3  
 I shift to discussing issues of “perception” and “knowledge” here rather 
than “experience” in an all-encompassing sense because perception and 
knowledge are the foremost problems a naturalist approach to religious 
experience must answer to. This is because the existence of religious experience is 
not in itself problematic—even illusory and hallucinatory experiences can be said 
to exist—what is at stake is whether any form of religious experience places one in 
touch with the real world and whether it provides access to reliable information. 
It is for this reason that the present chapter, perhaps more than any other, speaks 
to the dissertation’s twofold goal of clarifying Dewey’s religious naturalism and 
showing how it can effectively serve as the basis for a philosophy of religion 
capable of meeting the challenges posed by the ecological turn.   
 The mainstream, establishment view in the current field of perception 
research is that perception is an internal, subjective mental process by which we 
acquire knowledge of the external, objective world. We take this world to consist 
                                                        
3 Note the gerund form of the terms used here, which is to connote active, dynamic processes. 
When discussing “ecological” understandings of these faculties, the gerund form is implied even 
when not consistently employed due to considerations of grammatical flow.   
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largely of physical energies that exist independently of us and become, via our 
sensory systems and the use of learned conceptual categories, the 
representational “contents” of our perceptual awareness. As with any theory that 
aims to explain a complex human behavior, a host of presuppositions is at work 
in the establishment model of perception. These presuppositions are not always 
made explicit or addressed by its proponents, however. It is the job of a 
philosophical analysis to make these clear, subject them to critical scrutiny, and 
offer correction where possible.   
 Against the establishment, cognitivist model of perception, which claims 
perception is: (a) opaque, (b) propositional, and (c) contingent, Dewey’s work 
supports an ecological view of perception as: (a) transparent, (b) dispositional, 
and (c) holistic.4 It is acknowledged upfront that Dewey did not explicitly argue 
for this position; the philosophy and sciences of perception have grown 
considerably since his time.5 Rather, it is extrapolated from the convergences 
between his ecological naturalism and aspects of the DEEDS research programs 
introduced in Chapter 1. A core strength of the Deweyan account of perception 
offered is that it provides a more phenomenologically faithful account of 
qualitative modes of perceiving like the religious than the establishment model is 
                                                        
4 The topic of perception is complex and could take up an entire dissertation in its own right. 
Thus, I have chosen three theses around which to organize my analysis of perception and its 
potential religious dimensions in order to illuminate Dewey’s views on religious experience. It is 
likely that other theses could have been chosen and, for this reason, I do not claim the following 
analysis to be exhaustive.  
5 The basic positions one can take on a variety issues concerning perception actually have stayed 
the same, with only modest name changes to differentiate them from those known to Dewey and 
his peers. Naturally, more scientific details are available nowadays as to what many of these 
positions entail.  
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able to.  
 To my mind, the model outcome of philosophers of religion taking a 
Deweyan approach to religious experience seriously would be a dramatic revision 
of the categories and concepts that traditionally have occupied, and continue to 
occupy, their discipline. For example, from an ecological perspective, religious 
knowledge is no longer defensibly viewed as merely, or even mainly, 
propositional in nature, a form of what philosophers commonly refer to as 
“know-that”; it is more accurately viewed as an embodied form of “know-how,” a 
way of continually actualizing the self by skillfully engaging the relevant 
affordances of one’s organic-cultural environment. That natural forms of 
religious know-how can be learned and cultivated is perhaps one of the more 
radical and unexpected implications of Dewey’s religious naturalism. This and 
other consequences of implementing a truly ecological philosophy of religion are 
discussed briefly in the concluding section of the dissertation. 
 
 
Naturalism and the Cognitive Science of Religion 
 
 
Religious experience occupies a, if not, the central area of investigation for 
current science-and-religion studies. Perusal of recent work in this area uncovers 
a number of sophisticated experimental studies of mindfulness meditation and 
contemplative prayer, arrayed with images of Tibetan Buddhist monks and 
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Carmelite nuns with extravagant, electrode-laden headgear.6 A segment of this 
work goes by the name neurotheology and owes its high profile in large part to 
the work of Andrew Newberg, a pioneer in the field.7 That label is somewhat 
deceptive, however, as its aim is not to prove the truth of any particular 
theological position or persuasion, but rather to study the relationship between 
the brain and theology, and between the mind and religion more broadly. A less 
misleading and more inclusive title for this type of research is the cognitive 
science of religion. Insofar as philosophy thrives by incorporating the latest 
scientific research, it would seem that philosophers of religion seeking a 
sufficiently generalized and naturalistic account of religious experience would do 
well to look to the cognitive science of religion for a guide. Yet, as we will see 
momentarily, current definitional and operational shortcomings of this field 
make it unsuitable for this purpose.  
The cognitive science of religion represents the fastest growing segment of 
religious studies, as evidenced by the proliferation of professional societies and 
journals devoted to its methods. This proliferation represents a positive 
improvement over past periods in the relationship between science and religion 
where an unbridgeable gulf or chasm was posited to forever separate the two 
cultural forces. The idea of an inevitable conflict or incommensurability between 
science and religion, while still with us and going strong in the popular media and 
                                                        
6 See, for instance, O. L. Carter et al., “Meditation Alters Perceptual Rivalry in Tibetan Buddhist 
Monks,” Current Biology 15, no. 11 (2005): R412-R413; and Mario Beauregard and Vincent 
Paquette, “Neural Correlates of a Mystical Experience in Carmelite Nuns,” Neuroscience Letters 
405 (2006): 186-190. 
7 Andrew B. Newberg, Principles of Neurotheology (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010). 
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sprawling blogosphere, is gradually being replaced, within the university and 
research laboratory settings at least, by one of fated cooperation.8 This 
cooperation comes on the heels of the recognition that religion is a human 
universal not likely to fade and, if we are ever to understand it fully, we must 
make use of the most powerful intellectual tools we have available to us, which 
arguably are those of the natural sciences.  
Religious experience thus has come to serve as a litmus test of sorts for any 
intellectually serious investigation of religion. This is rightly the case. If religion is 
to boast any validity apart from the merely subjective, it must be found in 
experience clarified of personal bias by the light of scientific scrutiny. This is what 
being “scientific” means: open to the community of human interpreters on the 
basis of their shared perceptual and cognitive faculties. On the face of it, then, 
any scientific examination of religious experience should at least proceed in a 
fashion similar to that of other domains of human experience, that is, from the 
“bottom-up.” This means allowing the elements that might speak to the possibly 
religious dimensions of experience to emerge during the course of analysis.  
In the cognitive science of religion, however, the reverse case is more likely 
to hold; investigations of religious experience by cognitive scientists usually 
proceed in a “top-down” fashion. This means that the elements of religious 
experience are determined before beginning an analysis—its content is fixed and 
                                                        
8 The idea of a conflict between religion and science reached the height of its popularity at the 
turn of the 20th century owing to the wide influence of primarily two works: John William 
Draper’s History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science (New York: D. Appleton, 1875) and 
Andrew Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom 
(New York: D. Appleton, 1896). 
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not open to variation.9 As described by Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan, leaders 
in the field, this content is taken to consist of:   
1. Widespread counterfactual and counterintuitive beliefs in supernatural agents (gods, 
ghosts, goblins, etc.) 
2. Hard-to-fake public expressions of costly material commitments to supernatural agents, 
that is, offering and sacrifice (offerings of goods, property, time, life) 
3. Mastering by supernatural agents of people’s existential anxieties (death, deception, 
disease, catastrophe, pain, loneliness, injustice, want, loss) 
4. Ritualized, rhythmic sensory coordination of (1), (2), and (3), that is, communion 
(congregation, intimate fellowship, etc.)10  
 
Though never stated clearly in detail, this appears to be the “determinate 
content” Scott Aikin and Michael Hodges have in mind as de rigueur for the 
religious life in their criticisms of Dewey’s naturalization of religion discussed in 
the first chapter.  
The motivations behind the cognitive science of religion are laudable and 
are built upon the sweeping successes of the cognitive science of language. 
Results from this cognate field have shown that beneath the variety of human 
languages there is a deeper commonality, a set of core principles that account for 
the complexity of linguistic phenomena. The diversity of particular grammars 
worldwide is constrained by a universal grammar that works to organize words 
and sentences in specific manners.11 It is this search for cross-cultural 
commonality in religious forms and expressions that informs the definition 
provided by Atran and Norenzayan above. Some version of it underlies virtually 
every investigation of religion undertaken from a cognitive scientific perspective.  
                                                        
9 Aikin and Hodges, “Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the Possibility of Religion,” 2.  
10 Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan, “Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, 
Commitment, Compassion, Communion,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2004): 713. 
11 E. Thomas Lawson, “Towards a Cognitive Science of Religion,” Numen 47, no. 3 (2000): 340.  
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By narrowly limiting their focus to cognitive beliefs, especially those in 
“supernatural agents,” however, cognitive scientists of religion fall short of the 
generality that is a professed goal of their discipline. Not all religions admit the 
existence of supernatural agents, and many of those that do would not necessarily 
claim they were required (i.e., they are often interpreted figuratively and non-
literally) or formed the core “religious” aspects of their traditions. Moreover, 
naturalistic understandings of religion, such as Dewey’s, are conspicuously 
excluded from the scope of these studies. Herein lies the definitional deficiency of 
the current cognitive science of religion that makes it unfit as a model for our 
philosophical purposes.12    
 Yet it is precisely science’s aversion to predetermined knowledge that 
makes it ideally suited to study religion in an unbiased fashion. As Dewey rightly 
saw:   
 For scientific method is adverse not only to dogma but to doctrine as well, provided we 
 take “doctrine” in its usual meaning—a body of definite beliefs that need only to be taught 
 and learned as true. This negative attitude of science to doctrine does not indicate 
 indifference to truth. It signifies supreme loyalty to the method by which truth is attained. 
 The scientific-religious conflict ultimately is a conflict between allegiance to this method 
 and allegiance to even an irreducible minimum of belief so fixed in advance that it can 
 never be modified.13 
In addition to the definitional deficiency noted above, the current cognitive 
science of religion therefore also contains (at least) one significant operational 
                                                        
12 This does not imply that the cognitive science of religion has nothing interesting and valuable 
to say about religion or other aspects of human thought and behavior. What concerns us here is 
its fittingness as a model for philosophers to follow in seeking a properly general and naturalistic 
approach to religious experience. For an overview of common criticisms of the cognitive science of 
religion, along with insightful answers by some of its leading proponents, see Emma Cohen, 
Jonathan A. Lanman, Harvey Whitehouse, and Robert N. McCauley, “Common Criticisms of the 
Cognitive Science of Religion—Answered,” Bulletin for the Study of Religion 37, no. 4 (2008): 
112-115. 
13 CF, LW 9: 27. 
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deficiency: it is imperfectly naturalistic. To understand this criticism, we once 
again must return to the question of “the nature of naturalism,” a pun intended to 
highlight the slipperiness of the term within contemporary philosophy and 
science studies.    
 When invoking naturalism as an operative framework, scientists and 
philosophers typically have in mind either methodological naturalism or 
ontological naturalism. Methodological naturalism concerns the nature of 
scientific or philosophical practice, to be specific, that it should conform to 
rigorous empirical standards. This means that supernatural or transcendent 
principles of explanation are disallowed. Methodological naturalism does not 
entail any specific ontological claims about the nature of reality as such, for these 
considerations are believed to be extraneous and largely irrelevant for obtaining 
empirically robust, reliable information. Ontological naturalism, on the other 
hand, draws a firm line in the sand regarding the status of supernatural entities, 
arguing that, provided the causal closure of nature under physics, they do not 
exist. Ontological naturalism is thus much stronger in its claims than 
methodological naturalism. Paul Kurtz offers concise descriptions of the two 
naturalisms that help us to understand their differences: 
 First, naturalism is committed to a methodological principle within the context of 
 scientific inquiry; i.e., all hypotheses and events are to be explained and tested by 
 reference to natural causes and events. To introduce a supernatural or transcendent cause 
 within science is to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an 
 intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible…. 
  There is a second meaning of naturalism, which is as a generalized description of 
 the universe. According to the naturalists, nature is best accounted for by reference to 
 material principles, i.e., by mass and energy and physical-chemical properties as 
 encountered in diverse contexts of inquiry. This is a non-reductive naturalism, for, 
 although nature is physical-chemical at root, we need to deal with natural processes on 
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 various levels of observation and complexity: electrons and molecules, cells and 
 organisms, flowers and trees, psychological cognition and perception, social institutions, 
 and culture….14 
  
 Significant debate exists over the connection between these two theses and 
whether or not adopting one requires adopting the other. In an article addressing 
this issue, Barbara Forrest persuasively argues that while ontological naturalism 
is not logically required by methodological naturalism, it is the only reasonable 
conclusion, at least as a working hypothesis. Her argument is based on several 
factors, including: “(1) the demonstrated success of methodological naturalism, 
combined with (2) the massive amount of knowledge gained by it, (3) the lack of 
a method or epistemology for knowing the supernatural, and (4) the subsequent 
lack of evidence for the supernatural.”15 Forrest’s comments are supported by 
those of Kevin Schilbrack who states, “defending a naturalism without 
metaphysics is a problematic task,”16 and Leo Näreaho who suggests, “since the 
cognitive science of religion is a naturalistic research programme, it is doubtful 
that its proponents can remain neutral on important ontological questions.”17 The 
reservations shared among these scholars is that by professing a commitment to 
methodological naturalism without acceding to ontological naturalism one is 
basically trying to eat their cake without having it, to turn a popular idiomatic 
                                                        
14 Paul Kurtz, “Darwin Re-Crucified: Why Are So Many Afraid of Naturalism?,” Free Inquiry 
(1998), 17. Quoted in Barbara Forrest, “Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: 
Clarifying the Connection,” Philo 3, no. 2 (2000): 8. Italics added.    
15 Forrest, “Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism,” 1.   
16 Kevin Schilbrack, “Problems for a Complete Naturalism,” American Journal of Theology & 
Philosophy 15, no. 3 (1994): 291 
17 Leo Näreaho, “The Cognitive Science of Religion: Philosophical Observations,” Religious 
Studies 44 (2008): 83. 
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expression on its head.   
 To its critics, ontological naturalism is a bit like the mythical Ouroboros, 
the dragon eating its own tail used to symbolize self-reflexivity or circularity. Like 
most –isms, however, naturalism’s basic tenets are not always spelled out. And, 
further like most –isms, naturalism furnishes both attractive and less appealing 
resources for its adherents. Robert Cummings Neville recently notes in this 
regard, “One of the things right about naturalism…is its rejection of 
authoritarianism and its insistence on experiential inquiry.”18 This accurately 
describes naturalism’s appeal for Dewey and pragmatically influenced 
philosophers and theologians more generally (Neville among them). Yet, as 
Neville goes on to point out, naturalism’s dalliance with science’s reductionist, 
eliminativist tendencies, more often than not leaves it with “a religiously flat 
grasp of ultimate realities.”19 Neville is correct that ultimacy constitutes the 
largest problem for any philosophy of religion that claims to be completely 
naturalistic. Whether Dewey’s ecologically grounded religious naturalism is 
ultimately flat or brimming is a question we will return to in Chapter 5. 
 
 
The Limitations of Bracketing 
 
 Keeping these comments in mind, and based upon the definition of 
philosophy adopted at the start of this study, a genuinely philosophical approach 
                                                        
18 Robert Cummings Neville, “Naturalism: So Easily Wrong,” American Journal of Theology & 
Philosophy 34, no. 3 (2013): 199. 
19 Ibid.   
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to religion refuses to frame its inquiry into any problem of religion behind 
methodological naturalism’s principle of “bracketing” (epoché), or suspending 
judgment, concerning the truth status of the phenomena being investigated. This 
explains Dewey’s outright rejection of any supernaturalistic understanding of 
religion, at least as supernaturalism is traditionally understood, which, by 
definition, claims humans are forever foreclosed to certain of the universe’s 
marvels. As one scholar reminds us, for Dewey, “That there is no discontinuity 
between the biological and organic interactions of the world of nature and the 
human world of meaning is both a methodological postulate and the heart of a 
metaphysics.”20 Under Dewey’s view of philosophy as problem-solving, no belief 
or practice—scientific, cultural, religious, or otherwise—is secure from reasoned 
appraisal in light of its evolving costs and consequences.21 Religious naturalists, 
like Dewey, positively accept both ontological and methodological naturalism.  
 For those truly wary about accepting ontological naturalism, perhaps it is 
better to conceive of it not as a definitive and unrevisable thesis, but as a research 
program, as Michael Rea suggests in his World Without Design.22 Those working 
within running research programs are at least committed to the truth of their 
core hypotheses until further knowledge proves them incomplete or erroneous. 
This does not represent intellectual hubris in any form, but rather an intellectual 
                                                        
20 Shea, “Aesthetic and Religious Experience in Dewey,” 33. 
21 This is not to say that methodological naturalism is not appropriate to scientific or historical 
approaches to religion, however. For a recent discussion of the latter, see Jon H. Roberts, “In 
Defense of Methodological Naturalism,” Fides et Historia 44, no. 1 (2012): 61-64. I simply 
maintain it is not fit for philosophical approaches.  
22 Michael C. Rea, World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002).  
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prudence without which scientific progress would surely grind to a halt.  
 I again would like to point out at this juncture that nature has no 
contrastive term for full-blown naturalists like Dewey. Consequently, even 
discussing supernaturalism in arguments for or against naturalism makes little 
sense. For example, if we eventually discover entities, objects, or forces of the 
kind that the term supernatural is intended to capture, there is no a priori reason 
to think they would not be subsumed under what we now understand as natural, 
a point Dewey himself made in A Common Faith.23 Otherwise, as natural 
creatures with natural senses, we would never be able to experience them 
anyhow. The history of scientific discovery is replete with examples of this kind; 
Einstein’s “spooky action at a distance,” which some religious thinkers believed 
bore witness to God’s design, is now explainable (perhaps not entirely 
satisfactorily, however) by the thesis of quantum entanglement.  
 The ecological naturalism informing this study is thoroughly non-
reductive and is natural at all three philosophical levels: the ontological, the 
epistemological, and the axiological. A coherent and consistent naturalism is 
naturalistic in terms of being, meaning, and value, even if it admits that our idea 
of nature may grow and change to include things we do not currently understand. 
If the personal God of Christian theism reached down today and said, “I exist and 
this is how I interact with nature,” and this somehow could be confirmed 
scientifically, it would become natural, not supernatural, unless we are merely 
                                                        
23 CF (1934), LW 9: 46-47. 
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reserving the latter term as an honorific title.    
 As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, all human methods of meaning and 
sense-making, which obviously includes both the scientific and the religious, 
naturally emerge from the manner we physically inhabit the world. Yet, 
regardless of the fact that our scientific and religious inferences and 
understanding arise from the same awareness of our bodily experience and 
environmental interactivity, no two aspects of human experience are considered 
more distinct. Science is often claimed to study what is natural, in contrast to 
religion’s supernatural focus. Similarly, science investigates things immanent and 
visible in the world, while religion tends to focus on interpreting and 
understanding the invisible and transcendent.   
 On account of these admittedly trite characterizations, science and religion 
are usually considered antithetical endeavors. But from where do the distinctions 
that so strictly separate their objects, concepts, and symbols arise? Recalling that 
even our higher-level, abstract understanding is image schematic in structure, it 
appears the very dichotomies that separate science and religion are based upon 
the further development and reification of metaphorical projections of basic 
image schemas—specifically that of CONTAINMENT. Such a claim requires 
deeper study and evidential backing, beyond the resources of this dissertation. 
Despite this, in representing their possible transformations pictorially, the image 
schematic structure of the dichotomies that distinguish science and religion 
become evident. Recall the basic diagram of physical CONTAINMENT from the 
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last chapter. The CONTAINMENT schema operates for cases such as “The car is 
in the garage” and even “Ganesha’s presence is in our home.” Employing phrases 
of this nature requires understanding a number of basic variables, including what 
object one is speaking about, in this case the car or the Hindu god Ganesha. 
Similarly, understanding these statements requires recognizing well-defined 
spatial boundaries. This is relatively straightforward and unproblematic. 
However, spatial boundaries are not always clear-cut. For example, the 
CONTAINMENT schema, when further developed and expanded to represent the 
physical, natural world of scientific inquiry might look like that in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
  
 Supernature  
 
   
 
 
Figure 6: NATURE-SUPERNATURE 
  
 
 In the figure, the spatial boundary is represented by a dotted line. This is 
because our very notions of what is natural and supernatural, what is immanent 
and transcendent, are ambiguous and imprecise in various ways. Most often they 
are only defined in opposition to each other. Science offers no positive, 
meaningful definition of what is supernatural. Neither do most religions, for that 
matter. Furthermore, adequately defining what is supernatural would require a 
well-understood definition of what is natural. Such a definition does not exist, for 
to deem something supernatural one must be able to see both sides of the spatial 
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boundary outlined above. This fact undermines the confidence of asserting such a 
boundary to begin with, especially if there is no “God’s-eye view” from which to 
see it. If we cannot assume a perspective outside of nature to determine where its 
boundaries lie, then we cannot claim to truly understand the supernatural, either. 
As a result, scientific inference and religious experience are perhaps more 
consilient endeavors than commonly assumed.   
 
 
The Religious Qualities of Experience 
 
 Explaining the common emergence of scientific and religious 
understanding, or, rather, explaining away the conceptual dichotomies that so 
often separate them, does not speak to the question of the validity of specific 
religious truth claims, nor should it. It does, however, suggest that religious truth 
claims should be evaluated on equal footing with those offered by science and 
philosophy. Moreover, explaining the naturalness of religious experience is not 
meant to undermine its integrity as a special type of meaningful experience, as 
should be clear up to this point in our study. What it does entail is a radical 
reevaluation of our actual lived experiencing, for it is from our embodied somatic 
and affective experience that we construct the entirety of our meaning and 
understanding of the world. This directly challenges both the objectivist, realist 
position of science, as well as the transcendent, supra-realist position of 
traditional religion. The body-mind, as the locus of our rational, scientific 
inference, as well as our religious imagination and understanding, enables us to 
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live in and skillfully adapt to our environment. The concepts prevalent to both 
modes of investigation and discourse (literal and figurative) arise from the same 
basic image schemas and their metaphorical projections. 
 Debates between science and religion that make use of barren dichotomies 
that a priori separate their methods and insights only limit their advancement 
and curtail our epistemic openness. Science and religion should therefore engage 
in mutual cooperation, working toward developing an “embodied epistemology” 
which recognizes the manner in which our body indelibly shapes rational, 
scientific inference as well as the perceptions of what we deem religious. Such an 
approach to human experience allows for universal-objectivist and individual-
subjectivist elements of experience and “truth” to shine forth precisely when and 
where they arise. 
 Returning from this somewhat tangential but relevant analysis, it is 
apparent that the cognitive science of religion is an unfit model for philosophers 
of religion seeking a generalized and naturalistic approach to religious 
inwardness. In addition to this operational shortcoming, a host of other 
criticisms could be leveled against the field in its current formation, including its 
focus on conceptual content and representations, its acceptance of the mind’s 
modularity, its treatment of the mind as a computer, and so on. Many of these 
shortcomings mirror aspects of the stimulus-response psychology Dewey so 
forcefully critiqued over a century ago. As these shortcomings track those 
endemic to the establishment model of perception, they will not be discussed in 
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further detail until the next section. 
 The main problem with the current cognitive science of religion, as I see it, 
is that it leaves us without any way to approach religious perception and 
knowledge conceived of naturalistically. Insofar as genuine perception is essential 
for our knowledge of the world, if we are to make a compelling case for a natural 
form of religious knowledge, we must first construct a generalized and 
naturalistic account of religious perception. The idea that anything definitive can 
be said about religion without a proper understanding of perception is an ill-
founded one. Thus, if religious perception is false, then we have no access to 
knowledge that can be considered religious in nature. Provided these criticisms, 
which will be expanded on in Second 4.2, with certain correctives being offered in 
Section 4.3, it seems eminently more reasonable for scholars interested in 
religious experience to move away from prefixed, overly narrow definitions of the 
conceptual content of religious experience to a consideration of the 
multidimensional factors, including emotions and bodily feelings, that serve to 
make any kind of experience “religious.”24  
 Religious experience is sufficiently close to many persons so as to seem 
unproblematic. Our experience unfolds against the context of beliefs and 
practices in which we were raised, and the better part of that context, including 
its esteemed religious aspects, goes unquestioned as long as it provides us with 
                                                        
24 Ann Taves advocates a similar approach that investigates the relevant emotions and feelings 
that lead people to deem certain experiences “religious” in her recent Religious Experience 
Reconsidered (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). See, especially, the introductory 
chapter, “The Problem of ‘Religious Experience,’” 3-15.   
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stable existential meanings and experiences of value. For equally many others, 
however, the very notion of “religious experience” is a nuisance to be gotten rid 
of; like the naive explanation of natural disasters as manifestations of evil or in 
terms of an angered god, religious experiences represent a holdover from a more 
primitive stage in human development. The second of these opinions tends to 
view religious experience in overly superficial terms, as the presencing of a 
supernatural being or entity that transcends the self and the world. More 
sophisticated and nuanced interpretations of religious experience exist that 
better align with what science holds to be true of the physical universe, however. 
These interpretations are ignored for no reason other than the stubborn 
adherence to a prefixed definition of what religious experience is or should be. 
 In recognition of this fact, John E. Smith has persuasively argued that, 
“the proper interpretation of religion in terms of human experience coincides 
with the correct description not of religious experience, but of the religious 
dimension of experience.”25 John Dewey’s focus on the immediate qualities, or 
“generic traits,” that make any experience “religious” reflects Smith’s insight and 
offers a more empirically responsible route than the cognitive science of religion, 
one rendered further credible by its ability to capture the felt phenomenology of 
religious experiencing. Feelings are primary for organic creatures in that they 
come before conceptual elaboration and refinement. This is not to say that all 
meaningful experience is noncognitive, but to recognize that religion, as a natural 
                                                        
25 Smith, Experience and God, 55. 
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outgrowth of evolutionary drives for achieving optimal balance of organismic 
functioning and existential meaning, are primarily encountered through, and 
enacted by means of, our feelings of reciprocity and continuity with nature. For 
Dewey, this is engagement with a certain class of ideals, which I said earlier were 
best viewed as events capable of being perceived directly by appropriately 
attuned perceivers. This statement will be unpacked shortly.   
 
 
4.2 The Establishment Model of Religious Perception  
 
 
Strictly speaking, there is no “establishment model” of religious perception. 
There is no establishment model of perception in general for that matter. Like all 
philosophical and psychological concepts, there are countless theories about what 
perception is, what it is of, and what it is for. Despite this variety, however, there 
exists a convergence around certain themes and categories of perception within 
contemporary philosophy and the mind sciences. And it leaves little room for 
genuine perceptions of a “religious” nature—that is, perceptions not deemed 
illusory or conceptually overlaid interpretations of more basic, lower-level 
perceptions. Admittedly, the burden of responsibility for proving the case for 
religious perception is high, and any attempt at doing so will have to provide 
compelling reasons to accept an account alternative to the mainstream. Mere 
definitional sleight of hand will not do; we must also show on what factors 
established positions fall short.       
 Long implicit in philosophical analyses of a variety of subjects, theories of 
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perception have become a topic of explicit and lively discussion in recent years. 
This is due in large part to increased collaboration between philosophers, 
psychologists, and cognitive scientists. It is also a direct reflection of Fred 
Dretske’s astute observation that “problems tend to be classified as philosophical 
when they elude established methods, including scientific methods, of 
solution.”26 Perception is the quintessential problem of this type. Most 
introductory philosophy texts now include investigations of the relationship 
between perception and reality, perception and belief, the role of the imagination 
(if any) in perception, whether emotions are perceptions or can influence 
perception, how “direct” or “indirect” perception is, and the manners in which 
perception can be shaped by motion and intentional action.  
 What perception is most basically of—whether of facts, objects, events, 
actions, representations, or something else—also occupies a significant place in 
the literature. This is the thorny question of “perceptual content” and it is where 
we will begin our analysis of perception. Focusing on the nature of perceptual 
content is a particularly useful way to distinguish approaches to perception, as 
most serious disagreements revolve around this issue. It is also a topic Dewey’s 
writings speak directly to, even if the vocabulary that captures Dewey’s views has 
evolved over time. With this said, it is noted that what follows is necessarily a 
compressed introduction to a diverse and complex area of philosophy worthy of a 
dissertation in its own right. Recommendations for further reading are thus 
                                                        
26 Fred Dretske, “Seeing, Believing, and Knowing,” in Perception, ed. Robert Schwartz (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 2004), 269. 
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included in the footnotes where instructive.  
        
Perception as Opaque 
 
 The establishment view of perception in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science argues that perception is a mediated, or indirect, process because it 
begins with impoverished input. This claim is a variation on the theme of what 
linguists and philosophers of language describe as the “poverty of the stimulus.”27 
The reasoning is that perceptual input to the senses—in the form of light rays, 
sound waves, odor molecules, etc.—does not provide complete information about 
environmental objects and events, and therefore must be supplemented by 
cognitive inference and conceptual interpretation to become meaningful. This is 
why the child gets burned when reaching for the lit candle; the fact that the 
candle is hot and potentially harmful is not communicated by the light emanating 
from its flame. Likewise, paints of various hues and configurations on canvas are 
not believed to be enough for one to pick out a Picasso from a Pollock.    
 As Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn note, in the 1980s this was commonly 
referred to as the information processing view of the mind.28 Today, it also goes 
by computationalism, constructivism, indirect realism, the sense datum theory, 
                                                        
27 For an updated introduction to this topic within linguistics, see Alexander Clark and Shalom 
Lappin, Linguistic Nativism and the Poverty of the Stimulus (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011.) 
28 Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, “How Direct is Visual Perception?: Some Reflections 
on Gibson’s ‘Ecological Approach,’” Cognition 9 (1981): 139. 
 304 
or representationalism.29 Some of these titles are new, while others are long-
standing. The last one speaks most clearly as to what the thesis of perception’s 
indirectness entails: the contents of perception are not the forms and processes of 
the external world, but internal, picture-like symbols known as “mental 
representations.”  
 The history of representationalism is long and need not concern us here.  
In brief, it is a corollary of epistemological dualism and for this reason is typically 
associated with the name of Descartes. In truth, the thesis traces all the way back 
to Aristotle, who argued that visual perception required an intervening medium 
because objects themselves could not affect changes on the eye’s surface.30 Aside 
from Aristotle and Descartes, John Locke is perhaps the most widely recognized 
proponent of representationalism. It was Locke who argued for the foundational 
status of “primary qualities,” including shape, texture, size, and number, which 
inhere in external objects and are capable of being perceived directly; “secondary 
qualities,” including smell, color, taste, and emotion do not exist in the sensory 
stimulation and are tacked on, or re-presented, to internal experience by the 
perceiving subject.31 Figure 7 depicts something like the process Locke had in 
mind (with “percept” standing in for “mental representation”).   
                                                        
29 Subtle differences exist between these positions depending upon who is advocating them. For 
our purposes they can be treated as fairly consistent with each other, as all are committed to the 
indirectness of perceptual experience.   
30 Allan Bäck provides an excellent summary of Aristotle’s approach to sense perception. See his 
Aristotle’s Theory of Abstraction (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Science+Business 
Media, 2014), 85-130. 
31 For a critical review of Locke’s theory, see Claire F. Michaels and Claudia Carello, Direct 
Perception (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 176. 
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Figure 7: Mental Representation of a Cat32  
 
 
 Thinking of perception as consisting of content in the form of mental 
representations provides an intuitive explanation for the occurrence of illusions 
and hallucinations. For example, it is reasonable that both types of irregular 
experience involve a mistaken or incomplete representation of the world in some 
way. I may hallucinate that a small child is dangerously in the crosswalk. In this 
case, it can be said that I am in a perceptual state that misrepresents. It 
represents a child in the street, when in fact there is a rumpled garbage bag. In 
cases of illusion and hallucination, our perceptual experience is essentially 
providing us with a false picture of the environment—one that is correctable upon 
further experiencing (e.g., slowing down the car, realizing it is windy outside, 
                                                        
32 Reproduced from Max Velmans, Understanding Consciousness (London: Psychology Press, 
2000), 106. 
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etc.). Bence Nanay recently explains another important reason for accepting 
representationalism, regarding how we come to justify beliefs about perception:  
 Perceptual states, whatever they are, must be able to play a role in justifying our 
 perceptual beliefs. If perceptual states are representational, if they have content, then it is 
 easy to see how they can play this role: a perceptual state with such and such a content 
 justifies the perceptual belief with such and such (presumably similar) content in virtue of 
 its (similar) content. What role the content of our perceptual state plays in justifying 
 beliefs is widely debated, but the representationalist argument is that it needs to play 
 some role. Thus, if we think of perceptual states as not having content, it is not clear how 
 we can explain justification.33 
 
As Nanay rightly notes, without the notion of content it is hard to see how some 
perceptions can be viewed as more accurate, as truer to reality, than others, 
something crime scene reconstructionists, where observer effects and examiner 
bias run high, are well aware of. Despite its explanatory strengths, 
representationalism also faces several serious complaints. These will be discussed 
when presenting an ecological alternative in the next section.    
 It is important to point out moving forward that indirectness 
(representationalism) is not merely an epistemological thesis about the character 
of perception; it simultaneously speaks to the ontology of human perceivers. It 
implies that we are at least one degree removed from the world we inhabit and 
investigate by a “veil of perception.”34 In acknowledgement of both its 
epistemological and ontological dimensions, a better and more illustrative 
description of perceptual indirectness might be that perceiving is opaque. 
Without the aid of concepts and higher-order cognitive processes, it is believed 
                                                        
33 Bence Nanay, “The Representationalism versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory 
Contextualism about Perception,” European Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2014): 322. 
34 Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1971), 69. 
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that our vital contact with the world would remain forever muddied and obscure.     
 
 
Perception as Propositional 
 
 
 The view of perceptual experiences having representational content 
additionally speaks to the intentionality of perception. This refers to the fact that 
perception is frequently “about” or directed toward something. Influential 
German philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano described intentionality as 
characteristic of all acts of consciousness; in his terms, intentionality formed “the 
mark of the mental.”35 For instance, we see a cat, hear a child crying, feel a soft 
breeze, and so on. Beliefs are clearly intentional in this sense, which explains why 
we often describe beliefs using subjects, verbs, and other sentential complements. 
Belief and perception are treated similarly (sometimes it would seem 
indistinguishably) by establishment theorists. Like belief, then, perception is 
frequently depicted as being propositional in nature.36  
 Propositionality is basically an argument about the grammar of 
experience. Thinking of it in these terms will assist us in understanding where 
and on what issues ecological approaches depart from establishment accounts of 
perception. The propositional view of perception is old and often attributed to 
William of Ockham (of “razor” fame) who, in his Summa Logicae, maintained 
that thinking always takes place in a “language of thought”—what philosophers 
                                                        
35 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (New York: Routledge, [1874] 
2015), ix-xi. 
36 John McDowell is the strongest contemporary defender of this view. See his Mind and World 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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have since called mentalese.37 The gist of this position, as described by Alex 
Byrne, is that “perceiving is very much like a traditional propositional attitude, 
such as believing or intending…when one has a perceptual experience, one bears 
the perception relation to a certain proposition p.”38 This means that when one is 
actively perceiving one does not bear a perceptual relation to any particular 
object or event—a cat sitting on a mat, for example. The real relation is to a 
proposition, such as “The cat is on the mat.”  
 As this example shows, the theses of propositionality and 
representationality are deeply intertwined. Christopher Peacocke speaks to their 
connection in his classic treatment of perception, Sense and Content, in the 
following manner: 
 A visual perceptual experience enjoyed by someone sitting at a desk may represent 
 various writing implements and items of furniture as having particular spatial relations to 
 one another and to the experiencer, and as themselves as having various qualities…The 
 representational content of a perceptual experience has to be given by a proposition, or a 
 set of propositions, which specifies the way the experience represents the world to be.39   
 
This is not meant to imply that the intentional objects of perception are private 
and free from outsider scrutiny, however; they are absolutely “intended to be 
constituent elements of an ‘external world’, a four-dimensional world that is not 
determined by our subjectivity,” with enduring histories and the ability to be 
perceived by more than one sense—in other words, they must be “re-
                                                        
37 For a detailed study of Ockham’s view, see Sonja Schierbaum, Ockham’s Assumption of Mental 
Speech: Thinking in a World of Particulars (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2014). 
38 Alex Byrne, “Perception and Conceptual Content,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 
eds. E. Sosa and M. Steup (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 232. Quoted in Tim Crane, “Is Perception a 
Propositional Attitude,” The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 236 (2009): 453. 
39 Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 5. 
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identifiable.”40 Something is lacking from perceptions that fail to meet this 
criterion.    
 Propositionality provides the establishment model of perception with an 
intuitive appeal, for propositions can be either true or false, further helping to 
explain cases of mistaken perception like illusion and hallucination. The generic 
proposition “S ___ that p” (where ‘S’ refers to a subject, ‘p’ a propositional 
sentence, and ‘ ___ ’ a psychological verb) either does or does not hold when 
measured against an external state of affairs.41 The view that perception is a 
propositional attitude satisfies our common sense belief that experiences have 
accuracy conditions. “If an experience represents its object a certain way, then 
the experience is accurate if and only if it has an actual object which is as the 
experience represents it as being,” as Tim Crane explains.42       
 The propositionality of perception is modeled not only after similar 
assumptions concerning the nature belief, but of knowledge as well. With certain 
exceptions, the dominant view of knowledge in the Western tradition is what 
philosophers commonly refer to as “know-that.” This is a view of theoretical 
knowledge linguistically expressible in the form of propositions. For example, I 
can know that such-and-such is the case. I can also know who someone is, where 
something is, where you live, what the cost of milk is, and how tall my daughter 
                                                        
40 Manuel Liz, “Camouflaged Physical Objects: The Intentionality of Perception,” Theoria 56 
(2006): 165-166 
41 The most recent and rigorous defense of perception as a propositional attitude is to be found in 
Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
42 Crane, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude,” 457. It should be noted that Crane is a critic of 
this view.  
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has grown in the past month. Know-that is a mental state in which one accurately 
represents some (usually physical, quantitative) aspect of reality. An instance of 
know-that is correct, just as a particular belief or perception is accurate, precisely 
when one stands in the proper relation to the proposition reflected in the 
knowledge claim.  
 We will return to the topic of knowledge in Section 4.4, where know-that is 
contrasted with another important conception of knowing. It is mentioned 
already here because, as discussed early on in the dissertation, problems in 
philosophy are never as neat and tidy as its main divisions might suggest. 
Considerations of perception are virtually inseparable from those of belief, 
knowledge, existence, value; and the list could go on and on.43  
 
 
Perception as Contingent 
 
 
 Rounding out our presentation of the establishment view of perception is a 
commitment—implicit in most cases—to perception being contingent.44 This 
statement speaks once again to the contents of perception, as well as to the 
means through which perceiving agents receive perceptual contents. These 
means are the five sensory modalities of sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell. 
                                                        
43 Many of these relationships are explored in the essays in Jonathan Dancy, ed., Perceptual 
Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). The work of Fred Dretske is also invaluable 
here; see his collection Perception, Knowledge, and Belief: Selected Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
44 This term, along with that of perception’s opacity, is my own; both were introduced in an 
attempt to bring clarity to certain claims made by philosophers of perception and cognitive 
scientists working within different conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The propositional 
nature of perception is well noted in both the philosophical and scientific literature on perception 
and is fairly self-explanatory. 
 311 
Sense perception holds a pride of place in philosophical studies of perception for 
it is our most intimate form of connection to the concrete things outside of us. It 
is widely agreed that most of our perception is contingent upon maintaining close 
sensory contact with the world.  
 We naively distinguish between the senses on the basis of their unique 
phenomenal character, or qualia. Seeing is not the same as tasting or touching, 
for example, because there are identifiable differences in the ways these 
experiences feel. This is what Paul Grice influentially called the “special 
introspectible character” of sense experience.45 The modality-specificity of 
perception is, on phenomenological grounds, intuitive for “visual 
experience…does not seem to incorporate auditory phenomenal character,” and 
“nothing stands out in exteroceptive perceptual experience beyond the visual, 
auditory, tactual, olfactory, and gustatory.”46 On a technical level, these 
qualitative differences correspond to distinct sensory cell types responsive to 
specific physical phenomena and correlated with a particular brain region (or 
regions) where sensory signals are received and subsequently interpreted.47 For 
this and other reasons, the establishment approach to perception traditionally 
has considered each of the senses in isolation, “as if each sensory modality was an 
                                                        
45 H. P. Grice, “Some Remarks about the Senses,” in Analytical Philosophy, Series 1, ed. R. J. 
Butler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 133-153. 
46 Casey O’Callaghan, “Not All Perceptual Experience is Modality Specific,” in Perception and Its 
Modalities, eds. Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 134. 
47 For a thorough investigation of this topic, see C. U. M. Smith, Biology of Sensory Systems 
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 
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entirely separate module.”48 
 To describe perception as “modular” can mean many things. Within 
philosophy the most influential account is that produced by Jerry Fodor in his 
book The Modularity of Mind.49 The main argument of that work is about the 
brain’s architecture. Fodor believes, in some ways similar to the faculty 
psychology of centuries past—of which Kant and Franz Joseph Gall were prime 
exponents—that distinct brain areas or mechanisms are dedicated to carrying out 
specific functional tasks without influence from other areas. This is reflected in 
his description of modules as being domain-specific (i.e., a module computes a 
constrained class of inputs) and informationally encapsulated (i.e., other parts of 
the mind cannot access or influence a module’s internal workings), among other 
attributes.50 Each special-purpose module receives information from the external 
environment mediated through a system of sensory transducers that translate the 
data into formats it can (uniquely) process. In turn, each module outputs data in 
a common format suitable for central processing. As Jesse Prinz states, according 
to the thesis of modularity, “perception takes place in sensory systems. Sensory 
systems are systems that convert physical magnitudes into mental 
representations. Each sensory system has dedicated transducers that are 
stimulated by non-mental features of the world, and output mental 
                                                        
48 Jon Driver and Charles Spence, “Multisensory Perception: Beyond Modularity and 
Convergence,” Current Biology 10 (2000): R731. 
49 Jerry A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1983).  
50 The full list of qualities Fodor lists for mental modules are: domain-specific, informational 
encapsulation, hardwiring, innate specification, automaticity, characteristic development, and 
characteristic breakdown. Ibid., 47-100.   
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representations in a modality-specific code.”51 
 While modality and modularity are not equivalent notions, the idea that 
vision provides visual information, taste provides gustatory information, and that 
information from the separate modalities gets integrated at a later stage in the 
cognitive process (i.e., not at the perceptual level) that imbues it with meaning 
and value brings them into close convergence. Under the modular view, which is 
still widely ascribed to, perceptual experiences consist of piecemeal information 
that requires extra shaping and cleaning up to be made intelligible. The 
modularity of perception is a corollary of the mind’s larger modularity, with 
language, morality, rational decision-making, and so on occupying discrete 
centers in the brain. The story of 19th century railroad worker Phineas Gage, who 
lost his moral faculties after suffering brain damage when a tamping iron tore 
through his skull, has granted the thesis of modularity, despite facing significant 
challenges, with impressive staying power.52   
 There is a second important sense in which perception under the 
establishment view can be characterized as contingent because its content is 
(believed to be) wholly dependent upon information receivable by our sensory 
modalities (e.g., shapes, colors, etc.). It concerns two closely related puzzles of 
perception for which philosophers and perception researchers have no definitive 
answers, only competing explanations. These include “amodal completion,” 
                                                        
51 Jesse J. Prinz, “Is Emotion a Form of Perception?,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 
(2006): 138.  
52 Jelle De Schrijver, “An Evolutionary and Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Moral 
Modularity,” in The Moral Brain, eds. J. Verplaetse et al. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer 
Science+Business Media, 2009), 255-270. 
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which describes how we come to experience features of objects and events 
occluded or hidden from the senses (hence a-modal), and “perception of 
absence,” a phrase covering instances where we seem to successfully detect 
objects and scenes not present, even partially, to the senses. I am convinced that 
both of these perceptual puzzles provide clues as to how John Dewey thought 
humans come to perceive and actualize ideals in lived-through situations marked 
by existential lacks or incompletions. Before presenting how recent ecologically 
informed accounts of perception deal with these problems, which will help shed 
light on Dewey’s views, it will be instructive to review how the establishment 
deals with them as its methods of approach parallels in important respects how 
religious perception has been treated by philosophers of religion. 
 Amodal completion occurs when we look at an object that is partially 
occluded or hidden behind another object. To use a common example, suppose 
that you are looking at a cat behind a picket fence, but the cat’s tail is not visible 
on account of the fact that the fence’s pickets block it from your direct view. In 
such cases it seems that you are aware of not only the visible parts of the cat, but 
its occluded parts also; otherwise, it makes little sense to speak of your having a 
perceptual experience of a cat. Similarly, when you see a box on the floor you 
generally see only the exposed rectangular sides and yet you perceive a three-
dimensional volumetric cube, that is, the whole box. Though most examples in 
the literature tend to be visual, it should be noted that evidence for amodal 
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completion exists across the senses, in humans as well as in other animals.53 
 Perceptions of absence, though materially different from those of amodal 
completion (e.g., there are no occluded parts of objects present), possess a similar 
phenomenological structure. Take, for instance, the following examples, provided 
by Anna Farennikova, whose recent work has shed new light on this paradoxical 
phenomenon: 
 You’ve been working on your laptop in a café for a few hours and have decided to take a 
 break. You step outside, leaving your laptop temporarily unattended on the table. After a 
 few minutes, you walk back inside. Your eyes fall upon the table. The laptop is gone! 
  This experience has striking phenomenology. You do not infer the laptop is 
 missing through reasoning; you have an immediate impression of its absence. Our life is 
 replete with more mundane examples. We discover that there is no milk in the fridge, 
 notice an absence of a colleague in a meeting, or see that the keys are missing from the 
 drawer.54  
 
All of these are routine cases of perceiving absence, and surely everyone can 
admit to having experienced at least one of them at some time or another.  
 Because amodal completion and perception of absence happen so 
effortlessly and unconsciously they are frequently considered capacities of 
perception. However, the establishment model of perception, which contends 
that perception depends upon information reaching the relevant sense 
receptors—and it would seem that no sense modality carries information about 
occluded or absent objects—argues that such experiential episodes do not qualify 
as cases of genuine perception. It is rather the case that they make use of 
cognitive faculties distinct from perception, such as: (1) inferences (i.e., non-
perceptual beliefs) or (2) mental imagery (i.e., imaginative projections). Each of 
                                                        
53 Cory T. Miller, Elizabeth Dibble, and Marc D. Hauser, “Amodal Completion of Acoustic Signals 
by a Nonhuman Primate,” Nature Neuroscience 4, no. 8 (2001): 783. 
54 Anna Farennikova, “Seeing Absence,” Philosophical Studies 166, no. 3 (2013): 429. 
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these requires a bit further explanation before we move on to investigate how 
they may help us to understand traditional interpretations of religious 
perception.    
 First, concerning the potential role of inference in the two cases outlined 
above: when discussed in reference to amodal completion it implies that 
perception plays no role in filling-in what is hidden from the senses. Rather, as 
one commentator puts it,  
 We see those bits of the cat that are visible—that are not occluded—and we infer, on the 
 basis of perceiving the visible parts of the animal (as well as on the basis of our familiarity 
 with cat tails) that the occluded parts have such and such properties. In other words, we 
 do not see the cat’s tail at all, we just come to have a (non-perceptual) belief about it.55 
 
Such instances are argued to employ beliefs based on past experiences, because 
we tend to complete partially occluded objects in the simplest possible manner, 
as represented in Figure 8. When we view the image in the middle of the figure, 
most people will complete it as shown on the left and not as shown on the right, 
based upon the rational expectation that the partially occluded object is a circle 
and not an irregular shape of some sort. 
 
Figure 8: Amodal Completion56 
 
                                                        
55 Bence Nanay, “Four Theories of Amodal Perception,” in Proceedings of the 29th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, eds.  D. S. McNamara and J. G. Trafton (Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007), 1332.  
56 This is a commonly used example of the logic of amodal completion. Reproduced from Nanay, 
“Four Theories of Perception,” 1332.  
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Likewise, if we cannot literally see, hear, or otherwise perceive absences, it must 
be the case that we come to believe something is absent on the basis of a cognitive 
judgment about the currently perceived scene compared to prior moments. 
Under the inference-belief theory, we do not see the cat’s tail or the missing 
laptop; we make inferences about them based upon background beliefs with the 
experiences merely seeming perceptual. 
 Not all establishment theorists are convinced that cases of amodal 
completion and perception of absence rely on making inferences. A competing 
explanation of these phenomena is that mental imagery plays a crucial role; we 
represent the cat’s tail and missing laptop by means of imaginatively projecting 
them into the scene, with the aid of our “mind’s eye” so to say. In the visual 
domain this refers to the ability to produce a visual experience when there is no 
retinal stimulation present, much like one does when daydreaming or planning to 
rearrange furniture. As defined more broadly by Alan Richardson, 
 Mental imagery refers to all those quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual experiences of which 
 we are…consciously aware, and which exist for us in the absence of those stimulus 
 conditions that are known to produce their genuine sensory or perceptual counterparts, 
 and which may be expected to have different consequences from their sensory or 
 perceptual counterparts.57    
 
What this means is that in becoming aware of occluded features and absences, we 
project them, imaginatively, into the relevant regions of our egocentric space. 
This is possible because perceiving and imagining “engage overlapping neural 
                                                        
57 Alan Richardson, Mental Imagery (New York: Springer, 1969), 2-3. Quoted in Bence Nanay, 
“Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery,” Philosophical Studies 150 
(2010): 249. 
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machinery and interact in a variety of important ways.”58 Despite this overlap and 
despite their similar phenomenology, there is nothing really perceptual about 
episodes of amodal completion and perception of absence according to the 
mental imagery theory. What we are aware of in both cases are representations—
mental intermediaries—and not actual cat tails or actual laptops. 
 Though they differ on the mechanisms supporting episodes of amodal 
completion and perception of absence, both the inference-belief and mental 
imagery theories are products of the establishment model of perception. By way 
of review, this model views perception as consisting of symbolic representations 
which, via an input-output algorithmic process akin to that performed by a 
computer, forms the basis of our cognition and other higher-order mental 
processes. Implicit in this view is a commitment to the mind’s modularity, with 
perception, memory, imagination, judgment, belief, motivation, and so on 
serving different roles and acting fairly independently from one another. 
Furthermore, on this reading, emotions are completely overlooked as sources of 
information or as potential influencers of our perceptual engagement with the 
world. Like the mind’s distinct modules, the establishment model believes 
perception to be largely impenetrable. It is no wonder, then, that religion, 
whether viewed through a traditional or a naturalistic lens, both of which see 
religion as containing a significant emotional component, typically has not been 
considered to be a genuine perceptual faculty or capacity. Along with Locke’s 
                                                        
58 Robert E. Briscoe, “Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011): 153.  
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“secondary qualities,” emotions are something brought to experience by 
individual subjects—they have no existence or validity apart from the subjective. 
This viewpoint has questioned the credibility—or at least substantially weakened 
the epistemic status—of religious forms of experiencing within the contemporary 
philosophical community despite its continued importance to religious thinkers 
and scholars of religion of various stripes.           
 
 
Religion as Interpretation 
 
 
 As mentioned already, there is no establishment view of religious 
perception. Philosophers of religion traditionally do not speak in terms of 
perception or perceptual content, and thus the terminology employed within 
philosophy of mind and perception does not perfectly map onto discussions of 
religious experience within philosophy of religion. For this reason, the terms 
experience and perception will be treated synonymously when discussing 
religious perception, even though it is recognized that not all experiences are 
perceptual in character. Yet, to repeat a point made earlier, this is precisely what 
is at issue in discussions of religious experience by philosophers of religion, and 
so the identification is justified.  
 The main philosophical concern with the notion of religious experience is 
whether any religious experiences are genuinely perceptual and if the 
information they communicate is trustworthy. Though the connection may not be 
immediately apparent, the curious perceptual phenomena discussed above—
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those of amodal completion and perception of absence—speak directly to 
perception’s potential religious dimensions. This is because religion traditionally 
has been defined either as involving objects incapable of being perceived by 
regular perceptual (sensory) means, or as consisting primarily of inferences and 
interpretations of more basic, physiologically generated sensations.   
 The authoritative treatment of religious perception from what we here are 
calling the establishment perspective is that advanced by Wayne Proudfoot in his 
award-winning work, Religious Experience.59 Proudfoot’s book, now thirty years 
old, posed a direct challenge to the then dominant, and still highly influential, 
perennialist stance on the nature of religious or mystical experiences.60 In short, 
perennialism holds that religious experiences share a common core or essence 
that is the same across religious traditions and historical periods. Following this 
view, Proudfoot believes that in order to fully understand religion we must focus 
on its experiential dimensions, over and above its ritual and creedal components. 
Against the perennialist position, however, Proudfoot argues that religious 
experiences are determined solely by the experiencing subject’s social and 
intellectual background. This position, known as constructivism, has displaced 
perennialism as predominant in the philosophy and theory of religion.  
 Under the constructivist position as advanced by Proudfoot, religious 
experiences, provided their subjective feeling dimensions, do not represent 
                                                        
59 Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).  
60 Most works on the subject treat “religious experience” and “mystical experience” as 
synonymous. While this is debatable, I cannot address this issue in detail here and so follow the 
convention of the literature.   
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veridical perceptual experiences. It is rather the case that such experiences are 
primarily cultural, publicly accessible phenomena. These are experiences that a 
subject takes or interprets to be “religious” based upon criteria particular to the 
religiocultural tradition he or she belongs to and which provides the interpretive 
tools used to categorize and make sense of experiential episodes, especially those 
that deviate from the ordinary and everyday. In Proudfoot’s words: “Those who 
identify their experiences in religious terms are seeking the best explanations for 
what is happening to them.”61 Such experiences thus become infused with their 
after-the-fact conceptual interpretations.   
 This situation applies to interpretations of the intense emotions and bodily 
feelings that typically accompany religious experiences as reported by individuals 
who have undergone them, and which have been carefully documented by 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Jonathan Edwards, Rudolf Otto, and William James. 
While constructivists view the turn to religious experience as understandable—
scholars like those just mentioned made such a turn as a protectionist strategy 
against reductionism, in order to “remove [religion] from the arena in which it is 
dependent on particular beliefs or claims about the world, [and] vulnerable to 
conflict with scientific beliefs”62—they argue that such experiences are so 
conditioned by an experiencer’s linguistic and cultural contexts that it is hard to 
see how they can serve as reliable sources of public information. Since concepts 
are always involved in identifying an experience as “religious,” it is argued that 
                                                        
61 Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 227.  
62 Ibid., 78.  
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the experience itself can never be independent of its interpretation. According to 
Proudfoot:  
 Attempts to differentiate a core [experience] from its interpretation may cause the 
 theorist to lose the very experience he is trying to analyze. The terms in which the subject 
 understands what is happening to him are constitutive of the experience; consequently 
 those in different traditions have different experiences…It might be indeed be possible to 
 produce cross-cultural documentation of some common physiological states or mental 
 images in the experiences of mystics. But to focus on these…is not to delineate a core but 
 to attend to something other than the experience. A decelerated heart rate may be 
 common to some mystics and to all athletes at the height of training, and it may be a 
 natural endowment of some individuals in contrast to others…But to attend to such 
 phenomena while disregarding the content of the mystic’s beliefs and the expectations 
 that he or she brings to the experience is to err in one’s priorities. What others have 
 dismissed as interpretive overlay may be the distinguishing mark of the experience.63     
 
With this disclaimer, Proudfoot views the idea that religious experience could be 
independent of concepts and beliefs and yet expressible only through the vehicle 
of language as a contradiction in terms. Adopting a positive stance on this 
position would require that experience be both immediate and intentional, 
requirements that appear to be logically incompatible. Concepts are necessary 
preconditions for experience, not something we use after the fact to merely 
describe experiences.   
 In order to fully understand the nature of religious experiences, and what 
possible information they might relay to those who undergo them, Proudfoot 
feels we must also look at how we ascribe emotions to ourselves and others, and 
this cannot be done without reference to sophisticated concepts, beliefs, and rules 
of grammar. All of the above elements must be in place and certain conditions 
must be met, for instance, in order for an individual to identify what is happening 
to her as anger or joy, and thus to experience either anger or joy. And the 
                                                        
63 Ibid., 121-122.  
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conditions under which people attribute certain emotional states to themselves 
and others inevitably include explanatory claims—something superadded to the 
bare experience retrospectively. Reports of religious experiences always implicitly 
include a judgment on the experiencer’s part concerning the cause of the 
experience. As fallible creatures, we are often wrong in our private judgments—
incorrect judgments of experience underlie illusory and hallucinatory episodes 
that can be corrected upon further experience. Employing two personal 
examples, Proudfoot argues: 
 I will withdraw my claim to have seen a tree if I learn that my visual image of the tree can 
 be traced to some irrelevant cause and that I would have had the same image even if the 
 tree had not been there. The force of my experience of climbing Mount Rainier, as 
 compared with merely imagining the climb, derives from the judgments I make about the 
 connections between myself, the mountain, and the rest of the world. My judgment about 
 how the image in my mind is caused affects the experience, making it more vivid and 
 gripping than if I believe I am just entertaining the possibility of the climb.64    
 
 It is for these reasons that the constructivist position tracks the 
establishment model of perception, claiming that religious experience 
(perception) is mediated and indirect, is propositional in nature (i.e., it has an 
act-object structure), and is limited to what is contingently present to the senses 
at a given time. Emotions, feelings, and other higher-order faculties of human 
experiencing such as the imagination do not properly belong to a distinct 
category “religion.” Or, put differently, they do belong to religion but in doing so 
prove religion to be nothing more than an interpretive construction—as higher-
order experiential faculties are inextricably shaped by our social upbringing and 
surroundings. Such experiences do not put us in touch with unfiltered reality and 
                                                        
64 Ibid., 213.  
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therefore cannot provide us with objective, unbiased information. As Steven Katz 
puts this point, “there are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences,”65 for “the 
object of experience…is [always] regulated by structures of consciousness and 
experience.”66 It is precisely over these matters where an ecological approach to 
experience departs from standard cognitivist accounts and, by doing so, opens up 
novel ways of rethinking the nature of religious experience that align with several 
aspects of John Dewey’s thinking as already presented.              
 
 
4.3 Situating and Developing Dewey’s Ecological Alternative 
 
The revolutionary advancements of modern science, including perhaps most 
especially the counterintuitive implications of quantum mechanics and chaos 
theory, seem to contradict the picture of the world we perceive through our 
senses. Perception is frequently spoken of within the scientific literature as a kind 
of pervasive illusion rather than as a trustworthy presentation of reality. The 
world itself is depicted as stripped of meaning and value—it is colorless, odorless, 
flavorless, etc.—with the only real existences being the fluctuations of matter and 
energy described by physics and chemistry. The degree to which one accepts this 
quality-less picture of the world greatly influences how the notion of religious 
perception is received and interpreted.      
 Each of John Dewey’s major philosophical works is directed toward 
                                                        
65 Steven T. Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” in Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis, ed. Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 26.  
66 Ibid., 65.  
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elucidating the various forms and dynamics of human experience: its emergence 
from natural processes in Experience and Nature, its social and habitual 
character in Human Nature and Conduct, its inherent moral dimensions in the 
Ethics, its transformative potential in the Logic, and its consummatory 
fulfillments in Art as Experience. Many of these works even mention religion as a 
mode of experiencing, though their details on what this entails are not entirely 
clear and such comments are usually made in passing. Dewey attempted in A 
Common Faith to describe the meaning and significance of religious experience 
in plain language, but he failed to satisfactorily explain the central role of ideals 
in religious experience from his professed naturalistic standpoint. A Common 
Faith is consequently often viewed as a lapse of the “mature” Dewey into the 
(absolute) idealistic leanings of the “young” Dewey, when he was still “under the 
spell of Hegel,” as Richard Bernstein put it with a hint of admonition.67   
 Dewey’s early Psychology textbook offers rich and evocative descriptions 
of the functions played by the imagination, emotion, and bodily feeling in 
experiences deemed religious. With its dense language and imagery, however, the 
Psychology has been almost universally neglected by scholars of Dewey’s 
thought. Even Dewey believed its results to be largely superseded by William 
James’s monumental Principles of Psychology, published shortly after his own 
work. Yet, if one adheres to a coherentist reading of Dewey that views his early 
and later periods as consonant, the descriptions of the Psychology help to give 
                                                        
67 Bernstein, John Dewey, 12.  
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shape to the religious insights and reflections that are spread widely throughout 
his corpus. A recent study by Donald Morse has helped renew interest in Dewey’s 
early psychology by showing its connections to major developments in 
Continental philosophy, specifically those pioneered by Theodor Adorno, Jacques 
Derrida, and most recently, Slavoj Žižek.68 Morse makes a compelling argument 
that Dewey had already moved significantly past Hegel in the Psychology to 
create a new understanding of idealism, one that I believe to be fully compatible 
with his naturalism and, along with his wider body of work, anticipates later 
developments in enactivism and DEEDS cognitive science.69  
 On Dewey’s side, this included arguing for the active nature of perception, 
for inquiry as contextually situated, for value and meaning as emergent, for the 
self as a dynamic system, and for intelligent behavior as an extension of organic, 
creaturely coping. Equipped with only this brief description, it is already 
apparent where Dewey breaks from what we in the last section called the 
establishment model of perception, especially as that model has been applied to 
understanding the content and character of religious experiences. In this section 
we will address the specific points an ecologically grounded model of perception 
diverges from the establishment before moving on to a treatment of its 
significance for understanding Dewey’s generalized and naturalistic account of 
religion as ideal self-actualization.  
                                                        
68 Morse, Faith in Life.  
69 One of the defining characteristics of “ecological naturalism,” as outlined in Chapter 1, is the 
holistic combination of aspects of realism and idealism, along with objectivism and subjectivism 
and other philosophical positions usually defined in opposition to one another.     
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Perception as Transparent 
 
 The core concepts and ideas of enactivism and DEEDS cognitive science 
introduced at the end of Chapter 1 already provide a rudimentary understanding 
of where an ecologically grounded approach to perception departs from the 
establishment. In place of repeating that survey here, I draw attention to three 
general themes shared by the various positions comprising these research 
programs which build upon ideas that were also central to Dewey’s ecological 
naturalism. These themes, as identified by Lawrence Shapiro, are:     
 CONCEPTUALIZATION: The properties of an organisms’ body limit or constrain the 
 concepts an organism can acquire. That is, the concepts on which an organism relies to 
 understand its surrounding world depend on the kind of body that it has, so that were 
 organisms to differ with respect to their bodies, they would differ as well in how they 
 understand the world.  
  
 REPLACEMENT: An organism’s body in interaction with its environment replaces the 
 need for representational processes thought to have been at the core of cognition. Thus, 
 cognition does not depend on algorithmic processes over symbolic representations. It can 
 take place in systems that do not include representational states, and can be explained 
 without appeal to computational processes or representational states.  
  
 CONSTITUTION: The body or world plays a constitutive rather than merely causal role in 
 cognitive processing. To illustrate this distinction in a different context, consider 
 constitutive versus causal roles of oxygen. Oxygen is a constituent of water, because water 
 consists in atoms of oxygen conjoined with atoms of hydrogen. On the other hand, oxygen 
 might be a cause of an explosion, because without the presence of oxygen, the fuse would 
 not have ignited. Likewise, according to the Constitution claim, the body or world is a 
 constituent of, and not merely a cause influence on, cognition.70 
 
While Shapiro’s specific focus is on the fundamentally embodied nature of 
cognition, these insights apply in equal measure to the nature of perception (and 
potentially other experiential states) when re-conceived from an ecological 
perspective, for ecological theorists view cognition and perception as closely 
connected—the former is simply an elaboration of the latter and they frequently 
                                                        
70 Lawrence Shapiro, Embodied Cognition (New York: Routledge, 2011), 4-5. 
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interpenetrate each other.71 Given the continuity of lived experiencing with 
nature’s contours, perceptual states are not likely representations nor do they 
require mental intermediaries most of the time. Perceptions are rather 
constituted by the actual perceived objects and events of the world.  
 In other words, perception is the direct result of information issuing from 
the environment. Under this direct perception view, also known as anti-
representationalism, direct realism, and naive realism,72 perception reflects a 
genuine relation between an agent perceiver and what is perceived—and “not 
between the agent and some abstract entity called ‘perceptual content.’”73 The 
thesis of perceptual directness is rooted in a reconceived notion of information. 
In contrast to accepting the poverty of the stimulus, proponents of direct 
perception argue for the “richness of the stimulation” reaching organisms’ 
perceptual systems.74 Perception is not representational, but rather a 
“manifestation of interactions of organism and environment”75 that specify 
temporally unfolding events. 
 Like the thesis of perceptual indirectness (representationalism), a direct 
approach to perception is rooted in a distinct view of human perceivers. As 
expressions of a complex arrangement of nature’s dynamic processes, we are 
                                                        
71 M. D. Vernon, “Cognitive Inference in Perceptual Activity,” British Journal of Psychology 48, 
no. 1 (1957): 35-47.  
72 Several of these labels have been discussed in relation to John Dewey’s thought in previous 
chapters. While there are subtle differences between them depending upon the theorists 
advancing them, they admit enough similarities to be treated conjointly.    
73 Nanay, “The Representationalism versus Relationalism Debate,” 323.   
74 Claire F. Michaels and Claudia Carello, Direct Perception (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1981), 9. 
75 “Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder” (1939), LW 14: 16. 
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transparent to nature’s meanings, not opaque or removed from them by varying 
degrees. Meanings do not always need to be supplied by the organism through a 
mental process of conceptual enrichment, inference, or interpretation—though, 
of course, sometimes they are; very frequently meanings emerge immediately 
from organic interactivity with environmental structures rooted in organismic 
needs and capabilities. As Dewey pointed out, meaning resides in nature as the 
generic traits of experienced situations.   
 This conclusion represents nothing more than a complete overhaul of 
hundreds of years of philosophical and scientific thinking on the nature of 
perception, even approaches purportedly empiricist in orientation. Stuart 
Hampshire explains the deficiencies of traditional empiricist approaches to 
perception and action in his authoritative treatment on the topic with the 
following words: 
 The deepest mistake in empiricist theories of perception, descending from 
 Berkeley and Hume, has been the representation of human beings as passive 
 observers receiving impressions from ‘outside’ of the mind, where the ‘outside’ 
 includes our own bodies. In fact I find myself from the beginning able to act upon 
 objects around me. In this context to act is to move at will my own body, that 
 persisting physical thing, and thereby to bring about perceived movements of other 
 physical things. I not only perceive my body, I also control it; I not only perceive external 
 objects, I also manipulate them....It is therefore wrong to represent experience of the 
 external world as some synthesis of impressions of each of the five senses. A physical 
 object is recognized as a potential obstruction, or as something to be manipulated, 
 occupying a definite position in relation to me at the moment of perception.76 
 
Hampshire’s comments directly echo Dewey’s position that nature’s traits, being 
constituted by events and not by mere objects, are in no way limited to the 
quantifiable and physical. We are transparently open to the world’s meanings, for 
                                                        
76 Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1959), 47-48.  
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we are continuous with them. As Dewey states in Experience and Nature: 
 Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, 
 comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, fearful; are such immediately and in 
 their own right and behalf….These traits stand in themselves on precisely the same level 
 as colors, sounds, qualities of contact, taste and smell. Any criterion that finds the latter 
 to be ultimate and “hard” data will, impartially applied, come to the same conclusion 
 about the former. Any quality as such is final; it is at once initial and terminal; just what it 
 is as it exists.77  
 
This is not to say that experience never makes use of representations, but that 
perceptual experiences are not mainly representational.  
  
Perception as Dispositional 
 
 
 In contrast to egological (cognitivist, intellectualist) models of perception 
as advanced by establishmentarian theorists, ecological models, such as those 
advanced by enactivists, DEEDS researchers, and naturalist philosophers like 
Dewey, argue that we have all the information we require to get by in the world.78 
We do not necessarily need to add anything to what the world provides us. The 
information that would be housed in representations is contained in the world 
itself and broadcast to skilled perceivers.   
 As discussed earlier, under the ecological view perception is active and 
dynamic; a cup tells me what to do with it based upon certain properties of the 
cup—such as that the cup can hold liquid and has a handle—in combination with 
relevant properties of my present self-situation—such as that I am thirsty and 
have hands capable of grasping a cup, bringing it to my lips, and tilting it. As Tom 
                                                        
77 EN (1925), LW 1: 82.  
78 As noted previously, these positions of course contain subtle differences, but none significant 
enough to preclude discussing them conjointly. 
 331 
Burke notes, restating insights made by Dewey and Mead decades before him, 
perceived objects appear to be “as much a function of the organism as of the 
environment and hence is as much inner as it is outer.”79 Once learned, this 
information is stored in one’s muscles, the environment, and the relation 
maintained between the two. I do not need to pull up a mental script each time 
telling me what to do in most situations or begin discovering a possible course of 
action all over again, even though patients with brain damage or physical 
disabilities that negatively impact the connections to their surroundings may 
have to. As inquiring, information-seeking organisms we are innately attuned to 
functionally significant properties of the environment from our births through 
the different stages of our lives.  
 This brings us to the next point where an ecological approach to 
perception diverges from the establishment. Under evolutionary views like 
Dewey’s, where organism and environment are seen as tightly coupled by means 
of constant transactions, perception is not only viewed as direct, it is also 
considered to be dispositional in character, as opposed to being propositional. 
This means that perception is of and for action. The action-based nature of 
perception is especially attuned to detecting actions related to solving 
problematic deficiencies in experienced events. When dealing with situations that 
contain such lacks, something is to be achieved and, in order to do so, the 
situations must be changed accordingly. As discussed in the last chapter, in the 
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religious case such problems are viewed as lacks of the self, which should be 
recalled is a dynamic gestalt system in constant evolutive tension.  
 But how do humans, as natural organisms subject to the multiple forces 
and pressures of evolution, uncover opportunities for situational consummation 
and ideal self-actualization? What does it mean to say that human perception, at 
its most basic level, is of eventful action possibilities, as opposed to mental 
representations of focal objects? To grasp the full the significance of this 
question, and its importance for understanding Dewey’s departure from 
traditional philosophy and psychology, I return to an analysis of James Gibson’s 
ecological psychology. “Ecological psychology” has been used as a label by 
psychologists working in at least three distinct research programs, including 
those affiliated with perceptual psychologist James Gibson, social psychologist 
Roger Barker,80 and child psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner.81 The three thinkers 
share common historical antecedents in the phenomenological and Gestalt 
psychologies of the early 20th century. It is with Gibson’s work that I am 
primarily concerned with here, however, as it laid the groundwork for later 
ecological approaches, including those represented by enactivism and DEEDS 
cognitive science.    
 Affordances were introduced in our discussion of John Dewey’s views on 
the instrumental nature of meaning in Chapter 3. The term was actually coined 
                                                        
80 Roger G. Barker, Ecological Psychology: Concepts and Methods for Studying the 
Environment of Human Behavior (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968).  
81 Urie Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by Nature and 
Design (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).  
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by Gibson and became the cornerstone of his view of psychology, serving to 
distinguish it from the mainstream cognitive psychology of his day. As defined by 
Gibson, “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what 
it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.”82  
 What makes affordance an ecological concept is that it describes the 
reciprocal relationship between an organism and its environment. Its significance 
is bi-directional. An affordance notes a resource that the environment provides to 
an organism, one that an organism must posses the capabilities of perceiving and 
using in turn. I have mentioned examples of affordances at different points in the 
dissertation, including the ability of a dried out gourd to hold water, that of a tree 
stump for serving as a stool, and—to give a nonhuman example—the “chew toy” 
nature of almost anything to a dog. Importantly, for humans, affordances refer 
not only to opportunities for action resident in the natural environment, but the 
social and cultural environments we inhabit as well. As Eleanor Gibson clarifies 
this point:  
 An ‘affordance’ refers to the fit between an animal’s capabilities and the environmental 
 supports and opportunities (both good and bad) that make possible a given activity. For 
 example, a chair affords sitting for creatures possessing a flexible torso and hip joints, 
 and legs with knees that bend at the height of the chair’s seat. A path affords traversal to a 
 destination, and it may contain obstacles that afford collision or turning aside to avoid. 
 Affordances are properties of the environment as they are related to animals’ capabilities 
 for using them. They include not only objects but layout properties such as surfaces, 
 corners, and holes. Affordances are also offered by events, including social events such as 
 looming, loving, or angry faces.83  
 
                                                        
82 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 172.  
83 Eleanor J. Gibson and Anne D. Pick, An Ecological Approach to Perceptual Learning and 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15. For an updated and detailed analysis 
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 Affordances are intriguing because their ontology speaks directly to the 
commingling of actuality and possibility in existence. In this respect they bridge 
the idealism-realism divide in a way similar to the categories of Dewey’s and also 
Buchler’s naturalisms. Affordances further lend support to the primacy of events 
at the ontological (e.g., a freshly-leaved tree), epistemological (e.g., shaded 
shelter) and axiological levels (e.g., the avoidance of sun burn). Perception of 
environmental objects and events inevitably leads to a defined course of action, 
especially when that action satisfies a need or lack in the organism’s current 
functioning. Affordances are clues that indicate possibilities for action and are 
perceived in a direct and immediate way, with no sensory processing. This is 
because they are specified by the structured distribution of energy in an ambient 
array in an environment, as depicted in Figure 9 below.     
 
Figure 9: Ambient Energy Array84 
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 Ambient energy conveys information as its structure and arrangement is 
modified by the environment and agent motion, which in the case of light 
includes inclination, reflectance, shadows, and so forth.85 It is crucial to note that 
ambient energy is not only optical, even though most examples in the literature 
are of the visual domain. Affordances include both natural and sociocultural 
events—trees for climbing, buttons for pushing, and doorknobs for turning. 
Perceiving agents detect affordances by attuning themselves to lawlike relations 
between aspects of the environments that remain unchanged by transformations, 
which Gibson called invariants.86 While there is significant debate as to the 
precise nature of affordances and invariants, it is clear they speak to possible 
events in the same manner as Mead’s notion of collapsed acts does. Figure 10 
shows how actions are specified by the structured energy of the environment.  
 
Figure 10: Knob and Button Affordances87 
                                                        
85 James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Prospect Heights, NJ: 
Waveland Press, 1966), 208-216.  
86 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 18-19, 138-140. 
87 Public domain image.  
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 As the above examples illustrate, the same existential event is capable of a 
seemingly infinite number of qualitative meanings. Moreover, as Dewey was 
careful to note, events change over time in the sense that they develop and alter 
their characteristics in relation to other events.88 Being a determinate history, 
every event is partly distinguished from other events by its unique contour of 
alternative possibilities. In addition to every existence being an event, every event 
is also an “experiment” under the ecological view.  
 This last point holds radical implications for many areas of philosophy, but 
especially for any philosophical anthropology or theory of the self. Which event 
possibility is actualized, that is, which meaning is selected in a developing 
situation of lived experience crucially depends upon the needs and capabilities of 
the perceiver. A sufficiently tired person may view a tree stump as a “stool,” while 
to others it represents merely an inconvenient “obstacle” to be avoided. Likewise, 
a bottle of water means “thirst-quenching” to me when I am thirsty; it can mean 
that and also “gift” when I perceive a homeless person in need. To a dog, lacking 
symbolic language and opposable thumbs, it might mean “chew toy,” “something 
to fetch,” or have no meaning at all. Gibson describes the joint objective and 
subjective nature of affordances in the following telling manner:  
 An important fact about the affordances of the environment is that they are in a sense 
 objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which are often supposed to be 
 subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But, actually, an affordance is neither an objective 
 property nor a subjective property, or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the 
 dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally 
 a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet 
                                                        
88 On this point, see Roland Garrett, “Changing Events in Dewey’s Experience and Nature,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 10, no. 4 (1972): 439-455.  
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 neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.89 
 
 
 
Perception as Holistic  
 
 
 The final contrast between an ecological approach to perception with its 
establishment counterpart is that perception is argued to be holistic. This means 
two things. First, perception is not limited to any one sensory modality. 
Perception is plastic and typically integrated across the modalities. Further, to 
conceive of the sensory modalities as separate is, according to the most recent 
opinion in neurobiology, incorrect.90 Further, emotions, though typically 
distinguished from perception and considered cognitive-level interpretations of 
sensations, are deemed perceptual—more specifically, they represent 
“perceptions of patterned changes in the body.”91 Dewey argued as much in the 
Psychology, claiming that feeling and emotion were perceptual states of activity 
that inform of something in ourselves and the environments surrounding us.      
 The second sense in which perception is considered holistic is that it is 
directed beyond what is contingently available to a perceiver. Organismic 
behavior is often predictive, reaching beyond the present. This does not always 
happen via cognitive mediation, but is revealed in intelligent, adaptive action.92 
                                                        
89 Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems 129.  
90 Shinsuke Shimojo and Ladan Shams, “Sensory Modalities are not Separate Modalities: 
Plasticity and Interactions,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11 (2001): 505-509.  
91 Jesse J. Prinz, “Is Emotion a Form of Perception?,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 
(2006): 137. 
92 See the collected essays in Moshe Bar, ed., Predictions in the Brain: Using Our Past to 
Generate a Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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As Dewey states in Art as Experience: 
 Every need, say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least a temporary 
 absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings. But it is also a demand, a reaching 
 out into the environment to make good the lack and to restore adjustment by building at 
 least a temporary equilibrium. Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls 
 out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either 
 through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a growing life, the recovery is never mere 
 return to a prior state , for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through 
 which it has successfully passed. If the gap between organism and environment is too 
 wide, the creature dies. If its activity is not enhanced by the temporary alienation, it 
 merely subsists. Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more 
 extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of the conditions under 
 which it lives.93 
  
 As discussed earlier, this mirrors a central insight of the Gestaltists, whose 
experiments demonstrated that when we perceive an object or event scene the 
whole exists in each part—so when we are only given partial information, we 
project beyond what is present to bring about formed wholes. This informed the 
discovery of the Gestalt laws of perceptual organization shown in Table 2. These 
laws were not posited a priori, but were uncovered “descriptively in the lifeworld 
meanings themselves, in the necessary manner in which such meanings are 
found in fact to come to formation.”94 As Andrew Fuller persuasively states, 
“Gestalt laws do nothing but formulate certain constancies in what is going on 
around us all the time….The laws express the experienced play of directed (law-
governed) structural tensions, demands made on perception that available 
materials come to formation in certain ways and not in others, structural 
demands.”95 Well-formed wholes obtain in nature, not merely in the mind. 
                                                        
93 AE (1934), LW 10: 19.  
94 Andrew R. Fuller, Insight Into Value: An Exploration of the Premises of a Phenomenological 
Psychology (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990), 110. 
95 Ibid. 
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Table 2: Gestalt Laws of Perceptual Organization96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
96 All images reproduced are in the public domain.  
Figure-ground: Perception is typically 
articulated into two elements, a 
focused figure against a surrounding 
background. 
 
 
Proximity: Elements tend to be 
perceived as grouped together if they 
are close to each other. 
 
 
Common fate: Elements tend to be 
perceived as grouped together if they 
move in concert. 
 
 
Similarity: Elements similar to each 
other tend to be integrated into 
groups. 
 
 
Continuity: Oriented groups aligned 
with each other tend to be integrated 
into perceptual wholes. 
 
 
Closure: Elements that are parts of a 
closed figure tend to be grouped 
together. 
 
 
Good gestalt (Prägnanz): Elements 
that form part of a pattern that is 
simple, balanced, orderly, coherent, 
or otherwise “good,” tend to be 
grouped together. 
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 Building upon the early work of the Gestalt psychologists, Baingio Pinna 
has recently discovered that rules governing perceptual grouping apply to the 
organization of shape and meaning in the lifeworld as well, which helps us 
reframe what processes are at play in cases of amodal completion and perception 
of absence referenced in the previous section.  
 
Figure 11: Event Happenings and Resolutions97 
                                                        
97 Reproduced from Baingio Pinna, “New Gestalt Principles of Perceptual Organization: An 
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 According to Pinna’s research, absences are paradoxically describable as 
“something” and “nothing” at the same time.98 This is because he discovered that 
we phenomenally observe events (objects, states of affairs, etc.) at both 
“contingent” and “ideal” levels concurrently. This explains why in the case of the 
event happenings depicted in Figure 12 each happening “makes the figure appear 
incomplete and irregular and at the same time complete and regular.”99  
 The ideal and contingent levels of perception identified by Pinna’s 
research depend upon each other and are operative simultaneously, though 
through different perceptual means. The contingent level, as discussed in our 
presentation of the establishment model of perception, is perceived modally, 
through the various sensory systems. The ideal level, however, is perceived 
amodally. As Pinna explains the differences between the two levels of perception: 
 The complete whole (the square) is seen amodally (amodal completeness), while the 
 complete whole (irregular shape) modally (modal incompleteness). Similarly, the 
 complete part (the absence that at the ideal level is filled with what is missing) is 
 perceived amodally, while the incomplete part (the absence as it is perceived) modally. 
 Both ways coexist and reinforce each other. Briefly, the square appears as the amodal 
 whole object and the absence as the modal part of it. The square is the result of the 
 amodal wholeness completion of something perceived as its visible modal portion. Like 
 the absence, the square is perceived and not perceived at the same time and its amodal 
 whole complete occurs beyond (ideal perceptual level) the absence. It is the absence that 
 makes the square appear as such and to complete amodally beyond it. In other words, the 
 square cannot be perceived with this meaning if the absence is not perceived. Otherwise, 
 the square would be perceived like an irregular shape, and vice versa, it is the perceptual 
 meaning of the square that makes the empty space appear like an absence. None of these 
 meanings can exist without the others.100    
 
 
 
 
                                                        
Extension from Grouping to Shape and Meaning,” Gestalt Theory 32, no. 1 (2010): 55. 
98 Ibid., 53. 
99 Ibid., 57.  
100 Ibid., 58.  
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Religion as Perceptual Attunement 
 
 
 Pinna’s insight is groundbreaking and I believe it can help us understand 
how religious perception, naturalized along ecological, Deweyan lines, can be 
nonconceptual and direct, yet at the same time an achievement of sorts that 
admits individual differences based upon personal ability and past experiences. 
Our perceptual attunement to ordered wholes is, as Dewey recognized, a product 
of evolutionary design: “In a world like ours, every living creature that attains 
sensibility welcomes order with a response of harmonious feeling whenever it 
finds a congruous order about it.”101 The perceptual emotions and bodily feelings 
that guide us in completing fragmented events and bringing them to the best 
possible resolution help us distinguish between everyday situations and those 
with moral, religious, aesthetic, or other special qualitative significance. Take, for 
instance, the potentially moral situation depicted below.   
 
Figure 12: Perception of a Potentially Moral Situation102  
                                                        
101 AE (1934), LW 10: 20.  
102 Reproduced from Ana P. Gantman and Jay J. Van Bavel, “Moral Perception,” Trends in 
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The incongruity between the situation’s “contingent” and “ideal” levels leads to a 
state of organic imbalance to perceivers attuned to the relevant moral 
information. One’s knowledge and acceptance of the moral (normative) 
expectation that trash and recyclables should not be discarded on the street 
haphazardly is tied to certain feelings and affects that influence and inform their 
perception of the unfolding scene, which may go completely unnoticed by others. 
Personal relevance and salience play an important part in perception, and are not 
imputed after something has been identified. This has been confirmed by recent 
neuoanatomical studies,103 and reflects the Gestalt principle that when gestalts 
are “not good enough” we viscerally feel its “state of unrest, [its] play of troubling 
tensions to be in process.”104  
 Dewey makes the same recognition in Experience and Nature thusly: “The 
pervasive operative presence of the whole in the part and of the part in the whole 
constitutes susceptibility—the capacity of feeling—whether or no this potentiality 
be actualized.” Building upon this Deweyan insight, recent work by Matthew 
Bower and Shaun Gallagher show how emotions and bodily affects regulate and 
serve as “prenoetic elements” that constrain our perceptual experiences.105 For 
Dewey, the specific feeling that speaks to religious perceptual experiences, where 
an incongruity is detected not in some visual scene, but somatosensorily between 
                                                        
Cognitive Science 19, no. 11 (2015): 631.    
103 Lisa Feldman Barrett and Moshe Bar, “See It with Feeling: Affective Predictions during Object 
Perception,” in Predictions in the Brain, ed. Moshe Bar, 107-121.  
104 Fuller, Insight Into Value, 115.  
105 Matthew Bower and Shaun Gallagher, “Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive 
Perception,” Phenomenology and Mind 4, no. 1 (2013): 78-93. 
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the self’s “contingent” and “ideal” levels at a particular time is that of remorse: 
“Remorse is the feeling of the chasm existing between this ideal and our own 
actual state through some act of our own. We feel that we ought to have realized 
our being, and that we could have done so, but that we have not. The feeling of 
this split, this dualism, in our nature constitutes remorse.”106 The instinctive 
drive to resolve this functional imbalance sets us on the path to learning how to 
bridge the gulf between our actual and possible selves. As Dewey also notes, “Our 
nature can be completely objectified or realized only when the chasm between 
what is and what ought to be, between the actual and the ideal self, is overcome. 
Religious experience is the sphere in which this identification of one’s self with 
the complete realized personality, or God, occurs.”107 This statement brings us 
back to the connection between perceiving and knowing in experience.  
 
 
4.4 Religion as a Form of Know-How  
 
 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, perception and knowledge are 
mutually implicated and enfolded in experience. Perception is essential for our 
knowledge of the world, and our knowledge—though always admitting a personal 
element—implies a perceptual relationship to its objects. “While knowledge…as 
to its knower is individual, as to the known it is universal,” as Dewey claims in 
                                                        
106 PSY (1887), EW 2: 290.  
107 Ibid. 
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the Psychology.108 While past philosophers were content to separate the two 
faculties, whether by adherence to a Cartesian dualism or Christian metaphysics 
(where genuine knowledge is deductive or revealed, and perception is distrusted), 
Dewey posited a close connection between perception and knowledge that 
informed his existential approach to inquiry.     
 Connecting back to the analysis of Chapter 3, inquiry is successfully 
concluded when a situation is transformed by removal of its problematic quality 
and made whole again.109 The normative weight carried by inquiry is accrued to it 
by the exceptional demands of fragmented events and not by a priori guaranteed 
conclusions. Joseph Grange retraces the steps of this logical process for us with 
the following eloquent description:  
 Situations are marked by extremes of tensions that are the result of the various pushes 
 and pulls seeking resolution within them. These tensile nodes set up the polarities 
 through which a situation first expresses itself, then experiences its lack of unity, and 
 then, where and when possible, resolves these feelings into a satisfactory whole. The 
 feelings generated within these polar fields are what account for the sense of being in 
 phase and out of phase that is part of every situation. The shifting balance within every 
 situation establishes a dynamic stability as well as a definite sense of the precarious. It is 
 these alternating rhythms that set up the feel of a situation. True wisdom involves the 
 ability to feel these shifting phases and respond to them in such a way as to bring forth 
 whatever wholeness is possible within a given situation.110  
  
It was in thinking critically about the manifold ways humans confront existential 
uncertainties that Dewey came to view events as primary at the epistemological, 
axiological, and ontological levels. The very same considerations influenced 
Dewey’s reconstruction of ideals and the religious as emergent qualities of 
                                                        
108 PSY (1887), EW 2: 10. 
109 LTI (1938), LW 12: 203.  
110 Joseph Grange, John Dewey, Confucius, and Global Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 2004), 57. 
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natural situations as they dynamically unfold through and within selves.  
 Inquiry is a ceaseless affair, whether the context is scientific, ethical, 
aesthetic, or religious. All situations are malleable in terms of their composition 
and traits; this means that we have the power to change them by directing their 
future course. Importantly, this includes the future direction of ourselves as well, 
which speaks to the religious dimensions of inquiry. Successful inquiry permits 
our reintegration with the environment and a consummatory experience, which 
reaches its highest form when we actualize not simply the valuable closure of a 
situation, but its optimal, ideal configuration. 
 Growth in value thus underlies the knowing process according to Dewey, 
his pragmatist colleagues, and other ecological thinkers. The instinctive 
organismic striving after value pivotally shapes how we divide and classify 
environmental objects and events as they unfold around and within us; we can be 
said to genuinely know X only if X bears some meaningful, valuable relation to 
our current situation. This is why mere book learning is quickly lost outside the 
classroom if not made relevant to one’s daily activities and routines. 
 One of the more interesting consequences of fleshing out a Deweyan 
account of perception as an achievement, as a form of skillful engagement—as 
opposed to a passive (spectatorial) undergoing or reception—is the radically 
different account of knowledge it brings with it. From the perspective of a 
thoroughly ecological naturalism, knowledge is instrumental and creative. It is 
gained by practical, experiential means; nowhere does knowledge lie 
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predetermined, waiting to be revealed by some authority to an unwitting receiver. 
As the contextual result of existential inquiries, knowledge’s primary function is 
to satisfy natural homeostatic and sense-making drives, restoring balance to the 
organism-environment integrity that is the self. To fully grasp the revolutionary 
character of this position, especially for understanding the nature of religious 
knowing, we first must look at two very different conceptions of knowledge 
within philosophy. I then will move on to important questions of how such 
knowledge is gained and used.                 
 
 
Ways of Knowing 
 
 
 In his seminal work, The Concept of Mind, English analytic philosopher 
Gilbert Ryle lays down what is, along with John Dewey’s  Experience and Nature, 
one of the most definitive attacks on philosophical Cartesianism. It is here that 
Ryle famously dubs Cartesian dualism, what we similarly have referred to as 
egoic thinking in this study, “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine,” with the 
“ghost” being the mind conceived as a private interior theater, and the “machine” 
referring to the physical, public body.111 Like Dewey, Ryle was a consummate 
empiricist; he aimed to explain things like minds and bodies in terms of things 
we can actually experience and measure. Ryle’s argument against dualism formed 
part of a larger criticism of what he called the “intellectualist legend,”112 what 
                                                        
111 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Routledge, [1949] 2009), 1-13.  
112 Ibid., 30-31. 
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Dewey called the “intellectualist fallacy,” and what contemporary philosopher of 
perception Alva Noë simply calls “intellectualism.”113 Regardless of the label one 
adopts, this is the mistake of treating all experience as essentially cognitive.                
 Integral to Ryle’s attack on intellectualism was his criticism of the 
dominant understanding of knowledge in epistemological circles of his day—an 
understanding still prevalent enough to be considered the establishment view—of 
knowledge as propositional.114 Ryle argued that a significant portion of human 
knowledge was action-based. Stephen Hetherington usefully summarizes Ryle’s 
distinction between the two modes of knowing in a recent work on the topic: 
 Knowledge-that is a cognitive state in which one accurately represents or reflects or 
 reports some aspect of reality; knowledge-how is not. Knowledge-how is an ability, a not-
 necessarily-cognitive capacity to do or act; knowledge-that is not. (In other words, 
 knowledge-that and knowledge-how are simply two different kinds of knowledge, neither 
 being conceptually reducible to the other.)115 
 
As Ryle would years later, Dewey argued for the primacy of know-how in his 1918 
Essays in Experimental Logic: “It means that knowing is literally something 
which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; that meanings in 
their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of behaving toward 
fact, and that active experimentation is essential to verification.”116  
 Dewey makes this point more forcefully in his treatment of habit in his 
1922 work on social psychology, Human Nature and Conduct, where he makes 
the connection between knowledge and action explicit. According to Dewey’s 
                                                        
113 Alva Noë, “Against Intellectualism,” Analysis 65, no. 4 (2005): 278-290. 
114 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 14-48. 
115 Stephen Hetherington, How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge (Malden, MA: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 27.  
116  EEL, MW 10: 367.  
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analysis, a habit is a dispositional tendency that controls future experiences 
originating as an executive skill by uniting environmental stimuli and actions in 
order for the organism to achieve its goal. Habits play functional roles for 
conscious experiences—not only for unconscious actions. For instance, without 
“entering into organization with things which independently accomplish definite 
results, the eyes stare blankly and hand moves fumblingly. These organizations 
are habits.”117 Dewey further explains the difference between know-that and 
know-how, or reflective and non-reflective action in Democracy and Education:  
 
 When we reflect upon an experience instead of just having it, we inevitably distinguish 
 between our own attitude and the objects toward which we sustain the attitude. When a 
 man is eating, he is eating food. He does not divide his act into eating and food. But if he 
 makes a scientific investigation of the act, such a discrimination is the first thing he would 
 effect. He would examine on the one hand the properties of the nutritive material, and on 
 the other hand the acts of the organism in appropriating and digesting. Such reflection 
 upon experience gives rise to a distinction of what we experience (the experienced) and 
 the experiencing—the how.118  
 
 
Religion as Enactive Know-How 
 
 Knowledge, as a form of experience, is the result of a pattern of 
transactions between organism and environment. As enactivist theorist Alva Noë 
points out, “For something to feel this way or that (round, large, flat, rough, soft) 
is for it to condition the possibilities for movement” of the relevant body parts of 
the actor-perceiver in corresponding ways.119 This reframing of knowledge as 
eminently practical helps us make sense of Dewey’s notion of the “religious” as a 
                                                        
117 HNC (1922), MW 14: 22. 
118 DE (1916), MW 9: 173. 
119 Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 108. 
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particular quality of “ideal” events or situations, one that creatively pulls existing 
events toward better, more complete, more consummate ones. Ideal religious 
qualities are perceived primarily by means of a bodily, felt sense. By extending 
the Gestalt principle of Prägnanz, or “good gestalt,” which is usually applied to 
visual perception, to perception in its somatosensory modalities with the felt 
perception of lacks introduced as a corollary to the felt perception of wholes, we 
come to a more complete understanding of Dewey’s naturalist approach to 
religious experience. This interpretation is consonant with Dewey’s idea of the 
structural imbalances of the organism-environment unit felt when the behavioral 
resources of habit fail to meet present situational demands. One can argue that 
situational lacks—basically, missing parts of complete ideal situations—afford 
specific opportunities for responsive action that is restorative of wholes. Religious 
knowledge, under Dewey’s ecologically informed view would be a kind of 
embodied, enactive know-how, “exemplified by the set of expectations and 
possibilities for action that manifest themselves or would manifest themselves, in 
the perceptual exploration of environments.”120 
 As discussed briefly in the analysis of Chapter 3, evolution has provided a 
generous set of mechanisms for living organisms to maintain their internal 
stability, or homeostasis, in both local (e.g, heart, lung, kidney) and more widely 
dispersed (e.g., brain, nervous system) functions.121 Over the course of a 
                                                        
120 Daniel D. Hutto, “Knowing What? Radical versus Conservative Enactivism,” Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2005): 391.   
121 For a review, see the analysis in Jay Schulkin, Rethinking Homeostasis: Allostatic Regulation 
in Physiology and Pathophysiology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).  
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groundbreaking career of interdisciplinary synthesis, neuroscientist Jay Schulkin 
has brought the theoretical framework of evolutionary neurobiology to bear on 
pragmatism’s naturalistic theory of inquiry.122 He even makes a convincing 
argument for the human need for religious or spiritual quests in terms of innate 
biological drives, helping to shed insight on Dewey’s ecological naturalist 
approach to religion.123    
 To employ terminology standard to contemporary philosophy of mind, we 
might call Dewey’s approach to religion “adverbialist,” for it amounts to 
essentially the same thing to describe an experience as religious (adjective) as it 
does to say that one experienced religiously (adverb). According to the 
adverbialist view, when we state, for instance, that we see a green apple, it is the 
green apple that causes an experience in us, but not in terms of a green and 
edible (adjectives) mental object or sense-datum. The experience is better 
characterized as a subject sensing greenly and deliciously (adverbs), which 
doesn’t actually require there being green apples on the table, in the mind, or 
anywhere else for that matter. To “experience religiously,” then, is not to “have a 
religious experience”—Dewey denies the existence of a distinct category of such 
experiences (the above quote makes this clear)—nor is it to “experience religion.” 
Religious quality, under Dewey’s view, conceivably belongs to any or all 
experiences as such. It represents, according to the adverbialist thesis, a mode or 
                                                        
122 These are too numerous to list here; for a concise overview see Schulkin, Naturalism and 
Pragmatism. 
123 Jay Schulkin, “An Instinct for Spiritual Quests: Quiet Religion,” Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 21, no. 4 (2007): 307-320. 
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manner of perceiving objects and events, which is to say a way of acting in the 
world.  
 Starting with the biological level and moving upwards to the level of 
humans, Dewey employs such descriptions as adequate adjustment, fulfillment of 
need in concert with surrounding events, and successful elimination of imbalance 
between organism and environment leading to growth and enhancement of the 
self, to describe this process. Even the mystical experiences that all major 
religions speak of are, in Dewey’s view, natural phenomena that are only given 
supernatural interpretations upon secondary reflection: “There is no reason to 
deny the existence of experiences that are called mystical. On the contrary, there 
is every reason to suppose that, in some degree of intensity, they occur so 
frequently that they may be regarded as normal manifestations that take place at 
certain rhythmic points in the movement of experience.”124  
 Contemporary advances in the neuroscientific study of religious and 
spiritual experiences would seem to lend empirical support to Dewey’s views on 
this matter. Ideal actionable events presence as consummatory fulfillments 
(gestalts) for the needful, lacking self that perceives them, perpetually becomes 
them, is them. This convoluted, somewhat counterintuitive view, which combines 
elements of naturalism and idealism finds clear expression in Gibson’s succinct 
phrase: “One perceives the environment and coperceives oneself.”125 Religion is 
not solely an individual affair, however. Due to ecology’s web of relations, it has 
                                                        
124 CF (1934), LW 9: 26.  
125 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 126.  
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an innately moral and social aspect to it, one that Dewey explicitly recognized in 
the closing lines of A Common Faith. 
 The ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not shadowy and wavering. They assume 
 concrete form in our understanding of our relations to one another and the values 
 contained in these relations. We who live are parts of a humanity that extends into the 
 remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature. The things in civilization we 
 most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by the grace of the doings and sufferings of the 
 continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of 
 conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have 
 received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely 
 accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements 
 for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has 
 always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and 
 militant.126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
126 CF (1934), LW 9: 57. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Dewey, Daoism, and Dōgen: Three Ecologies of Ultimacy 
 
 
A person rides in a boat, looks at the shore, and mistakenly thinks that the shore 
is moving. If one looks carefully at the boat, one sees that it is the boat that is 
moving. In like manner, if a person is confused about the mind-body and 
discriminates the myriad things, there is the error of thinking that one’s own 
mind or self is eternal. If one becomes intimate with practice and returns within 
[to the true self], the principle of the absence of self in all things is made clear. 
                    -Dōgen1  
  
 
 
5.1 Dewey’s Religious Naturalism in Comparative Perspective 
 
 
More than a decade has passed since religion scholars Mary Evelyn Tucker and 
John Grim described what they saw as “the emerging alliance of world religions 
and ecology.”2 For those who regard Lynn White’s controversial thesis 
(introduced in Chapter 1) as fact, such an alliance is highly unlikely to come to 
fruition presently or in the far-off future. To their skeptical minds, the only way 
the concerns of religion and ecological living could converge would be if drastic 
changes were to occur in religion’s traditional forms and expressions. On this 
point I believe the skeptics to be correct; the reactionary influences of religious 
fundamentalism and conservatism worldwide (frequently combined with Neo-
Luddism), that in most forms fears change and desires to block progress, are 
enough to give any prudent person caution. But it is not religion (or technology) 
                                                        
1 Dōgen, “Genjō Kōan,” in Sounds of Valley Streams: Enlightenment in Dōgen’s Zen: 
Translations of Nine Essays from Shōbōgenzō, trans. Francis H. Cook (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1989), 66-67. 
2 Mary Evelyn Tucker and John A. Grim, “Introduction: the Emerging Alliance of World Religions 
and Ecology,” Daedalus 130, no. 4 (2001): 1-22.  
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in itself that forms the root problem of the global ecological crisis. The future 
health of the planet, of our very selves, depends on nothing less than a complete 
recalibration of our inherited Cartesian self-understanding and egoic 
conditioning.  
 That religious reformations have occurred and continue to do so today is 
fact, one reflected in the names Protestantism, Reform Judaism, and Neo-
Confucianism, to name just three examples. That religious reformations are often 
foreseen and facilitated by the philosophers among us is not always recognized. 
By far the biggest contribution of philosophers to the study of religion in this new 
21st century has been the push to rethink religion and religiosity in light of the 
results of the various sciences, as demonstrated by the refinement of naturalism 
as a descriptive and normative framework. Unfortunately, much of this work 
retains residual aspects of the ego-defined and ego-directed project initiated 
during the Age of Enlightenment.     
 While a growing number of philosophers and theorists representing a 
range of disciplines have begun to explore the meaning and significance of 
religion from a naturalistic perspective, John Dewey’s religious naturalism so far 
has been little engaged by philosophers of religion who seem to not know what to 
make of its curious mix of Hegelian and Darwinian, idealist and realist insights. 
As mentioned at several points in this study, however, Dewey did not view these 
diverse commitments as antithetical or incompatible, and his ecological 
naturalism is able to account for a wide spectrum of human belief and behavior in 
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an empirically responsible and phenomenologically faithful manner.      
In Chapters 3 and 4 we worked through an analysis of Dewey’s religious 
thought with respect to the philosophical problems of religious externality and 
religious inwardness. Religious ultimacy, identified in Chapter 2 as the third 
problem an ecological philosophy of religion must prove capable of addressing, is 
the focus of this final chapter. Proving Dewey’s ecological naturalism capable of 
handling issues of ultimacy as far as religious matters are concerned is a 
necessary—perhaps the most necessary—step toward discrediting the standard 
interpretation of Dewey as a thoroughly scientific and secular thinker blind to the 
ultimate existential choices facing humanity seemingly at every turn.3 Ever 
concerned with finding workable solutions to the “problems of men” (and 
women), however, Dewey naturally held views on ultimate matters even as he 
reconstructed them to better fit what he felt one could honestly believe and hope 
for in a space age.  
 Against the standard interpretation of Dewey’s religious thought, the 
dissertation has advanced a radically revised reading of Dewey where his ideas on 
the religious dimensions of nature and the experiencing self are not viewed as 
some mysterious add-on to his philosophy, but rather as its ground and apex.4 
                                                        
3 This opinion is endorsed even by many of Dewey’s supporters, including Hilary Putnam and 
Kenneth Stikkers. See Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 190. Compare Putnam’s remarks to Kenneth Stikkers, “Technologies of 
the World, Technologies of the Self: A Schelerian Critique of Dewey and Hickman,” The Journal 
of Speculative Philosophy 10, no. 1 (1996): 65.  
4 Richard Bernstein makes a similar claim about the centrality of religion for Dewey’s philosophy, 
but ironically devotes only a handful of pages to exploring his religious thought. See Bernstein, 
John Dewey, 160-165.  
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Dewey’s religious naturalism is the enduring thread tying together his idealism 
and naturalism; religiously-toned passages from the early Psychology (1887) 
show up again in only slightly modified form in Essays in Experimental Logic 
(1916), and closely mirror those appearing decades later in Art as Experience 
(1934), A Common Faith (1934), and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938). 
Further, as will be shown momentarily, Dewey’s religious naturalism shares 
striking similarities with contemporary ecospiritualist philosophies, such as Arne 
Næss’s deep ecology, as it does with Eastern philisophico-religious traditions, 
particularly those of Daoism and Zen Buddhism.  
 These diverse schools of thought and practice, far separated by time, 
geography, and culture, all view the vital essence and goal of the religious life as 
the actualization of a fuller, more whole, more ideal state of self than that 
represented by the rational, thinking ego-mind. To argue against Dewey’s 
standing as a serious (even if short-winded) religious thinker after carefully 
bringing these connections to light would be to deny well-recognized religious 
traditions as being “really religious”—a conceptually muddled debate over which 
religious studies scholars have spilled much ink.5 Below I offer a perspective on 
this debate informed by Dewey’s pragmatic vantage point with the hope of finally 
laying it to rest.  
 
 
                                                        
5 This does not mean that all aspects of a particular religion are “religious,” however, at least not 
as Dewey defines the term. One of ecological philosophy of religion’s implicit—and controversial—
problem-solving tasks is to help us decide which religious beliefs and practices are worth 
conserving and transmitting to future generations.    
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Philosophy of Religion as Religious Naturalism 
 
 
 The consequences of Dewey’s ecological approach for philosophy of 
religion are vast and clear: any philosophy of religion worthy of the name 
necessarily proceeds from a generalized, naturalistic perspective with the goal of 
better understanding the nature of religion and its role in human self-
actualization and existential problem-solving more generally. This is what makes 
Dewey’s philosophy of religion simultaneously a form of religious naturalism. It 
further helps to explain why the terms have been used in close connection when 
discussing Dewey’s religious views throughout the dissertation. Philosophy is an 
intrinsically active and practical affair; it is a way of life, to repeat Pierre Hadot’s 
phrasing. Philosophy’s critical function does not stop at the accumulation of 
descriptive knowledge (know-that), as many scientific disciplines do; the chief 
objective of philosophy is to help us discern nature’s ideal possibilities and 
actualize them in problematic situations where they are needed (know-how). 
Philosophy of religion is an application of this general method to a particular type 
of situation.    
 This quick review of philosophy’s authentic purpose serves to distinguish 
Dewey’s religious naturalism from other movements that fall under the same 
heading, but are markedly different in terms of their approach. According to 
Jerome Stone’s widely referenced definition, religious naturalism is a “type of 
naturalism which affirms a set of beliefs and attitudes that there are religious 
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aspects of this world that can be appreciated within a naturalistic framework.”6 
Stone’s definition is informative, helping to distance religious naturalism from 
empirical and natural theology, such as that of the “Chicago School,” which 
appealed to human experience to ascertain the reality of God, and applied the 
historico-critical method to the religious understandings of specific communities 
in order to illustrate the perspectivism of religious truth claims.7 By avoiding talk 
of God (capital G) and focusing on the “religious aspects of this world,” as Stone 
claims, it is apparent that religious naturalism is less theological, and more 
philosophical, in its composition and outlook.8 Although instructive on this 
important detail, Stone’s definition is also vague, and so I propose a twofold 
division to help further spell out the similarities and differences between Dewey 
and other religious naturalists. This division is made mainly for purposes of 
illustration; I fully recognize that outliers and counterexamples exist, as they 
surely do for all classificatory schemes.        
 With that said, Dewey’s “active” and “critical” religious naturalism is easily 
marked off from religious naturalisms that are primarily “passive” and 
“honorific” in their content and expression. These include various forms of 
pantheism that equate God with Nature (capital N) as an entity or force to be 
                                                        
6 Stone, Religious Naturalism Today, 1. The resurgence of interest in religious naturalism over 
the past few decades is largely due to Stone’s efforts.  
7 This is admittedly a simplification of the wide variety of approaches of the Chicago School, 
which is represented by figures as diverse as Shirley Jackson Case, Shailer Mathews, Henry 
Nelson Wieman, Bernard Meland, Daniel Day Williams, and Bernard Loomer. For a more 
comprehensive overview, see W. Creighton Peden and Jerome A. Stone, The Chicago School of 
Theology—Pioneers in Religious Inquiry (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996).  
8 The differences between theology and philosophy of religion were discussed in Chapter 2. 
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worshipped. Spinoza and perhaps Ralph Waldo Emerson are the most 
distinguished pantheists in Western philosophy. Pantheism can also be used to 
describe much Native American spirituality, as well as certain aspects of the 
Vedic tradition of Indian philosophy. It also includes panentheism, which 
exempts God from much human influence, despite existing inside a Nature that 
reflects the impact of human decision in its every fold and wrinkle. Famous 
advocates of panentheism include German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich 
Krause, who coined the term, and American philosopher Charles Hartshorne, a 
student and expander of Whitehead’s process philosophy.  
 Despite the fact that most pantheisms and panentheisms reject 
supernaturalistic conceptions of religion (e.g., personal theism), many repeat the 
same mistakes Dewey locates in supernaturalism. These mistakes include 
separating the divine from the human either conceptually or empirically, defining 
the religious in terms of static objects (as opposed to processive events), failing to 
see how the religious in one context may not be so in another, viewing religious 
faith as blind and passive, and so on. This list is not intended to be exhaustive; 
these are just some of the ways in which Dewey’s views are different from two 
general forms of religious naturalism widely represented in the history of 
religious thought.  
 We now turn our attention to two specific religious naturalisms to further 
highlight what is unique about Dewey’s approach. Once again, these comments 
do not exhaust the possibilities for comparison between Dewey’s religious views 
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and those of other so-called religious naturalists. Several recent forms of religious 
naturalism amenable to Dewey’s nonreductive view of nature and human 
experience are not addressed here due to considerations of scope and space.9 
Such deeper investigations are left for future work, as the main purpose of this 
study is to show how Dewey’s religious naturalism can serve as the basis for a 
philosophy of religion answerable to the challenges posed by the ecological turn 
in contemporary theory.      
 Though both issue from an ecologically grounded perspective, Dewey’s 
religious naturalism should not be confused with the naturism proposed by 
philosopher Donald Crosby, which deems nature “sacred in its own right” and as 
“religiously ultimate.”10 It is true that Crosby’s religious naturalism rejects any 
appeal to supernatural deities or forces and in this way is aligned with Dewey’s 
thinking on religion. Yet, like pantheism and panentheism, it can be argued that 
Crosby’s religious naturalism attributes too much power and significance to 
nature apart from human experience and culture, which are constantly working 
to reshape nature’s boundaries and bounty. Nature is sacred, but not in its own 
                                                        
9 I specifically have in mind Robert S. Corrington’s ecstatic naturalism, a complex and unique 
position in religious naturalism that draws on insights from American pragmatism and 
Continental phenomenology, as well as from Justus Buchler’s ordinal naturalism. Corrington has 
developed this position over several decades of reflection in the following works: Ecstatic 
Naturalism: Signs of the World (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), Nature’s Self: 
Our Journey from Origin to Spirit (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), Nature’s Religion 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), and Nature’s Sublime: An Essay in Aesthetic 
Naturalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013). For a critical and concise introduction to 
Corrington’s thought, see Wesley J. Wildman, “Corrington’s Ecstatic Naturalism in Light of the 
Scientific Study of Religion,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 34, no. 1 (2013): 3-16.  
10 Donald A. Crosby, “Naturism as a Form of Religious Naturalism,” Zygon 38, no. 1 (2003): 117. 
For a fuller exposition, see Donald A. Crosby, A Religion of Nature (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 2002).  
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right; it is sacred in its capacity for supporting meaningful and valuable 
experiences.  
 Dewey likely would further argue naturism makes too much of the nature-
culture, natural-artificial distinction and for this reason is an example of what he 
called, in reference to his contemporary George Santayana’s views, “broken-
backed” naturalism.11 Moreover, naturism sets up nature as the ultimate religious 
object. With this declaration Crosby commits the philosophical fallacy of making 
static that which is a dynamic and processive event.12 This fallacy seems to run 
even more rampant through philosophers’ religious formulations, which are 
perhaps too closely modeled on the historical religions. Finally, Dewey would 
hardly find nature in and of itself, apart from specific situations, intrinsically 
valuable and deserving of our devotion. Nature can be brutal, destructive, and 
uncaring toward our every need and desire. It is in those moments when one is 
fully attuned to nature’s moods and rhythms, channeling them positively for the 
betterment of experience, that nature qua experience qua part of one’s very self 
obtains intrinsic value. For these reasons, Crosby’s naturism appears to be simply 
a naturalization of traditional (dualistic, egoic) Christian themes and concepts.13 
Thomas Jefferson created a similar, though considerably less sophisticated, kind 
                                                        
11 “Half-Hearted Naturalism” (1927), LW 3: 73-81. This article was Dewey’s reply to George 
Santayana’s critique of his naturalism as “half-hearted,” a criticism Santayana made by claiming 
Dewey’s view privileged one perspective above others. Dewey replied that Santayana’s naturalism, 
by making a rigid bifurcation between nature and humanity, was “broken-backed.”  
12 Victor Kestenbaum is guilty of making the same error in regards to his interpretation of 
Deweyan ideals. Review the argument of Chapter 3 for more details.  
13 Walter Gulick, “Outlining a Religion of Nature: The Work of Donald Crosby,” Tradition and 
Discovery: The Journal of the Polanyi Society 42, no. 2: 17. 
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of religious naturalism when he stripped the Bible of its miracle stories in the 
early 19th century.    
 Dewey’s religious naturalism should also be seen as distinct from the 
scientific religious naturalism promulgated by biologist Ursula Goodenough.14 
Claiming to be stripped of needless theological baggage (though her language 
betrays this claim at several turns), Goodenough describes a “Covenant with 
Mystery in the presence of apparently unanswerable questions” as the natural 
root of the religious impulse.15 Goodenough’s method is primarily descriptive; 
she elegantly describes complex scientific narratives of what humans are and how 
we got here, to which she believes the appropriate religious response is humility, 
awe, and desire for communion with nature. We are a part of nature and nature is 
a part of us, informing our virtues and mindful relations to others, ourselves, and 
the ecosystems we belong to. With this much Dewey would be in full agreement; 
Goodenough’s sentiments mirror his own advocacy of expressing piety and moral 
behavior toward all of nature. But Dewey’s natural piety is not the sort of passive 
reverence or submissiveness endorsed by Goodenough.  
 Dewey further parts ways with Goodenough when she leaves the door 
open for transcendent experiences of God, even the personal God of traditional 
theism. Goodenough admits she “regard[s] as unnecessarily constrained a 
definition of religious naturalism that disallows theistic concepts considered 
                                                        
14 Ursula Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
15 Ursula Goodenough, “Religious Naturalism and Naturalizing Morality,” Zygon 38, no. 1 
(2003): 102. 
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incompatible with philosophical naturalism.”16 It is for this reason that she 
deliberately brands her version of religious naturalism as non-philosophical. For 
Dewey, this form of religious naturalism would be a contradiction in terms. A 
fully naturalistic approach to religion is both descriptive and prescriptive. It tells 
us what to do because it is a more accurate description of what is. Dewey’s 
religious naturalism is vitally concerned that uncritically held beliefs, such as 
nature’s sovereignty, nature’s intrinsic sacredness, or the supernaturalistic 
leanings of personal theism, could prevent individuals and thus society from 
responding adaptively to novel experiences and problems. These shortcomings 
render Goodenough’s religious naturalism not only non-philosophical, but non-
religious and unscientific to boot.17 
  Process and change are unavoidable features of the natural universe. They 
are also fundamental traits of human experience. We change nature with our 
every thought and action, just as nature changes us. This is the golden rule of 
ecology: organism and environment, self and nature are one. Privileging a single 
aspect of this integrated unit over the other, whether ontologically, 
epistemologically, or axiologically, is to fall into the trap of egoic thinking. 
Consequently, it is important to keep in mind as we move forward in our 
appraisal of Dewey’s religious naturalism that nature, like religion, is best 
thought of as a verb, not as a noun or adjective. Nature is not a static being or 
object to be honored and worshiped passively. Nature is an event, a disposition, a 
                                                        
16 Ibid., 103.  
17 At least as Dewey defined these terms, which is our concern here; see Chapter 1 for a review of 
their meanings.  
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skill within us to be developed and actively exercised. This active understanding 
of nature shares more in common with certain Eastern religious naturalisms than 
it does with their Western counterparts, a point that is further explored in 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 below.  
 
Classical Pragmatists on the Religious Question 
 
 
 The connection between Dewey’s philosophical views with those of his 
pragmatist colleagues Charles Sanders Peirce and William James has been noted 
at various points in the dissertation. So far, no mention has been made of either 
Peirce’s or James’s religious views, however, and so it will serve our task of 
further clarifying Dewey’s religious thought if we were to view it in relation to the 
wider circle of influence under which it was formed.18 Neither Peirce nor James 
can be considered a religious naturalist of the same pedigree as Dewey, yet the 
stance each thinker adopted in deciding religious matters was firmly marked by 
commitments to antifoundationalism, empiricism, fallibilism, instrumentalism, 
and pluralism in matters of inquiry (commitments not wholly shared by Crosby 
and Goodenough, to provide a point of contrast). Pragmatist approaches to 
religion are all marked by a deep appreciation of the cultural and historical 
situatedness of religious beliefs and practices, an abiding concern for connecting 
religious concepts to lived social reality, and a critical open-mindedness when it 
comes to analyzing and evaluating religious experiences. Dewey’s criticisms of 
                                                        
18 George Herbert Mead and C. I. Lewis, the other classical pragmatists discussed in some detail 
throughout this study, did not write extensively on religion and so they are not mentioned here.   
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traditional institutionalized and supernaturalistic forms of religion were fueled 
by these convictions.  
 Peirce was born into a privileged and well-respected family on September 
10, 1839 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His father was Benjamin Peirce, the 
distinguished Harvard mathematician and astronomer, and his mother, Sarah 
Hunt Mills, was the daughter of a prominent senator. Peirce died in isolation and 
poverty on April 19, 1914 on a farm near Milford, Pennsylvania. The stark 
contrast of circumstances between Peirce’s beginnings and his end make up one 
of the more interesting intellectual biographies of recent memory. Despite his 
lifelong lack of stable academic employment, in the period from about 1857 until 
his death, Peirce published roughly 12,000 printed pages, with a further 80,000 
handwritten pages making up his unpublished manuscripts. Although by no 
means a household name in scholarly circles, many consider Peirce among the 
greatest of American philosophers, if not in fact the greatest.  
 A known polymath who would make significant contributions to several 
fields of study, including astronomy, philosophy, phenomenology, logic, 
linguistics, and semiotics, Peirce graduated from Harvard College in 1859, the 
same year Darwin published the Origin of Species and John Dewey was born. 
Formally trained in the science of chemistry, Peirce worked as a field scientist 
with the US Coast and Geodetic Survey for three decades. He held a research 
position at the Harvard Observatory when still young and later taught logic and 
mathematics at the newly founded Johns Hopkins University from where Dewey 
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would obtain his doctorate. Peirce is considered the founder of the school, style, 
or method of philosophy known as pragmatism, though Peirce himself traced 
pragmatism’s origins to Scottish philosopher and educationalist Alexander Bain, 
and later renamed his own philosophy pragmaticism—a term he claimed was 
ugly enough to keep it safe from kidnapping, in order to distant it from the 
pragmatist philosophy popularized by his friend and benefactor William James.  
 Peirce set down the basic presuppositions of pragmatism in two seminal 
articles published over a two year period from 1877 to 1878, “The Fixation of 
Belief” 19 and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.”20 The second paper’s title was an 
explicit nod to and criticism of Descartes’s notion of “clear and distinct” ideas 
that was foundational to the beginnings of modern philosophy. Peirce saw the 
Cartesian criteria of clarity and distinctness as deficient in several respects and 
sought to supplement them with a third condition of meaningfulness, which has 
come to be known as the “pragmatic maxim.” In a tangle of dense prose, Peirce’s 
maxim states: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception 
of the effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”21 What this means is 
that the meaning of a proposition or concept lies precisely in its practical effects, 
in the consequences that issue from our using it. To give a common example that 
                                                        
19 Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 (1867-1893), 
ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 109-
123. 
20 Ibid., 124-141. 
21 From “The Maxim of Pragmatism,” in Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected 
Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-1913), ed. the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1998), 133. 
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Peirce himself used: when we say that something is “hard,” what we really mean 
is that most other things will not scratch it. The proper method to fix beliefs, 
given the pragmatic criterion of meaningfulness, is by a self-corrective process of 
inquiry in which a community of interpreters eventually converges on truth over 
time and, importantly, only for a time. All beliefs, all established “truths”—
scientific, religious, or otherwise—are fallible and open to criticism and future 
correction. We see this reflected today in the scientific community’s commitment 
to falsifiability as a condition for determining meaningful scientific theories from 
invalid or pseudoscientific ones.       
 Though highly critical of the Cartesian quest for secure knowledge, Peirce 
still believed metaphysical questions could be broached in a meaningful, critical 
fashion. Metaphysics, under the Peircean program (as will be the case for 
Dewey), becomes the study of the generic traits of reality as those traits make 
themselves known in experience. Following this procedure, Peirce settled on 
three generic traits or metaphysical postulates: (1) tychism, the thesis that 
spontaneous chance is really operative in the universe; (2) synechism, the thesis 
that deep continuity exists between and among the world’s various components; 
and (3) agapism, the thesis that sympathy or love is basic to the universe’s 
evolutionary development and expression. These three theses comprise Peirce’s 
unique evolutionary cosmology and are mirrored in three fundamental categories 
of Firstness (possibility), Secondness (actuality), and Thirdness (necessity or 
law), which, in the realm of experience, manifest as quality of feeling, element of 
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reaction, and intellectual representation, respectively. These three conceptual 
and experiential categories, in turn, are related to the triadic structure of Peirce’s 
semiotics which consists of multitrajectory relations between signs, objects, and 
interpretants.    
 Peirce applied his complex yet elegantly simple system to all subject 
matters of human inquiry, religion included. His most immediate contribution to 
philosophy of religion lies in his “Humble Argument” for God’s reality as 
presented in the 1908 article “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.”22 In 
this paper Peirce examines the attractive force of the idea of God, concluding that 
human nature instinctively leans toward it. Peirce asserts that belief in God is 
simply irresistible to anyone who through mindful “Musement,” or the “pure play 
of ideas,” comes to contemplate God’s possibility. The “God Hypothesis” is 
basically an abductive inference arising from the human power of “guessing,” 
which Peirce argues is analogous to animal instinct.  
 Early on in the paper Peirce makes an important conceptual distinction 
between an argument and argumentation. An argument is “any process of 
thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief,” while the term 
argumentation refers to an argument that proceeds “upon definitely formulated 
premises.”23 As Peirce makes clear, his Neglected Argument is to be understood 
as an argument, in contrast to the traditional arguments or “proofs” for God's 
existence (e.g., ontological, cosmological, teleological) offered by medieval, 
                                                        
22 Ibid., 434-450. 
23 Ibid., 435.   
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modern, and even some contemporary philosophers, which are actually 
argumentations.  
 Peirce further made a distinction between reality and existence that is 
useful when discussing religious matters. Broadly speaking, reality encompasses 
what exists but is not synonymous with existence. For something to be real, it 
must have properties sufficient to identify it, whether or not those properties are 
attributed to it by someone. At the most fundamental level, the existent is what 
interacts with things in a space-time environment. God, however, is not a spatio-
temporal object, nor is God to be thought of as a Supreme Being. Thus, for Peirce, 
it would be absurd for someone to say that God exists. Consequently, his 
Neglected Argument is not an argument for God's existence, but one for God's 
reality. One would not be wrong to detect hints of Buchler’s thesis of ontological 
parity here; Buchler was influenced by Peirce even more than he was by Dewey.24  
 The goal of Peirce’s Neglected Argument was to put forth an argument he 
felt should be instinctually obvious to all minds, educated or “humble.” The core 
of the argument lies in Peirce’s theory of hypothesis and explanation. That is, the 
God Hypothesis, if it is to be a proper conclusion, must pass through three 
successive stages of logical inquiry: retroduction (i.e., abductive inference), 
deduction, and induction.  Unfortunately, Peirce does not delve into much detail 
on how these three stages apply to the Neglected Argument, yet he does conclude 
that scientific inquiry requires all hypotheses be verified by testing their 
                                                        
24 Buchler wrote his dissertation on Peirce, which was later published as Charles Peirce’s 
Empiricism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939).  
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implications—their practical effects—in actual experience. Despite the fact that 
this seems prima facie impossible in the case of the God Hypothesis, Peirce’s 
turning to lived experience as the final court of appeal for deciding religious 
questions helps us to understand Dewey’s own experiential starting point. As 
pragmatists, both Peirce and Dewey preferred to think of religion as a universal 
sentiment and way of life, rather than as a matter of propositional belief. In 
Peirce’s words: “It is absurd to say that Religion is a mere belief. You might as 
well call society a belief, or politics a belief or civilization a belief. Religion is a life 
and can be identified with a belief only provided that belief be a living belief.”25 
 William James was born on January 11, 1842 in New York City, to Henry 
James, Sr., an independently wealthy enthusiast of Swedenborgian theology, and 
Mary Walsh James. He died on August 26, 1910 with his intellectual legacy 
secured as the “Father of American psychology.” The James family was 
intellectually active and cosmopolitan, moving frequently between America and 
Europe, with the children learning to speak several languages while still young. 
Thanks to the James parents’ encouragement of their children’s autonomy, the 
James siblings would go on to lead extremely interesting and accomplished lives. 
James’s brother was the prominent novelist Henry James, and his sister the 
noted diarist Alice James.  
 Early on James showed a strong talent for drawing that resulted in his 
securing an apprenticeship at the studio of William Morris Hunt, the leading 
                                                        
25 Charles S. Peirce, Selected Writings, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York: Dover, 1966), 183.  
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portraitist of mid-19th century New England. A wandering and highly creative 
mind, James soon switched courses of study from art to science, enrolling in 
Harvard University’s Lawrence Scientific School, where Peirce’s father taught 
graduate-level mathematics. James later received an M.D., his only academic 
degree, from Harvard Medical School in 1869 where he would go on to teach 
anatomy and physiology. During his medical school studies, James took a leave to 
go on a yearlong expedition collecting zoological specimens in the Amazon with 
distinguished biologist Louis Aggassiz. This trip and much of his academic 
studies was interrupted by severe bouts of neurasthenic illness, including what 
James would take to calling his “soul-sickness.”    
 In 1890, James published The Principles of Psychology, a monumental 
synthesis of comparative scholarship and his most influential work. The work 
included extensive and innovative treatments of human emotion, habit, will, and 
the “stream of consciousness,” an influential psychological notion of James’s 
personal creation that led to the formulation of his pragmatic notion of truth: 
“Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events.”26 Though 
The Principles established him as the premier scientific psychologist of the 
English-speaking world, James remained deeply interested in philosophical and 
religious matters and would go on to teach and publish voluminously in these 
areas.      
 Medically trained, James had a keen understanding of the biological roots 
                                                        
26 William James, Pragmatism and Other Writings (New York: Penguin, 2000), 135.  
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of human thought and action. According to neuroscientist Jay Schulkin, James’s 
main contribution to intellectual history is his psychobiology (a discipline known 
today as behavioral neuroscience), particularly his claim that human ideation is 
subserved by neural functioning and itself serves mainly instrumental purposes 
of homeostatic self-regulation.27 The controversial truth implicit in James’s 
psychobiological approach is that ideas and actions are to be judged largely on 
the basis of their functional utility. It is on this point that Jamesian (as well as 
Deweyan) pragmatism faces its most damning criticism—namely, that it is a de 
facto relativism that weakens individual responsibility to the collective or, worse, 
justifies Darwinist approaches to social and political affairs. James was sensitive 
to this criticism and went to great lengths to show how human progress crucially 
depends upon cultivating habits of thought and conduct that satisfy individual 
needs but at the same time support the entire social edifice, an insight that 
greatly influenced Dewey’s democratic theory.    
 James’s contributions to the philosophical study of religion, over and 
above those implied by his biological understanding of human mentality, can be 
found in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897), The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), and A Pluralistic Universe (1910). In 
the title essay of the first work, “The Will to Believe,” James defends the rational 
right of individuals, when presented with a “live hypothesis”—basically, a 
hypothesis that appeals as a real possibility—to adopt the stance of belief without 
                                                        
27 Schulkin, Naturalism and Pragmatism, 172. 
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sufficient evidence or justification. For James, this right covered not just 
everyday hypotheses (such as choosing to believe a loud noise is an intruder), but 
religious ones as well (believing God listens and is responsive to one’s prayers, for 
instance). James was not interested in defending the truths of any particular 
religious tradition; his concern, rather, was to defend the rationality of adopting 
religious faith in certain moments of intense existential gravity—in those 
moments where a decision simply must be made. For this reason, James’s “will to 
believe” is often closely associated with the famous “wager” of 17th century 
French philosopher Blaise Pascal, but perhaps with one important difference: the 
coping mechanism benefits of James’s pragmatic wager are realized even if it 
turns out that God does not exist. This is because, as John E. Smith points out, 
“The ‘faith state’ is both psychological and biological; it performs an essential 
function since it is a foundation on which men live. Religion in this sense endures 
and will continue to do so precisely because it meets a universal need.”28 
 In The Varieties, James argues that the religious hypothesis is lent a 
further level of support by the results of careful psychological studies carried out 
on subjects of religious conversion and mystical experiences. He sums up the 
results of these findings thusly: “Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining 
ourselves to what is common and generic, we have in the fact that the conscious 
person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, 
a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and 
                                                        
28 John E. Smith, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 163. Emphasis original. 
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objectively true as far as it goes.”29 While to many interpreters mention of this 
“wider self” smacked of an otherworldly supernaturalism out of touch with 
James’s professed pragmatism, for James it merely pointed to the reality of a 
pluralistic universe broader than the one presented to us by the physical sciences. 
It was the job of a more coherent and comprehensive empiricism, one that 
avoided the narrow focus on sense experience of the early British empiricists and 
their philosophical heirs the logical positivists, to probe these hidden dimensions 
of reality.  
 Reality, for James, was synonymous with “pure experience,” his thesis that 
the relations between things are at least as real as the things themselves as 
evidenced by the effects they produce within everyday experience. According to 
James’s “radical empiricism,” reality qua pure experience is fundamentally 
relational in character, with the vitality of its dynamic relations—conjunctive as 
well as disjunctive—capable of immediate perception through feeling. The wider 
self that these felt relations point to are the universal phenomenological facts of 
human experience in its religious modality.30 Experience reveals the religious to 
be continuous with the world of nature. Dewey’s principle of continuity makes 
this same point. James’s radical empiricism and pluralism lead to a radically 
ecological conception of reality, one whose actual and possible, present and 
absent features are entangled in a joint fate and destiny. This is a theme Dewey 
                                                        
29 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), 505. Emphasis original. 
30 For a closer look at these themes in James’s philosophy, see Charlene Haddock Seigfried, 
William James’s Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1990). 
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picks up from James who inherited it from Peirce, though each expressed it in a 
distinctive way.    
 
An Ecologist Among the Philosophers (of Religion) 
 
 
 With its larger philosophical context better established, we now return to 
our assessment of Dewey’s religious thought. At the end of Chapter 2 I offered a 
definition of religion rooted in Dewey’s ecological naturalism and religion’s 
double-barreled etymology. I repeat that definition here:  
 Religion is living enactment of the ideal self through one’s skillful perceptual attunement 
 to the ideal action possibilities of nature’s orders that harmonize the actual self, bringing 
 it to ideal consummatory fulfillment.  
 
We have already discussed the manner in which action possibilities (affordances) 
and consummatory fulfillments (gestalts) emerge from the ongoing organic 
transactions between skilled selves and nature. We have also examined the bodily 
feelings and emotions that reveal ideal affordances and gestalts in particular 
situations. We have yet to address in specific detail the ultimate ontological or 
existential status of the “ideal self” that obtains when these various factors are 
brought into cosmic alignment in a dynamic event of lived experience. In order to 
do this effectively, we again will rely on comparisons between Dewey’s views and 
others. 
 Most work in philosophy of religion, in both the modern and 
contemporary periods, has proceeded from a limited comparative standpoint. 
This is in some measure understandable, given the frequently parochial nature of 
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traditional religions where contrastive, potentially rival accounts are discouraged. 
It is from within traditional religious frameworks that the majority of 
philosophers of religion still operate, as the table of contents lining most 
introductory works to the field show.31 Moreover, it is difficult—if not 
impossible—to compare religious ideas across cultures without a coherent 
heuristic theory of what religion is, yet philosophers of religion largely tend to 
assume a theory of religion rather than articulate one explicitly. It is thus 
important to note, as Paul Griffiths has, the immense conceptual difficulties 
facing even the prospect of “comparative philosophy of religion,” given that what 
is denoted by “religion” and “philosophy of religion” are “rooted in historical 
developments specific to Europe since the seventeenth century.”32 Raimon 
Panikkar argues even more boldly that the very notion of comparative philosophy 
is self-contradictory, for there exists no neutral basis outside the philosophies 
being compared by which to assess the cogency of any comparisons.33  
 Dewey likely was aware of such conceptual difficulties, and for this reason 
ventured not to define religion, preferring instead to discuss the religious 
qualities of experience. Comparison of these qualities, defined in terms of their 
felt effects, seems to more easily traverse the idiosyncrasies of social and cultural 
location, for despite all our differences, humans at least boast a common 
                                                        
31 There are a few notable exceptions to this rule. They were addressed in the discussion of 
contemporary philosophy of religion’s “crisis” in Chapter 2.   
32 Paul J. Griffiths, “Comparative Philosophy of Religion,” in Blackwell Companion to Philosophy 
of Religion, eds. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010), 718.   
33 Raimon Panikkar, “Aporias in the Comparative Philosophy of Religion,” Man and World 13, 
no. 3 (1980): 357-383. 
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evolutionary history and corporeal-affective constitution. Contemporary 
philosopher of religion Mark Wynn has leveraged this biological insight to argue 
for a greater role for the emotions as “data” for philosophy of religion, as opposed 
to its traditional focus on cognitive beliefs and propositional statements, which 
pose greater obstacles of translation.34 Emotions, even though they also admit 
variations between cultures and individuals, are highly relevant as tools of 
discovery in our appraisal of the problematic situations that confront us daily. As 
we saw in the last chapter, the approach Wynn outlines echoes that of Dewey in 
his early Psychology, where he presents a rich and compelling analysis of the 
phenomenology of certain bodily feelings and their centrality for appraising and 
resolving what we might call “religious situations.”   
 Philosophy of religion, conceived along Deweyan lines as a specialized 
form of problem-solving, is intrinsically multidisciplinary and comparative. It is 
accordingly from a multidisciplinary comparative perspective that any 
philosophy of religion, including Dewey’s, must be considered and judged.35 This 
is the normative flipside of the descriptive unity of knowledge and action 
indicated by ecological thinking and extolled in E. O. Wilson’s frank advice to 
students in the information age: “Profession-bent students should be helped to 
understand that in the twenty-first century the world will not be run by those who 
possess mere information alone. The world will henceforth be run by 
                                                        
34 Mark Wynn, “Valuing the World: The Emotions as Data For the Philosophy of Religion,” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (2002): 97-113. 
35 The need and rationale for greater multidisciplinarity and comparativeness in philosophy of 
religion, and philosophy more generally, was introduced in Chapter 2. For a sustained defense, 
see Wildman, Religious Philosophy.    
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synthesizers, people able to put together the right information at the right time, 
think critically about it, and make importance choices wisely.”36 That at least 
some of these choices will have religious dimensions to them is beyond question.    
 Before proceeding further, we should pause to reflect a final time on the 
purpose and aims of our inquiry. This study was undertaken partly as a form of 
resistance to traditional philosophy religion with its egoic presuppositions, most 
of which are rendered suspect by the turn to ecological thinking—but perhaps 
most especially the view of the self as an atomic, autonomous, rational ego. 
Contemporary philosophers of religion, in lockstep with their modern forebears, 
are inclined to approach philosophy of religion’s problems from within the 
perspective of this profoundly deficient anthropology. Religious meaning and 
value are viewed largely as prefixed, as located apart from nature and the self, 
and as revealed or made available primarily through a propositional, cognitivist 
faith. In a similar manner, religious experience, if interpreted positively, is taken 
to involve the awareness or perception of a transcendent, eternal reality (an 
object, entity, or person) and justifiable by internal standards alone. If 
interpreted negatively, religious experiences are viewed as fully determined by 
the experiencer’s cultural context. In other words, they are conceptual, and thus 
potentially illusory, in nature.  
 A Deweyan critique of traditional approaches to religious externality and 
religious inwardness argues they are innately disposed to sever our primordial 
                                                        
36 E. O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 269.   
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feelings of reciprocity with nature, while further masking our organic 
interrelatedness with the larger human community, including our future selves. 
Dewey’s ecological naturalism denies the dualisms of subject-object, fact-value, 
nature-culture, and ideal-real that traditional approaches to religious externality 
and religious inwardness adopt, whether explicitly or implicitly, as guiding 
premises. Traditional approaches to religious ultimacy tend to follow the same 
dualistic structure.     
 In contrast to customary approaches to ultimacy, Dewey saw that it is only 
by means of our deep perceptual attunement to the ideal action possibilities of 
nature that harmonize the rhythmic tensions of our needful, lacking selves that 
religious ultimacy (though he never spoke in these precise terms) can be engaged 
and actualized at all. That philosophers of religion would find Dewey’s ecological 
reconstruction of religion capable of handling the problem of ultimacy is 
doubtful; at least not as ultimate realities, concerns, or values typically are 
understood. Dewey’s philosophy, we must remember, is inherently perspectival 
and context-driven. On account of this fact, Alan Ryan persuasively states that 
“the language of higher and lower, immediate and ultimate was what Dewey 
always tried to escape.”37 In Ryan’s view, to graft Dewey’s broad, horizonal 
approach onto the vertical language of ultimacy leaves us with a severely skewed 
map of his philosophical terrain. Ryan makes a powerful argument, yet there are 
various ways of conceiving ultimacy, especially as far as religion is concerned. 
                                                        
37 Ryan, Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, 249.  
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And, as we will see below, Dewey’s ecological approach combines features of 
many of them in unique and compelling ways.   
 
 
Dewey’s Ecology of Ultimacy 
 
 
 Conceptions of ultimacy vary greatly among philosophers and between 
schools. In fact, the term itself is not universally recognized or employed, so 
making even a rough list of conventional approaches to ultimacy carries with it 
certain difficulties. And yet a number of philosophers of religion have found the 
notion of ultimacy remarkably useful as a comparative category on account of its 
ability to bridge disparate religious visions and cultural worldviews. For instance, 
Robert Cummings Neville argues that ultimacy functions well as a sort of logical 
placeholder into which different determinate conceptions of the ultimate can be 
hospitably housed.38 Ninian Smart has spoken similarly about the important role 
of placeholder concepts for the field of religious studies.39 Ultimacy’s wide 
functional appeal lies in its ability to incorporate theistic and atheistic, monist 
and pluralist, religious, philosophical, and perhaps even scientific conceptions of 
its intended subject matter under a single category. Effective religious dialogue 
and comparative philosophical analysis crucially depend on the formation and 
collaborative use of such kinds of categories. 
 From a purely etymological standpoint, ultimacy, which derives from the 
                                                        
38 On this point, see Robert Cummings Neville, On the Scope and Truth of Theology: Theology as 
Symbolic Engagement (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006), 5-7.  
39 Ninian Smart, “A Contemplation of Absolutes,” in God, Truth, and Reality: Essays in Honor of 
John Hick, ed. Arvind Sharma (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1993), 181. 
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Latin ultimare, meaning “come to an end,” is connected with a sense of finality. 
Patrick Bourgeois gives tight expression to this sense of ultimacy: “The use of the 
word ‘ultimacy’…does not refer to an absolute being or substance. Rather, it 
means the end of a process, or the most far-reaching, the all-pervasive or all-
inclusive, or final point.”40 Provided the classic symmetry expressed between 
beginnings and endings, however, ultimacy is also associated with primality. This 
symmetry is expressed neatly in the Gestalt rules governing perceptual 
organization, as it is in the law of “eternal return” advanced by Friedrich 
Nietzsche and the Stoics before him. Philosophers throughout history have 
routinely sought to establish the primal or final nature of phenomena—Plato had 
the ideal realm of Pure Forms, Kant his noumenal world, Hegel the Absolute 
Spirit, Ludwig Wittgenstein language, John Rawls the principles of justice, and 
Brand Blanshard satisfactory experiences. The list goes on indefinitely and spans 
ontological, epistemological, and axiological approaches to first and last things.  
 Primality and finality can be understood in terms of a linear sequence, as 
just described, or in terms of conclusiveness and importance. It is immediately 
obvious then that not only do philosophers and religionists make claims about 
ultimacy, but scientists do as well. As an example, physical chemist Peter Atkins 
is making a type of ultimacy claim when he asserts “science is the only path to 
understanding,” and “science is limitless in scope.”41 Atkins is joined by 
                                                        
40 Patrick L. Bourgeois, The Religious Within Experience and Existence: A Phenomenological 
Investigation (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1990), 10, n. 4. 
41 Peter Atkins, “Atheism and Science,” in Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, eds. Philip 
Clayton and Zachary Sampson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 124. 
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evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins who argues in his classic work The Blind 
Watchmaker that “the theory of evolution by cumulative natural selection is the 
only theory…capable of explaining the existence of organized complexity.”42 
Furthermore, both theorists are arguing against the viability of alternate religious 
ultimacy claims that view God or other Supreme Being as creatively interacting 
with the humans in addition to having created the entire physical universe. In 
this case, ultimacy would seem to be on the side of Atkins and Dawkins, as views 
of divine creation and action, although ever increasing in sophistication and 
complexity, are undermined with virtually each scientific advance.  
 As the statements just provided illustrate, ultimacy claims are not only 
about the presumed reality (or unreality) of things, but are intrinsically bound up 
with individual and communal values, desires, and choices. It is by this 
recognition that the more inclusive term “ultimate concern,” in contrast to the 
potentially infinite range of determinate ultimates, entered the Western 
philosophical and religious lexicon. Specifically, it is to German-born American 
theologian Paul Tillich that we owe the phrase. A popular preacher and speaker, 
in addition to being a highly syncretic religious thinker, Tillich sought ways to 
defend what he saw as the fundamental truths of religion from enemies laying 
siege to it from opposite sides. First, he wanted to preserve genuine religion from 
the threat of meaninglessness brought on by the rapidly expanding scientific 
picture of humanity. Second, Tillich was enthusiastically opposed to literalist and 
                                                        
42 Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe 
Without Design (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 317. 
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inerrantist approaches to religious language and symbols, which are typically 
more reactionary than substantive in their argumentation. One finds 
unmistakable echoes here with Dewey’s approach to religion in A Common Faith, 
which, in a letter Dewey wrote to Max Otto, he explained he wrote “for the people 
who feel inarticulately they have the essence of the religious with them and yet 
are repelled by the religions and are confused—primarily for them, secondarily 
for the ‘liberals’ to help them realize how inconsistent they are.”43 Like Tillich, 
Dewey was speaking out against religious conservativism and militant atheism. 
Each theorist sought to locate a wholesome middle path between these extremes.    
 Against the many threats facing it, Tillich chose to reconceptualize religion 
in terms of an individual’s fundamental concerns about the meaning of life. Every 
person, whether they consider themselves to be religious or not, has some 
concern that is ultimate for her; in a certain sense, then, everyone is “religious.” 
In a socially and culturally mixed world, these concerns range from things like 
money, security, sex, and fame, to intellectual and artistic fulfillment. Tillich 
channels the psychological acumen of Freud when, reflecting on this situation, he 
states, “whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him.”44 Here, once 
again, Tillich’s connection to Dewey shines through, for he is essentially 
describing the religious as a natural attitude or quality that can attach itself to 
every aspect of human life. Wesley Wildman has refined Tillich’s inclusive notion 
                                                        
43 Letter from John Dewey to Max Otto (1935), LW 9: 455. 
44 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Volume One (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
1951), 211.  
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in a Deweyan fashion under the heading of “ultimacy experiences,”45 a category 
that applies not only to the intense experiences of meaning and value reported by 
the mystics of the world’s religions, but to the secular correlates of such 
experiences described by modern positive psychologies.46 I cannot do justice to 
Wildman’s work on this topic here, which includes significant scientific and 
logical analysis of a variety of intense human experiences—he lists “religious,” 
“spiritual,” “vivid,” “ultimacy,” and “anomalous” experiences, among others. The 
take-away point is that there is not a single category or fixed type of intense 
experience; the qualities that pervade and suffuse intensity show up in 
experiences of various kinds.     
 As a philosopher of process, of events, Dewey refused to speak in terms of 
primality or finality. He rejected as invaluable metaphysical speculation that 
could not be answered by empirical methods, such as that of the universe’s 
creation or the possibility of an afterlife. By focusing on first and last things, the 
classic accounts of ultimacy found in the world’s philosophies and religions 
commit three errors associated with the “philosophical fallacy” Dewey spoke out 
against his entire career: (1) they set up an artificial (secondary) distinction that 
                                                        
45 Wesley J. Wildman, Religious and Spiritual Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 104-143.  
46 Take, for instance, the following description of a positively-valenced experience that 
psychologist Abraham Maslow described in terms of self-transcendence: “An episode, or a spurt 
in which the powers of the person come together in a particularly efficient and intensely enjoyable 
way, and in which he is more integrated and less split, more open for experience, more 
idiosyncratic, more perfectly expressive or spontaneous, or fully functioning, more creative, more 
humorous, more ego-transcending, more independent of his lower needs, etc. He becomes in 
these episodes more truly himself, more perfectly actualizing his potentialities, closer to the core 
of his Being, more fully human.” See Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1970), 97.  
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betrays (primary) experience; (2) they fail to check their formulations against 
future experiences for confirmation or refutation; and, as a result, (3) their 
practical utility is limited. In Experience and Nature Dewey argued that the only 
remedy against these errors was a return to, and sensitive appreciation of, the 
ultimacy (one of the few instances where he uses the term) of ordinary, everyday 
experience:  
 Reference to the primacy and ultimacy of the material of ordinary experience protects us, 
 in the first place, from creating artificial problems which deflect the energy and attention 
 of philosophers from the real problems that arise out of actual subject-matter. In the 
 second place, it provides a check or test for the conclusions of philosophic inquiry; it is a 
 constant reminder that we must replace them, as secondary reflective products, in the 
 experience out of which they arose, so that they may be confirmed or modified by the new 
 order and clarity they introduce into it, and the new significantly experienced objects for 
 which they furnish a method. In the third place, in seeing how they thus function in 
 further experiences, the philosophical results themselves achieve empirical value; they 
 are what they contribute to the common experience of man, instead of being curiosities to 
 be deposited, with appropriate labels, in a metaphysical museum.47 
 
 Dewey’s view of nature as constituted by dynamically unfolding events, his 
focus on the flow of lived experiencing, and his transactional approach to the self, 
make his philosophy difficult to reconcile with traditional understandings of what 
is ultimate. That Dewey can handle ultimate values in Tillich’s sense, however, 
would seem a foregone conclusion. An organism’s adjustment to its surroundings 
is properly viewed through an ultimate lens when that process of self-
actualization takes on ideal, consummatory meaning, and results in the positive 
expansion of capabilities—a new and better self, in a sense. Many religious 
converts describe their conversion experiences in a manner strikingly similar to 
this, a fact not lost on Dewey, who surely read James’s Varieties in addition to his 
                                                        
47 EN (1925), LW 1: 26. Italics added.  
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other works.   
 There are, however, several instances where Dewey’s ecological approach 
diverges from Tillich’s intentional account of ultimacy. For Dewey, to speak of 
ultimacy in terms of a personal “concern” is much too cognitive and egocentric; 
dynamic selves are frequently unconscious of what is lacking in their present 
situation and are most certainly ignorant at the outset as to what will restore self-
nature, organism-environment balance and harmonic functioning. In most cases, 
this would only result from a deliberate, controlled process of inquiry—not 
necessarily or wholly cognitive—which includes imaginative—again, not 
necessarily or wholly cognitive—projection of an ideal course of action and 
eventual confirmation or falsification of that proposed ideal by its existential fit to 
the situation—falsified ideals being shown to not have been really ideals at all.  
 I say “not necessarily or wholly cognitive,” because in the religious case 
inquiry has less to do with thinking and rational analysis and more to do with 
feelings, which are often vague in their origins and prospective directions. For 
example, while I may know that the sandwich in my refrigerator will sate my 
midday hunger, I am considerably less able, at the cognitive level at least, to 
know what will quiet that creeping, disturbing feeling of something missing or 
being “off” in myself. This insight forms the foundation of the psychotherapeutic 
method of “focusing” developed by Eugene Gendlin, where the goal is for one to 
get in touch with their bodily felt sense to obtain new insights on the self, 
determine what is missing or lacking from one’s current situation, and stimulate 
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the healing process.48 In Deweyan terms, focusing can be viewed as a form of self-
inquiry or self-semiosis where one interprets their actual, current self in terms of 
possible ideal states of self. Further, as ideals are always “ideals for” a particular 
problematic situation, we must keep in mind that ultimacy, from a Deweyan 
perspective, is a temporally bound achievement; its effects are not absolute or 
permanent. The feelings and effects of ultimacy encounters may be partially 
retained in future states of the self as organic modifications, however, which, 
when unsettled, begin the process all over again as a new lacking self seeking 
unification and wholeness. Dewey speaks to this complicated point in the 1926 
essay “Affective Thought”: 
 Past experiences are retained so that they may be evoked and arranged when there is 
 need to use them in attaining the new end set by the needs of our affective nature. But the 
 retention is not intellectual. It is a matter of organic modifications, of change of 
 disposition, attitude, and habit. The “stuff” from which thinking draws its material in 
 satisfying need by establishing a new relation to the surroundings is found in what, with 
 some extension of the usual sense of the word, may be termed habits: namely, the 
 changes wrought in our ways of acting and undergoing by prior experiences. Thus the 
 material of thought all comes from the past, but its purpose and direction is future, the 
 development of a new environment as the condition of sustaining a new and more fully 
 integrated self.49 
 
 Tillich did comparative philosophers of religion a great service by 
clarifying the array of meanings ultimacy can take on in individual contexts. His 
particularist approach provides an important conceptual stabilizer to 
philosophical approaches seeking a universal account true for all cases. To date, 
the most comprehensive, but at the same time carefully nuanced, interrogation of 
religious ultimacy from a philosophical perspective is that born of the 
                                                        
48 Eugene T. Gendlin, Focusing (New York: Bantam Books, 1978). 
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Comparative Religious Ideas Project (CRIP) which was carried out at Boston 
University from 1995 to 1999.50 After close consideration of the world’s core 
religious texts and practices, the scholars of the CRIP found that the majority of 
religious approaches to ultimacy fall into one of two general types. The first views 
ultimacy in ontological terms of an ultimate reality—what is the highest, best, or 
“most real” thing or person—toward which religious devotion is rightly expressed, 
such as Brahman, Allah, Yahweh, Heaven, or the Dao. Yet, as the CRIP was also 
cautious to note, not all religions have gods; some religions, including most forms 
of Buddhism, eschew reference to ultimate realities altogether. Similarly, in a 
variety of Hindu systems of thought, ultimate reality is equated not with any 
object or entity, but with aksara, a sacred utterance that upholds the ritual order 
of the universe (such as Om). Finally, like certain acosmist philosophies, negative 
interpretations of beliefs and doctrines from the various religions can be taken to 
deny the ultimate reality of the world. 
 Many religious traditions, even those containing what can be taken as 
descriptions of ultimate reality within their sophisticated theologies, are inclined 
to set their focus on more anthropocentrically defined concerns. It is on the basis 
of such considerations that the second type of ultimacy identified by the CRIP is 
termed an “anthropological ultimate,” in order to distinguish it from the 
                                                        
50 The CRIP resulted in the publication of three multidisciplinary volumes on select topics in 
philosophy of religion: The Human Condition, Ultimate Realities, and Religious Truth, all edited 
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philosophies, see Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher, eds., Models of God and Alternative Ultimate 
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“ontological ultimate” of ultimate realities. As the scholars of the CRIP describe 
it: “if religion is first approached anthropocentrically, in terms of salvation, 
enlightenment, and release from suffering, ultimacy need not be construed 
ontologically but perhaps in terms of what is most sought. Indeed, perhaps what 
is ontologically ultimate is too far away to be religiously interesting to people 
dealing with their own existence.”51  
 Anthropological ultimates view human quests, paths, or purposes as 
religiously ultimate, such as the path to sagehood for Confucians, or that of the 
bodhisattva in Mahāyāna Buddhism who opts to postpone personal release from 
the cycle of suffering and rebirth until all other sentient beings can do the same. 
An analogous example from secular culture might be the rich businessperson 
who gives up her wealth and status to philanthropic efforts in the name of the 
“greater good.” Tillich’s ultimate concern seems to fit more neatly into the 
anthropological category of ultimacy, though it is connected, as the analysis of the 
CRIP points out, to ultimacy’s ontological side in important ways. For example, 
nothing is worth being the target of one’s ultimate concern and devotion if it is 
not, on some fundamental level, ontologically ultimate. As Tillich himself restates 
his original point: “Man is ultimately concerned about his being and meaning. ‘To 
be or not to be’ in this sense is a matter of ultimate, unconditional, total, and 
infinite concern. Man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he 
                                                        
51 Robert Cummings Neville and Wesley J. Wildman, “Introduction,” in Ultimate Realities, ed. 
Robert Cummings Neville (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 1. 
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belongs, from which he is separated, and for which he is longing.”52 The concerns 
for greater wealth and fame, then, though describable in the language of 
ultimacy, are revealed to be false ultimates upon more serious reflection.               
 Where does Dewey’s approach to the problem of ultimacy fit into the 
twofold scheme laid out by the CRIP? After all, the purpose of the present chapter 
is not to assess the plausibility and persuasiveness of all available models of 
ultimacy, but to show how Dewey’s religious naturalism can help us to rethink 
the meaning of ultimacy in ecologically valid terms. Dewey’s account of religious 
ultimacy turns out to be hybrid in nature, with some similarities to Tillich’s, but 
with significant differences also.  
 For Dewey, the ultimate concern for the self, which importantly only 
becomes a concern in a problematic existential situation, is that of enacting the 
ideal self, which consists of the optimal consummatory fulfillment of the creative 
lacks of the actual self that perpetually disrupt organism-environment integrity. 
Such consummatory fulfillment is only perceivable and made possible by one’s 
deep somatic and affective attunement to certain affordances of nature that take 
on ideal religious quality by virtue of their unifying, holistic functions and 
qualitative effects. This reestablished homeostatic gestalt-state is fragile and 
temporary; thus, it makes better sense to speak in terms of existence, which 
comes and goes and is specific to a person or group, than in terms of reality, 
which attempts to account for all existences, for all people, at all times. This is not 
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to imply a commitment to antirealism or strong social constructivism, however. If 
we must speak in terms of realism, Dewey’s approach to ultimacy can be 
considered a form of “onto-anthropological realism,” or in keeping with the 
terminology of this study, an “ecological realism.”53 
 Tom Burke has described ecological realism as a “dual-process” model 
which recognizes that the environment external to the brain and nervous system 
plays an active role in constituting and driving our experience, but also that the 
environmental conditions to which our experiences are ultimately responses 
equally depend on our organic constitution and physical capabilities. In other 
words, “experience is a function of the environment as much as of the 
organism.”54 I see no problem adding “existence” to Burke’s comments on 
“experience” just cited for the ecological framework of Dewey’s philosophy, 
reflected in the basic tenets of the enactivist and DEEDS research programs, 
views the traditional inner-outer and subjective-objective divisions as highly 
deficient from both empirical and phenomenological standpoints.  
 Religious ultimacy, under Dewey’s ecologically reconstructed perspective, 
consists of ideal events of self-consummation that are actualized in this world—
for there is no other world. Consummation is a term roughly synonymous with 
ultimacy, but with certain subtle differences. Both imply a sense of finality and 
completion. In Latin, ultimare means “come to and end,” while consummare 
means “bring to completion,” which is why people commonly speak of 
                                                        
53 For a precise overview of ecological realism, see William M. Mace, “The Primacy of Ecological 
Realism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2002): 111.   
54 Burke, “Pragmatist Dual-Process Active-Externalist Theory of Experience,” 196. 
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consummating relationships and contracts of sale. Yet consummate also means 
to exhibit a high degree of skill and competence; think of the consummate chess 
player or sommelier, for instance. In a world of continuous change and process, 
verbs speak more clearly to the heart of things; nouns are but mere abstractions 
that arrest the spontaneity of experience. This is a theme that figured 
prominently in Dewey’s writings, even if it was not always expressed in this 
fashion.   
 This brief diversion into etymology clearly shows the ontological as well as 
the anthropological side of Dewey’s approach to the problem of religious 
ultimacy. Human selves are wholly constituted by their capabilities and 
dispositions, which fundamentally alter the course of their future with every 
choice. Fully actualized, ideal selves are the gods among us, but they are fallible 
gods returned to earth with each new unsettling and imbalance. 
 
 
The Ideal Self as an Ecological Self 
 
 
 The goal of the religious life, though it varies greatly in the form it takes in 
specific religious traditions, or even non-traditions, is arguably that of self-
actualization. Self-realization, self-transformation, self-cultivation, and even 
the negatively charged self-annhiliation are but variations on this basic theme. 
The very same goal is central to the world’s spiritualistic philosophies, old and 
new, as it is to the modern schools of psychotherapy and positive psychology. The 
following passage from Dewey’s Ethics would be right at home in the 
 394 
foundational texts of any one of these traditions or schools:             
The kind of self which is formed through action which is faithful to relations with others 
will be a fuller and broader self than one which is cultivated in isolation from or in 
opposition to the purposes and needs of others. In contrast, the kind of self which results 
from generous breadth of interest may be said alone to constitute a development and 
fulfillment of the self, while the other way of life stunts and starves selfhood by cutting it 
off from connections necessary to its growth.55  
 
One would not be wrong to hear clear echoes of the Christian Golden Rule, 
Gandhi’s ahimsa, Buddhist mindfulness, and Baha’ullah’s belief in the oneness of 
humankind in this passage. It also has a certain Darwinian ring to it, although 
you have to listen more closely to discern it.  
 Dewey passionately believed that it is only when we redirect the selfish 
impulses of our narrow egos and adopt a “genuine perspective”—a perspective 
that takes into account the totality of present deficiencies and possible 
satisfactions of a complete situation—that we could reach a state of existence that 
can be properly called religious. Only in these moments—and they are only 
moments—do we become fully actualized, consummate, ideal selves. It is this 
fully actualized self or personality that Dewey, in his early Psychology, called 
God, a term he similarly used in A Common Faith to convey the union of the ideal 
and the actual in events of experience (which constitute the self). To further tease 
out the meaning and significance of these complex ideas, we now move to a 
theorist who is not remembered as a religious thinker, but who nonetheless 
paints ultimacy in religiously charged, ecologically relevant terms: 20th century 
Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss.  
                                                        
55 ETH2, LW 7: 302. 
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 Despite a strong interest among Nordic philosophers in American 
philosophy in general and pragmatism in particular, Næss’s work has not been 
discussed extensively alongside that of Dewey.56 It is on their relational, 
dynamically processive (i.e., non-substantial, anti-Cartesian) conceptions of the 
self that a connection between the two philosophers is most readily apparent. 
Dewey scholars, however, mainly tend to focus on the social and cultural 
dimensions of Dewey’s self-concept at the expense of its ecological origins and 
functions. As such, his connection to Næss for the most part has gone unnoticed. 
 Næss initially came to prominence in philosophy for his work in 
semantics, which had a neopositivist, logical empiricist bent; he has also written 
several books on Spinoza, Gandhi, epistemological skepticism, and philosophy of 
science. Næss is best known to posterity, however, as the founder of deep ecology, 
which names a theoretical philosophy as well a socio-political movement. The 
ecological framework that underpins Næss’s project of deep ecology, which he 
called ecosophy, combines insights from a variety of philosophical and religious 
traditions, and is largely inimical to his early neopositivism, as it is to 
contemporary analytic philosophy.57  
 Næss explains the meaning of ecosophy in the following manner: “By an 
ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A 
                                                        
56 I refer here to the work of scholars affiliated with the Nordic Pragmatism Network, which has 
published several books on pragmatism and funded various research projects on pragmatism-
related themes. These developments can be reviewed at the following website: 
http://www.nordprag.org. 
57 On this point, see Thomas Uebel, “‘A Kind of Metaphysician’: Arne Næss from Logical 
Empiricism to Ecophilosophy,” Inquiry 54, no. 1 (2011): 78-109.  
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philosophy as a kind of sofia (or) wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both 
norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses 
concerning the state of affairs in our universe.”58 The view of philosophic activity 
articulated by Næss in this passage resonates deeply with Dewey’s notion of 
philosophy as problem-solving. For Dewey, existential situations become 
problematic when organism-environment harmony, that is, the self is disrupted. 
Effectively solving such problems of the self requires “living as if nature 
mattered” through careful reorganization of individual and collective habits.  
 Næss presciently saw that the moral aims of the deep ecology movement 
could not be achieved by impassioned rhetoric alone. If the better world deep 
ecologists visualize is ever to be made actual, nothing less than a complete 
reconstruction of our ontological self-understanding is required. Fritjof Capra 
describes this paradigm shift in perception as follows: “Deep ecology does not 
separate humans—or anything else—from the natural environment. It sees the 
world not as a collection of isolated objects, but as a network of phenomena that 
are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent. Deep ecology recognizes 
the intrinsic value of all living beings and views humans as just one particular 
strand in the web of life.”59 Most philosophies that argue for the intrinsic value of 
nature remain entrenched in an egoic conception of the self which views the self 
as an atomic, autonomous entity and thus prevent the kind of empathic 
identification with all living creatures—with the entire universe—of which deep 
                                                        
58 Næss, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement,” 8. 
59 Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1996), 7.   
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ecologists’ speak. Næss, and Capra following him, thus would likely view many 
contemporary religious environmental movements and even many forms of 
religious naturalism that focus on nature as the object of religious devotion, but 
which maintain a rigid dualism between nature and the self, as shallow in 
orientation. 
 In place of the narrow egoic self characteristic of modern Western 
philosophy and religion, Næss embraced an expansive sense of the self, informed 
by his study of the sciences of ecology and Eastern religions, that extended 
beyond one’s personal sense of self. He called this wider, fuller self the “ecological 
self.” According to Næss, the ecological self’s boundaries are shifting, 
impermanent, and vary between individuals, much like Dewey would claim of the 
ideal self. The ecological self is everything with which a person identifies, where 
identification is defined as “a spontaneous, non-rational…process through which 
the interest or interests of another being are reacted to as our own interest or 
interests.”60 The affective and perceptual processes involved in the process of 
(re)identification with the ecological self are difficult to explain in intellectual 
formulation. They are best communicated in a personal example Næss frequently 
used in his speeches and writings: 
 My standard example has to do with a nonhuman being I met forty years ago. I looked 
 through an old-fashioned microscope at the dramatic meeting of two drops of different 
 chemicals. A flea jumped from a lemming strolling along the table and landed in the 
 middle of the acid chemicals. To save it was impossible. It took many minutes for the flea 
 to die. Its movements were dreadfully expressive. What I felt was, naturally, a painful 
 compassion and empathy. But the empathy was not basic. What was basic was the 
 process of identification, that ‘I see myself in the flea’. If I was alienated from the flea, not 
                                                        
60 Arne Næss, “Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes,” in Deep Ecology, ed. M. 
Tobias (San Diego, CA: Avant Books, 1985), 261. 
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 seeing anything resembling myself, the death struggle would have left me indifferent.61  
 Næss’s expansive, field-like construal of the self is remarkably similar to 
Dewey’s. Recall that Dewey described the self as an ecological system (organism-
environment unit) that is in constant conjunction with other objects, people, and 
events. What we naively call the “self” is an adaptive emergent function of this 
system that reciprocally shapes the system in turn. Under Dewey’s view, nature 
consists of orders of dynamically unfolding, uniquely determinate events that are 
revealed in terms of the action possibilities they afford the self. When such 
opportunities take on ideal gestalt quality and are executed by a skilled self 
perceptually attuned to them, that actual self, which is constantly becoming 
unsettled by some lack or need, is consummated and made whole—it becomes an 
ideal self. This achievement of self-actualization is temporary, however. Its 
inevitable disruption leads to loss of organism-environment integrity and self-
identity, and the quest for ideal forms of the self begins anew. Herein lies the 
natural, ecological foundations of religion for Dewey and Næss.    
 The ecological or ideal self, though an achievement, can be considered 
ontologically ultimate (perhaps even “prior”) in the sense that the actual self 
depends upon it for its full actualization, but only insofar as one’s current 
capabilities permit attunement to it. It is a trait of the actual self, one that implies 
its possible future state. This is what Alan Watts has in mind when he exhorts his 
                                                        
61 Arne Næss, “Self-realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World,” in The Deep 
Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology, eds. Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue (Berkeley, 
CA: North Atlantic Books, 1995), 15-16.   
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readers to “become what you are” in a short essay of the same title.62 It is mainly 
through emotion and bodily feeling that we are made aware of our alienation 
from and identification with this larger self that we are. For Næss, it was feelings 
of intense empathy; for Dewey, it was feelings of possibility, remorse, sympathy, 
dependence, and wholeness. One’s self expands and becomes whole by 
acknowledging the source of the resolution of these feelings and making them a 
part of a renewed actual self. For both theorists, these ultimate moments are 
contextual and situation-bound. Næss’s deep ecology, like Dewey’s religious 
naturalism, is pragmatically-minded and ripe with spiritual possibility. Both 
combine the best aspects of scientific and humanistic inquiry in hopes of healing 
humanity’s self-imposed estrangement from the ideal aspects of nature, parts of 
our very being.  
 The comments made so far should not be taken as a complete statement of 
a Deweyan approach to ultimacy. They were offered primarily to situate Dewey’s 
ecological method of approach to a core problem of philosophy of religion among 
others. As we continue our effort to rehabilitate and make Dewey’s religious 
thought understandable and appealing to contemporary philosophers of religion, 
we will explore its connections to two other “ecologies of ultimacy”—those laid 
out in the ancient Chinese text the Zhuangzi and in the thought of Japanese Zen 
Buddhist monk Dōgen.  
 
 
                                                        
62 Alan Watts, Become What You Are (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 2003), 10-11. Italics added. 
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5.2 Genuineness and Skillful Action in the Zhuangzi  
 
 
Comparative philosophy undertaken within the bounds of historically or 
geographically proximate cultures is necessarily limited in the insights it can 
provide. John Dewey and Arne Næss, while separated from each other by several 
decades and thousands of miles, nonetheless shared an intellectual footing in the 
main ideas and thinkers of the Western canon. Næss, like Dewey, was a skilled 
logician who at the same time was capable of engaging the speculative 
rationalism of Spinoza. Dewey, like Næss, viewed philosophy primarily as a tool 
for improving experience and argued that human fulfillment and self-
actualization could be achieved only through redirecting our selfish, ego-centered 
impulses in less destructive directions. That Dewey’s philosophy is a fit vehicle 
for managing human ethical relations with the natural environment and 
nonhuman animals has been positively argued for by a number of scholars who 
share the preservationist instincts of Næss’s deep ecology movement.63 Though 
Dewey himself is not remembered as an environmentalist, this endorsement is 
not surprising given the social orientation and transformative outlook of his 
philosophy.   
 Dewey and the classical pragmatists were among the first philosophers to 
take comparative inquiry seriously.64 The pragmatist focus on lived experiencing 
                                                        
63 See, for instance, Erin McKenna and Andrew Light, eds., Animal Pragmatism: Rethinking 
Human-Nonhuman Relationships (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004); and 
Andrew Light and Eric Katz, eds., Environmental Pragmatism (New York: Routledge, 1996).  
64 For a detailed exploration of this issue, see Robert W. Smid, “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the 
Role of Inquiry in Comparative Philosophy,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 33, no. 
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and the importance of embodied skill for matters of inquiry is a marginal one in 
the history of Western philosophy, but mirrors ideas put forward by Dewey’s 
Continental contemporary Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and later French thinkers 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. It also shares much in common with ancient 
Greek Stoicism. Although the “passivity” of the stoic path at first may seem 
antithetical to pragmatism’s focus on action, both philosophies looked to improve 
the human condition by developing the self. As John Lachs points out in an 
intriguing study of the two schools: “On the personal side, pragmatism teaches 
drive, stoicism surrender. Both are necessary for living well; the former so that 
we may develop what is latent in us, the latter so that we do not become slaves to 
our success.”65  
 In casting a wider comparative net than that covering Western thought, we 
find that Dewey’s pragmatism, his religious naturalism included, also resonates 
deeply with Eastern traditions, most notably Daoism and Zen Buddhism. This 
might seem strange given the popular interpretation of pragmatism as anti-
metaphysical and what appears to be the metaphysical enthusiasm of Eastern 
thought, represented in such enigmatic propositions as “the way that can be 
followed is not the constant Way” (Dao) of the Laozi, or “You are that” (tat tvam 
asi) of the Chandogya Upanishad. Such statements can be read through a 
metaphysical lens, of course, but they can also be seen as practical techniques for 
undoing egoic attachments to reified dualisms and ontologies of substance. This 
                                                        
2 (2012): 146-158. 
65 John Lachs, “Stoic Pragmatism,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19, no. 2 (2005): 105. 
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seems a more accurate reading of Eastern thought’s rejection of conceptual 
abstraction, believing it ultimately detracts from a higher understanding that can 
be gained through experiential means alone. As one scholar notes of the Daoist 
tradition in particular: “Daoists appeal to the standard of an earlier golden age in 
human history, before people made sharp distinctions among things. This was a 
time when values and qualities were not clearly distinguished, when things 
simply were as they were spontaneously.”66 The wish here is not to return to 
chaos, but to a simpler way of living before the erection of rigid social, political, 
and economic structures that suppress harmonious living with nature. Though 
Dewey ultimately envisioned a more constructive role for such structures, his 
religious project can be viewed from a similar perspective, as we will see in the 
comparisons to Daoism and Zen Buddhism made in this and the following 
section. Dewey’s own struggles with expressing experiential truths through the 
conceptually burdened language of Western philosophy and religion has led to 
his being insufficiently understood and appreciated by the tradition he worked 
alongside. 
 Like all other religions and philosophies, Daoism and Zen are open to a 
considerable range of interpretations. The expression of Daoism examined 
presently is that of the ancient Chinese text the Zhuangzi67 with a brief 
                                                        
66 Philip J. Ivanhoe, The Daodejing of Laozi (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002), xix. 
67 Transliteration of Chinese terms and names is given in the official Pinyin phonetic system when 
possible. An exception is where secondary sources quoted use the older Wade-Giles system, which 
is standard for works published before 1979. For example, Zhuangzi (Pinyin) can also be written 
as Chuang Tzu (Wade-Giles).    
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introduction to the Daoist tradition provided for general context.68 While Dewey 
lectured in China and Japan late in his career, it is safe to say that he was largely 
unstudied in either system of thought when he penned his major works.69 This 
makes the following analyses all the more telling for Dewey scholars and 
comparative philosophers.70  
 
 
Daoism: A Synoptic Overview 
 
 
 Over the past four decades, interest in Daoism in the West has grown 
considerably, not only in academic circles but in the wider culture as well. 
Daoism is a rich and diverse tradition—more accurately, it is a group of traditions 
with certain family resemblances—rooted in an understanding of the place and 
responsibilities of human beings within nature radically different to that of the 
                                                        
68 The choice of the Zhuangzi, instead of the better-known Laozi (an alternate title for the 
Daodejing), is largely personal; of the two, it is the text with which I am more familiar and, as 
respected interpreter of Chinese philosophy Roger Ames in any case notes, “The difference 
between the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi tends to be one of emphasis rather than substance.” 
Roger T. Ames, “Introduction,” in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 1.  
69 Of course, Dewey’s philosophy is highly indebted to Hegel, who, along with the Romantics, was 
influenced by the Eastern philosophical and religious texts available to the reading public at the 
time. As this acknowledgment shows, however, the indirect influences on a person’s thinking at 
any moment are too numerous and scattered to accurately account for.    
70 I am unaware of any sustained comparison of Dewey’s religious thought to Daoism. Crispin 
Sartwell has written an intriguing article comparing the concepts of teleology and art in Dewey 
and Daoism, however. See Crispin Sartwell, “Dewey and Taoism: Teleology and Art,” Journal of 
Aesthetic Education 43, no. 1 (2009): 30-40. And Joseph Grange has analyzed the connections 
between Daoism and American naturalism more generally. See Joseph Grange, “Dao, Technology, 
and American Naturalism,” Philosophy East and West 51, no. 3 (2001): 363-377. Finally, Michael 
Raposa has likened Peirce’s notion of “musement” to the “listening energy” cultivated by 
practitioners of the Daoist martial arts. See Michael L. Raposa, “Musement as Listening: Daoist 
Perspectives on Peirce,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39, no. 2 (2012): 207-221. Comparisons 
between the classical pragmatists and Zen are more common, though Dewey’s religious views are 
not usually addressed. These studies are not listed here, as they will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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modern West. The texts through which Daoism’s basic tenets have been revealed 
to the world are the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, which are named for their ostensible 
authors, although records confirming this are scarce and unreliable. It is more 
likely that each work represents the composite effort of several authors, as do the 
Qur’an, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Gospels of the Christian New Testament.           
 As Thomas Michael notes, despite a wealth of recent scholarship, Daoism 
remains a controversial topic in the modern academy.71 The controversy centers 
on whether Daoism is to be understood and approached as a philosophy or as a 
religion. The standard view of historians is to place a firm division between the 
early Daoist philosophical texts of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, which reached 
their present forms sometime during the third and fourth centuries B.C.E., and 
the Daoist religious institutions appearing much later in the middle of the second 
century C.E.  
 The debate over a system of thought’s religiousness or philosophicality is, 
from the ecological naturalist perspective adopted in this study, misguided, or at 
least imperfectly framed. It gains traction only by presuming substantive, 
essentialized definitions for both philosophy and religion, and thus commits what 
Dewey called the “intellectualist fallacy,” which we fall trap to daily due to the 
strictures of human language. The nouns religion and philosophy, it should be 
recalled, are but conceptual abstractions from more immediate, qualitative 
experiences that are productively described as religious or philosophical on 
                                                        
71 Thomas Michael, The Pristine Dao: Metaphysics in Early Daoist Discourse (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), 1.  
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account of their function and effects. On a deeper level, they are verbs, modes of 
acting and perceiving, before they are nouns. For example, an idea or activity that 
assists one in efficiently solving existential problems is properly considered a 
philosophical one. In the same way, a belief or practice that harmonizes the self’s 
dynamic tensions while contributing to its positive growth and expansion is 
essentially religious in character. 
 Michael also seeks to erase the dichotomy between philosophical and 
religious Daoism on account of the fact that there are demonstrable thematic, 
verbal, and intellectual connections among early and later Daoist schools.72 The 
conceptual misgivings shared by Michael and myself about the philosophy-or-
religion debate are supported by Oliver Leaman’s shrewd reminder about the 
abstract and manufactured nature of geographical distinctions: “The whole 
concept of ‘Eastern’ philosophy is rather an artificial one, since there are difficult 
issues in defining where ‘East’ starts and ends.”73  
 I recognize that the comments just offered will prove unconvincing to 
those who, like Herlee Creel and A. C. Graham, among the first Western scholars 
to offer sophisticated interpretations of Daoism, find simply too many differences 
between early and later Daoism—in fact, even between the Laozi and the 
                                                        
72 While early 19th and 20th century scholars made a separation between what they called “Daoist 
philosophy” (daojia) and “Daoist religion” (daojiao), recent scholarship has pointed to the 
intertwined nature of these dimensions of the Daoist tradition. See Michael, The Pristine Dao, 1-6; 
Eske Møllgaard, An Introduction to Daoist Thought: Action, Language, and Ethics in Zhuangzi 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 5-11; Harold D. Roth, Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the 
Foundations of Taoist Mysticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 174 ff; and James 
Robson, “Daoism: An Overview,” in The Norton Anthology of World Religions: Daoism, eds. 
James Robson and Jack Miles (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 45-67.    
73 Oliver Leaman, Eastern Philosophy: Key Readings (New York: Routledge, 2000), ix.  
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Zhuangzi—to treat them synoptically.74 With this “agree to disagree” admission 
in place we can now move on to a presentation of the philosophical and religious 
insights that have animated, and continue to animate, Daoists worldwide. 
Besides, historically Daoists themselves have been uninterested in how to 
categorize or describe Daoism, preferring instead to focus on concrete ideas and 
lifeways.  
 This characterization can be extended to classic Chinese philosophy and 
religion in its entirety, which differs from its Western counterparts by its focus on 
practical affairs. Though often romanticized as mystical and otherworldly, most 
Chinese philosophers and religious thinkers at this time were grappling with 
predominantly existential problems. Kongzi (551-479 BCE, better known as 
Confucius), for instance, strove to show how ordinary individuals could attain the 
ideal of ethical excellence from which humane and righteous conduct naturally 
flows by studying the ancient wisdom texts. Mengzi (372-289 BCE) further 
described this self-cultivation process, focusing on creating the environmental 
and social conditions conducive to virtuous action—a form of religious 
engineering, if you will. Laozi (6th-5th c. BCE) recommended a return to a 
prereflective simplicity or mindfulness obtained by letting go of inherited, 
socially constructed notions of right and wrong, truth and falsity, and so on. This 
advice was not for individuals alone to heed, it was society’s way to more peaceful 
and just governance. Finally, Zhuangzi (4th-3rd c. BCE), like Laozi before him, 
                                                        
74 Michael, The Pristine Dao, 3-4.  
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set out a path for spiritual transformation involving a radical change of 
personality and perspective whereby all things are treated as equal so their truth 
worth and value can shine through readily.     
 Whether primarily read through the lens of philosophy or religion, 
classical Chinese thinkers without question sought to articulate a critical and 
creative praxis, a way of life. For Daoism, that way, as its very name signals, is 
simply to follow Dao, or “the Way.” Dao is an ultimacy concept that can be 
interpreted, using the terminology of the CRIP introduced above, in both 
ontological and anthropological senses. In some cases, it is a path or way of doing 
a particular activity, while in others it is described as a metaphysical entity much 
like the God of Western religions, albeit more impersonal in character. While 
variations of emphasis and interpretation exist between schools, P. J. Ivanhoe 
finds that on the whole Daoists believe “there is a way the world should be, a way 
that, in some deep sense, it is,” and that “human beings can understand this and 
need to have and follow such knowledge if they and the world are to exist in 
harmony.”75 This recognition is reflected in the ultimate goal of the Daoist 
religious quest, which is to live naturally (ziran) by non-action (wuwei) so that 
one can become a fully realized and genuine person (zhenren). The uniformity 
between this view and Dewey’s religious naturalism of ideal self-actualization is 
already implied by this description. The following sections are intended to make 
their connections more explicit so that we might further understand how the 
                                                        
75 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Taoism,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 901. 
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ideal self, though impermanent, can be properly considered as religiously 
ultimate.  
 
Wuwei: An Essential (But Essentially Contested) Concept  
  
 
 To the uninitiated, Eastern spirituality can appear passive on first glance, 
even nihilistic. Romantic and Orientalist descriptions of meditating monks and 
world-negating ascetics have gone far to perpetuate this misunderstanding. So 
have the popular English translations of indigenous terms that lack precise 
equivalents in languages with strikingly different grammatical structures.  
 As regards Daoism, the term that has caused the most hermeneutic trouble 
is wuwei, commonly translated as “non-action,” “non-doing,” or even “actionless 
action.” Without probing further, such descriptions provide an incomplete 
picture of Daoist spirituality and further render it paradoxical, for how can one 
accomplish something by doing nothing? Many saw a similar paradox in Dewey’s 
commingling of reality and ideality in his descriptions of religious experience.  
 Wuwei is an essential concept for understanding Daoist spirituality; to 
embody it is to live effortlessly in alignment with the Dao, the dynamic energy 
flow of the universe.76 Yet it is also an “essentially contested concept,” a term 
introduced by Scottish philosopher W. B. Gallie to describe the various and 
variable interpretations of qualitative notions used in art, religion, and areas of 
                                                        
76 The concept of wuwei has a place in non-Daoist Chinese religions as well. For an interesting 
analysis of its importance for the Confucian tradition, see Roger T. Ames, The Art of Rulership: A 
Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 28-64.   
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normative philosophy.77 To recognize a concept as “essentially contested” does 
not mean that all definitions are equally valid, however. It is merely to recognize 
that different positions exist as to the best realization of the term. In what follows 
I will not engage all of the competing interpretations of wuwei, for to do so would 
be to depart from the purpose of this chapter, which is to further clarify the 
ultimacy dimensions of Dewey’s religious naturalism by revealing its connections 
to other ecologically grounded accounts.78 As a result, what follows is an 
inevitably partial analysis.  
 Despite subtle differences, most discussions of wuwei in the literature 
agree that the type of action it speaks to is not rigid or premeditated—the action 
of “non-action” does not conform to any cognitive plan or behavioral map. As 
with many religious concepts, wuwei is better explained through the use of 
examples rather than by logical definition. The story of Butcher Ding from the 
inner chapters of the Zhuangzi has come to serve as an exemplar of wuwei 
action. The story is particularly interesting because the profession of butcher was 
one of the most despised in ancient China, and yet Ding approaches his work 
with great pleasure and pride. While the carving up of animal carcasses may seem 
the most mundane or even repugnant of experiences, for Butcher Ding it takes on 
an intense aesthetic and religious quality due to the skill with which he is able to 
perform it. In the terminology of Dewey’s Psychology, Ding is experiencing “the 
                                                        
77 W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 
(1956), 97-114.  
78 David Loy offers a broad and critical survey of meanings of wuwei. See his “Wei-Wu-Wei: 
Nondual Action,” Philosophy East and West 35 (1985): 73-86.  
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feeling of the agreement of some experience with the ideal nature of the self.”79  
 Dozens of translations of the Butcher Ding passage have been offered over 
the years; the one reproduced below is that of Thomas Merton. Merton is not 
typically quoted as authoritative in studies of the Zhuangzi—he was a Catholic 
Trappist monk, after all—yet his poetical rendering of the text communicates its 
message in a profoundly experiential manner. The poetic approach is fitting, for 
as Merton elsewhere insightfully notes, Zhuangzi “is not concerned with words 
and formulas about reality, but with the direct existential grasp of reality in 
itself.”80 Dewey’s denotative-empirical method was built on similar concerns.  
 Prince Wen Hui’s cook 
 Was cutting up an ox. 
 Out went a hand, 
 Down went a shoulder, 
 He planted a foot, 
 He pressed with a knee. 
 The ox fell apart 
 With a whisper. 
 The bright cleaver murmured 
 Like a gentle wind. 
 Rhythm! Timing! 
 Like a sacred dance, 
 Like “The Mulberry Grove,” 
 Like ancient harmonies! 
 
 “Good work!” the Prince exclaimed, 
 “Your method is faultless!” 
 “Method? said the cook 
 Laying aside his cleaver, 
 “What I follow is Tao 
 Beyond all methods! 
 
 “When I first began 
 To cut up oxen 
 I would see before me 
 The whole ox 
 All in one mass. 
 “After three years 
                                                        
79 PSY (1887), EW 2: 273.   
80 Thomas Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu (New York: New Directions, 1969), 11. 
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 I no longer saw this mass. 
 I saw the distinctions. 
 “But now, I see nothing 
 With my eye. My whole being 
 Apprehends. 
 My senses are idle. The spirit 
 Free to work without plan 
 Follows its own instinct 
 Guided by natural line, 
 By the secret opening, the hidden space, 
 My cleaver finds its own way. 
 I cut through no joint, chop no bone. 
 
 “A good cook needs a new chopper 
 Once a year—he cuts. 
 A poor cook needs a new one 
 Every month—he hacks! 
 
 “I have used this same cleaver 
 Nineteen years. 
 It has cut up  
 A thousand oxen. 
 Its edge is as keen 
 As if newly sharpened. 
 
 “There are spaces in the joints; 
 The blade is thin and keen: 
 When this thinness 
 Finds that space 
 There is all the room you need! 
 It goes like a breeze! 
 Hence I have this cleaver nineteen years 
 As if newly sharpened! 
 
 “True, there are sometimes 
 Tough joints. I feel them coming, 
 I slow down, I watch closely, 
 Hold back, barely move the blade, 
 And whump! the part falls away 
 Landing like a clod of earth. 
 
 “Then I withdraw the blade, 
 I stand still 
 And let the joy of the work 
 Sink in. 
 I clean the blade 
 And put it away.” 
 
 Prince Wan Hui said, 
 “This is it! My cook has shown me 
 How I ought to live 
 412 
 My own life!”81 
 
 Clearly, Butcher Ding is acting here; knives do not wield themselves. Yet 
the skill with which he accomplishes his task is so effortless that it is describable 
in the language of “non-action.” Though seemingly paradoxical, we all have had 
experiences where we have lost sense of what we were doing, along with a sense 
of ourselves as distinct individuals, because it has become automatic or “second 
nature” to us. We have become one with our activity. As Edward Slingerland 
crisply expresses this point: “For a person in wu-wei, proper conduct follows as 
instantly and spontaneously as the nose responds to a bad smell, and with the 
same sense of unconscious ease and joy with which the body gives in to the 
seductive rhythm of a song.”82 Positive psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has 
described such experiences under the rubric of “flow,” a term used to express the 
skillful spontaneity of daily actions like driving or riding a bicycle as well as more 
optimal experiences of the kind described by artists or technicians who literally 
become “lost in their work” for the joy it gives them.83 Prince Wan Hui, witness to 
this spirited flow in the work of his butcher, clearly saw its positive value for all of 
life’s activities.  
 The ability to have and appreciate intrinsically valuable experiences of this 
nature was the paramount goal of education for Dewey, who spoke out against 
                                                        
81 Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu, 45-47. 
82 Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal 
in Early China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8. 
83 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2008). For a detailed treatment of the similarities of wuwei and “flow” 
experiences, see Nathaniel F. Barrett, “Wuwei and Flow: Comparative Reflections on Spirituality, 
Transcendence, and Skill in the Zhuangzi,” Philosophy East and West 61, no. 4 (2011): 679-706. 
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the rote mechanization of the educational practices dominant in his day. Dewey 
lobbied instead for a curriculum that supports a child’s freedom to develop in 
accord with the best of her abilities, an insight that informed the system 
developed by Italian physician and educator Maria Montessori. The purpose of 
such an open approach to education, according to Dewey, is to strike a “certain 
delicate combination of habit and impulse,” of structure and spontaneity that 
supports and facilitates one’s full development as an individual.84 The religious 
potential of education is implied with this image.85 
  This resonates with Butcher Ding’s story and may even explain the 
process by which his skill developed over time; as he admits, he was not an expert 
on day one. But how does it help us to understand the connection between 
Daoism and Dewey’s religious views? To answer this question, we have to take a 
closer look at what an individual is according to Daoism. Daoist anthropology, 
like Dewey’s, is intrinsically ecological and two-pronged: where Dewey speaks of 
actual and ideal selves, Daoism speaks of unrealized and fully realized, or 
“genuine,” persons. Transforming oneself from the first to the second constitutes 
the religious quest for both Dewey and Daoism and crucially depends on 
acquiring the type of embodied know-how the concept of wuwei describes.  
 
 
 
                                                        
84 HNC (1922), MW 14: 124.  
85 Dewey explores the connection between religion and education in “Education as a Religion” 
(1922), MW 13: 317-322, and the earlier “Education as Engineering” (1922), MW 13: 323-328. 
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Situational Self-Transformation in the Zhuangzi 
 
 There are other stories besides the one of Butcher Ding that exemplify 
wuwei in the Zhuangzi. The message threading them together is that reason, 
logical argument, and personal desire are not viable means for obtaining the end 
of Dao: “While aware of herself and the things around her, [a genuine] person 
does not stand back to view and analyze the dao. Since she sees herself as 
inextricably intertwined with the overall harmony of the dao, she never assumes 
the perspective of a narrowly self-interested agent seeking to maximize her 
individual well-being. Any such higher-order perspective is alien to the Daoist 
ideal.”86 In Deweyan language, Ding has recognized the reciprocal nature of ends 
and means for achieving worthwhile goals, and the continuity of the ideal with 
the self’s future contour.  
 Individuals like Ding who live in oneness with Dao, as exemplified through 
skillful action congruent with its rhythms, are able to creatively adapt to 
unexpected obstacles (e.g., sometimes carcasses have tough joints). The Zhuangzi 
refers to such individuals by various titles, including sages, immortals, and 
genuine persons. Persons stuck in the ruts of daily routine, of mechanized action 
that prevents intimate connection with nature, can never realize their full 
potential as human beings. Dewey, a severe critic of the dehumanization of 
assembly-line factory labor common in his era, where workers (i.e., means) are 
removed from the fruits of their labor (i.e., ends), saw the truth of this statement 
                                                        
86 Ivanhoe, The Daodejing of Laozi, xx-xxi. 
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firsthand.    
 Genuine persons are frequently described in superhuman terms 
throughout the text:  
 The [genuine] person is miraculous, beyond understanding! The lakes may burst into 
 flames around him, but this can’t make him feel it is too hot. The rivers may freeze over, 
 but this can’t make him feel it is too cold. Ferocious thunder may crumble the mountains, 
 the winds may shake the seas, but this cannot make him feel startled. Such a person 
 chariots on the clouds and winds, piggybacks on the sun and moon, and wanders beyond 
 the four seas. Even death and life can do nothing to change him—much less the 
 transitions between benefit and harm.87   
 
It is not our place here to engage in extended debate about the intentions of the 
writers concerning whether or not such descriptions should be taken literally or 
metaphorically. Early Daoists believed they were factually true. Stories of qigong 
and taiji practitioners during the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), who were 
convinced that appropriately cultivated vital energy (qi, a fundamental 
expression of Dao) would prevent modern weaponry from harming them, show 
that some still took these stories literally not that long ago.88 
 The true goal of martial arts practice, however, is not to gain supernatural 
strength or powers, but to enable one to respond to the demands of problematic 
situations with the skill and reserve required to resolve them in an optimally 
harmonious manner.89 This clarification of martial practice points us in the 
                                                        
87 Zhuangzi, Chapter 18. Quoted in Tim Connolly, “Perspectivism as a Way of Knowing in the 
Zhuangzi,” Dao 10 (2011): 493. Connolly’s translations from the Zhuangzi  are taken from Brook 
Ziporyn, ed. and tr., Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings, With Selections from Traditional 
Commentaries (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2009).  
88 For a history of qigong that includes a discussion of this theme, see Kenneth S. Cohen, The 
Way of Qigong: the Art and Science of Chinese Energy Healing (New York: Random House, 
1997), 12-21. 
89 For an extended philosophical interpretation of the Asian martial arts that conforms to the 
opinion expressed here, see Barry Allen, Striking Beauty: A Philosophical Look at the Asian 
Martial Arts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).   
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direction of a naturalist, ecological reading of Daoism’s genuine person. Under 
this view, the genuine person is not a supernatural being, but one who knows “the 
capacity and limitations of one’s own nature” and creatively adapts it “to the 
universal process of transformation” which mirrors the natural evolution of a 
universe in constant flux.90 Nature, the universe, is a constitutive part of 
ourselves and the source and ground of all possibilities, including the possibility 
of becoming more ideal, more “genuine.” Dao does not transcend the world. It is 
everywhere in the world. Acting in accordance with your own nature is to become 
fully realized and live a life marked by equanimity and well-being. Action that 
goes against nature—whether one’s self-nature or the larger nature one is a part 
of—is the cause of suffering and pain. As a later passage of the Zhuangzi 
expresses this point:  
 The duck’s legs are short, but if we try to lengthen them, the duck will feel pain. The 
 crane’s legs are long, but if we try to cut off a portion of them, the crane will feel grief. We 
 are not to amputate what is by nature long, nor to lengthen what is by nature short.91 
 
 Provided these comments, it seems definitive that religious self-
transformation for the Daoist partakes of nothing above or outside of nature, 
including one’s own natural constitution.92 Butcher Ding, after all, was a butcher. 
It is highly unlikely that he was as adept at other activities, even if that is a 
further goal of the religious life. According to the Zhuangzi, “admitting and 
                                                        
90 Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1963), 177.  
91 Zhuangzi, Chapter 8. Fung Yu-Lan, Chuang-Tzu: A New Selected Translation with an 
Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1997), 9.  
92 Kim-chong Chong, “The Concept of Zhen in the Zhuangzi,” Philosophy East and West 61, no. 2 
(2011): 324-346. 
 417 
accepting one’s destiny is the premise from which one must begin in order to 
reach the state of mind in which one can enjoy true freedom.”93 What is ideal for 
Ding as a butcher, may not be ideal for a carpenter or statesman, both of whom 
confront different situations with unique capabilities at their disposal. Ding’s 
attunement to the Dao was made possible by his long years of training in a 
particular task, a task for which he was authentically suited. He realizes Dao and 
himself within particular existential situations.  
 An ecological reading of Daoism finds further support in the work of Roger 
Ames and David Hall. In what can be described as a focus-field model, Ames and 
Hall describe Daoist ontology as consisting of a reciprocal matrix of 
complementary relations between all existences (what in Daoist writings are 
frequently referred to as “the ten thousand things”).94 This web of relations is 
best described as a “field” and the way the field shapes our worldly interactions as 
its “focus” (we could equally substitute “ground” and “figure” here) which gives 
expression to an ontological parity among the objects and events that constitute 
the universe and populate our individually unique experiences.95 As in Dewey’s 
ecological naturalism, all things are events, including persons. The genuine 
person allows all of these relations to present themselves and acts in accordance 
with their objective demands within a situation, by not imposing her will or rigid 
preconceptions on them in a forceful manner: 
                                                        
93 Liu Xiaogan, “Daoism: Laozi and Zhuangzi,” in The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy, 
eds. Jay L. Garfield and William Edelglass (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 53. 
94 Roger T. Ames and David Hall, A Philosophical Translation of the Dao De Jing: Making this 
Life Significant (New York: Ballantine, 2003).  
95 Ibid., 11-13.  
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 The sage is calm, but not because he declares calmness good. None of the ten thousand 
 things are enough to rattle his mind, so he is calm. When water is calm, you can see the 
 wispy hair on your temples in it. Its surface is level and sets the standard for great 
 builders. If water is so clear when calm, how much more so the spirit! The calm mind of 
 the sage is a mirror to Heaven and earth and a looking glass for the ten thousand 
 things….96 
  
 This lines up with other descriptions of the genuine person as one for 
whom heaven and human action are not in conflict. Genuine persons are not in 
touch with a supernatural realm of knowledge; they are able to identify with both 
the organism and environment side of the system that constitutes the self and 
restore their balance whenever necessary:   
 Thus his liking is one, his disliking is also one. His ‘being one’ is one, his ‘not being one’ is 
 also one. His ‘being one’ means that he is a follower of heaven, his ‘not being one’ means 
 that he is a follower of the human. Not allowing heaven and the human to overcome one 
 another, this is called the true person.97 
 
The genuine person’s skills are perfectly aligned with the demands of her tasks, 
her situations. Her intent is in harmonious congruence with the environment as 
far as her capabilities allow. Her “non-action” is better described as a form of 
“skillful action”; its negative aspect consists in being noncognitive, for such 
action requires no reflective awareness or conceptual mediation; it can only be 
achieved by letting go of cognitive fixation. In the end, Daoist spirituality 
recommends us to not over-think things and to return to a natural state, much 
like a child’s, whenever possible.  
 To connect back to the analysis of the last chapter, wuwei is not a form of 
know-that; it cannot be described in propositional terms, nor does it require 
                                                        
96 Zhuangzi, Chapter 13. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, eds., Readings in Classical 
Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2001), 244. 
97 Zhuangzi, Chapter 6. Quoted in Chong, “The Concept of Zhen in the Zhuangzi,” 326. 
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planning to initiate its sequence. It is better viewed as a species of embodied 
know-how, a form of what Dewey calls “thoughtless action.”98 It further helps us 
to understand what Jelle Bruineberg and Erik Rietveld have in mind when they 
describe the phenomenon of skilled intentionality as action that is responsive to a 
relevant field of affordances by an appropriately attuned and receptive 
perceiver.99 Such responsiveness speaks directly to a somatic, corporeal form of 
intelligence like that exhibited by those trained in the martial arts.100  
 Fully attaining the Way and becoming a genuine person is not easy, nor is 
it intended to be difficult. It merely requires loosening the grip of (just) the 
negative social and cultural conventions of one’s upbringing—those which narrow 
one’s perception of meaning and value in detrimental ways—in order to allow 
oneself to be led more by one’s natural spontaneous inclinations, inclinations that 
will eventually align themselves with the fundamental pattern of the cosmos,101 
the way that most indigenous peoples naturally coexist in harmony with their 
environments.102     
 
 
5.3 Dropping Off Body-Mind: Dōgen on the Authentic Self  
 
Daoist doctrines of self-cultivation are taken up and transformed in intriguing 
                                                        
98 HNC (1922), MW 14: 121. 
99 Bruineberg and Rietveld, “Self-organization, Free Energy Minimization, and Optimal Grip.” 
100 I do not examine the methods recommended by Daoists for obtaining this type of know-how 
in detail here as they are similar to what Dōgen recommends which will be discussed shortly.   
101 These themes are also reflected in Chapters 38 and 74 of the Laozi. See the translations in 
Ivanhoe, The Daodejing of Laozi, 41, 77.   
102 Fikret Berkes, Sacred Ecology (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
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directions by the Zen Buddhist tradition. Zen is best known to the West in its 
Japanese forms, with Rinzai and Sōtō being the two major schools, but actually 
originated in China before coming to Japan in the 12th century. Zen is the 
Japanese equivalent of the Chinese term Ch’an, a transliteration of the Sanskrit 
dhyāna, meaning “meditation,” “insight,” or “quietude.” Buddhism derives from 
the Sanskrit budh, meaning “enlightened.”103 Knowledge of the original meanings 
of both of these terms provides key insight into the primary religious concern of 
Zen, which is to help us find out what we really are by freeing us from the false, 
ego-bound state in which we habitually reside. No religious doctrines or 
propositional knowledge claims can effect this liberation for us; it requires a 
radical readjustment of personal perspective. In this sense Zen is like 
contemporary Gestalt therapy, the main goal of which is to increase a patient’s 
awareness of “what is,” in order to permit a reacquaintance and reidentification 
with the part of the self from which one has become alienated.104 Deep ecology 
and Dewey’s religious naturalism share this goal, though each expresses it in a 
slightly different idiom. 
 Like the Daoist philosophy suffusing it and the Hindu religion Buddhism 
began partly as a reaction to, Zen advances concepts and principles alien in 
essence to those dominant in Western thought. Commenting on this situation, D. 
T. Suzuki, who is primarily responsible for introducing Zen to Western audiences, 
                                                        
103 Romanization of Japanese text is provided in the widely used Hepburn system and Sanskrit 
text by means of the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration.  
104 For a concise overview of the core tenets of Gestalt therapy, see Brownell, Gestalt Therapy, 21-
38. 
 421 
describes Zen as a movement in which “the Chinese mind completely asserted 
itself, in a sense, in opposition to the Indian mind. Zen could not rise and flourish 
in any other land or among any other people.”105 Suzuki is right that in its 
founding and root metaphors, which are adaptations of Daoist teachings about 
the self and the natural world, Zen is distinctively Chinese. This can be seen in 
Zen’s emphasis on naturalness, tranquility, non-artificiality, and effortless action. 
Yet it is important to note that Zen has gone on to become a truly global religious 
movement, as well as an important intellectual counterbalance to Western 
philosophy in its own right, especially contemporary philosophy’s dominant 
analytic strain.106 The strength of this counterbalance is most evident in the 
lasting appeal of the “Kyoto School” philosophers, whose analyses of topics 
ranging from the existence of the self, the nature of being and time, and how to 
live a good life are as subtle and sophisticated as those of Descartes, Heidegger, 
Bergson, and Aristotle.107  
 Arguably nowhere is the Daoist influence on Zen, and the variance of both 
with modern and most contemporary Western philosophy, on greater display 
than in 13th century monk Dōgen’s reconstruction of Buddhism along ecological 
lines. Like Dewey would do for Western philosophy and religion centuries after 
him, Dōgen challenged aspects of the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition he inherited 
                                                        
105 Quoted in Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 425.   
106 Areas of consonance between Japanese and modern Continental philosophy have been 
explored in some depth. See Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth, eds., Japanese 
and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School  (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2011).  
107 For an excellent and updated overview of the philosophy of the Kyoto School, see Robert E. 
Carter, Kyoto School: An Introduction (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2013). 
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while offering correctives rooted in careful examination of the phenomenology of 
lived experiencing. Before presenting some of these correctives, it will serve us 
well to first take a closer look at the broader correlation between Buddhism and 
pragmatism, which has not gone unnoticed by scholars of the two fields.108 The 
connections typically made, however, are between Buddhist metaphysics and 
psychology with William James’s “pluralist universe” and “stream of 
consciousness” concepts.109 And the few examinations of Dewey’s relationship to 
Buddhist thought ignore the obvious parallels between his religious perspective 
and Zen.110 The analysis that follows seeks to fill this gap in the scholarship on 
Buddhism and pragmatism while helping to shed further comparative light on 
the ultimacy dimensions of Dewey’s religious naturalism. 
 The comments made above about the Daoist tradition bear repeating here 
about Zen: Zen is a cluster term covering several approaches with predictable 
disparities among them, yet for our purposes it can be viewed through a synoptic 
lens insofar as there also exist core uniformities of doctrine (e.g., impermanence, 
                                                        
108 For a general treatment of the connection between Buddhism and pragmatism, see Richard 
Shusterman, “Pragmatism and East-Asian Thought,” Metaphilosophy 35, nos. 1/2 (2004): 13-43. 
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East Asian Buddhism,” William James Studies 10 (2013): 1-7; David Scott, “William James and 
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110 These include Gregory M. Fahy, “Huayan Buddhism and Dewey: Emptiness, Compassion, and 
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selflessness, interdependence, and emptiness) and pedagogy (e.g., seated 
meditation, manual labor, and the study of paradoxical riddles known as kōans) 
across its various schools. Wing-Tsit Chan provides an accurate and concise 
description of the common core of Zen belief and practice in his classic work, A 
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy:  
 The standard sayings of the school are: “Point directly to the human mind” and “See one’s 
 nature and become a Buddha.” Everything other than the cultivation of the mind, such as 
 reading scriptures, making offerings to the Buddha, reciting His name, joining the 
 monastic order, are regarded as unnecessary. The total effect is to minimize, if not to wipe 
 out, the whole Buddhist organization, creed, and literature and to reduce Buddhism to a 
 concern with one’s mind alone. The logical conclusions are that everyone can achieve 
 enlightenment and become a Buddha, since everyone possesses the Buddha-nature, that 
 he can do so immediately, and that he can do so “in this very body.”111  
 The question over whether Buddhism is more accurately considered a 
philosophy or a religion also frequently pops up among scholars. In fact, the 
problematic is even more exaggerated in the Buddhist case, which contains 
analytical and systematic presentations of its major conceptual categories 
(abhidharma) that rival those of Plato, Kant, or any other system of Western 
philosophy. Substantive, essentialized definitions of philosophy and religion 
frequently are at play in these debates, as when Buddhism is considered not to be 
a religion because most of its forms are atheistic. The stance taken on this issue 
with regards to Daoism applies in the same manner to this case. The philosophy-
or-religion debate, while an interesting exercise in contemplation (theoria), 
cannot be solved universally, once and for all; it ultimately must be decided in 
specific moments of interpretation and practical application (praxis). In any case, 
the ultimate goal of Zen is enlightenment, a concept common to both Eastern and 
                                                        
111 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 428. 
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Western thought, and one with equally philosophical and religious overtones.  
 
 
The (Un)Surprising Convergence of Buddhism and Pragmatism 
 
 
 From the holist perspective of ecological thinking, the dualism between a 
meaningless physical world and a meaningful mental realm that runs 
undercurrent to many world philosophies and religions (and even some scientific 
fields) is both pernicious and invalid. It is rather the case that we are primordially 
open or transparent to qualitative wholes of felt meaning and value (events) that 
are only described as “physical” or “mental” upon secondary reflection and 
abstraction. Further, when we reify these abstractions, when we take them as 
objectively real apart from context and situational location,112 the consequences 
can be disastrous, as the worsening global ecological crisis has shown. This dire 
state of affairs speaks to the intimate connection between ontology and ethics, 
between phenomenology and axiology that is missed in compartmentalized 
conceptions of philosophic activity and which Dewey’s reconstructed approach 
attempted to make explicit. It is by now obvious that ecosystemic destruction 
knows no limits to the suffering and injustice it can cause, which will take 
decades, if not centuries, to fully understand. As a human caused problem, it is 
ultimately a problem for humans—especially the philosophers and religious 
thinkers among us—to solve.  
 On a superficial reading, Dewey’s active instrumentalism and Buddhism’s 
                                                        
112 This does not mean they have no objective ontological existence, but it is more accurately 
described as “positionally objective,” a concept introduced in earlier discussions.  
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passive, retreat-from-the-world approach seem to be mutually opposed, as the 
exaggerated caricatures of a podium-thumping professor and a reclusive monk 
might suggest. Yet Buddhism, much like pragmatism, has been concerned from 
its historical beginnings with what Dewey called “problems of men.” As Toshihiko 
Izutsu shrewdly reminds us, “The starting-point of the Buddha’s search after the 
Truth was provided by the disquieting miseries of human existence as he 
observed them around himself. And the doctrines which he developed after his 
attainment to enlightenment were through and through human, humane and 
humanitarian.”113  
 The Buddhist doctrine of anattāvāda, commonly translated as “no-self” or 
“no-ego,” claims the vast majority of human misery comes through our 
attachment to a false ontology of the self, from our clinging to a personal identity 
shaped by the needs and wants of the ego. The doctrine of no-ego is not as 
pessimistic as it initially sounds. On the contrary, living and acting in the full 
reality of its recognition is said to lead to mindfulness, bliss, and a fuller, more 
genuine existence.  
 Once again, the injunction against egoic thinking and behavior is not 
intended merely as a normative claim. Its ethicality is rooted in the fact that it 
more accurately reflects the ontological structure of existence, which, according 
to most schools of Buddhism, is one of process and relation, where nothing is 
                                                        
113 Toshihiko Izutsu, Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism (Boulder, CO: Prajñā Press, 1982), 3.  
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independent, substantive, or permanent.114 This is what the related theory of 
pratītyasamutpāda, or dependent co-arising, fundamentally means. Dewey’s 
transactional model of the self similarly grounded his ethical thinking about the 
kind of self one ought to become—because, on a more fundamental level, one is 
this wider, ideal self. The connection—and frequent rift—between our two selves 
escapes rational mediation; it is communicated to us through our deepest 
emotions and bodily feelings.             
 This convergence between Buddhist and pragmatist viewpoints becomes 
less surprising when we take a closer look at the distinct history of Eastern 
thought’s reception by the West. 115 Between 1890 and 1910, Asian traditions 
began to have an increasing impact on American intellectual life through their 
presentation in several well-received publications, such as William James’s 
comparative study of religious life in The Varieties of Religious Experience 
(1902). James’s engagement with Buddhism was admittedly surface-level, but he 
found much in the tradition that mirrored his and Dewey’s pragmatic orientation. 
As James states in The Varieties: 
 I am ignorant of Buddhism, and speak under correction, and merely in order to describe 
 my general point of view, but as I understand the Buddhist doctrine of karma, I agree in 
 principle with it. All supernaturalists admit that facts are under judgment of higher law; 
 but for Buddhism as I interpret it, and for religion generally so far as it remains 
 unweakened by transcendentalist metaphysics, the word ‘judgment’ here means no such 
 bare academic verdict or platonic appreciation as it means in Vedantic or modern 
 absolutist systems; it carries on the contrary, execution with it, is in rebus as well as post 
 rem, and operates causally as partial factors in the total factor....I state the matter thus 
                                                        
114 One of the clearest descriptions of this theory is offered in Walpola Sri Rahula, What the 
Buddha Taught (New York: Grove/Atlantic, 2007), 51-66.   
115 For a detailed overview of Buddhism’s reception in the United States, see Thomas A. Tweed, 
The American Encounter with Buddhism, 1844-1912 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
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 bluntly, because the current of thought in academic circles runs against me, and I fell like 
 a man who must set his back against an open door quickly if he does not want to see it 
 closed and locked.116   
 
These words were published around the time of the World’s Parliament of 
Religions, which brought prominent Buddhist figures such as Dharmapāla of the 
Therāvada tradition and Zen monk Shaku Soen to Chicago, who later toured 
extensively around the United States.117 James’s work was but one product of the 
increasing pluralism witnessed by the American public in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, during which pragmatism as a philosophical movement took 
shape and rose to a certain prominence.        
 A note of caution before we proceed: Ellen Suckiel warns us not to view 
comparisons between pragmatism and Buddhism, between any two independent 
systems of thought, as “conclusive.” Thematic comparisons are better 
understood, on her account, as mainly “suggestive” in their results.118 The caution 
Suckiel expresses is prudent and an especially wise stance to adopt as a guiding 
principle for comparative philosophy and cross-cultural studies more generally. 
However, Buddhism and pragmatism admit simply too many similarities to 
remain at the level of “suggestion” only, despite the widely different social and 
cultural matrices each way of life arose within. The same is true of an impressive 
number of revolutionary and anti-establishmentarian movements throughout 
history, many of which have been religious in their inspiration and fundamental 
                                                        
116 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), 497. Quoted in Scott, “William James 
and Buddhism,” 337. 
117 Both of these developments are detailed in Scott, “William James and Buddhism.”    
118 This point is made at several places in Ellen Suckiel, Heaven’s Champion: William James’s 
Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).   
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expressions. Moreover, given humans’ shared embodiment and evolutionary 
history, which has given rise to a wide array of cultural universals,119 the division 
between “Eastern” and “Western” philosophy and religion should be viewed as 
more porous and fluid than it is by Suckiel and those sympathetic to her position. 
 Sandra Rosenthal probes the fluid boundary between the two traditions 
and finds that Buddhism and pragmatism, especially in its Deweyan form, find an 
unsuspected alliance in a joint commitment to scientific method.120 In 
Rosenthal’s perceptive analysis, both Buddhism and pragmatism reject the 
human-nature split allowing a more complete understanding of the scientific fact 
that “the nature into which the human organism is placed contains the qualitative 
fullness revealed in lived experience and the grasp of nature within the world is 
permeated by structures by which humans and their world are bound.”121 
Following from this recognition, both traditions are suspicious of 
authoritarianism and foundationalism. Further, just like pragmatism is 
frequently viewed as anti-metaphysical (at least as metaphysics is commonly 
understood in the West), Siddhārta Gotama (c.53-c.483 BCE), the historical 
founder of Buddhism, refused to speculate on issues that outstripped human 
experience.122 This does not mean that metaphysical questions are meaningless 
for either the Buddhist or the pragmatist; they are, however, largely irrelevant to 
                                                        
119 For a recent treatment of this issue, see the excellent essays comprising Mark Schaller et al., 
eds., Evolution, Culture, and the Human Mind (New York: Psychology Press, 2010).  
120 Rosenthal, “Scientific Method and Natural Attunement,” 239-246. 
121 Ibid., 241.  
122 Hans H. Penner, Rediscovering the Buddha: Legends of the Buddha and Their 
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the religious quest for wholeness and liberation.123  
 Before moving on, there are other notable connections between the 
Buddhist and pragmatist traditions that demand pointing out. Pragmatism and 
Buddhism advocate a return to lived experiencing in order to locate practicable 
solutions to problems of human (and non-human) suffering. Each expresses a 
deep belief in the improvability of the human condition—human nature is not 
wholly innate, but the combined product of education, cultural upbringing, and 
social influence. The Buddhist sutras, much like the writings of the classical 
pragmatists, convey a strong distrust of reified language, intellectual formations, 
and the human tendency toward objectification—what Dewey critiqued as the 
“intellectualist fallacy,” James as “intellectualism,” and the Buddha as “worldly 
habit” (lokavyavahāra).  
 It is specifically this last recognition that lies behind pragmatism’s and 
Buddhism’s belief that we must let go of our “quest for certainty,” which is 
ultimately rooted in selfish desire and a false self-understanding, so that we can 
live mindfully in the present. Only by doing so can we achieve an enlightened 
perspective and a more authentic existence along with it. Dissatisfaction and 
suffering inevitably arise from our individual and collective failure to understand 
the world—and ourselves—as they really are. Among the classical pragmatists, it 
was John Dewey who made this point most forcefully. Dōgen did the same for the 
Zen Buddhist tradition. That Dewey’s and Dōgen’s religious outlooks diverge 
                                                        
123 Dewey’s reconceived view of metaphysics as the study of the generic traits of existence is 
immune to this critique and mirrors the Buddhist approach in fundamental ways. 
 430 
from the traditions they inherited is evident. That they exhibit a remarkable 
parallelism with each other is less evident, but is already greatly suggested by 
descriptions of Dewey as a “natural mystic”124 and Dōgen as a “mystical 
realist.”125  
 
Nāgārjuna’s Two Truths 
 
 Although Zen is taken to originate with the introduction of Buddhism to 
China, its roots trace back to the Indian founder of Mādhyamika (“middle way” in 
Sanskrit) Buddhism, Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250). Nāgārjuna’s writings are brief, 
cryptic, and riddled with apparent contradictions. For instance, as Jay Garfield 
and Graham Priest note, Nāgārjuna “asserts that there are two truths, and that 
they are one; that everything both exists and does not exist; that nothing is 
existent or nonexistent; that he rejects all philosophical views including his own; 
that he asserts nothing.”126 In these statements we discover the conceptual recipe 
for the heartiest of Zen kōans. 
 Like all Buddhists, Nāgārjuna emphasized the importance of paying 
mindful attention to experience and perception of this world. As organic beings 
situated in a phenomenal world, our healthy functioning crucially depends upon 
being open to the meanings of the world we live in, which at the same time 
constitutes a part of our very being. This is the experiential and ontological truth 
                                                        
124 Aisemberg, “Dewey’s Naturalistic Mysticism.” 
125 Hee-Jin Kim, Eihei Dōgen: Mystical Realist (Boston, MA: Wisdom, 2004).  
126 Jay L. Garfield and Graham Priest, “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought,” Philosophy East 
and West 53, no. 1 (2003): 1.  
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of the pratītyasamutpāda doctrine. Reality, the world, is in constant flux; it 
consists of dynamic, perpetually becoming and diminishing events. Through 
careful experiential analysis of these events, we can touch upon the “truth,” but 
only in a fallibilist, provisional sense, for all absolute views are refuted by further 
experiencing. It is the momentary, the fluid, the ephemeral that is real, if one 
must speak in terms of reality.  
 According to Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two realities or truths, there is a 
“conventional” reality and an “ultimate” reality, with a truth relative to each of 
these levels or perspectives. Conventional reality refers to the truths of the 
everyday, empirical world, which are typically relative to the dynamics of a 
particular situation or capabilities of a particular observer.127 Ultimate reality 
hinges on the notion of emptiness, which, for Nāgārjuna, does not mean non-
existence, but rather non-substantial existence, which is the fundamental 
meaning of co-dependent origination. Nothing exists independently of all things; 
there are no Platonic essences or Kantian things-in-themselves according to 
Buddhism’s process metaphysics. The most important truth at the level of 
ultimate reality is that everything is empty—including emptiness itself. 
Nāgārjuna wields this realization to further identify ultimate and conventional 
reality, given that both are equally empty. This is the essence of the following 
lines from the Vimalakīrtinirdesa-sūtra: “To say this is conventional and this is 
ultimate is dualistic. To realize that there is no difference between the 
                                                        
127 Gandjin Nagao, The Foundational Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy, John P. Keenan, 
trans. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), 51-60.  
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conventional and the ultimate is to enter the Dharma-door of nonduality.”128 
Masao Abe helps us to understand the revolutionary character of Nāgārjuna’s 
insight for rethinking core Buddhist ideas with the following explanation: 
 Buddhist ideas of anātman or absence of an eternal self, the impermanence of all things, 
 and dependent origination, all imply the negation of being, existence, and substantiality. 
 It is Nāgārjuna who established the idea of Sūnyatā or Emptiness by clearly realizing the 
 implication of the basic ideas transmitted by the earlier Buddhist tradition. It must be 
 emphasized that Nāgārjuna’s idea of Emptiness is not nihilistic. Emptiness which is 
 completely without form is freed from both being and non-being because ‘non-being’ is 
 still a form as distinguished from ‘being’ In fact, Nāgārjuna not only rejected what came 
 to be called the ‘eternalist’ view, which proclaimed the reality of phenomena as the 
 manifestation of one eternal and unchangeable substance, but additionally denounced its 
 exact counterpart, the so-called ‘nihilistic’ view. He thus opened up a new vista liberated 
 from every illusory point of view concerning affirmation or negation, being or non-being, 
 as the standpoint of Mahayana Emptiness, which he called the Middle Path.129  
 
This middle path between two levels of reality bears striking resemblance to 
Dewey’s mediation between the real and the ideal within experience—both levels 
press themselves upon us and are entangled in an ecology of being, meaning, and 
value.  
  
Enlightenment and Ecological Attunement in Dōgen 
 
 
 For many of the reasons cited above, the eminent scholar of Eastern 
thought Hu Shih acclaimed Zen as a “revolution in Buddhism.”130 That Zen is no 
mere continuation of the Mahāyāna tradition is perhaps most evident in the work 
of Japanese monk and religious reformer Dōgen (1200-1253), who builds on the 
theme of radical nonduality introduced by Nāgārjuna. Dōgen is esteemed as the 
                                                        
128 Quoted in Garfield and Priest, “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought,” 6.  
129 Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1985), 126-
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130 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 425.  
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founder of the Sōtō school of Zen Buddhism in his native Japan, but his 
reputation as a highly creative philosopher, religious thinker, and poet has spread 
across the globe.131 
 In a tradition known for its sparseness, Dōgen was a prolific writer. His 
magnum opus is the Shōbōgenzō, or “Treasury of the True Dharma Eye,” which 
consists of a compilation of 95 fascicles written between 1239 and 1246. The 
“treasury” the title speaks of is the immediate knowledge the historical Buddha 
purportedly transmitted to his successor, Mahākāshyapa, by simply holding up a 
flower without speaking. This wordless transmission is said to mark the 
beginning of the Zen tradition, which focuses less on the study of scriptures and 
more on self-cultivation through daily work and seated meditation (zazen). 
Dōgen spoke out against forms of Buddhism that favored the former at the 
expense of the latter with the following harsh words: “What good are such actions 
as reading the sutras and saying the nembutsu [the name of the Amitabha 
Buddha]? How futile to think that merits accrue from merely moving the tongue 
and raising the voice. If you think this covers Buddhism you are far from the 
truth. Constant repetition of the nembutsu is worthless, like a frog in a spring 
field croaking night and day.”132 In this statement one hears echoes of Dewey’s 
criticisms of the propositional faith of traditional Western religion. 
 What Dōgen intended by these remarks is that enlightenment is not 
capable of being achieved passively or purely cognitively (i.e., by book learning). 
                                                        
131 Dōgen’s increased profile is due largely to the efforts of Kyoto School philosopher Tetsurō 
Watsuji’s work Shamon Dōgen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1925). 
132 Ernest Wood, Zen Dictionary (Rutland, VT: Charles Tuttle, 1988), 37.  
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It requires the active exercise of practical skills, even those represented by 
mundane chores like preparing meals, washing dishes, and sweeping, all of which 
are integral to Zen monastic life. In an extension of Nāgārjuna’s equation of the 
truths of conventional and ultimate reality, Dōgen declared that practice and 
enlightenment were one.133 This means that enlightenment is not a permanently 
altered state of awareness or plane of reality transcendent to the everyday; one 
must continually enact it anew or risk losing it. As Heinrich Dumoulin explains 
this point: “the experience of enlightenment does not constitute the terminus of a 
way. Practice must be continued, because it is practice in enlightenment. And 
enlightenment must continually be confirmed in practice.”134 This was a 
fundamental challenge to the predominant conception of Buddha-nature—the 
seeds of enlightenment existing in all creatures—as somehow removed from daily 
living. According to Dōgen, the possibility for enlightenment exists within the self 
at every moment with every activity; each task we undertake is an opportunity for 
religious realization, just as Dewey argued all experiences could take on religious 
quality. 
 The enlightenment experience, or satori, takes place in, and is of, this 
world. It describes an awakening not to the reality of a supernatural being, but to 
one’s authentic self, which includes an expansive identification with all of nature. 
In the Yuibutsu yobutsu fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen claims: “What the 
                                                        
133 This was the main point of Dōgen’s manuals on Zen meditation known as Fukanzazengi. For 
an excellent English translation, see Carl Bielefeldt, Dōgen’s Manuals of Zen Meditation 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).   
134 Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Enlightenment: Origins and Meaning, trans. John C. Maraldo (New 
York: Weatherhill, 1985), 95. 
 435 
Buddha means by the self is precisely the entire universe….Thus, whether one is 
aware of it or not, there is no universe that is not the self.”135 The opposite of 
enlightenment for Zen is the narrow egoic view, called mayoi, which we 
habitually reside in. Often translated as “discrimination,” mayoi involves seeing 
things in terms of similarities and differences, through the preconceptions and 
false needs of our limited ego-minds. This is the position of the inauthentic self, 
which merely observes and interprets as a spectator.  
 Transforming oneself from an inauthentic self into an authentic self 
cannot be accomplished by intellectual or cognitive means; it comes, rather, “by 
transforming or remodeling…one’s whole being.”136 Though commonly used in 
translations of Buddhist texts, “transformation” is perhaps misleading in the Zen 
context, for one already is an authentic self. Zen practice consists in learning to 
drop the false ego and attuning oneself to the resonances of the authentic self 
lying primordially beneath it. 
 Dōgen sets down instructions for how to attune oneself to the self’s 
authentic possibilities in the Genjō kōan, the most famous fascicle of the 
Shōbōgenzō. The phrase Genjō kōan can be translated in many ways, including 
“the question of everyday life, actualizing the fundamental point, the matter at 
hand, the realized law of the universe, manifesting absolute reality, the 
actualization of enlightenment, manifesting suchness, living what is, according 
                                                        
135 Quoted in Francis H. Cook, “Dōgen’s View of Authentic Selfhood and Its Socio-ethical 
Implications,“ in Dōgen Studies, ed. William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1985), 139.  
136 D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1994), 136. 
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with the truth.”137 In its most famous lines, Dōgen says, “To study the Buddha 
Way is to study the self. To study the self is to forget the self. To forget the self is 
to be authenticated by the myriad things. To be authenticated by the myriad 
things is to drop off the mind-body of oneself and others.”138 Realizing one’s 
authentic self involves a radical gestalt shift of personal perspective, whereby one 
allows things in the background to presence in the foreground without grasping 
or seeking after them in an overly cognitive, overly restrictive way. As Dōgen goes 
on to say, “Conveying the self to the myriad things to authenticate them is 
delusion; the myriad things advancing to authenticate the self is 
enlightenment.”139 In other words, do not let reality be exhausted by your 
conceptions of it; allow reality to presence in the full vitality of its facticity. The 
way one does this is by the dropping off of body-mind (shinjin-datsuraku).   
 Following modern Japanese, the dropping off of body-mind can also be 
translated as “the molting of body-mind,” which has the advantage of making it 
more intelligible by comparing it to a natural process, such as that of shedding 
hair or skin. By doing so, one uncovers an original, pure, untainted self-nature 
below outward appearances constrained by particular social and cultural 
ideologies. As Steven Heine notes, this analogy is apt, for it further implies the 
practice must be undertaken frequently, as enlightenment is a continuous 
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process, and not a once-and-done event for the Zennist.140  
 The fundamental lesson of the Genjō kōan, of the entire Shōbōgenzō, is 
that enlightenment is achievable only by allowing things to presence as they are, 
in the fullness of their reality. To read reality through our predefined conceptual 
frameworks, reified images, or habitual desires is to forgo enlightenment. 
Enlightenment is about renegotiating the religious meaning and affordances of 
things in terms of objective needs and values. The money in my wallet affords my 
buying a new watch; it also affords buying food for the homeless. I am connected 
to both of these situations, even if it does not seem so, and only one of them 
permits my authentic self-realization. Learning to feel the myriad relations we are 
connected to is part of what it means to become an authentic, whole, fully 
realized self. The nonduality of the authentic self from the environments it 
inhabits (i.e., the universe, according to the Buddha) forms the basis of a radically 
ecological imperative. As Dōgen states:  
 When a fish swims in water, there is no end of the water no matter how far it swims. 
 When a bird flies in the sky, fly though it may, there is no end to the sky. However, no fish 
 or bird has ever left water or sky since the beginning. It is just that when there is a great 
 need, the use is great, and when there is a small need, the use is small. In this way, no 
 creature ever fails to realize its own completeness; wherever it is, it functions freely. But if 
 a bird leaves the sky, it will immediately die, and if a fish leaves the water, it will 
 immediately die.141  
 
 The self is dynamically connected to the web of significances that 
constitute its situations. Delusion and suffering occur when the self egoically 
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posits itself as the nexus of meaning and value, rather than as merely one aspect 
of an infinitely greater whole. The authentic self is one who has broken free from 
egoic thinking and is able to wield what Bret Davis has perceptively translated as 
“egoless perspective.”142 As Davis explains this phrase for understanding Dōgen, 
“Rather than an overcoming of perspectivism, enlightenment for Dōgen entails a 
radical reorientation and qualitative transformation of the process of perspectival 
delimitation.”143The authentic self absorbs both self and other in a larger 
perspective, which can be viewed as an expression of the Boddhisattva goal of 
showing radical compassion to all creatures even at the expense of one’s 
individual (egoic, inauthentic) self.  
 This mirrors Dewey’s statement that feelings of self-realization always 
include a healthy “forgetfulness of self.”144 This genuine, egoless perspective is 
bound to no school, doctrine, or dogma. It is achieved by a simple return to the 
natural rhythm of lived experiencing revealed to us by our embodied, skillful 
transactions with the natural world and its ideal possibilities. Upon careful 
reflection, this sounds strikingly similar to Dewey’s little explored notion of 
“genuine perspective,” which he introduced in A Common Faith by claiming, 
“whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious.”145 When read alongside 
his ecological ontology and aesthetic theory, it is best described as a holistic, 
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qualitative mode of perception with religious effects, a new way of seeing and 
living in the world that results from the self’s deep ecological attunement to the 
entire range of conditions essential to its existence.  
 The experiential achievement of egolessness allows one to see into one’s 
true nature—which both Dōgen and Dewey argue is “empty” of any permanent 
identity—and become receptively open to the self-presentation of all things in 
their qualitative suchness. German psychoanalyst Erich Fromm gives clear 
expression to the meaning and value of the ecological attunement that facilitates 
such types of experience with the following description: 
 How can we overcome the suffering, the imprisonment, the shame which the experience 
 of separateness creates; how can we find union within ourselves, with our fellowman, 
 with nature?...The question is always the same. However…there are only two answers. 
 One is to overcome separateness and to find unity by regression to the state of unity 
 which existed before awareness ever arose, that is, before man was born. The other 
 answer is to be fully born, to develop one’s awareness, one’s reason, one’s capacity to 
 love, to such a point that it transcends one’s egocentric involvement, and arrives at a new 
 harmony, at a new oneness with the world.146 
 
 Comparing John Dewey’s religious views with the Eastern traditions of 
Daoism and Zen Buddhism highlights a cross-culturally shared focus on the 
ultimacy of human growth and perfection through harmonious transactions and 
identification of the self with the whole of nature. All three systems assumed the 
natural and human worlds were informed by common principles and thus, if we 
could understand the one, we could understand the other.147 Both Daoist and Zen 
Buddhist texts describe a wide range of somatic cultivation practices that 
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emphasize developing a phenomenological sensitivity to one’s inner body 
(emotions, feelings) and its location in the world. Dewey’s Psychology and his 
work with F. M. Alexander showed such practices were equally important in his 
view, even if he did not articulate them in a step-wise guide for his readers.148  
 The religious goal of bodily training is to dissolve the experiential 
boundary between self and world so as to enter a more holistic, more ecological 
way of being. This is also the professed goal of Richard Shusterman’s 
“somaesthetics,” a philosophy of mindfulness rooted in classical pragmatism. 
Shusterman, building on Dewey’s idea about the essential unity of the “body-
mind,” an idea we also see reflected in comments made in the Zhuangzi and 
Dōgen’s writings, argues that the whole body is our basic medium of perception 
and action, and that the problems contemporary culture suffers from, including 
stress, overstimulation, and deficits of attention, can be therapeutically resolved 
by improving our “body consciousness.”149  
 Shusterman’s analysis does not touch upon the subject of religion in a 
sustained manner, but it is important to remember that for Dewey, Daoism, and 
Zen the emphasis on enrichment of experience, embodied action, and meaning 
through a skillful sculpting of the self is an essentially religious affair. Each 
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advocates being “fully awake” and present to what our experiences tell us, agree 
that human language is inadequate for communicating the contents of those 
experiences, find a constitutive role of emotions and bodily feelings in the process 
of knowledge formation, and express a deep piety toward nature as continuous 
with the self and that by means of attunement to its natural rhythms we can 
achieve a more peaceful and enlightened state of living. This self-development is 
forever in process and never finished, however. To claim otherwise would be to 
express a deep ignorance of nature’s inviolable rhythms:   
 Except as the outcome of arrested development, there is no such thing as a fixed, 
 readymade finished self. Every living self causes acts and is itself caused in term by what 
 it does. All voluntary action is a remaking of self, since it creates new desires, instigates 
 new modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions which institute new ends. Our 
 personal identity is found in the thread of continuous development which binds together 
 these changes. In the strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is 
 becoming, and becoming for the better or the worse.150 
 
 
 
5.4 Living up to Dewey’s Religious Genius 
 
 
In a fast evolving world, a world absent meaningful firsts and lasts to 
epistemically constrained creatures, traditional conceptions of ultimacy tend to 
fall somewhat flat. Paul Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern is noteworthy 
because it provides a vehicle for ultimacy suitable to naturalistic understandings 
of religion and religiosity. The preceding comparisons between John Dewey’s 
religious thought with deep ecology, Daoism, and Zen Buddhism shed light on a 
distinctive sense in which the goal of an ecological religious naturalism—the 
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actualization of the ideal self—can be considered religiously ultimate. The ideal 
self, in many ways synonymous with deep ecology’s ecological self, Daoism’s 
genuine person, and Zen’s authentic self, is existentially significant and worth 
engaging because, on a fundamental level, it is “more real.” Its ultimacy lies 
precisely in its authenticity, the positive value of which is felt directly in the 
moments when it is enacted, as the story of Butcher Ding helps illustrate. A 
conception of ultimacy as authenticity further assists us in comprehending the 
manner in which description and prescription are inextricably intertwined from 
the perspective of ecological thinking. As Alan Watts elegantly expresses this 
point: when we act in accordance with what is, we most fully become what we 
are.151   
 This way of describing things speaks to an additional manner in which 
actualizing the ideal self can be considered ultimate, and that is because it is 
adaptive. Adaptivity is perhaps the most fitting conception of ultimacy for 
religion conceived of naturalistically. The question of the possible adaptive value 
of religion has been discussed widely within the scientific study of religion and 
there is no consensus on the answer. To fairly assess any belief, feeling, or 
behavior as “adaptive,” one needs to understand what is implied by “adaptation.” 
Roughly speaking, adaptation involves some change of characteristic in an 
evolving organism in order to adjust its activities to relevant features of its 
environment. The adaptation process can be fast or slow. An example of the first 
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type is the biological adaptation of an animal’s immune system to novel 
environmental conditions. An example of the second is the cultural process of 
adapting educational practices to an altered socioeconomic and technological 
reality. 
 As discussed already in Chapter 3, each organism seeks to maintain its 
homeostasis and self-preservation. Behaviors that contribute to this purpose are 
intrinsically valuable and worth engaging in; those that do not are dis-valuable 
and best avoided. This evolutionary truth had a significant impact on Dewey’s 
conception of experiencing as an adaptive process and on classical American 
philosophy on the whole. According to enactivist researcher Ezequiel Di Paolo, 
this insight lies at the heart of an important distinction relevant to our analysis 
here, and it is that “behaviour can be classified as adapted if it contributes to the 
continued viability of a system, and as adaptive if it restores the necessary 
stability when this viability is challenged.”152 Thus, a behavior adapted to one 
context can easily prove maladaptive if rigidly inflexible to changing 
circumstances. This is why there are no set, prefixed ideals, religious or 
otherwise. Ideal consummations inevitably change when the complex dynamics 
of a situation (organism-environment system) are modified. 
 The ubiquity but sheer diversity of religious beliefs and behaviors across 
cultures and time makes a general assessment of the adaptivity of religion 
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Teleology Beyond the Closed Senorimotor Loop,” in Dynamical Systems Approaches to 
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difficult. As much depends upon one’s definition of religion as it does on the 
understanding of adaptation adopted as a guiding principle. This situation is 
reflected dramatically in a recent article with the title “Is Religion Adaptive? Yes, 
No, Neutral. But Mostly We Don’t Know.”153 For example, if religion is defined in 
narrow terms of belief in the existence of supernatural beings, then it is 
accurately considered a by-product of the adaptive propensity to detect agency 
and represent animacy.154 If religion is viewed primarily through a social lens, 
then a case might be made for its adaptivity,155 though the impulse to pro-social, 
cooperative behavior would likely be the genuine adaptation, with all of the 
theological “extras” of religion eventually fading, as we see with the increasing 
migration of believers toward non-theistic and secular spiritualities. Finally, if 
religion is defined from a wholly naturalistic perspective as a specialized form of 
problem-solving, its adaptivity seems all but assured, with adaptivity on the 
human level being defined as an “individual’s dispositional tendency to make 
active attempts to adjust him or herself to fit new tasks and new 
environments.”156 This is what a consummately skilled individual does when 
enacting the ideal self in existential situations where it is lacking and required. As 
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we saw in the last chapter, a skilled individual does not necessarily have an 
explicit “ideal self” in mind, but remains open, somatically, affectively, whole 
bodily, to the solicitations or invitations of the relevant affordances of her 
situation. This creative process of self-organization through the formation and 
reformation of habits is ongoing and facilitates the adequate interaction of a self 
with a constantly shifting organic-cultural environment.157 Flexibility in 
perception and skillful action is key. Knowing what to do by itself is of small 
consequence; it is knowing when and how to do what needs to be done that 
matters.  
 As we come to the conclusion of our study, I should state that it was not 
my intention to argue for the superiority of Dewey’s religious naturalism over 
other outlooks bearing the same appellation; though this may seem implied by 
claims of its being ultimately authentic and adaptive. The purpose of teasing 
apart the various dimensions of Dewey’s religious thought was to show, firstly, 
that it is more nuanced and sophisticated than how it is typically depicted and, 
secondly, that Dewey’s particular version of religious naturalism can help pave 
the way for a philosophy of religion that is more empirically responsible, 
phenomenologically faithful, and existentially transformative—which is to say, 
more ecological—in its problems and methods than it is presently. Herein lies, I 
believe, Dewey’s particular religious genius. Let me clarify what I mean by this 
statement. 
                                                        
157 For a fuller treatment of the concept of adaptation aligned with the understanding provided 
here, see John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity (New York: Basic 
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 We are all familiar with the notion of the scientific or artistic genius: the 
inspired visionary who through her work radically alters the way humanity 
perceives the world. What characteristics constitute genius is highly individual 
and unique, yet most of us would agree that Newton, Noether, and Einstein were 
geniuses, as were Michelangelo, Mozart, and Tolstoy. If pressed, we may even 
accept the notion of the “religious genius” and, momentarily setting aside 
personal convictions, offer up Jesus of Nazareth, the Buddha, and Black Elk of 
the Oglala Sioux as potential candidates.  
 Though widely regarded as America’s most distinguished philosopher, 
Dewey is not typically viewed as a genius in any of the above senses. As far as the 
scientific and artistic cases go, this assessment is valid. Dewey shed important 
light on the nature and utility of scientific method; he was not led by his 
theorizing to challenge the known physical world or invent a new mathematics. 
In the same way, Dewey carefully elucidated the structure and value of aesthetic 
experience, but go on to paint the Sistine ceiling or pen War and Peace he did 
not.  
 It is tempting for similar reasons to dismiss outright any consideration of 
Dewey as a religious genius. While it is true that A Common Faith lacks the wide 
readership and influence enjoyed by the Gospels, the Buddhist sutras, or even 
Black Elk Speaks, I believe it to be no less radical in its vision. Moreover, upon 
closer investigation, Dewey is found to possess several characteristics of the 
religious genius as set down by physician-philosopher Albert Schweitzer. Though 
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perhaps best known for his interpretive life of Jesus, Schweitzer was also greatly 
intrigued by the disruptive and transformative potential of the genius figure for 
effecting social progress of all kinds. In his early work, The Essence of Faith, 
Schweitzer defined the religious genius in the following telling manner: 
 [T]he nature of every religious genius is shown in that he constructs a unity by working 
 over the wreckage of a religion destroyed either deliberately or unconsciously as the 
 exigencies of his religious personality dictate it without concern as to whether, for the 
 average person, the broken pieces fit together into a structure of not. The genius seizes 
 what is only in the light of his own convergence into a unified image—and the rest 
 becomes blurred in the shade.158  
 
 The religious “wreckage” worked over by Dewey in A Common Faith and 
several other writings was that of traditional supernaturalist religion, the basic 
tenets of which had grown increasingly untenable in the wake of Darwin’s theory 
of evolution. Unlike Darwin in the Origin, however, Dewey was deliberate in his 
attack on religious supernaturalism, as he was on all forms of mystery and 
speculation untethered to experience. Further, Dewey certainly seemed 
unconcerned, to his most trenchant critics at least, about whether his reworking 
of the religious qualities of experience—the “broken pieces” of traditional religion 
Dewey thought worth saving—through the prism of ecological naturalism “fit 
together” in any unified, recognizably religious way.  
 Like the scientific or artistic genius, the religious genius is rarely 
appreciated as such during her lifetime. As Schweitzer notes and history more 
often than not bears out, it is typically the case that the religious genius is ignored 
or actively persecuted for her radical beliefs, insofar as those beliefs are judged 
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against deeply ingrained, culturally inherited conceptions of what religion is or 
should be:  
 Because progress cannot be achieved on the basis of the customary or the habitual, it is 
 especially the religiously interested masses who sense the new structure not as religion 
 but as appearance—that is, a conglomerate of religious pronouncements—and the 
 religious genius becomes a deluded heretic.159  
 
This trajectory accurately describes the reception of Dewey’s religious naturalism, 
which was nearly universally dismissed as delusory or impracticable by 
philosophers and religionists during his day. Along with his philosophical 
pragmatism, Dewey’s religious naturalism strove to infuse new potency into all 
manners of thinking and practice grown ineffectual by timeworn custom and 
habit. Unfortunately, individual and collective modes of living change at but a 
snail’s pace, and thus we are still waiting to see if Dewey’s religious insight ushers 
in any measurable shift in public religious life. 
 As far as academic religious life is concerned, at least three related areas of 
religious inquiry would be impacted, and potentially significantly altered, if an 
ecological transformation were to take place in philosophy of religion, namely, 
those of religious dialogue, religious studies, and philosophical theology. The 
precise shape the changes in any one of these areas might take cannot be known 
beforehand, though certain courses suggest themselves as more fruitful than 
others. Below I outline what I take to be productive changes implied by taking a 
Deweyan, ecological approach seriously, though I make no attempt to defend 
them in a rigorous fashion. My suggestions may prove unpopular or even 
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impolitic, but such is the territory that comes with following the naturalistic 
method to its logical conclusions. There is no need to be fatalistic, however, for in 
all worthwhile endeavors new doors are opened just as others are closed. As 
Dewey reminds us in Experience and Nature: 
 The naturalistic method, when it is consistently followed, destroys many things once 
 cherished; but it destroys them by revealing their inconsistency with the nature of 
 things—a flaw that always attended them and deprived them of efficacy for aught save 
 emotional consolation. But its main purport is not destructive…an empirical method 
 which remains true to nature does not ‘save’; it is not an insurance device nor a 
 mechanical antiseptic. But it inspires the mind with courage and vitality to create new 
 ideals and values in face of the perplexities of a new world.160 
 
 
 
Praxis-based Religious Dialogue 
 
 
 First, religious dialogue should move beyond discussing religious concepts 
to interrogating established religious practices—and innovating new ones—in 
terms of their utility for improving individual and shared experience. Of course, 
religious dialogue is impractical, if not impossible, without a basic level of 
conceptual religious literacy. Absent a working understanding of the core beliefs 
of the world’s religious traditions and “non-traditions” (i.e., religious ways of 
living without established institutions and doctrinal histories, of which there are 
an increasing number), attempts at dialogue quickly devolve into soliloquies, as 
Stevie Smith’s playful yet foreboding poem “Our Bog is Dood” aptly illustrates:  
 Our Bog is dood, our Bog is dood, 
 They lisped in accents mild, 
 But when I asked them to explain 
 They grew a little wild. 
 How do you know your Bog is dood 
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 My darling little child? 
 
 We know because we wish it so 
 That is enough, they cried, 
 And straight within each infant eye 
 Stood up the flame of pride, 
 And if you do not think it so 
 You shall be crucified. 
 
 Then tell me, darling little ones, 
 What’s dood, suppose Bog is? 
 Just what we think, the answer came, 
 Just what we think it is. 
 They bowed their heads. Our bog is ours 
 And we are wholly his. 
 
 But when they raised them up again 
 They had forgotten me 
 Each one upon each other glared 
 In pride and misery 
 For what was dood, and what their Bog 
 They never could agree. 
 
 Oh sweet it was to leave them then, 
 And sweeter not to see, 
 And sweetest all to walk alone  
 Beside the encroaching sea, 
 The sea that soon should drown them all, 
 That never yet drowned me.161 
Smith is clearly condemning religion’s tendencies toward closed-mindedness and 
faction-building here, just as Dewey criticized institutional forms of religion 
during his day. Accepting humans as fully natural organisms means recognizing 
the biological roots of all perceiving, acting, and knowing, regardless of how these 
practices are filtered through distinct cultural systems. It further means 
recognizing the embodied character of all human languages and symbolic 
schemes, including those that enable religious expression.  
 While there may be no theory-neutral set of observations by which to 
judge disparate religious practices, the qualitative feelings accompanying intense 
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religious and spiritual experiences—which Dewey viewed as rooted in humans’ 
shared biology and the invariant structures of our inhabited environments—come 
about as close as an empirically responsible theorist could fairly wish for. Just as 
practicing artists from different world regions and cultures find themselves able 
to experientially engage, fondly appreciate, and brutally critique works of art 
wildly dissimilar to their own, there is no a priori reason why adherents of the 
world’s faiths should be unable to do the same with a critical open-mindedness 
and spirit of charity rooted in a desire for improving the whole human lot.    
 
 
Critical and Applied Religious Studies 
 
 
 Second, the epoché, or “bracketing,” regarding the ontological status of 
religious phenomena that underlies the discipline of religious studies—what 
Ninian Smart defined as its “methodological agnosticism,” akin to the 
“methodological naturalism” of the natural sciences—should be abandoned.162 
From an ecological standpoint, the phenomena of human experience are part and 
parcel of the natural world (there is no other world), are perceived through 
wholly natural channels, and are open to investigation by empirical methods. 
This fact poses a direct challenge to the operative principle of religious studies, 
upheld in the names of objectivity and political correctness, of permitting 
descriptions of religious phenomena as “unnatural,” “supernatural,” or “non-
natural,” as seen especially in the models of religious experience currently in 
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vogue in the cognitive science of religion.  
 By choosing to embrace an assertive naturalism over a weak agnosticism, 
scholars of religious studies could signal a new era in the study of religion, one 
rich in opportunities for interdisciplinary collaboration and intercultural 
cooperation for uncovering the universal truths of natural religion. Much like 
William James’s attempt to establish a “science of religion” and not simply a 
“scientific study of religion,” the discovery and advancement of bona fide 
religious knowledge requires subjecting all religious beliefs and practices to 
critical scrutiny against the most up-to-date scientific and ethical standards. 
 This hints at a potential engineering side to future religious studies. While 
ecological thinking in general is replete with suggestions for pioneering better 
and less destructive ways of being religious, there are specific disciplines that 
employ ecological principles of design to engineer environments where value-
laden experiences can be structurally integrated and engaged, like the field of 
Kansei, or “affective,” engineering.163 Though to date Kansei has been applied 
primarily to the design of consumer products, its core objective of using design 
factors to inhibit or facilitate certain types of qualitative experience appears to 
translate itself readily to the theme of religious experience when construed 
naturalistically as the experience of wholeness and self-consummation. From the 
arrangement of furniture in a room to the layout of a city, the organization of 
space and materials for the aim of meeting different emotional needs and values 
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is something humans already do quite naturally.164 Such a critical and applied 
religious studies is desperately needed in a world marked by cultural difference 
and increased alienation from the natural world, though convincing religious 
scholars and layperson practitioners of its merits will be no easy task.  
 
 
An Ecological Theodicy 
 
 Third, and finally, we come to the “problem of evil,” or theodicy, which 
due to its innate allure is unlikely to go away. Religious naturalists are frequently 
criticized for failing to take evil seriously; John Dewey was criticized by his peers 
on precisely this issue. Dewey had plenty to say on the “problem,” however, 
namely, that they way it is typically posed by philosophers renders it senseless:  
 One answer to the question is that we are involved by this search in all the problems of 
 existence of evil that have haunted theology in the past and that the most ingenious 
 apologetics have not faced, much less met. If these apologists had not identified the 
 existence of ideal goods with that of a Person supposed to originate and support them—a 
 Being, moreover, to whom omnipotent power is attributed—the problem of the 
 occurrence of evil would be gratuitous.165 
 As Dewey say, traditional framings of this problem within philosophical 
theology (i.e., of justifying a beneficent God’s allowance of evil) find little 
resonance in a scientific age. This does not mean the problem is meaningless, 
however, or that it has no validly religious dimensions to it. Instead of offering a 
solution to the logical problem of evil, of attempting to justify evil’s existence or 
explain it away, an ecological philosophical approach locates evil in the dynamic 
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structure of the organism-environment relationship.  
 Building upon the notion of situational lacks, evil should be recast as a 
particular kind of lack, akin to Augustine of Hippo’s idea of evil as “privation,” as 
the absence of good, to provide a correlate traditional theological understanding. 
More specifically, I argue that evil should be viewed as the foreclosure of ideal 
possibility from a developing event’s contour, whether we are speaking of a 
person, relationship, society, or any other “event.” This way of viewing things 
potentially can account for a range of evils (e.g., moral, natural, etc.) and places 
the burden of responsibility for locating and thwarting evil squarely upon 
humans as skilled perceivers and actors. Honing our phenomenological 
sensitivity to evil’s structural presence within situations—whether on the 
organismic side or the environmental side—will require specialized training. 
Education in theory must be met with rigorous practical disciplines if it is to be 
effective for solving real-world problems of evil.  
 Whether or not one agrees with the suggestions just made, the empirical 
and normative implications of the ecological turn clearly demand fresh 
methodological approaches for all academic disciplines and practical initiatives 
concerned with religion if they are to remain applicable to 21st century realities 
and needs. In short, this means a turning away from tiresome and stale 
description in favor of bold experimentation. Admittedly, this will be a risky 
move, but one that brings a vibrant, liberating creativity in tow. With this 
consideration in mind, I draw attention in closing to a quote from David Hume 
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on the manner in which most philosophical inquiries end. In Book Four of his 
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, Hume wryly states: “The 
observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and 
meets us, at every turn, in spite of our endeavors to elude or avoid it.”166 It is my 
sincere hope that Hume is wrong on this point and that philosophers and other 
scholars of religion will overcome their perennial blind pots and weaknesses and 
begin exploring radically ecological models for their respective disciplines. Only 
by doing so will they secure religion’s—and their own—future relevance within 
the academy and the wider culture.    
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AFTERWORD 
 
 
Open and honest inquiry requires little defense, if any at all. By the end of her 
presentation of results, the genuine scholar, contra the intellectual hobbyist or 
dilettante, will have well convinced her readers of the reasons why a particular 
study was undertaken and, if especially gifted, the relevance of its results to daily 
living. This task becomes extra challenging, but all the more important, when 
working with abstract or unfamiliar topics. Intellectual prudence demands in 
such cases that a scholar’s defense be made explicit and transparent.   
 The dissertation had two general aims. The first was to offer a critique and 
constructive alternative to traditional philosophy of religion rooted in ecological 
thinking. The second was to present an essay—in the classical sense of the term, 
retained in the French essai, of “an effort,” ”an attempt”—to claim a place of 
significance for classical pragmatist John Dewey in contemporary philosophy of 
religion by rehabilitating his religious thought. By doing so, it challenges 
dominant currents in both philosophy and Dewey studies that argue Dewey did 
not hold a philosophy of religion, or that pragmatism’s focus on practical 
problem-solving is eo ipso unfit to serve as the basis for a philosophy of religion. 
Against this view, it was shown that Dewey’s ecologically grounded religious 
naturalism provides a solid foundation for a conceptually rich and coherent, even 
compelling philosophy of religion, albeit one quite different in appearance and 
function from what typically passes under that label. 
 Yet to view the dissertation as merely an application of philosophical 
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principles and methods to traditional religious topics would betray its intention 
as much as it would indicate a parochial and pernicious understanding of 
philosophy of religion. Parochial in that it fails to recognize the myriad ways in 
which philosophy of religion differs from the distinct, even if thematically related, 
disciplines of theology and religious studies. Pernicious in that this view has 
become so deeply ingrained within both the academy and the popular 
imagination that it blocks the reception of fresh and important work in 
philosophy of religion at precisely the cultural moment when it is most needed. 
This unfortunate state of affairs is in no way unique to philosophy of religion; it is 
but one of the ironies of all “philosophy of X” fields and a palpable consequence 
of academic specialization in the West, as any philosopher forced to defend the 
status and integrity of her particular X in the face of shrinking enrollments and 
budget constraints can readily attest to.    
 The philosophy of religion case seems especially ironic, however, for 
arguably no subfield of philosophical inquiry is as broad in scope and rich in its 
implications. Philosophers of religion routinely touch upon questions concerning 
the structure of reality, the theory of knowledge, the nature of human being, the 
content and character of perceptual experience, and the problem of linguistic 
reference in their conceptual dealings with religion. The purpose of this 
statement is not to boast a greater measure of philosophical dexterity on the part 
of philosophers of religion; it is simply to point out their craft inherently includes 
within its purview considerations of metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical 
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anthropology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. This list could be 
easily expanded. As a result, an exercise in philosophy of religion is at once an 
exercise across several philosophical domains, and the dissertation was taken up 
with this charge in mind.  
 It is my hope that this admission is not taken as evidence of hubris or 
unrestrained ambition on the part of a budding philosopher. This philosopher is 
in full agreement with Reinhold Niebuhr’s conviction that no sin is greater than 
pride, of which intellectual pride is an especially insidious sort. Rather, the 
characterization of philosophy of religion as a complex, multifaceted undertaking 
is intended to signal the importance of consciously attending to philosophical 
concerns of various stripes if one aims to do philosophy of religion in a clear and 
comprehensive manner—in other words, without conjecture, assumption, or 
undue speculation (only a confused or self-conflicted philosopher would argue 
speculation as wholly bad).        
 Reflection upon this last point may make the choice of John Dewey as 
backdrop and inspiration for a work in philosophy of religion seem odd and off 
the mark. Dewey wrote but a single, short work on religion late in his career, and 
a clear and comprehensive treatment of the topic it is not. Truth be told, A 
Common Faith raised more questions, especially for neo-orthodox theologians 
like Niebuhr, about Dewey’s naturalization of religion than it provided answers. 
Furthermore, as a naturalist, Dewey’s methodological starting point has time and 
again been deemed fundamentally at cross purposes with a full and realistic, 
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which is to say a non-reductive and non-skeptical, treatment of religion, insofar 
as philosophical investigations of religion, in Dewey’s time and largely still today, 
presuppose definitions of religion in supernaturalistic or non-naturalistic terms. 
Be that as it may, to the close and careful reader of Dewey’s oeuvre it is clear he 
was occupied with spiritual and religious questions throughout his long life, and 
even if one were to doubt the sincerity of this occupation or question the 
orthodoxy of his resulting views, Dewey wrote extensively on topics (e.g., 
ontology, epistemology, perception, ethics, politics, language, values, etc.) of 
immense relevance to considerations of religion.  
 All inquiry, academic or otherwise, is provoked by open questions, by 
indeterminate situations that call out for resolution. Much of the time we are 
consciously unaware of the questions that spur us to action, such as “How do I 
get to work on time?” or “What should I eat for breakfast today?”—we merely find 
ourselves waking up early and navigating our morning routines automatically 
and with little reflection. For most purposes, it is not necessary to be clear as to 
what questions our daily routines are set up as responses to. Academic inquiry, 
however, differs significantly from the ordinary, everyday case. Academic 
questions are formulated consciously and after considerate deliberation. They 
need not be overly specific, though in scientific investigations they normally are; 
it is sometimes the case that a scholar is simply curious why a certain issue or 
topic is not viewed as more relevant and worthy of study than others, or why a 
particular thinker has been neglected in a field that would be progressively 
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advanced if it took into account her ideas and recommendations. The central 
motivating questions prompting my undertaking this dissertation were of the 
second, curiosity-driven type and include: Why Philosophy of Religion?, Why 
Ecology?, and Why John Dewey?  
 
 
Why Philosophy of Religion? 
 
 
 It might seem more natural, if not also perfunctory, to undertake a study 
in philosophy of religion in response to the question What is philosophy of 
religion? Although an important and underlying question throughout this study, 
I was primarily motivated by the more difficult question Why philosophy of 
religion? I say more difficult for “why questions” ask far more of us than “what 
questions.” “What questions” are satisfactorily (though not necessarily easily) 
answered by a descriptive account of the experience or phenomenon under 
investigation. “Why questions,” on the other hand, seek beyond factual 
description and demand reasons for, or causes of, something’s existence. Put 
differently, “what questions” seek knowledge; “why questions” demand 
understanding. Those who fail to see the distinction between the two need only 
think of the persistence of young children when supplied with a parent’s 
halfhearted “what answers” to their wholehearted “why questions.” 
 Now, then, Why philosophy of religion? I have been pondering this 
question, often at the prodding of concerned others, ever since I switched 
programs of study as an undergraduate from pre-medicine to philosophy. My 
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standard reply, one polished throughout graduate school, begins by tracing 
philosophy’s etymological roots, which in the ancient Greek (philosophia) means 
“love of wisdom.” Of course, wisdom implies knowledge, but it also implies deep 
understanding of knowledge’s purposes and judicious applications, as well as its 
ambiguities and limits. Such a definition implies a richer understanding of 
philosophy than that put forth by the German Romantic philosopher Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel when he described philosophy in relatively narrow 
terms as the “thinking study of things.”1 Debates about philosophy’s content and 
scope take up entire works in their own right and many philosophers remain 
actively engaged in definitional debates today, as evidenced by their support or 
allegiance to various philosophical schools or camps. Based upon the argument 
laid out over the past five chapters, however, it suffices to say that philosophy 
involves more than “mere thinking.”  
 Dewey ardently spoke out against the tendency of philosophers to 
interpret everything in light of thinking and propositional knowledge by 
designating it “the philosophical fallacy.” One commits this fallacy when 
assuming distinctions made after (secondary) reflection on an event of (primary) 
experience are fully present in the original experience or, as Dewey puts it, when 
one converts “eventual functions into antecedent existence.”2 What makes this a 
philosophical error lies precisely in the fact that abstractions are always made 
retrospectively. It also overlooks the human contribution to perception and 
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knowledge, which inextricably involve imagination, feeling, and emotion, in 
addition to reason. For Dewey, philosophy, like all human activity, is an 
intrinsically practical, lived-through affair. This means that philosophy’s content 
should not be limited to the cognitive domain; it should include data from the 
affective and somatic domains as well. Philosophy ideally contains both rhetorical 
and athletic components.  
 Following philosophy’s etymology, philosophy of religion thus means 
something like “love of wisdom of religion.” The cumbrousness of the resulting 
phrase notwithstanding, the reasons why wisdom concerning religion is needed 
(and should be loved!) are clear enough. Religion surrounds us. Contrary to the 
predictions of secularization theorists that religious belief and observance would 
decline, if not altogether disappear, with the spread of modern forms of industrial 
production and political governance, religion remains a salient and critical 
dimension of people’s lives worldwide. This is true even in the West, where 
secularism serves as the central organizing principle of public life. Religion 
confounds us. The faithful religious willingly sacrifice and suffer for the right to 
practice their beliefs and customs. This seems to hold across racial, cultural, as 
even class lines, calling into question Marx’s narrow understanding of religion, 
avidly taken up by the New Atheists, as “the opium of the people.” Religion 
astounds us. The struggle after the religious life in a pluralistic and scientific age 
frequently erupts in violence against its opponents, both real and imagined. It 
just as frequently bursts forth with peacekeeping behavior and acts of kindness.  
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 Coming to terms with religion’s Jekyll and Hyde—and, hopefully, 
encouraging its Jekyll and helping it win in the long run—requires more than 
descriptive, analytical, “thinking” knowledge of the world’s religious beliefs and 
practices. That task, while important, is properly left to the history of religions or 
comparative religious studies, though its broad scope is perhaps better captured 
by the full meaning of the German cognate discipline Religionswissenschaft. 
Wisdom of things religious requires deeper-than-conceptual understanding of 
the meaning, truth, and value proper to religion. This task falls more suitably to 
philosophy of religion, although it foretells a radical change in the problems and 
concerns that traditionally have occupied the discipline.  
 Philosophy of religion, like philosophy more generally, has been 
“kidnapped,” to use Will Durant’s colorful phrasing from his masterful The Story 
of Philosophy, by epistemology.3 Perusal of almost any introductory text on 
philosophy of religion reveals extensive treatment, typically from a Western 
Judeo-Christian perspective, of such epistemological concerns as the concept of 
God, the justification of religious belief, the nature of religious language, and the 
problem of evil. While interesting from an intellectual point of view, such 
concerns would fit better in a book on philosophical theology or, for some 
positivists, one on mythology,4 than one on philosophy of religion. Philosophy of 
                                                        
3 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Great Philosophers (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2009). See the prefatory section, “To The Reader” (unpaginated).  
4 I have specifically in mind Daniel Dennett’s comment: “At least in the eyes of academics, science 
has won and religion has lost. Darwin’s idea has banished the Book of Genesis to the limbo of 
quaint mythology.” Daniel Dennett, “Intuition Pumps,” in Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific 
Revolution, ed. John Brockman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 187. Dennett’s remarks are 
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religion, if it is to remain relevant in an age of multidisciplinarity and 
multiculturalism, must widen its myopic gaze on the accumulation and 
systematization of religious knowledge narrowly conceived—that is, as consisting 
mainly of intellectual, propositional ways of knowing—to include the synthetic 
interpretation, evaluation, and even cultivation of the essentially religious 
dimensions of nature and human experience conceived more broadly, which is to 
say experience and knowledge considered noncognitively.  
 Philosophy of religion holds significance for all philosophers, even those 
who openly disdain it. This is because virtually all areas of philosophy hold 
implications for religion. In fact, most philosophers throughout history, even 
professed non-believers, have found it necessary to address religious themes and 
topics in some fashion. Likewise, religious traditions regularly employ 
philosophical techniques and methods when justifying the coherence of their 
beliefs and practices.  
 Philosophy of religion also has much to offer the fields of theology and 
religious studies. Theology, at least as it has been practiced in the West, has 
always drawn on philosophical ideas and schools, most notably Platonism and 
Aristotelianism, and later Cartesianism and Kantianism. All of these have exerted 
a considerable influence on the development of Christian theological doctrine. 
Contemporary theologians follow this trend by drawing heavily on the work of 
philosophers, especially those in the Continental tradition, such as Hegel and 
                                                        
meaningful only as a criticism of inerrantist hermeneutics, however; he seems completely 
unaware of allegorical, tropical, and other non-literal interpretations of biblical texts, or of the 
large and sophisticated body of scholarship of “academics” working in that field for that matter.    
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Martin Heidegger, and more recently, Paul Ricouer and Jacques Derrida. 
Religious studies scholars also routinely make assumptions about the status of 
religious phenomena and what the best way is to go about investigating them. 
These choices are essentially philosophical in nature and are consequently open 
to appraisal and challenge by philosophers from various fields.   
 
 
Why Ecology? 
 
 
 Philosophy of religion is in the midst of a paradigmatic crisis, as several 
recent works in the field have persuasively argued.5 The postmodern and feminist 
critiques of authority and reason have made stale the analytic philosopher of 
religion’s bread and butter. By this I mean the preference of analytic philosophers 
of religion for linguistic-logical “analysis,” for rationally justifying particular 
religious beliefs and principles. Think of Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological 
argument for proving the existence of God. This is a masterful work of 
philosophical insight, but one ultimately bound by internal and historical 
limitations. In similar fashion, the rise of naturalist and relational modes of 
thinking has greatly weakened the preferred strategy of Continental philosophers 
of religion of substituting personal narrative for rational argument so as to 
insulate religious faith from critical scrutiny. Such was the tactic of Søren 
Kierkegaard’s existential “leap of faith.” While compelling on a personal level, the 
leap of faith concept forecloses the possibility of constructive dialogue with 
                                                        
5 See Chapter 2 for a review of the arguments made on this point by Nick Trakakis, Wesley 
Wildman, and Kevin Schilbrack.   
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science as well as with other faith traditions. In the end, the strategies of Aquinas, 
Kierkegaard, and those following their lead wind up being patently anti-
philosophical (at least in terms of how philosophy has been defined in this study).  
 The increasing appeal of postmodern and feminist views, along with 
naturalist and relational frameworks in philosophy and theology, parallels a 
growing awareness of and concern for the ecological in contemporary theory 
more generally. In a nutshell, ecological thinking eschews the barren abstractions 
and reductive dualisms of modern Western thought introduced by Descartes and 
cemented in their status by Immanuel Kant who, in the eyes of feminist 
philosopher Lorraine Code, moved human reason to “the center of the 
philosophical-conceptual universe” t0 rule above all else.6 The ecological turn 
now rapidly transforming theory and practice in both the sciences and the 
humanities is, at its base, an exercise in philosophical anthropology, one marked 
by a rejection of the rational, ahistorical, autonomous ego-self foundational to 
modern thought, and adoption of a wider view of the self that embraces 
affectivity, relational interdependence, and sociohistorical location.   
 Within philosophy of religion, both analytic and Continental approaches 
traditionally operate on the basis of an egoic conception of the self that sharply 
separates subject from object, experience from nature, self from world.  The same 
dualistic view of human nature underlies many of the world’s spiritual and 
religious traditions. The Western monotheisms, for instance, stress the absolute 
                                                        
6 Code, Ecological Thinking, 3.  
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transcendence of God over immanent nature, in addition to the soul’s (or mind’s) 
supremacy over the body. These should not be viewed as naive religious beliefs or 
innocent theoretical claims, free of external costs and consequences. It can 
reasonably be argued that their adoption and perpetuation has led to a 
significantly reduced concern for the environment among generations of their 
adherents, religious and irreligious alike.  While the individualistic, egoic view of 
the self has led to the remarkable technological accomplishments of modern 
human beings, the failure to view the larger world of nature as constitutive of the 
very self has unquestionably contributed to the global ecological crisis now 
threatening humanity’s, as well as countless other species’, survival. The negative 
externalities endemic to egoic thinking can be seen readily in the widespread 
processes of deforestation, soil erosion, toxic chemicals, land, air, and water 
pollution, and accelerated population growth. It is clear that a remedial, radically 
ecological way of thinking and being in the world is needed if we are to stave off 
the immanent doom portended by these developments and secure our long-term 
future and stability.   
 Taking its cue from 20th century developments in the natural and social 
sciences, the ecological conception of the self challenges the debilitating dualistic 
divisions inherent to egoic thinking and shows that what is commonly referred to 
statically and in isolation as subject, experience, or self is really a dynamic open 
system of beliefs and practices emerging from the ongoing, tightly coupled 
transaction of a biological organism with a complex environment shaped largely 
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by social and cultural factors. Our personality, which most of us like to think is 
stable and fixed, is really a bundle of habits and dispositions constantly forming 
and reforming from one moment to the next. This view holds revolutionary 
consequences for any academic discipline or research field that includes theories 
of nature and the self—which, quite frankly, is all of them.       
 The specific and by no means insignificant challenge posed to 
philosophers of religion by ecological thinking, is that of reframing their 
discipline’s core problems from the perspective of a radically different, but 
considerably more accurate, philosophical anthropology. Yet how do 
philosophers of religion seeking to remain intellectually progressive and relevant 
within the emerging ecological paradigm go about handling concerns of religious 
meaning and value, religious inwardness, and religious ultimacy? One way for 
philosophers of religion to proceed is by looking outside of the analytic and 
Continental philosophical traditions to the pragmatist tradition for inspiration, 
which to date has been hugely overlooked within philosophy of religion. This is 
not to say that the analytic and Continental traditions are without their merits. 
After all, the esteem of analytic philosophers for rational explanation stems from 
an appreciable philosophical concern for capturing the objective facts of the 
matter. And the preference of Continental philosophers for literary description 
stems from a similarly appreciable concern for preserving the richness and 
complexity of subjective experience.  
 Despite their many virtues, both analytic and Continental philosophy of 
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religion, insofar as they rely upon an impoverished philosophical anthropology, 
are demonstrably ill-equipped to meet the challenges posed to philosophy of 
religion by the ecological turn. And, while other areas of philosophy have begun 
to adopt radically ecological methodological frameworks—including, for instance, 
the embodied and extended mind theses, the concepts of situated, dynamic, and 
distributed cognition and agency, and the broadly set research program of 
enactivism—philosophy of religion so far seems markedly reluctant to do so. 
John Cottingham laments this unfortunate trend from a different angle and in 
different language in his recent call for a “more humane approach” to philosophy 
of religion. In a particularly insightful passage he states:  
 The habits of thought that philosophers develop inevitably predispose them to focus on 
 the analysis and evaluation of propositions, the truth or falsity of beliefs, and the degree 
 to which those beliefs are supported by argument and evidence. All this is perfectly valid, 
 and valuable; but a proper philosophical understanding of religion requires us to take 
 account of much more. To be religious is not just to espouse certain doctrines; it is to 
 follow a certain way of life and to take up certain commitments. It is in part a project of 
 formation, of forming or reforming the self, a process of askēsis (training) or mathēsis 
 (learning), to use two ancient Greek terms. The latter term when translated into Latin 
 becomes disciplina (discipline), a word whose connotations are perhaps more 
 informative for the modern reader. It suggests not just the theoretical acquisition of 
 knowledge, but a structured programme supported by rules and practices.7 
 
The dissertation was positioned at the crossroads of this challenge. It marshaled 
the resources of John Dewey’s ecological naturalism to develop a philosophy of 
religion capable of addressing the field’s central concerns—where theory and 
practice intertwine—in light of the many challenges posed by ecological thinking. 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 John Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Humane Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 148.  
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Why John Dewey? 
 
 
 John Dewey is counted among the most influential thinkers in the history 
of the United States. According to historian Henry Steele Commager, Dewey was 
“the guide, the mentor, and the conscience of the American people: it is scarcely 
an exaggeration to say that for a generation no major idea was clarified until 
Dewey had spoken.”8 Dewey no longer occupies such a lofty status within the 
public consciousness, partly because his thought has never been sufficiently 
understood. This is especially true of his religious thought. Despite the creativity 
and originality of Dewey’s religious proposals, and regardless of their 
considerable influence on such figures as Richard Rorty, Wayne Proudfoot, and 
Jeffrey Stout, Dewey’s views on religion have been largely marginalized and 
misinterpreted within philosophy and Dewey studies.9 Further, within 
philosophy of religion Dewey has been all but ignored. This is also the case within 
philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, even though popular recent 
developments in these fields (DEEDS, enactivism) are built upon core Deweyan 
insights (e.g., the primacy of events, the unity of organism-environment, 
knowledge and perception as action-based, etc.), including those relevant to 
understanding his religious naturalism.   
 The neglect of Dewey as a religious thinker can be traced to three main 
                                                        
8 Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950), 
100. 
9 See, for instance, Richard Rorty, An Ethics for Today: Finding Common Ground Between 
Philosophy and Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Wayne Proudfoot, 
Religious Experience (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); and Jeffrey Stout, 
Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
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factors. First, Dewey’s musings on religion are scattered throughout his vast 
corpus, rendering complex the task of discerning his religious thought on the 
whole. Second, the dominant interpretation of Dewey’s religious thought views it 
essentially as scientific, secular humanist critique of the Judeo-Christian religious 
tradition with little to no substantive content of its own. Third, persistent 
misconceptions of pragmatism as superficially concerned with practical utility, 
with “what works,” have placed into question—before the fact, it should be 
added—its ability to address serious philosophical concerns like those associated 
with religion.  
 Recent intellectual developments have greatly attenuated the above-
mentioned factors. Newly edited and digitized editions of Dewey’s collected 
works have made possible more probing investigations of his religious views. 
Likewise, a growing number of scholars have begun arguing for richer 
interpretations of Dewey’s religious thought that move beyond his commitments 
to science and secularity.10 Finally, subtle and sophisticated analyses of Dewey’s 
pragmatism appearing of late11 have cleared the way for its sober reappraisal by 
philosophers of religion, who in the meantime have already embraced the 
religious views of fellow pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce and William James.12  
                                                        
10 Representative examples include Aisemberg, “Dewey’s Naturalistic Mysticism”; Rosenthal, 
“The Illuminating Alliance of Dewey and Buddhism”; and Vaught, “Dewey’s Conception of the 
Religious Dimension of Experience.” 
11 Including, especially, Burke, Dewey’s Logical Theory; Hickman, Pragmatism as Post-
Postmodernism; Popp, Dewey and the Continuity of Nature; and Shook, Dewey’s Empirical 
Theory of Knowledge and Reality. 
12 See, for example, Leon J. Niemoczynski, Charles Sanders Peirce and a Religious Metaphysics 
of Nature (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011); Michael L. Raposa, Peirce’s Philosophy of 
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 The reach of Dewey’s philosophical vision is extensive. In truth, it is 
almost unthinkable in today’s age of disciplinary specialization, which has 
affected (infected?) even philosophy, once considered the repository and 
synthesizer of all human knowledge.13 Dewey was a philosopher in the fullest 
sense of the term. He concerned himself with and made significant contributions 
to fundamental problems of knowledge, reality, values, mind, reason, and 
language. Today, philosophers of Dewey’s scope come in short supply, though 
there exists an abundance of epistemologists, metaphysicians, value theorists, 
philosophers of mind, logicians, and philosophers of language. In no way do I 
mean to imply that such abundance is a bad thing, though it may seem so to 
those applying to academic posts in philosophy, anxious about which labels to 
adopt and thus about which jobs they might disqualify themselves from. I do feel, 
however, the blessings of this abundance are mixed. Disciplinary specialization, 
an outgrowth of the “scientification” of knowledge that began in the nineteenth 
century, has led to innumerable advances in our understanding of the universe 
and its intricate inner workings. At the same time, however, our place in the 
universe has grown less secure. It reasonably can be argued that disciplinary 
                                                        
Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989); Ellen Kappy Suckiel, Heaven’s 
Champion: William James’ Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1996); and John W. Woell, Peirce, James, and a Pragmatic Philosophy of Religion (New 
York: Continuum, 2012). 
13 Dewey provides an incisive critique of the tendency toward scientification—while at the same 
time recognizing its necessity—in a 1933 address at the University Club in Boston, MA titled “The 
Supreme Intellectual Obligation”: “[T]he field of knowledge cannot be attacked en masse. It must 
be broken up into problems, and as a rule, detailed aspects and phases of these problems must be 
discriminated into still lesser elements. A certain degree of specialization is a necessity of 
scientific advance. With every increase of specialization, remoteness from common and public 
affairs also increases.” LW 9: 96. 
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specialization has led to the alienation or fragmentation of the very subjects it 
was intended to benefit.  
 As disciplinary professionalization and specialization have proliferated, so 
too have specialist techniques and vocabularies; it has become increasingly 
difficult for academics to communicate their ideas and discoveries across 
disciplinary borders, and even more so to the public at large. Likewise, the 
quantification of knowledge that dominates academic research, both in the 
sciences and to an increasing extent the humanities, which are eagerly 
incorporating computational and algorithmic modes of analysis, leaves little 
room for consideration of qualitative factors of knowledge management and 
application. This is all to say that despite our impressive stockpiling of 
information, we still struggle significantly in our efforts to apply this information 
for the betterment of humanity on the whole. Absent a profound sea change in 
our cultural posturing toward knowledge, this trend portends consequences of 
disastrous scale as gaps between theory and practice, between facts and values, 
between knowledge and wisdom continue to widen in the academy and beyond.  
 Pragmatism, the philosophical school of which Dewey is perhaps the 
foremost representative, is founded upon a sea change in the way knowledge is 
viewed. According to pragmatism, and especially Dewey, knowledge is more or 
less instrumental: ideas and theories are tools available to assist us in resolving 
existential uncertainties, or, as Dewey preferred to call them, “problematic 
situations” that disrupt our wholesome functioning. Failure to grasp the simple 
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truth of this fact accounts for a large number of the world’s hard-fought battles, 
conceptual and empirical. Accepting and learning to live in its light is, for the 
pragmatist, essential for our present comfort and future survival. As crisply 
stated by Durant, “The problem of philosophy” under Dewey “is not how we can 
come to know an external world, but how we can learn to control it and remake it, 
and for what goals. Philosophy is not the analysis of sensation and 
knowledge...but the synthesis and coordination of knowledge and desire.”14   
 This is precisely where modern philosophy, and by extension, philosophy 
of religion, errs in Dewey’s eyes. Modern philosophy was—and, in many cases, 
contemporary philosophy still is—beholden to a Cartesian egoic perspective that 
sharply divides the knower from the known world. According to Descartes, secure 
knowledge is either self-evident or arrived at by deductive methods. This 
included religious knowledge, the authority of which resided with scripture and 
the Church; nature and human experience were each untrustworthy in their own 
way. While such an understanding of religious knowledge might work for a 
community of like-minded believers committed to a rigidly dualistic and 
supernaturalistic picture of the world, in an age of religious pluralism and 
scientific naturalism its defects are quickly apparent. Religious divisiveness, 
intolerance, and ignorance are its inevitable and logical results.   
 Dewey relentlessly challenged philosophical egoism, gesturing toward the 
fallible, experimental nature of the knowing process and the human self 
                                                        
14 Durant, The Story of Philosophy, 392. Durant’s few pages on Dewey at the end of this work are 
some of the most eloquent and insightful I have read.  
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throughout his writings. On Dewey’s naturalistic, ecologically grounded view of 
inquiry, all knowledge—including what might be called religious knowledge, 
originates within the context of concrete existential situations for the 
instrumental purposes of meeting particular needs or achieving specific goals. 
For Dewey, the focus on everyday human activities and experiences challenges 
the understanding of religion as an inborn attitude prefixed to a static and 
infallible body of extra-experiential knowledge and beliefs. Rather, lived 
experience reveals religion as essentially dynamic in nature, as a vital relation 
obtaining between selves (organisms) and nature (environment)—one with a 
melioristic and unifying function that mankind’s future crucially depends upon 
cultivating. I believe what Roger Ward says of Charles Sanders Peirce applies 
equally well to Dewey here: “Although there is no…identification of Peirce with a 
community of religious practice, his philosophical researches are…full of 
nutrition for religious speculation.”15   
 Dewey is rightly considered one of the first ecological thinkers. And yet, 
within contemporary philosophy and Dewey studies—which focus too narrowly 
on Dewey’s commitments to scientific method and secular humanism—he is 
typically read through an egoic lens. It is the dominance of this scientific-secular 
interpretation of Dewey that has led most scholars to miss the depth and 
originality of Dewey’s religious naturalism, and with it his potential contributions 
to philosophy of religion and the academic study of religion more broadly. 
                                                        
15 Roger Ward, Conversion in American Philosophy: Exploring the Practice of Transformation 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 29.   
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Thomas Colwell argued essentially the same point regarding Dewey back in 1971 
when he called for an “ecological basis of human community” to ground 
educational theory in an article with the same title.16 In a follow-up piece, Colwell 
made a strong case for viewing Dewey as a “pioneer in ecological thought,” a case 
supported by Dewey’s focus on the study of organisms in their environments, 
while at the same time lamenting the fact that most interpreters miss the 
ecological dimensions of Dewey’s naturalism by their exclusive focus on his social 
and political thought.17       
 For all of its popular misconceptions, Dewey’s ecological approach to 
philosophy can be viewed as an attempt to meet both the analytic philosopher’s 
demand for empirical responsibility and the Continental philosopher’s for 
phenomenological fidelity. In place of choosing between these two often-
competing demands, Dewey offers philosophers of religion a middle path that 
begins with the ecological recognition that self and world are inextricably 
intertwined and co-constituted. Thus, wherever the religious can be said to be 
found, it is at the emergent nexus of their dynamic interrelationship, and not 
within the structure of logical proof or theater of private consciousness.  
 The tension between the demands for empirical responsibility and 
experiential fidelity in philosophy of religion parallels a comparable tension in 
the larger academic study of religion: that between realist and constructivist (or 
                                                        
16 Thomas B. Colwell Jr., “The Ecological Basis of Human Community,” Educational Theory 21, 
no. 4 (1971): 418-433.     
17 Thomas B. Colwell Jr., “The Ecological Perspective in John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education,” 
Educational Theory 35, no. 3 (1985): 265.   
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idealist) theories of religion. There exists heated and ongoing debate within 
various subfields of religious studies (especially in anthropology of religion, 
psychology of religion, and cognitive science of religion) over whether the objects 
and events that religious experience putatively point to exist “out there,” in the 
world (realism), or whether they reflect merely the creative imagination of the 
human mind or brain (constructivism or idealism). Dewey’s ecological approach, 
by occupying the theoretical space between these epistemological extremes, 
furnishes attractive resources to scholars of religion seeking fresh ways of 
addressing the realism-constructivism debate in religion—one that, given the 
ecological turn in contemporary theory, holds high promise and can potentially 
lay the foundation for a new interdisciplinary research agenda in religious 
studies.  
 This is the real thrust of Dewey’s ecological naturalism for philosophy in 
general and philosophy of religion in particular. In broadening philosophy’s 
narrow focus on the accumulation and systematization of content knowledge, 
Dewey opened up new possibilities for philosophy of religion—possibilities that 
have yet to be explored in any real depth. To connect this point to comments 
made earlier, Dewey basically made religious “why-questions” respectable and 
important again. Freed from its bondage to egoic problems and methods, 
philosophy of religion after Dewey is one ideally fully able to turn to the urgent 
tasks of interpreting and evaluating the genuinely religious dimensions of nature 
and human experience with an eye toward their cultivation for the purposes of 
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improving human as well as ecosystem well-being. Yet the question remains fifty 
years after Dewey’s death as to whether philosophy of religion is willing to 
embrace such a radical transformation of its scope and methods. It was my 
intention in this dissertation to highlight, in Deweyan spirit, both the innate 
appeal and absolute necessity of such an embrace. I leave it to the reader to 
decide if I have succeeded.   
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